The Rudolf Steiner Archive

15. Goethe and Scientific Illusionism

[ 1 ] This account was not written for the reason that an edition of Goethe (in Kürschner's German National Literature) must also include the Theory of Colors, with an accompanying introduction. It stems from a deep spiritual need of the editor of this edition. He started out from the study of mathematics and physics and was led by the many contradictions that pervade the system of our modern view of nature to a critical examination of its methodological basis. His initial studies pointed him towards the principle of strict empirical knowledge, and his insight into those contradictions pointed him towards a strictly scientific theory of knowledge. His positive starting point protected him from turning to purely Hegelian conceptual constructions. With the help of his epistemological studies, he finally found the reason for many of the errors of modern natural science in the completely false position that the latter has assigned to simple sensory perception. Our science places all sensory qualities (sound, color, warmth, etc.) in the subject and is of the opinion that "outside" the subject these qualities correspond to nothing but processes of motion of matter. These processes of movement, which are supposed to be the only thing that exists in the "realm of nature", can of course no longer be perceived. They are closed on the basis of subjective qualities.

[ 2 ] Now, however, this development cannot appear to consistent thinking as anything other than a half-measure. Motion is initially only a concept that we have borrowed from the world of the senses, i.e. that we only encounter in things with those sensory qualities. We know of no movement other than that of sensory objects. If we now transfer this predicate to non-sensuous beings, as the elements of discontinuous matter (atoms) are supposed to be, we must be clearly aware that through this transfer an attribute perceived by the senses is given a form of existence that is essentially different from that conceived by the senses. One falls into the same contradiction if one wants to arrive at a real content for the initially completely empty concept of the atom. Sensual qualities, however sublimated, must be attached to it. Some attribute to the atom impenetrability, the effect of force, others expansion and the like, in short, each attribute some properties borrowed from the sensory world. If one does not do this, one remains completely in the void.

[ 3 ] Therein lies the half-measure. One draws a line through the middle of the sensually perceptible and declares one part to be objective and the other subjective. Only one thing is consistent: if there are atoms, then these are simply parts of matter with the properties of matter and are only imperceptible because of their smallness, which is inaccessible to our senses.

[ 4 ] This, however, eliminates the possibility of seeking something in the movement of atoms that could be contrasted with the subjective qualities of sound, color, etc. as an objective. And the possibility of looking for more in the connection between the movement and the sensation of "red", for example, than between two processes that belong entirely to the world of the senses, also disappears.

[ 5 ] It was therefore clear to the editor: ether movement, atomic storage, etc. belong on the same page as the sensory perceptions themselves. To declare the latter to be subjective is merely the result of unclear reflection. If one declares the sensory quality to be subjective, one must do the same with the ether movement. We do not perceive the latter for any reason of principle, but only because our sense organs are not organized finely enough. But this is a purely accidental circumstance. It could be that one day, with increasing refinement of the sense organs, mankind would also be able to perceive ether movements directly. If a person of that distant future then accepted our subjective theory of sensory perceptions, he would have to declare these ether movements to be subjective in the same way that we today declare color, sound, etc.

[ 6 ] As you can see, this physical theory leads to a contradiction that cannot be resolved.

[ 7 ] This subjective view now has a second support in physiological considerations.

[ 8 ] Physiology proves that sensation occurs only as the final result of a mechanical process that first communicates itself from the part of the bodily world lying outside our bodily substance to the end organs of our nervous system in the sense organs, is transmitted from here to the uppermost center, and is only then triggered as sensation. The contradictions of this physiological theory can be found in the chapter "The ˂Original Phenomenon˃" [see p. 266ff. of this publication]. Only the form of movement of the brain substance can be described as subjective. However far one may go in the investigation of the processes in the subject, one must always remain in the mechanical realm. And sensation will not be discovered anywhere in the center.

[ 9 ] There therefore remains only the philosophical consideration in order to gain insight into the subjectivity and objectivity of sensation. And this provides the following:

[ 10 ] What can be described as "subjective" about perception? Without having a precise analysis of the term "subjective", one cannot move forward at all. Subjectivity cannot, of course, be determined by anything other than itself. Anything that cannot be proven to be conditioned by the subject cannot be called "subjective". Now we must ask ourselves: What can we designate as own to the human subject? That which it can experience in itself through external or internal perception. Through external perception we grasp the physical constitution, through internal experience our own thinking, feeling and willing. What can be described as subjective in the first respect? The constitution of the whole organism, including the sensory organs and the brain, which will probably appear in slightly different modifications in every person. However, everything that can be proven in this way is only a certain configuration in the arrangement and function of the substances through which the sensation is conveyed. Subjective, therefore, is actually only the path that the sensation has to go through before it can be called my sensation. Our organization mediates the sensation and these mediation paths are subjective; the sensation itself, however, is not.

[ 11 ] This leaves us with the path of inner experience. What do I experience within myself when I describe a sensation as my own? I experience that I carry out the relation to my individuality in my thinking, that I extend my field of knowledge to this sensation; but I am not aware that I create the content of the sensation. I only establish the reference to myself, the quality of the sensation is a fact established in itself.

[ 12 ] Wherever we start, inside or outside, we do not get to the point where we could say: The subjective character of the sensation is given here. The term "subjective" is not applicable to the content of the sensation.

[ 13 ] It is these considerations that forced me to reject as impossible any theory of nature that in principle goes beyond the realm of the perceived world and to seek the sole object of natural science in the world of the senses. But then I had to seek in the interdependence of the facts of this very world of the senses that which we express with laws of nature.

[ 14 ] And thus I was forced to adopt the view of the scientific method that underlies Goethe's Theory of Colors. Whoever finds these considerations correct will read this color theory with quite different eyes than modern naturalists can do. He will see that it is not Goethe's hypothesis that is confronted here with Newton's, but that the question at issue is: Is today's theoretical physics to be accepted or not? If not, then the light that this physics sheds on the theory of color must also be lost. What our theoretical basis of physics is, the reader may learn from the following chapters, in order then to see Goethe's disputes in the right light from this basis.