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Karma of Untruthfulness I
GA 173c

13 January 1917, Dornach

Lecture XVIII

It seems to me today more then ever necessary that the members of our Movement should be knowledgeable about what is going on in the world. Indeed this purpose has been served to a greater or lesser degree by the discussions we have been having here. To speak of spiritual science in the way we understand it means to fill ourselves with knowledge of how our world, which we observe with our physical understanding and senses, is in fact a revelation of the spirit. As long as the spiritual world is taken in the abstract, as long as the human being is divided up into his constituent parts, as long as all kinds of theories about karma and reincarnation are expounded—something we have really never done here in such a theoretical way—spiritual science cannot become fruitful for life. That is why I have been directing your attention in all kinds of ways to external reality, whereby I never lost sight of all that stands behind this external reality, either by way of direct occult factors, or by way of impulses being used in one way or another by human beings.

Those who understand the true situation today to some extent will find it becoming increasingly obvious in future, when looking back at this time, that the old way of looking at history is no longer sufficient for an understanding of the present. Circumstances will make certain occult teachings necessary for the increasingly mature understanding of human beings, and those who shut out such possibilities will in future have to bear the mark of ignorance, of lack of understanding,

Since the nineteenth century it has been the custom to construct history purely materialistically, on the basis—as people put it—of the available documents. Today it is not yet realized that this does not lead to a true depiction of historical impulses, but merely to a description of materialistic spectres—paradoxical though this may sound: a description of materialistic spectres. Even in the best history books, the description of people and events of the past right up to the present shows nothing but spectres without any real life, however realistic it is meant to be. It can, indeed, only be a description of spectres because all reality is founded on spiritual impulses, and if these are omitted, what remains are spectres. Thus up to today, the recounting of history has been spectral, yet in a certain way it has satisfied human souls; it has worked in a certain way.

In many respects, today's great tragedy is the way in which karma is lived through in such untrue, spectral ideas which people have gradually amassed. But within our Movement, too, we must not allow the process of history to fall into two disconnected halves—though there are some among us who would like this: On the one hand to luxuriate in so-called super-sensible ideas, which remain, however, more or less abstract concepts, and on the other hand to become firmly stuck in habitual opinions, no different from the ordinary vulgar understanding of external reality viewed entirely materialistically. These two aspects, external physical reality and spiritual existence, must unite, that is, we must understand that in place of traditional historical methods something must be developed which I have called symptomatic history, a history of symptoms which will teach us that the historical process expresses itself in some phenomena more strongly than in others.

Recently I have perhaps described things rather too realistically, though only for those whose feeling makes them ask: Why is he telling us things we anyway hear elsewhere? Look more closely, however, and you will find that you do not, actually, hear them elsewhere in the way they are described here. You do not find them juxtaposed as they are here, as symptoms in which various characteristic details unite to form a living concept of reality. The obvious question now is: How do symptoms such as the ones I have quoted come about? Let me go a little further into this.

During the course of these lectures I have mentioned a whole series of facts, some of which people might well consider excessively minute, such as that of the descendant of the Voidarevich family, the voivodes of Herzegovina, or that matter of the Russian-Slav Welfare Committee and so on. Such things could, in one way, be viewed as utterly insignificant. In another way, though, you could say: What is the connection between such things? What is this way of looking at history that collects widely different and separate details and then endeavours to fit them together in a total picture? A more direct way of asking me this question could be: How has it come about that as you have gone through life you have collected and know all about just these particular events, which have to be seen as characteristic of our time? I should like to answer this question in a way which I hope will give you a living idea of how spiritual science can intervene in life.

During the course of life one comes to know about certain things if one's karma leads to them, and if one's karma is allowed to take its course honestly and truthfully. Many people believe they are giving their karma a free reign, or are surrendering themselves to their karma, but this can be a great illusion. No one can follow external events in such a way that the truth is revealed to him, if he fails to surrender himself genuinely to his karma, if he fails to leave much in the subconscious realm, if he fails to let much pass unnoticed before his soul, for every morsel of sympathy or antipathy clouds free vision. Nothing is more likely to cloud free vision than what is today called the historical method. This historical method brings spectres into being because today's historian is unable to surrender himself to his karma. Obviously if he did so from his earliest years, he would fail every exam. He is not allowed to surrender himself to his karma and thus learn to know those things to which his karma leads him; he has to learn to know what the exam regulations and so forth require of him. But they require all kinds of things which of course tear his karma to shreds, and he can never arrive at the actual truth if he follows the stream of those requirements.

The actual truth can only be reached if these things about which spiritual science speaks are taken as seriously as life—if they are not taken as mere theories but as seriously as life. Another way of not taking them as seriously as life is to allow one's view to be clouded by all kinds of sympathies and antipathies. You have to approach things objectively, and then the stream of the world will bring you what you need in order to reach an understanding.

Now one aspect of surrendering to one's karma with regard to present events may be found in the fact that you, my dear friends, have been brought into the Anthroposophical Society by your karma. So it really should be possible in the Anthroposophical Society to speak about the facts without being hampered by sympathies and antipathies. If not, it would mean that, even within this Society, karma was not being taken as seriously as life.

I wanted to give you this introduction to what we still have to discuss because I wish to show you certain important spiritual facts which cannot, however, he understood unless we can link them to life, and unless we can penetrate the really tangled undergrowth of untruths which today buzz about in the world. The world today is filled with untruthfulness, and the sense for truth must be cultivated in the Anthroposophical Society for as long as it exists—and regardless of how long it is likely to exist under present circumstances—if it is to have a real meaning, a real sense for life.

I have—you could say—burdened you with a great variety of things recently, not simply to throw light on them in one way or another, but because I am filled with the conviction that it is important to correct certain concepts. Those who believe that I say these things from any kind of nationalistic feeling, simply do not understand me.

Terrible accusations are being continuously hurled at the centre from what is today the periphery, all of which end, in some form or other, in the phrase: Never mind, the German will be burnt. Of course, people are ashamed to quote this directly. Among these insults is the fact that in the widest circles certain personalities, whose works are of course not known or understood, are pilloried as being the despoilers, the corrupters of the German people. One of those brought to the forefront in this way is the German historian Heinrich Treitschke.

Now, as I have said, I should like to view such a personality not from a national, but from a purely human standpoint. I told you that I never had much to do with Treitschke but that I did meet him once. I said that he was a somewhat blustering character. Today let me add that at that meeting I did form a picture of his being and his character, for we covered much more than just those first few words which I have already quoted to you. We spoke about historical interpretation, about publications on history which were causing rather a sensation then, in the nineties, and there was time—banquets usually last for several hours—to go into many questions of principle with regard to scientific history. I was well able to form a picture of this man at the end of his life—he died soon afterwards—quite apart from the fact that his work as a historian is very well known to me.

The main thing I want to say is that Treitschke is a personality who gives us cause to approach him to some extent from an occult standpoint. Socrates spoke, in a good sense, of a kind of daimon. In the case of Treitschke you could say that he was indwelt by a form of daimon; not an evil demon, a kind of daimon. You could sense that he was not merely driven by considerations of the materialistic intellect but that his driving force came from within, from what Socrates called the daimonic forces. I could even say that this is what led him throughout the course of his life. This man from Saxony was an enthusiastic champion of the nascent German state; for he worked in a most significant way even before this state was founded. His German History, though, was written after its founding. In a manner characteristic of Central Europe, there lived in him something that is not known in the periphery, not only not wanted but also not known, something which people do not wish to understand. This was a sense for reality, for what is concrete. There lived in him a certain aversion to abstract theories and to everything expressed in empty phrases. This aversion was present with daimonic force to such an extent that you could look, you might say, through the personality to the spiritual forces speaking out of it.

In addition to this, Treitschke went profoundly deaf very early in life, so that he heard neither his own voice nor that of others, but associated only with his own inner being. Such a destiny turns a person in upon himself. The complete absence of a sense of hearing, far more than the absence of one of the other senses, brings a person who is so inclined into contact with occult powers which are at work and which usually remain unnoticed because people are distracted by their sense-perceptions from what speaks to them over and above their senses. So there is definitely a significance in a karma which makes a person totally deaf early on in life, and it is connected in this case with what I have called a daimonic nature.

This nature, this human being, in contrast to many—indeed most—people today, was formed and shaped as a whole. His intellect never worked in isolation; his whole soul was always involved. There are plenty of plain truths in the world, truths which can easily be confirmed by ‘logical proof’. But special note should be taken, whether one agrees with them or not, of truths with which human blood accords, truths filled with warm human feeling. For the human being is the channel linking the physical world with the spiritual world, and we approach the spiritual world not only by studying the theories of spiritual science, but also by acquiring a sense of how each individual represents a channel between the physical world and the spiritual world.

Above all else, Heinrich Treitschke was a personality who strove to form his knowledge and his thoughts on the basis of a broad understanding, an understanding always founded on judgements of the soul and not of the intellect. His judgements were always warm because they were formed by the critical faculty of his soul. They may have had a blustery quality, but they were always warm through having been formed by his critical faculty of soul. From this angle Treitschke always placed at the centre of his considerations the question of human freedom, which—since he was a historian and prepared himself early on to become the historian of his people—for him was always linked with the question of political freedom, freedom from the state.

There is among German literature a work which deeply penetrates the question of the relationship between the overall power of the state and the freedom of the individual, not only the freedom living in the individual soul, but freedom as it can be realized in social life. I know of no other work in world literature which penetrates so deeply into this question. It is entitled The Sphere and Duties of Government and is by Wilhelm von Humboldt, the friend of Schiller and brother of the writer Alexander von Humboldt. This work, written at the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, defends most beautifully the human personality in its full, free unfolding, against every aspect of state omnipotence. It is said that the state may only intervene in the realm of the human individual to the extent that such intervention leads to the removal of obstacles standing in the way of the personality's free unfolding.

This work stems from the same source as Schiller's wonderful Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. I could say that Wilhelm von Humboldt's work on the limitations of the state is the brother of Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. It stems from an age when people were endeavouring to assemble every thought from cultural life capable of placing the human being firmly on the soil of freedom. For various reasons it was not much used during the nineteenth century, yet it was often enough consulted by those who, during the course of the nineteenth century, were endeavouring to reach an understanding of the more external aspects of the concept of freedom. Of course the nineteenth century was in one way the time when in many respects the concept of freedom was laid in its grave. But people were still keen to come to an understanding of the concept of freedom, and in this connection Wilhelm von Humboldt's work The Sphere and Duties of Government gained a degree of international importance in Europe.

Both the Frenchman Laboulaye and the Englishman John Stuart Mill took it as their point of departure. This work was an important point of departure for both these thinkers. Both, in their turn, and each in his own field, endeavoured to come to grips with the concept of freedom. Laboulaye considered that the institutions of his country, in so far as they concerned the relationship between state and individual, were suited only to the smothering of any true freedom, any free unfolding of the personality, by the state. John Stuart Mill, once he had discovered Wilhelm von Humboldt's work, took his departure from it and argued forcefully, in his own work on freedom, that English society could only undermine a true experience of freedom. With Laboulaye it is the state, with John Stuart Mill society. John Stuart Mill's work poses the question: How can an unfolding of the personality be achieved in the atmosphere of unfreedom generated by society?

Then Treitschke, with the critical faculty of soul I mentioned just now, and linking his work to that of Laboulaye and Mill, himself wrote about freedom at the beginning of the eighteen-sixties. Treitschke's paper on freedom is of particular and special interest because as a historian and as a politician he is immersed in that schism which invades the human soul when, on the one hand it recognizes the necessity of a social structure called the state and, on the other, is filled with enthusiasm for what we call human freedom. In this way, in the sixties of the nineteenth century, Treitschke set himself to discuss the concept of freedom on the basis of Laboulaye and John Stuart Mill.

In this paper Freedom he endeavoured to work out a concept of the state which, on the one hand, does not deny the necessity of a state structure, yet, on the other hand, does make of the state something that is not the gravedigger of freedom; but its cultivator and guardian. A state structure that could achieve this was what he had in mind: This was the time, remember, when a German, asked to name his fatherland, might easily have replied: Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, or Reuss-Schleiz, or something similar. At the beginning of the sixties what we now call the German Reich did not yet exist. At a time when a great many people were thinking about bringing together in some way all the individual groups in which Germans lived, Treitschke, too, was thinking about the necessity of a state structure. But for him it was axiomatic that no state should be allowed to come about which did not guarantee, to the human personality, conditions in which it could unfold as freely as possible. Even if it cannot be maintained that Treitschke achieved any rounded-off philosophical concepts, nevertheless his paper on freedom does contain many points worth considering very deeply.

In appreciating Treitschke and taking into account those aspects which are important for an occult understanding of him, we must not forget that he was a fearless person willing to serve no god other than truth. Many things that are said today without any objectivity about Treitschke are the height of stupidity. Such judgements buzzing about in the world today cannot be given even the flimsiest of foundations, for the simple reason that something is missing. I mentioned it the other day when I said that if people were willing to investigate what spiritual science has to say about the differences between the folk spirits, then fewer stupid statements would be made. I said this apropos of various stupid remarks made both by and about Romain Rolland. I had to say it because a really penetrating view of what is called a folk spirit can only be undertaken through spiritual science. Those who do not want to become involved in this can only reach subjective and therefore stupid judgements such as those of Romain Rolland.

Those who are willing to take into account what arises out of a spiritual scientific view of the folk spirits must be clear above all about one thing: that a person who is typical of his people will bear certain traits characteristic of that people. What made Treitschke typical was his daimonic nature. And it is true to say that to understand Treitschke is to understand much—not all, but much—of what was characteristic of the German people in the second half of the nineteenth century. Those for whom it is possible to gain a point of view from spiritual knowledge must investigate—not through cosmopolitan, but through national individuals—the fundamental difference that exists between western European and Central European judgements.

This cannot be taken into account for matters which are general and human, but they are relevant in so far as the daimon of a people lives in the folk spirit. With this reservation I shall say what I now have to bring forward. When the characteristics of a people are seen working through individuals it is possible to say what a certain American said. It is better if I tell you what this American said, because if I use my own words they might be taken amiss. He said: A French judgement, if it comes out of the nature of the people—not an individual, whose judgement might indeed be cosmopolitan—a judgement that comes out of the very substance of the French people lives in the word; an English judgement lives in practical political concepts; and a German judgement lives in an a-national, a non-national, search for knowledge.

This was said by an American travelling in Europe. It means that certain judgements formed in the West turn into something different when they are taken into the substance of the German people. In the West they are abstract in character. But a German belonging to the German people tends to translate judgements into their concrete components. He thus calls many things by their true name which are never touched upon by their true name in the West. Let us take a concept we have been discussing: the concept of the state.

In his lectures on politics, which were later published, Treitschke spoke about the state. Of course very many people speak about the state; but let us for the moment consider only what it means when someone speaks about the state by drawing on the very substance of the people to whom he belongs. In the West people tend to speak about it by using the state as a hook from which to suspend all sorts of concepts which, for one reason or another, they want to link with the concept of the state. Thus they attach to it such concepts as freedom, justice and many others, and they might even come up with the peculiar statement: The state must be divested of any concepts to do with power; the state must be a Rechtsstaat, a state subject to the law. You can say this only so long as you are not obliged to look squarely at the concept of the state.

But if you approach the concept of the state in the way Treitschke did, you discover the mystery of the state. Instead of demanding that the state must be based on the principle that power is above the law—an assertion slanderously attributed to Treitschke—you come to realize that the concept of the state is unthinkable without the concept of power. Power is simply a truth in this situation because it is impossible to found a state except by basing it on power. If you refuse to admit this, you are quite simply not representing the truth. So Treitschke could not avoid speaking about the state in connection with power. This is then distorted by those who claim Treitschke to mean that in the German concept of the state, power is above the law. Yet there is no question that Treitschke ever thought like this. His soul was far too strongly imbued with the meaning of what Humboldt said in his Sphere and Duties of Government. Just because the state cannot avoid unfolding a certain power, it must not be allowed to become omnipotent. A Rechtsstaat, a state subject to the law, is a contradiction in terms, like saying—perhaps not iron made of wood, but certainly iron made of copper. The two concepts are disparate, to use a term from the sphere of logic; they have nothing to do with one another. But this conclusion can only be reached by one who takes things really seriously.

From the same viewpoint Nietzsche arrived at his concept of ‘the will to power’. Again, it is nothing but a monstrous defamation to impute that Nietzsche defended the ‘principle of power’. The only thing he defended was the need to consider how far power is indeed one of the basic drives of human beings. It is quite in character that Nietzsche should postulate the following. He says: There are people who from certain principles of asceticism defend the thesis that power should be opposed. Why do they do this? Because by their very nature they can achieve quite a degree of power by means of opposing power! To oppose power is their particular will to power! To stress powerlessness is merely their particular will to power! To stress powerlessness in an ascetic way gives them in their own way a particular power! What lay at the foundation of what Nietzsche said, and also what pervades Treitschke's considerations is: not to try and convince oneself that black is white; to see things as they are in very truth and not to turn out empty phrases.

So you see, neither Treitschke nor Nietzsche intended to introduce into social life any kind of principle of power. Their concern was simply to show that power lives wherever the state manifests, and that it would be untruthful to maintain anything different. One could say that the karma under which Treitschke worked was: to come upon the idea that it is a monstrosity to live with the illusion of abstract, empty concepts which one trumpets forth into the world. He wanted to take a straightforward hold on reality and this is what is so attractive about his writings. From the same standpoint he could say of the concept of freedom: The question as to whether the state exists in order to promote, or not to promote, freedom, is no question at all. In other words, his object was to seek things where they live in their reality. I do not want to defend this, but simply to describe it.

Surely a fearless human being who only wanted to state things as he saw them with his sense for truth cannot be weeded out by means of inciting opinion against him. And yet everywhere these days people are weeded out by means of incitements against them. Treitschke is a fearless spirit whose aim, no matter what he is discussing, is truly never to mince his words. It would be far more to the point—I really must repeat this again—to indicate how Treitschke was in reality a kind of teacher for those who wanted to listen to him. There were not nearly as many who listened as is claimed nowadays. When Treitschke speaks about freedom he does this far less as a critic of other nations than as an educator of his own. I should now like to read you a passage from his article Freedom, which ought to be at least as well known as so much that is quoted out of context and which cannot possibly be understood without proper context. Having first discussed what aspects of society promote freedom, Treitschke writes:

‘It is still most timely’—he is speaking in the eighteen-sixties—‘to speak of class prejudices. How truly discouraging to discover that this great civilized nation’—he means the Germans—‘continues to acknowledge the legal concept of misalliance in marriage, a concept thrown overboard by the ancients at the beginning of their rise to civilization. We do not, of course, refer to that crude titled gentry who hold a career in the stable to be more respectable than a scientific calling, and the rule of the fist more noble than the free citizen's respect for the law. That caricature of aristocracy has had its comeuppance. But even the motley crowd of the so-called educated, well-to-do classes cherishes a multitude of unfree, intolerant class conceptions. How hard are the loveless judgements passed on the shamefully misnamed dangerous classes! How heartless the deprecation of “luxury” for the lower orders, when a free and noble individual ought to be overjoyed to see the poor beginning to take some pride in themselves and the decency of their appearance! What abject fear at every sign of defiance and of self-respect among the lower classes! German goodness of heart has perhaps preserved our educated classes from developing this attitude in a form as crude as that held among blunter Britons; but so long as aristocradc interests, of which the cleverer among us have never been entirely free, take these forms, there is not much hope for our inner freedom.

We enter a field in which unfreedom and intolerance flourish in abundance when we enquire after the class concepts of that most mighty and exclusive of all “classes”—or whatever else you would like to call this natural aristocracy—the male sex. Unbelievably widespread amongst us, lords of creation, are the ramifications of a silent consipiracy, thoroughly to defraud women of a portion of harmonious human culture. For women gain a part of their culture only through us. Yet we take it for granted amongst ourselves that religious enlightenment is a duty of the educated man but a bringer of corruption to the populace and to women. Indeed, how many of us find a woman most particularly winsome the moment she displays some glaring superstition. And as for “politically-minded females”, they are an abomination we prefer not to mention. Is this indeed our manly faith in the divine nature of freedom? Is religious enlightenment really only a matter of sober understanding and not to a far greater degree a need of the soul? Yet we imagine a woman's warmth of heart might suffer if we let her take her own delight in the great spiritual works of the last hundred years. Do we truly understand German women so little as to imagine that they could ever become “political” and start to worry their heads over ground rents and commercial agreements? Yet the political poverty of our people has to it a human side which might be more deeply, more delicately, more intimately understood by women than by ourselves. Of this abundance of enthusiasm and love, which we so often confront with coldness, inner poverty and heartlessness, could not a small fraction be reserved for our fatherland? Must the shame of the French occupation return once more if our women are to feel themselves, as do their neighbours in East and West, daughters of a great nation? With our unfree lack of magnanimity we have maintained silence towards them for far too long about what stirs in our breast; we felt that they were great enough to be told no more than the most trifling of trifles; and because we were too small-minded not to begrudge them the freedom of culture and education, there is now only a minority of German women capable of understanding the earnest gravity of this momentous era.’

You see how it is possible to quote from Treitschke passages which refer to matters of general humanity, even though on his part he wrote them out of a national spirit for his own nation. If any of the nations who today abuse Treitschke had among them a spirit who meant to them what he means to Germans, you would see that they would place him on the highest pedestal. Imagine an Italian Treitschke. What would the Italians say if the Germans were to speak of their Italian Treitschke in the way they and many others speak of the German Treitschke. The infinite tragedy of our age is that it is stamped with ignorance and with all that counts on ignorance. It would be utterly impossible for such untruths to buzz about in the world today if it were not at every moment feasible to count on people's ignorance. By ignorance I do not, of course, mean the fact that not everybody has time to inform himself about everything. What I do mean is that a little self-knowledge is what is needed.

Of course certain situations cannot be judged if certain things are not known, and judgements born of ignorance, made about whole nations, work in the most terrible way. Today so very much is born out of ignorance. This is, as a matter of fact, caused by that black magic—I have described it like this on other occasions too—known today as journalism. It is a kind of black magic, and there was a certain truth in the way folk legend felt the inventors of the art of printing—with all the perspectives this opens up—to be black magicians.

You might now exclaim: As if there were not enough follies and oddities in anthroposophical spiritual science—now the art of printing is described as black magic! But I did only say ‘a kind’ of black magic. I have often stressed that it is wrong always to say: I must not let Ahriman anywhere near me; away with him! I must not let Lucifer anywhere near me; I only want to have dealings with the good gods! If this is what you want, you can have no dealings with the world, for whether you like it or not, the world hangs in the balance between Ahriman and Lucifer. It is impossible to have dealings with the world if you have this attitude of mind, an attitude which appears particularly frequently in our circles. One must achieve truthfulness even in the smallest matters. This must be the practical outcome of our efforts in spiritual science—the practical outcome. You can feel this in yourselves: If you cannot develop the urge for truthfulness in yourselves, you will always be open to the danger of being infected, influenced, by the untruthfulness that lives in the world.

That is why I said the other day: In future all the efforts that have been made towards peace will be forgotten, and in the periphery the only thing to be remembered will be the shouting-down of peace; but it will not be remembered as a shouting-down but as something that was justified; everything else will be forgotten. This is sure to be what will happen. So at least our discussions here should be a contribution to making it possible to sense the truth of the situation. For today one of the foremost demands made of those who are truly concerned with the welfare of mankind and the progress of mankind is that they should not allow themselves to be taken in by untruthfulness.

Let us look at one of the facts of today totally sine ira but not sine studio; without sympathy and antipathy but with a basis of facts. You have, I am sure, all read the note from the Entente to President Wilson. From a certain standpoint this note, in contrast to all the earlier ones, ceuld be regarded as a favourable symptom for the future. For if things are taken too far, if the bowstring threatens to snap, then there is once again hope, the hope that if spiritual powers are challenged, then the blow will also be returned by the spiritual side. This note certainly outdid all the earlier ones.

Let us now look at the facts. Here, roughly, is Austria-Hungary as it is today. [The lecturer drew.] Here is the Danube and this is where Vienna would be. Now assume that the demands of the note from the Entente are met. It says that the Italians—that is the Austrian Italians—want to be liberated. The worst thing about this note from the Entente is that it suffers from that inner untruthfulness which arises out of total ignorance. That is why it is difficult to make the drawing I now want to make. There will be difficulties, as you will see. Assume that the Italian Austrians are liberated. Now the southern Slavs are also to be liberated. This is rather difficult. If the southern Slavs were liberated, the map would look like this, for they live everywhere over here.

Further it is said, funnily enough: The Czecho-Slovaks are to be liberated. We know the Czechs and also the Slovaks. It goes without saying that only the Entente has heard of Czecho-Slovaks. Let us presume that it is the Czechs and the Slovaks who are meant. If we go by what the Czechs themselves think, the result would be like this. Then on to the liberation of the Romanians. This is what it would look like. Also to be liberated, as the note says ‘... in accordance with the will of His Majesty the Tsar’, are the Poles inhabiting Galicia; but this is to be done by Austria herself. In the end, Hungary would look something like this, and Austria something like this.

This map is the result of carrying out what is said about Austria in the note from the Entente. And at the same time it is said that there is no intention of doing anything to the peoples of Central Europe!

The whole note demonstrates, for instance, a total lack of awareness of the difficulties of managing all this here, where the Slavs are in the majority, compared with there, where they are a tiny minority. The whole note lays bare the most arrogant, unscrupulous ignorance of the situation! With this ignorance, historical notes are written. And to add insult to injury it is further said that the only intention is ... I really don't know, for it is almost too repulsive to repeat these empty phrases.

What could be better proof than this note from the Entente of the fact that Austria was forced to defend herself? What could give better proof? In short, this note can only be seen as something pathological. It is a challenge to truth and reality. It is taking things too far. So let us hope, since it is a challenge to the spiritual world, that this spiritual world will find it necessary to put things right, even though, of course, human beings will have to be the tools with which the spiritual world will work.

It really is time for an illustration such as the one I have sketched here to be shown all over the world in order to demonstrate this utter historical ignorance and lack of understanding about Central Europe. Obviously, where power rules, reason cannot have much effect. But a start must be made by understanding that, when rights and freedoms are mentioned, power is meant, actual power. Things must be called by their true names. This is what our time is suffering from: That people cannot bring themselves to call things by their right names, that people cannot make the resolve to call things by their right names. Many people fail to understand a great deal. When you come up against something like this absolutely idiotic division of the Austrian nations, it becomes perfectly obvious that this note stems from people who know nothing of what exists in Central Europe, yet who possess the arrogance to judge things about which they know nothing and who want nothing other than to extend their power over these territories. They could not care less what the real situation is.

But you do have to ask how such things could come about in the first place. For instance in some versions it says: Liberation of the Slavs, the Czechs and the Slovaks. But the Swiss newspapers, whose translation is probably more accurate, speak about Czecho-Slovaks. You will agree, if someone makes a correct statement, you are not curious about the source of his information; but when someone speaks absolute balderdash, such as the description of the nations in the note from the Entente, you do begin to wonder about its source. It is indeed not uninteresting to take note when situations seem to run, in a way, parallel, though of course without basing any hypothesis on this, or drawing any conclusions. I naturally asked myself: What is the source of these nonsensical terms? I repeat: Without forming any kind of hypothesis or conclusions, let me give you an aperçu.

In the last few days—I am not judging the fact, but simply telling you this—a sentence passed in Austria on the Czech leader, Kramar, has been made public. He was for a long time one of the most influential people in Austria. He was sentenced to death, and this sentence was then commuted to fifteen years hard labour. The wording of the sentence also includes the statement that certain articles that had appeared in The Times—in English, of course—had been found in the possession of Kramar in his own language. Now Dr Kramar has a friend, the university professor Masaryk, who has fled from Austria and now lives in London and Paris. So let us consider certain sentences from Kramar's programme which were the basis on which he was sentenced. If you understand nothing about the situation in Austria and you read these sentences in The Times, or wherever else—they also appeared in Paris in Revue tchèque—and play about a little with the wording, not forgetting that Kramar of course uses the proper terms, you arrive, curiously enough, at the sentences about the peoples of Austria as they appear in the note from the Entente. And if the term ‘Czecho-Slovaks’ is indeed used, you gain the strange impression that Kramar was hoping to found a state consisting of Czechs and Slovaks, which would be meaningful. But those in western Europe who know nothing about the actual situation would make of this: ‘Czecho-Slovaks’.

It is indeed necessary today, when so many underground channels play their part, to clarify certain questions about interconnections. I do not want to build any hypotheses, nor draw any conclusions in connection with what I have said, but the fact remains that a curious conformity exists between the sentence that was passed and the text of the note from the Entente. Obviously you can have different opinions about this sentence, depending on your point of view. Kramar could be seen either as a martyr or a criminal. But I do not want to pass judgement. The important thing is to be in a position to observe this curious conformity. As I said, I simply noticed this when I was puzzling about the origin, apart from everything else, of the stupendous ignorance on which the note is based.

We must certainly speak about this stupendous ignorance. For it is significant, and is one of the characteristics of our time, that on a basis of this kind of reality an opinion is expressed by those who dominate one half of the habitable earth. It is a challenge indeed to the spirit of truth.

[The next few sentences in this lecture refer to a quotation from an ‘article’ dated 25 July 1914 mentioning Rasputin, which the stenographer unfortunately did not record. Since they are meaningless without the quotation, they have been omitted. Ed.]

It will always be possible, if one has the power, to give the facts an impudent slap in the face—and the periphery does have this power. But you cannot slap truth in the face. Truth speaks and will—let us hope—also be an impulse which, when things are at their worst, can lead mankind to some kind of salvation.

We shall continue tomorrow.

Achtzehnter Vortrag

Es scheint mir doch gerade in unserer Zeit notwendig zu sein, daß die Mitglieder unserer Bewegung über die Verhältnisse der Welt etwas wissen. Dem haben die Betrachtungen, die wir hier angestellt haben, ja mehr oder weniger gedient. Wenn wir in unserem Sinne von Geisteswissenschaft sprechen, so ist es ja so, daß wir uns durchdringen müssen mit der Erkenntnis, wie unsere Welt, die wir mit dem physischen Verstande und den Sinnen überblicken, die Offenbarung ist der geistigen Welt. Solange man die geistige Welt nur abstrakt auffassen wird, indem man den Menschen in seine verschiedenen Wesensbestandteile gliedert und allerlei theoretische Betrachtungen über Karma und Reinkarnation anstellt — wie wir es ja so theoretisch im Grunde nie gemacht haben -, kann Geisteswissenschaft für das Leben nicht wirklich fruchtbar werden. Deshalb habe ich Ihren Blick in der verschiedensten Weise auf die äußere Wirklichkeit gelenkt, wobei ich immer im Auge hatte, was hinter dieser äußeren Wirklichkeit steckt, seien es direkt okkulte Faktoren, okkulte Impulse, sei es, daß okkulte Impulse von Menschen in dieser oder jener Beziehung gebraucht werden.

Für den, der die gegenwärtigen Verhältnisse ein wenig durchschaut, wird es in der Zukunft bei einem Rückblick auf unsere Zeiten immer klarer werden, daß die alte historische Betrachtungsweise, wie sie heute herrscht, nicht mehr ausreicht, um zu verstehen, was in der Gegenwart geschieht. Es werden sich gewisse okkulte Lehren der reifenden Erkenntnis der Menschen durch die Verhältnisse als notwendig ergeben, und denen, die sich solchen Dingen verschließen, wird sich in der Zukunft der Stempel der Unwissenheit, der Kenntnislosigkeit aufdrücken müssen.

Man hat ja seit dem 19. Jahrhundert für die Verhältnisse der Vergangenheit die Gepflogenheit, rein materialistisch, aus den Akten, wie man sagte, die Geschichte zu konstruieren. Man sieht heute noch nicht ein, daß man dadurch nicht zur wirklichen Aufzeigung der geschichtlichen Impulse kommt, sondern bloß zur Schilderung von materialistischen Gespenstern — mag auch das Wort paradox klingen, es ist so: zur Schilderung von materialistischen Gespenstern. Was heute in den gebräuchlichen Handbüchern und sonstigen Darstellungen als Geschichte figuriert, die Darstellungen der Menschen und der Verhältnisse der Vergangenheit bis in die Gegenwart herein, es sind — wenn es auch noch so realistisch gemeint ist — Gespenster ohne wirkliches Leben. Es können nur Gespenster sein aus dem Grunde, weil aller Wirklichkeit okkulte Impulse zugrunde liegen, und wenn man diese wegläßt, so bekommt man eben nur Gespenster. Daher ist die Darstellung der Geschichte bis heute eine gespenstische gewesen, aber sie hat in einer gewissen Beziehung die Gemüter der Menschen erfüllt; sie hat in einer gewissen Beziehung gewirkt. Und die Tragödie der heutigen Zeit ist in vieler Beziehung gerade ein Ausleben des Karma in solchen unwahren, gespenstischen Vorstellungen, die sich die Menschen allmählich angeeignet haben. Es darf aber auch innerhalb unserer Bewegung der Weltengang nicht gewissermaßen in zwei unvermittelte Hälften zerfallen, wie es gerade manche Menschen in unserer Bewegung gern hätten: Auf der einen Seite das Schwelgen in sogenannten übersinnlichen Vorstellungen, die aber mehr oder weniger abstrakte Begriffe bleiben, und auf der andern Seite das fortdauernde Stehenbleiben in den gewöhnlichen Anschauungen, wie sie eben der ganz von Matertalismus durchtränkte Vulgärverstand über die äußere Wirklichkeit entwickelt. Die beiden Dinge — äußere physische Wirklichkeit und geistiges Dasein — müssen sich gerade verbinden, das heißt, man muß einsehen, daß an die Stelle der bisherigen Geschichtsbetrachtung dasjenige treten muß, was ich eine symptomatische Geschichte genannt habe, durch die man lernen wird, daß sich in gewissen Erscheinungen stärker als in andern das geschichtliche Werden zum Ausdruck bringt.

Nun habe ich Ihnen in den letzten Zeiten manches vielleicht allzu realistisch angedeutet, allzu realistisch aber nur für eine Empfindung, die sagt: Warum schildert er uns die Dinge, die wir sonst auch hören? — Wenn Sie genauer zusehen, so werden Sie feststellen, daß Sie sie in der Art, wie sie hier geschildert werden, sonst nicht hören können, namentlich nicht in dieser Art von Zusammenstellung, in dieser Art von Symptombetrachtung, in der sich die verschiedenen charakteristischen Einzelheiten zu einer lebendigen Erfassung der Wirklichkeit zusammenfügen. Die Frage liegt nun nahe: Wie kommen denn überhaupt solche Symptome zustande, wie ich sie Ihnen angeführt habe? — Hierauf möchte ich ein wenig eingehen.

Ich habe Ihnen im Laufe der Zeit eine Reihe von Tatsachen mitgeteilt, zum Teil solche, die die Leute winzig kleine Tatsachen nennen werden, wie die von dem Sprößling des Herzegowinischen Woiwoden Woidarewitsch, oder das, was ich Ihnen anführte über das russisch-slawische Wohltätigkeitskomitee und so weiter. Solche Dinge können einerseits leicht als unbedeutend angesehen werden, auf der andern Seite aber könnte gesagt werden: Wie finden sich denn überhaupt solche Sachen zusammen? Wie kommt es denn, daß eine Geschichtsbetrachtung unter uns Platz greift, welche weit auseinanderliegende Einzelheiten zu einem Gesamtbilde zusammenzufassen versucht? — Vulgärer gefaßt würde die Frage, wenn jemand sie an mich stellte, so lauten können: Wie kommen Sie dazu, gerade diese Dinge, die für die Ereignisse der Gegenwart als charakteristisch gelten müssen, zu wissen und im Leben so aufgesammelt zu haben? — Darauf möchte ich eine Antwort geben, die Ihnen lebendig zeigen soll, wie eben Geisteswissenschaft ins Leben eingreifen kann.

Man erlangt im Verlaufe seines Lebens Kenntnis von solchen Dingen, wenn es das Karma so mit sich bringt, und wenn man dem Karma einen wirklich aufrichtigen, wahrheitsgemäßen Lauf läßt.Gar mancher meint, er ließe dem Karma einen freien Lauf, er ergebe sich gewissermaßen in das Karma; aber das kann eine große Täuschung sein. Niemand kann äußere Ereignisse so verfolgen, daß sich ihm die Wahrheit ergibt, wenn er sich nicht wirklich dem Karma überläßt, wenn er nicht vieles unten läßt im Unterbewußten, vieles vorbeigleiten läßt an seiner Seele, denn durch allerlei Sympathien und Antipathien trübt man sich das freie Anschauen. Nichts ist so sehr geeignet, das freie Anschauen zu trüben, als dasjenige, was man heute geschichtliche Methode nennt. Durch diese geschichtliche Methode kommen eben Gespenster zustande, weil der Historiker von heute sich nicht seinem Karma überlassen kann. Er würde ja selbstverständlich, wenn er von früher Jugend an sich seinem Karma überließe, bei jedem Examen durchfallen, das ist ja ganz klar. Er darf sich nicht seinem Karma überlassen und dasjenige wissen, was ihm das Karma zuführt, sondern er muß dasjenige wissen, was ihm die Examensverordnungen und so weiter vorschreiben. Die schreiben aber lauter Dinge vor, welche selbstverständlich das Karma des Menschen zerfetzen, so daß derjenige, der einfach dem Strome folgt, der ihm da vorgeschrieben wird, niemals zu der wirklichen Wahrheit kommen kann. Zur wirklichen Wahrheit kann man eben nur kommen, wenn man diese Dinge, von denen in der Geisteswissenschaft gesprochen wird, lebensernst nimmt, wenn man sie nicht bloß als Theorie, sondern wenn man sie lebensernst nimmt. Natürlich nimmt man die Dinge auch dann nicht lebensernst, wenn man sich den freien Blick trüben läßt durch allerlei Sympathien und Antipathien. Man muß ihnen schon mehr oder weniger objektiv gegenüberstehen, dann trägt einem der Strom der Welt das zu, was zum Verständnis notwendig ist.

Nun gehört ja auch wirklich ein Teil dieses Sich-dem-Karma-Überlassens in bezug auf die Ereignisse unserer Gegenwart zu der Tatsache, daß Sie, meine lieben Freunde, durch Ihr Karma in die Anthroposophische Gesellschaft getragen worden sind. Daher muß es in der Anthroposophischen Gesellschaft schon möglich sein, unbehindert von Sympathien und Antipathien über Tatsachen zu reden; sonst würde man ja auch innerhalb dieser Gesellschaft das Karma nicht lebensernst nehmen.

Ich wollte diese Einleitung vorausschicken den Betrachtungen, die wir noch anstellen wollen, aus dem Grunde, weil ich Ihnen gewisse wichtige okkulte Tatsachen zeigen will, die wir aber nicht verstehen können, wenn wir sie nicht anzuknüpfen wissen an das Leben, und wenn wir namentlich nicht durchdringen können durch das reichlich verworrene Gestrüpp von Unwahrhaftigkeiten, die heute durch die Welt schwirren. Die Welt ist ja heute voll von Unwahrhaftigkeiten, und der Sinn für Wahrhaftigkeit muß innerhalb der Anthroposophischen Gesellschaft gepflegt werden, wenn diese — gleichgültig wie lange sie unter den gegenwärtigen Verhältnissen bestehen kann — während ihres Bestandes einen Sinn, einen wirklichen Lebenssinn haben soll.

Ich habe Sie nun mit verschiedenerlei Ausführungen, die ich in der letzten Zeit gemacht habe, nicht bloß aus dem Grunde, möchte ich sagen, belästigt, um Ihnen dies oder jenes in diesem oder jenem Lichte erscheinen zu lassen, sondern weil ich durchdrungen bin davon, daß es wichtig ist, mancherlei Begriffe zu korrigieren. Wer glaubt, daß ich diese Dinge aus irgendeinem nationalen Pathos heraus sage, der versteht mich einfach nicht.

Nun, unter den schweren Anschuldigungen, die von der Peripherie der heutigen Welt gegen die Mitte immer wieder geschleudert werden, und die, wie ich schon öfter sagte, ausklingen in die in dieser oder jener Form ausgesprochene Phrase — sie in der wirklichen Form auszusprechen, geniert man sich: Tut nichts, der Deutsche wird verbrannt -, gehört auch, daß man in weitestem Kreise gewisse Menschen, deren Werke man selbstverständlich nicht kennt, als die Verderber, die Verzieher des deutschen Volkes anführt. Und einer von denen, die man da in erster Linie anführt, ist der deutsche Historiker Heinrich Treitschke. Nun will ich, wie gesagt, gar nicht von einem nationalen, sondern von einem ganz allgemein menschlichen Standpunkt aus eine solche Persönlichkeit einmal ins Auge fassen. Ich habe Ihnen erwähnt, daß ich ja nicht viel mit Treitschke verkehrt habe, sondern ihn nur einmal getroffen habe; daß er etwas Polterndes hatte, das habe ich dazumal angedeutet. Ich will heute nur sagen, daß ich mir wohl aus jener Zusammenkunft mit Treitschke ein Bild seines Wesens und Charakters machen konnte, denn er hat ja natürlich nicht bloß von dem gesprochen, was ich Ihnen als die erste Anrede angeführt habe, sondern es ist über Geschichtsauffassung, über historische Publikationen, die gerade damals in den neunziger Jahren viel Aufsehen machten, gesprochen worden, wobei man in der Lage war, viele prinzipielle Fragen über wissenschaftliche Geschichte und dergleichen in einigen Stunden Gastmähler dauern ja immer einige Stunden — zu besprechen, und es war mir durchaus möglich, den Mann gewissermaßen an der Grenze seines Lebens — er ist bald danach gestorben — kennenzulernen, abgesehen davon, daß mir sein Wirken als Historiker in allen Einzelheiten wohl bekannt ist.

Nun möchte ich vor allen Dingen darauf hinweisen, daß Treitschke ein Mensch war, der Veranlassung dazu gibt, ihn ein wenig vom okkulten Gesichtspunkte aus ins Auge zu fassen. In dem guten Sinne, wie Sokrates von einer Art Dämonium gesprochen hat, könnte man auch bei Treitschke sagen, daß etwas von einem Dämonium in ihm lebte, nicht ein böser Dämon, aber etwas von einem Dämonium. Und man hatte bei ihm nicht das Gefühl, daß er bloß getrieben wird durch die Erwägungen des materialistischen Verstandes, sondern daß er von innen heraus getrieben wird, eben durch dasjenige, was Sokrates dämonische Kräfte nennt. Dadurch war er ja auch, ich möchte sagen, in seiner ganzen Lebensbahn geleitet. Der Sachse ist ein begeisterter Sänger des werdenden deutschen Staates; denn Treitschke hat schon in einer sehr bedeutenden Weise gewirkt, als dieser deutsche Staat noch nicht begründet war. Seine «Deutsche Geschichte» hat er allerdings erst nach der Begründung dieses Staates geschrieben. Es lebte in ihm gerade in der charakteristischen Weise, wie das in Mitteleuropa der Fall ist, was man im Umkreise nicht kennt — nicht nur nicht wünscht, sondern nicht kennt und nicht verstehen will -, es lebte in ihm, wenn ich so sagen darf, Sinn für die Konkretheit, für die Wirklichkeit. Eine gewisse Abneigung gegenüber bloßen abstrakten Theorien und gegenüber allem Phrasentum lebte in ihm, und zwar mit dämonischer Kraft, so daß man, ich möchte sagen, durch die Persönlichkeit hindurch auf die geistigen Kräfte sah, die aus ihr sprachen. Außerdem war Treitschke verhältnismäßig früh im Leben ganz taub geworden, so daß er weder die Stimme eines andern noch seine eigene hörte und er eigentlich nur mit seinem eigenen Inneren verkehrte. Solches Lebensschicksal weist den Menschen auf sich selbst zurück. Das vollständige Fehlen des Gehörs bringt den Menschen, wenn er dazu Anlage hat, viel leichter als sonst beim vollständigen Fehlen eines Sinnes in Zusammenhang mit den wirkenden okkulten Mächten, die ja eigentlich nur deshalb nicht beachtet werden, weil der Mensch durch seine Sinne abgelenkt wird von dem, was über die Sinne hinaus zu der Seele spricht. Solch ein Karma, früh vollständig taub zu werden, hat also schon eine gewisse Bedeutung und hängt mit dem zusammen, was ich in diesem Falle eine dämonische Natur nenne.

Nun, diese Natur, diese Menschenwesenheit war wirklich im Gegensatze zu vielen, ja zu den meisten Menschen unserer Gegenwart, wie aus einem Einheitlichen heraus gestaltet. Bei ihm wirkte nie der bloße Verstand, sondern im Grunde genommen immer die ganze Seele. Hausbackene Wahrheiten, die man mit sogenannten «logischen Beweisen» jederzeit beweisen kann, haben wir ja genug in der Welt; Wahrheiten aber, an denen Menschenblut haftet, die durchdrungen sind von warmem menschlichem Fühlen, die sind wohl zu beachten, ob man sich nun auf den gleichen oder auf einen andern Standpunkt stellt. Denn der Mensch ist doch der Kanal, durch den die sinnliche Welt an der geistigen Welt hängt, und man kommt zur geistigen Welt nicht bloß durch das Studium von geisteswissenschaftlichen Theorien, sondern durch die Aneignung des Sinnes, wie der einzelne Mensch einen Kanal darstellt zwischen der Sinnenwelt und der geistigen Welt.

Vor allen Dingen war Heinrich Treitschke eine Persönlichkeit, welche sich ihre Kenntnisse und ihre Gedanken zu bilden versuchte auf Grundlage einer breiten Erkenntnis, einer Erkenntnis, die immer aufgebaut war auf das seelenkritische, nicht auf das verstandesmäßige Urteil. Es waren die Urteile immer warm von dieser Seelenkritik. Sie hatten gewiß etwas Polterndes, aber sie waren warm von dieser Seelenkritik. Und von diesem Gesichtspunkte aus lag für Treitschke im Mittelpunkt seiner Betrachtungen vor allen Dingen die Frage nach der menschlichen Freiheit, die sich für ihn, da er Historiker war und sich früh vorbereitete, der Historiker seines Volkes zu werden, immer verband mit der Frage nach der politischen Freiheit, der Staatsfresiheit.

Nun gibt es in der deutschen Literatur eine Schrift — Sie können sie sich leicht verschaffen, weil sie in der Reclamschen Universal-Bibliothek erschienen ist —, welche in der eindringlichsten Weise die Frage des Verhältnisses zwischen der Staatsomnipotenz und der menschlichen Freiheit behandelt, also der Freiheit nicht nur, wie sie aus dem Inneren der menschlichen Seele heraus lebt, sondern der Freiheit, wie sie sich im sozialen Leben verwirklicht. Mir ist keine andere Schrift in der Weltliteratur bekannt, welche diese Frage in einer ähnlich eindringlichen Weise behandelt. Diese Schrift heißt: «Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen», und ist von Wilhelm von Humboldt, dem Freunde Schillers und dem Bruder des Schriftstellers Alexander von Humboldt. In dieser Schrift, aus der Wende des 18. zum 19. Jahrhundert, wird in sehr schöner Weise die menschliche Persönlichkeit in ihrer vollen, humanen, freien Entfaltung gegenüber aller Staatsomnipotenz in Schutz genommen. Es wird darauf hingewiesen, daß der Staat nicht mehr in das Gebiet des menschlichen Wesens überhaupt eingreifen dürfe, als durch sein Eingreifen Hindernisse für die freie Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit beseitigt werden. Die Schrift entstammt ja demselben Grunde, auf welchem Schillers schöne Briefe «Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen» ersprossen sind. Und ich möchte sagen, die Schrift von Wilhelm von Humboldt über die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates ist eine Bruderschrift dieser Schillerschen Schrift «Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen». Sie stammt aus der Zeit, wo man versuchte, aus dem geistigen Leben alle Gedanken zusammenzubringen, welche den Menschen so recht auf den Boden der Freiheit stellen können. Diese Schrift ist aus gewissen Gründen im 19. Jahrhundert nicht gerade sehr viel benützt worden, bildete aber doch immer wieder das Studium derer, die sich im Verlaufe des 19. Jahrhunderts über die Außenseite des Begriffes der Freiheit aufklären wollten. Natürlich, das 19. Jahrhundert war die Zeit, in der der Begriff der Freiheit ja in vieler Beziehung zu Grabe getragen worden ist; aber die Leute wollten sich doch immer wieder über den Begriff der Freiheit orientieren, und gerade von diesem Gesichtspunkte aus bekam Wilhelm von Humboldts Schrift «Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen», eine gewisse internationale Bedeutung in Europa. Von dieser Schrift sind nämlich sowohl der Franzose Laboulaye wie auch der Engländer John Stuart Mill ausgegangen; für beide war die Schrift von Wilhelm von Humboldt ein wichtiger Ausgangspunkt. Und sie haben ihrerseits, ein jeder auf seinem Gebiet, versucht, sich über den Begriff der Freiheit zu orientieren. Laboulaye fand, daß die Einrichtung seines Landes in bezug auf das Verhältnis zwischen Staat und Individuum geeignet ist, jegliche wirkliche Freiheit, das heißt jede wirkliche Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit, unter dem Staatsbegriff zu begraben; John Stuart Mill hat, ausgehend von Wilhelm von Humboldt, nachdem er ihn entdeckt hatte, in seiner Schrift über die Freiheit in eindringlicher Weise ausgeführt, wie die englische Gesellschaft geeignet ist, das wirkliche Erlebnis der Freiheit zu untergraben. Dieser Frage ist ja gerade die Schrift von John Stuart Mill — bei Laboulaye ist es der Staat, bei Mill die Gesellschaft — gewidmet: Wie kann man bei der von der Gesellschaft herausgebildeten Unfreiheit zu einer Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit kommen?

Treitschke hat nun, wiederum mit der seelenkritischen Art, von der ich eben sprach, anknüpfend an Laboulaye und John Stuart Mill, seine Schrift über die Freiheit im Beginne der sechziger Jahre verfaßt. Und diese Treitschkesche Schrift über die Freiheit ist ganz besonders deshalb von außerordentlichem Interesse, weil Treitschke als Historiker und als Politiker ganz in dem Zwiespalt lebt, in den die menschliche Seele gebracht wird, wenn sie auf der einen Seite die Notwendigkeit jenes sozialen Gebildes erkennt, das man Staat nennt, und auf der andern Seite begeistert ist für dasjenige, was man menschliche Freiheit nennt. So hat sich namentlich Treitschke mit Bezug auf den Begriff der Freiheit in den sechziger Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts mit Laboulaye und mit John Stuart Mill auseinanderzusetzen versucht. Er versuchte in dieser Schrift «Die Freiheit» geradezu einen Staatsbegriff herauszuarbeiten, welcher das Notwendige, was im Staatsgebilde liegt, nicht aufhebt, und auf der andern Seite es doch dahin bringt, daß der Staat nicht der Totengräber, sondern der Förderer, der Pfleger der Freiheit werde. Ein solcher Staatsbegriff schwebte Treitschke vor. Es war ja die Zeit, in der man auf die Frage: Welches ist dein engeres Vaterland? — von einem Deutschen zur Antwort bekommen konnte: SchwarzburgSondershausen — oder Reuß-Schleiz jüngere Linie. -— Im Anfang der sechziger Jahre gab es ja das, was heute Deutsches Reich genannt wird, noch nicht. In jener Zeit, in der eine große Anzahl von Leuten an eine Art Zusammenschluß der verschiedenen individuellen Gebilde dachten, in denen Deutsche wohnten, dachte auch Treitschke an die Notwendigkeit eines Staatsgebildes. Aber für ihn war es, ich möchte sagen, Axiom, daß kein Staat entstehen dürfe, welcher nicht der menschlichen Persönlichkeit eine möglichst freie Entfaltung gewährte. Und wenn man auch nicht sagen kann, daß Treitschke zu ganz durchgebildeten philosophischen Begriffen gekommen ist, so ist doch gerade mit Bezug auf diesen Gesichtspunkt in der Treitschke-Schrift über die Freiheit vieles sehr Beherzigenswertes gesagt.

Wenn man Treitschke würdigen und gerade das ins Auge fassen will, was für den Okkultisten wichtig ist, muß man nicht unberücksichtigt lassen, daß Treitschke eine furchtlose Persönlichkeit war, die keinem andern Gott dienen wollte als dem der Wahrheit. Es ist geradezu der Gipfel der Torheit, wenn man von manchen Seiten her mit Begriffen, die nichts mit Sachlichkeit zu tun haben, heute über Treitschke urteilen hört; denn die Urteile, die da durch die Welt schwirren, sind meistens gar nicht in der Lage, auch nur im entferntesten irgendeinen Standpunkt zu gewinnen, aus dem einfachen Grunde, weil das fehlt, worauf ich neulich hingedeutet habe, als ich sagte, daß wenn man sich ein wenig auf die aus der Geisteswissenschaft sich ergebende Differenzierung der Volksgeister einließe, man nicht so viel Torheiten reden würde. Ich knüpfte da an die verschiedenen Torheiten an, welche teils von ihm selbst, teils über Romain Rolland vorgebracht worden sind. Ich habe das sagen müssen, weil eine eindringliche Betrachtung desjenigen, was man Volksgeist nennen kann, heute wirklich nur aus der Geisteswissenschaft heraus möglich ist. Wer sich darauf nicht einlassen will, kann dann eben nur zu solchen ganz subjektiven und darum törichten Urteilen kommen wie Romain Rolland.

Wenn man sich nun auf dasjenige einläßt, was aus der geisteswissenschaftlichen Betrachtung der Volksgeister folgt, dann muß man sich vor allen Dingen klar darüber sein, daß bei einem für sein Volk typischen Menschen — und das ist gerade Treitschke dadurch, daß er eine dämonische Natur war — auch gewisse typische volkshafte Merkmale hervortreten. Das ist auch bei Treitschke der Fall, und man kann wirklich sagen: Wenn man Treitschke versteht, versteht man viel von dem Deutschtum der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, nicht alles, aber vieles. Hat man zunächst einmal die Möglichkeit, einen Gesichtspunkt aus dem Okkultismus heraus zu gewinnen, so muß man - nicht bei kosmopolitischen, aber bei nationalen Naturen — an den Grundunterschied herangehen, der besteht zwischen westeuropäischen und mitteleuropäischen Urteilen. Wohlgemerkt, solche Dinge können nicht in Betracht kommen für das Allgemein-Menschliche, aber sie kommen in Betracht, wenn das Dämonisch-Volkhafte in den Geistern lebt. Nur mit dieser Einschränkung sage ich, was ich nunmehr zu sagen habe. Wenn auf dieses Volkstümliche so gesehen wird, wie es durch die Menschen durchwirkt, dann gilt schon das, was ein Amerikaner meint, wenn er sagt — vielleicht ist es besser, wenn ich jetzt nicht meine Worte gebrauche, sondern die eines Amerikaners, weil mir die Worte vielleicht übelgenommen werden könnten: Das französische Urteil, insofern es volkstümlich ist - also nicht das Urteil des einzelnen Franzosen, der ja kosmopolitisch sein kann, sondern das Urteil, das aus der Volkssubstanz, aus dem Volke hervorgeht -, lebt in dem Worte; das englische Urteil lebt im politisch-praktischen Begriff; das deutsche Urteil lebt im Anationalen, im nichtnationalen Suchen nach der Erkenntnis. — So sagt ein Amerikaner, der Europa bereist hat. Das aber bedingt, daß gewisse Urteile, die im Westen gefällt werden, sich innerhalb der deutschen Volkssubstanz anders ausnehmen, als sie im Westen gefällt werden. Im Westen haben sie einen abstrakten Charakter. Der Deutsche ist als Deutscher geneigt, die Urteile in ihre Konkretheiten zu übersetzen und dadurch vieles bei seinem wahren Namen zu nennen, was im Westen eigentlich niemals mit dem wahren Namen berührt wird. Nehmen wir einen Begriff, der jetzt im Laufe unserer Betrachtungen liegt: den Begriff des Staates.

Treitschke hat in seinen Vorträgen über «Politik», die auch gedruckt sind, über den Staat gesprochen. Über den Staat sprechen natürlich sehr viele Leute; aber betrachten wir jetzt das Sprechen über den Staat nur, insofern es sich innerhalb der nationalen Volkssubstanz vollzieht. Im Westen wird man gerne vom Staate so sprechen, daß man das Wort nimmt und dann allerlei Begriffe daran hängt, die man aus irgendwelchen Gründen mit dem Begriff des Staates zusammenbringen will. So wird man dem Staat als solchem den Begriff von Freiheit, von Recht und allerlei anderes anhängen, und wird sich sogar womöglich in sonderbarer Weise zu der Phrase aufschwingen: Der Staat muß jeglicher Begriffe von Macht entkleidet werden, der Staat muß ein Rechtsstaat sein. — Das kann man sagen, solange man nicht genötigt ist, den Begriff des Staates real ins Auge zu fassen. Wenn man aber wie Treitschke an den Begriff des Staates herangeht, so kommt man auf das Geheimnis des Staates. Man fordert dann nicht, daß der Staat sich auf den Grundsatz stellt: Macht geht vor Recht —, eine Behauptung, die man Treitschke verleumderischerweise unterschiebt; sondern man kommt darauf, daß der Begriff des Staates ohne den Begriff der Macht überhaupt nicht denkbar ist. Man wird einfach wahr, weil es keine Möglichkeit gibt, einen Staat zu begründen, als ihn auf Macht zu begründen. Und wenn man das nicht zugibt, so vertritt man eben nicht die Wahrheit. So wurde Treitschke genötigt, über den Staat im Zusammenhange mit der Macht zu sprechen. Das wird in der Weise, man kann schon sagen «verdreht», daß man sagt, Treitschke hätte behauptet, Macht ginge vor Recht nach der deutschen Staatsauffassung. Aber es ist keine Rede davon, daß Treitschke das jemals in den Sinn gekommen ist, sondern er hatte viel zu stark noch den Sinn der Humboldtschen Auseinandersetzungen in der Seele: «Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen.» Weil der Staat eben notwendigerweise Macht entfalten muß, darf er nicht omnipotent werden. Man kann nicht von einem Rechtsstaat reden, weil das soviel heißt wie — nun, nicht gerade hölzernes Eisen, aber mindestens kupfernes Eisen. Die beiden Begriffe sind, wie man in der Logik sagt, disparat; sie haben nichts miteinander zu tun. Darauf kommt aber erst der, der die Dinge ernst nimmt.

Und von diesem Gesichtspunkte aus kam auch Nietzsche zu seinem Begriffe vom «Willen zur Macht». Es ist wiederum nichts anderes als eine grenzenlose Verleumdung, wenn man Nietzsche imputiert, er hätte das «Prinzip der Macht» vertreten. Er hat nichts anderes vertreten als: Man solle betrachten, inwiefern die Macht in Wahrheit unter den Impulsen der Menschen lebt. — Charakteristisch ist es ja, daß Nietzsche von diesem Gesichtspunkte aus das Folgende vorbringt. Er sagt: Da gibt es Leute, welche aus gewissen Grundsätzen der Askese heraus die These vertreten, die Macht sei zu bekämpfen. Warum tun sie das? Weil sie nach ihrer besonderen Beschaffenheit gerade dadurch zu einer besonderen Macht kommen, daß sie die Macht bekämpfen! Das ist nur ihr besonderer Wille zur Macht, die Machtlosigkeit besonders zu betonen! Denn das gibt ihnen gerade in ihrer Art eine besondere Macht, asketisch die Machtlosigkeit zu betonen. — Was bei Nietzsche zugrunde lag, und was auch in Treitschkes Betrachtungen spukt, ist: sich nicht ein X für ein U vorzumachen, sondern die Dinge in Wahrheit zu sagen, nicht Phrasen zu drechseln.

Dies zeigt Ihnen aber, daß es weder Treitschke noch Nietzsche darauf angekommen ist, ins soziale Leben irgendein Prinzip als ein Machtprinzip einzuführen, sondern einfach darauf, zu zeigen, wie überall, wo Staat ist, Macht lebt, und wie, wenn man die Wahrheit sagen will, man gar nicht anders kann, als dies aussprechen. Das ist, möchte ich sagen, das Karma, unter dem Treitschke gewirkt hat: darauf zu kommen, daß es ein Unding ist, sich bloße abstrakte, leere Begriffe vorzumachen und sie in die Welt hinauszuposaunen. Er wollte unmittelbar die Wirklichkeit angreifen, das ist gerade das Reizvolle seiner Schriften. Von diesem Gesichtspunkte aus betrachtete er dann auch den Begriff der Freiheit so, daß er sagte: Die Frage, ob der Staat dazu da ist, die Freiheit zu fördern, oder die Freiheit nicht zu fördern, ist überhaupt keine Frage. — Also er ging darauf aus, die Dinge da zu suchen, wo sie in ihrer Realität leben. Das will ich nicht verteidigen, sondern es heute nur charakterisieren; und man kann wahrhaftig den furchtlosen Menschen, der die Dinge aussprechen wollte, wie sie sich ihm für seinen Wahrhaftigkeitssinn ergeben hatten, nicht agitatorisch ausschroten. Das agitatorische Ausschroten wird aber heute überall gepflegt. Treitschke ist ein furchtloser Geist, der nun wirklich durchaus darauf ausgeht, nirgends, keinem Verhältnis gegenüber ein Blatt vor den Mund zu nehmen. Und gescheiter — das muß ich noch einmal sagen — wäre es, wenn man darauf hinweisen würde, wie Treitschke doch eine Art Erzieher derjenigen geworden ist, die ihn haben hören wollen. Es waren ja ihrer nicht so viele, als man heute glauben machen will. Denn wenn Treitschke über die Freiheit redet, so tut er das viel weniger als Kritiker der andern Völker, denn als Erzieher seines eigenen Volkes. Da möchte ich Ihnen eine Stelle gerade aus seiner Schrift «Die Freiheit» mitteilen, die man ebenso kennen soll, wie manche aus dem Zusammenhang gerissenen Dinge, die gar nicht verstanden werden, wenn man sie nur aus dem Zusammenhang reißt. So schreibt Treitschke, nachdem er zuerst erörtert hat, durch welche gesellschaftlichen Dinge die Freiheit gefördert wird:

«Insbesondere von Standesvorurteilen zu reden, ist noch immer sehr wohl an der Zeit», also Anfang der sechziger Jahre. «Ein niederschlagender Gedanke, fürwahr, daß dieses große Kulturvolk» - er meint die Deutschen — «noch den barbarischen Rechtsbegriff der Mißheirat kennt, welchen die Alten schon zu Anfang ihres Kulturlebens über Bord warfen. Von jenem rohen Junkertum freilich, welchem die Stallkarriere anständiger scheint als ein wissenschaftlicher Beruf, das Faustrecht adliger als der gesetzliche Sinn des freien Bürgers, von ihm reden wir nicht: dies Zerrbild des Adels hat seinen Lohn dahin. Aber auch die buntscheckige Masse der sogenannten gebildeten wohlhabenden Stände hegt und pflegt eine Fülle unfreier, unduldsamer Standesbegriffe. Welche lieblose Härte des Urteils über die schändlicherweise so genannten gefährlichen Klassen! Welch herzloses Absprechen über den «Luxus der niederen Stände, während ein freier und vornehmer Mann sich daran freuen sollte, daß auch der Arme beginnt, etwas auf sich selbst und den Anstand seiner Erscheinung zu halten! Welche gemeine Angst bei jeder Regung des Trotzes und des Selbstgefühls unter dem niederen Volke! Deutsche Herzensgüte hat uns zwar davor bewahrt, daß diese Gesinnungen der Gebildeten bei uns eine so rohe Form annähmen wie bei den schrofferen Briten; aber solange die aristokratischen Neigungen, wovon wohl noch nie ein feiner Kopf gänzlich frei gewesen, in solcher Gestalt auftreten, steht es gar traurig um unsere innere Freiheit.

Vollends ein Gebiet, auf welchem Unfreiheit und Unduldsamkeit in Fülle wuchern, betreten wir, wenn wir fragen nach den Standesbegriffen des mächtigsten und geschlossensten der «Stände — oder wie sonst wir diese natürliche Aristokratie nennen wollen — des männlichen Geschlechts. Unglaublich weit verzweigt besteht unter uns Herren des Erdkreises eine stille Verschwörung, den Frauen einen Teil der menschlich harmonischen Bildung grundsätzlich zu versagen. Denn einen Teil ihrer Bildung erlangen die Frauen nur durch uns. Unter uns aber versteht sich von selbst, daß religiöse Aufklärung für den gebildeten Mann eine Pflicht, für den Pöbel und die Frauen ein Verderben sei, und wie viele finden eine Frau ganz absonderlich «poetisch», wenn sie den plumpsten Aberglauben zur Schau trägt. Nun gar «politisierende Weiber sind ein Greuel, darüber verlieren wir kein Wort mehr. Ist das unser mannhafter Glaube an die göttliche Natur der Freiheit? Ist die religiöse Aufklärung wirklich nur eine Sache des nüchternen Verstandes und nicht weit mehr ein Bedürfnis des Gemütes? Und doch meinen wir, die Herzenswärme der Frauen werde leiden, wenn wir sie in ihrer Weise sich erfreuen lassen an der großen Geistesarbeit der jüngsten hundert Jahre. Kennen wir die deutschen Frauen wirklich so wenig, daß wir meinen, sie würden jemals «politisieren», jemals sich den Kopf zerbrechen über Grundsteuern und Handelsverträge? Und doch bietet das politische Elend dieses Volkes eine rein menschliche Seite, welche von den Frauen vielleicht tiefer, feiner, inniger verstanden werden kann als von uns. Soll denn von dieser Fülle des Enthusiasmus und der Liebe, vor der wir so oft kalt und bettelarm und herzlos dastehen, nicht ein ärmliches Bruchteil dem Vaterlande gelten? Muß erst die Schande der Franzosenzeit sich erneuern, wenn unsere Frauen wieder, wie längst schon alle ihre Nachbarinnen in Ost und West, sich empfinden sollen als die Töchter eines großen Volkes? Wir aber haben in unfreier Engherzigkeit allzulange vor ihnen geschwiegen von dem, was uns das Innerste bewegte, wir hielten sie gerade gut genug, um ihnen von dem Nichtigen das Nichtigste zu sagen; und weil wir zu klein dachten, ihnen die Freiheit der Bildung zu gönnen, ist heute nur eine Minderzahl der deutschen Frauen imstande, den schweren Ernst dieser bedeutungsvollen Zeit zu verstehen.»

Sie sehen, man kann eben auch Dinge, die schon recht allgemein menschliche sind, aber die eben von ihm als einem nationalen Geist für seine Nation gefordert werden, von Treitschke bringen. Wenn eine von den Nationen, die heute Treitschke schelten, einen solchen Geist, wie er es für die Deutschen war, für sich in Anspruch nehmen könnte, dann würde man sehen, wie er in den Himmel gehoben würde. Man denke sich einen italienischen Treitschke, und was die Italiener sagen würden, wenn die Deutschen einem italienischen Treitschke so begegnen würden, wie die Italiener und viele andere dem Treitschke begegnet sind. Aber das, was unserer Zeit den Stempel gibt — und das ist ja das unendlich Traurige -, ist die Unwissenheit und das Rechnen auf die Unwissenheit. Es wäre ja ganz und gar unmöglich, daß solche Unwahrhaftigkeiten heute durch die Welt schwirrten, wenn man dabei nicht immer auf die Unwissenheit der Menschen rechnen könnte. Unter Unwissenheit verstehe ich natürlich nicht diejenige, die notwendigerweise dadurch entsteht, daß nicht alle Leute Zeit haben, sich über alles zu unterrichten; aber was notwendig wäre, das ist ein wenig Selbsterkenntnis. Man kann ja gewisse Verhältnisse nicht beurteilen, wenn man gewisse Dinge nicht kennt, und Urteile über ganze Völker, die aus der Unwissenheit heraus geboren sind, wirken sich in der allerschlimmsten Weise aus. Und heute ist eben unendlich vieles aus der Unwissenheit heraus geboren. Das ist natürlich bedingt durch jene schwarze Magie ich habe sie ja schon bei andern Gelegenheiten charakterisiert —, welche man heute Journalismus nennt; denn es ist eine Art von schwarzer Magie, und es war nicht unrichtig, daß, als die Buchdruckerkunst mit all den Perspektiven, die sie ergeben hat, heraufgekommen ist, die Volkslegende die Urheber als schwarze Magier empfand.

Natürlich können Sie sagen: Nun kommt zu allen Torheiten und Vertracktheiten der anthroposophisch orientierten Geisteswissenschaft auch noch diese, daß die Buchdruckerkunst als eine schwarze Magie geschildert wird. Aber ich sage ja nur «eine Art». Ich habe ja auch oftmals betont, es sei unrecht, immer zu sagen: Ahriman, oh, der darf nicht an mich heran; weg mit ihm! Luzifer, oh, der darf nicht an mich heran! Ich will nur mit den guten Göttern verkehren. — Dann können Sie eben nicht mit der Welt verkehren, denn die Welt ist nun einmal in der Balance zwischen Ahriman und Luzifer. Man kann nicht mit der Welt verkehren, wenn man diese Gesinnung haben will, wie sie insbesondere in unseren Kreisen so sehr häufig hervortritt. Im Kleinsten muß man sich Wahrhaftigkeit aneignen. Das muß das praktische Ergebnis unserer geisteswissenschaftlichen Bestrebungen sein — das praktische Ergebnis. Sie können das jetzt schon fühlen: Wenn man diesen Trieb nach Wahrhaftigkeit nicht in sich entwickelt, dann wird man immer der Gefahr ausgesetzt sein, von der in der Welt lebenden Unwahrhaftigkeit angesteckt, suggeriert zu werden. Deshalb sagte ich neulich: Die Dinge werden so verlaufen, daß in der Zukunft alles das, was als Friedensbestrebung da war, vergessen werden wird, und erinnern wird man sich in der Peripherie nur an dasjenige, was an Bebrüllung des Friedens da war; aber das wird man nicht als Bebrüllung empfinden, sondern als etwas ganz Gerechtfertigtes. Alles übrige wird man vergessen. — So wird es schon kommen. Und wenigstens sollte durch diese Betrachtungen dazu beigetragen werden, daß Gelegenheit vorhanden sei, die Dinge in ihrer Wahrheit zu empfinden. Denn heute gehört das zu den allerersten Erfordernissen des Menschen, der es mit dem Menschenheil und mit dem Menschenfortschritt ehrlich meint, sich nicht übertölpeln zu lassen von der Unwahrhaftigkeit.

Betrachten wir ein Faktum dieser Tage, ich möchte sagen, ganz sine ira, wenn auch nicht sine studio; ohne Sympathie und Antipathie, jedoch unter Zugrundelegung der Tatsachen. Sie alle haben ja gewiß gelesen, was bekanntgeworden ist als Note der Entente an den Präsidenten Wilson. Nun, von einem gewissen Standpunkte aus kann man gegenüber allen früheren vielleicht gerade diese Note als ein günstiges Symptom für die Zukunft betrachten. Denn wenn die Dinge allzuweit getrieben werden, dann wird der Bogen überspannt, und dann ist wiederum einige Hoffnung allerdings, die Hoffnung, daß, wo geistige Mächte herausgefordert werden, auch der Rückschlag von geistiger Seite dann kommen kann. Gerade durch diese Note wurde ja alles Frühere noch überboten.

Betrachten wir nun Tatsachen. Das wäre so ungefähr das heutige Osterreich-Ungarn (es wird gezeichnet). Hier etwa wäre die Donau, hier etwa würde Wien liegen. Nehmen wir nun an, es würde verwirklicht, was die Note der Entente fordert. Da wird gesagt, daß die Italiener — es sind die österreichischen Italiener gemeint — freigemacht werden wollen. Worunter diese Note der Entente am meisten leidet, das ist jene innere Unwahrhaftigkeit, die aus der vollständigen Unwissenheit kommt. Daher ist es schwer, die Zeichnung zu machen, die ich jetzt machen will. Es wird daher, wie Sie gleich sehen werden, einige Schwierigkeiten geben. Aber nehmen wir an, die italienischen Österreicher würden befreit. Nun, die Südslawen sollen auch befreit werden. Das ist ja natürlich schwer, denn die Befreiung der Südslawen würde ungefähr dieses ergeben; denn da wohnen sie überall.

Jetzt wird gesagt, komischerweise: Befreiung der Tschecho-Slowaken. Man kennt Tschechen, man kennt Slowaken - aber TschechoSlowaken kennt natürlich nur die Entente. Also es dürften vielleicht die Tschechen und die Slowaken gemeint sein. Die Befreiung würde dann das Folgende ergeben nach den Begriffen, die da herrschen unter den Tschechen selber. Dann die Befreiung der Rumänen. Das würde dieses ergeben. Dann müßten noch befreit werden, wie da steht: «...nach dem Willen seiner Majestät des Zaren», die in Galizien wohnenden Polen, aber das soll ja von Österreich selbst durchgeführt werden. Das würde dann etwa Ungarn sein, das würde etwa Österreich sein.

Diese Karte ergibt sich, wenn man sich verwirklicht denkt dasjenige, was über Österreich in der Note der Entente gesagt ist. Und daneben ist gesagt, daß man den Völkern Mitteleuropas nichts antun will!

Die ganze Note zeigt, daß da zum Beispiel gar kein Bewußtsein davon vorhanden ist, welche Schwierigkeiten es macht, die Majorität der slawischen Bevölkerung in diesen Gebieten gegenüber der verschwindenden Minorität in jenen Gebieten zurechtzukriegen. Aus dieser ganzen Note spricht die arroganteste, gewissenloseste Unkenntnis der Verhältnisse! Und damit macht man heute historische Noten. Und dann sagt man, daß man eigentlich, ja, auf nichts anderes ausgeht, als auf ich weiß schon nicht was, denn es ist fast widerwärtig, die Phrasen, die da gesprochen werden, zu wiederholen.

Aber was könnte denn besser beweisen, daß Österreich in die Notwendigkeit versetzt war, sich zu wehren, als diese Note der Entente? Was könnte einen besseren Beweis liefern? Kurz, diese Note ist nur pathologisch zu betrachten. Sie ist eine Herausforderung an die Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit selber. Das überspannt eben den Bogen. Da ist die Hoffnung vorhanden, daß, da es eine Herausforderung der geistigen Welt ist, diese geistige Welt selber notwendigerweise die Sache zurechtrücken muß, wenn auch Menschen dieser geistigen Welt selbstverständlich die Werkzeuge abgeben müssen.

Es wäre schon an der Zeit, daß eine solche Illustration, wie ich sie hier annähernd gemacht habe, dieser absolutesten weltgeschichtlichen Unkenntnis und Unwissenheit über Mitteleuropa in der ganzen Welt verbreitet würde. Es ist ja selbstverständlich, daß da, wo Gewalt wirkt, Vernunftgründe nicht viel Wirkung haben können. Aber der Anfang muß damit gemacht werden, einzusehen, daß, wenn von Recht und Freiheit gesprochen wird, Gewalt gemeint ist, richtig Gewalt gemeint ist. Die Dinge müssen beim rechten Namen genannt werden. Und gerade darunter leidet unsere Zeit, daß sich die Menschen nicht entschließen wollen, die Dinge beim rechten Namen zu nennen. Viele Menschen kommen auf vieles nicht. Wenn einem so etwas entgegentritt wie diese absolut törichte Gliederung der österreichischen Völker, dann wird ganz klar, daß die Note von Leuten stammt, die von alledem nichts wissen, was in Mitteleuropa ist, die aber die Arroganz haben, über Dinge zu urteilen, die sie gar nicht kennen und nichts anderes wollen, als ihre Gewaltherrschaft über diese Gebiete ausdehnen; denen es ganz gleichgültig ist, wie die Wirklichkeiten liegen. Aber man frägt sich doch: Wie können denn diese Dinge überhaupt zustande kommen? Zum Beispiel gibt es einige Versionen, wo es heißt: Befreiung der Slawen und der Tschechen und der Slowaken; die hiesigen Zeitungen, die wahrscheinlich richtiger übersetzen als andere, bringen aber Tschecho-Slowaken. Nicht wahr, wenn jemand etwas Richtiges sagt, wird man nicht neugierig sein, woher er die Dinge hat; wenn aber einer ein knüppeldickes Blech sagt, wie zum Beispiel die Einteilung der Völkerschaften in der Ententenote, dann sucht man, woher das Blech kommt. Und es ist nicht uninteressant, auf einen gewissen Parallelismus hinzuweisen, selbstverständlich ohne eine Hypothese darauf zu begründen, ohne irgend etwas daraus zu folgern. Ich habe mich natürlich gefragt: Woher kommen diese Termini, die unsinnig sind? — Nun, ich betone es noch einmal: Keine Hypothese, keine Schlußfolgerung, nichts davon, sondern nur ein Apergu sei gegeben.

In den letzten Tagen wurde — wobei ich wieder nicht über das Faktum urteile, sondern es nur erzähle - das Urteil veröffentlicht, das in Österreich über den Tschechenführer Kramarz gefällt wurde, der lange Zeit eine der einflußreichsten Persönlichkeiten in Österreich war. Er wurde zum Tode verurteilt und dann zu fünfzehn Jahren schwerem Kerker begnadigt. In dem Urteil ist auch die Rede davon, daß sich gewisse Artikel, die in der «Times» gestanden haben - in englischer Sprache selbstverständlich —, bei Kramarz in seiner Sprache fanden. Der Freund des Dr. Kramarz ist der aus Österreich entflohene Universitätsprofessor Masaryk, der nun in London und in Paris lebt. Man nehme anläßlich der Urteilsfällung aus dem Programm des Kramarz gewisse Sätze, auf Grund derer er verurteilt worden ist und verweile dabei. Wenn man gar nichts versteht von den österreichischen Verhältnissen, diese Sätze in der «Times» liest oder sonstwo, sie sind auch in Paris in der «Revue tchäque» erschienen, und sie verballhornt — der Kramarz spricht natürlich in richtigen Termini —, so kriegt man kurioserweise die Sätze aus der Ententenote über die österreichischen Völkerschaften heraus. Und wenn nun wirklich der Terminus «TschechoSlowaken» drinnensteht, so würde sich das merkwürdige Bild ergeben, daß bei Kramarz sich die Geneigtheit findet, einen Staat zu gründen aus den Tschechen und Slowaken, was einen Sinn hat; wer in Westeuropa aber von diesen Verhältnissen nichts weiß, der macht daraus «Tschecho-Slowaken».

Ja, es ist schon notwendig, daß man sich in der heutigen Zeit, wo so viele unterirdische Kanäle spielen, gewisse Fragen über Zusammenhänge klarlegt. Ich will auf das, was ich gesagt habe, weder Hypothesen noch Konsequenzen begründen; aber die Tatsache ist da, daß eine merkwürdige Übereinstimmung besteht zwischen einem Urteil, das gefällt worden ist, und der Ententenote. Selbstverständlich kann man über solch ein Urteil, je nachdem man dem einen oder dem andern Standpunkte angehört, die allerverschiedenste Meinung haben; man kann jemand für einen Märtyrer oder für einen Verbrecher halten, je nachdem. Über diese Sache will ich nicht urteilen; aber darauf kommt es doch an, diese merkwürdige Übereinstimmung beobachten zu können. Wie gesagt, das hat sich mir nur ergeben, als ich darauf kommen wollte, woher neben allem übrigen die grandiose Unwissenheit denn eigentlich stammt, die dieser Note zugrunde liegt.

Von dieser grandiosen Unwissenheit muß man schon sprechen; denn es ist bedeutsam und gehört unter die Charakteristiken unserer Zeit, daß von jener Seite, die den halben bewohnbaren Erdteil beherrscht, ein Urteil abgegeben wird, das auf solcher Wirklichkeitsgrundlage ruht. Das ist eine Herausforderung des Geistes der Wahrheit selber.

[Die nächsten Sätze dieses Vortrags beziehen sich auf ein vom Stenographen leider nicht aufgenommenes Zitat und sind dadurch unverständlich. Es handelt sich um ein «Schriftstück» vom 25. Juli 1914, welches auf Rasputin Bezug nimmt. Der Herausgeber.)

Man wird ja immer wieder, wenn man die Macht dazu hat - und die hat man in der Peripherie —, den Tatsachen dreist ins Gesicht schlagen können. Aber der Wahrheit kann man nicht ins Gesicht schlagen. Und die Wahrheit spricht und wird hoffentlich auch ein Impuls sein, der, wenn die Dinge am schlimmsten liegen, die Menschheit zu einigem Heil führen kann.

Morgen wollen wir weitersprechen. Nun, ich weiß nicht, es ist ja der Wunsch von einigen unserer Freunde ausgesprochen worden, die sich morgen noch weiter die Reinhardtsche Unkunst ansehen wollen, daß wir unsere Versammlung hier früher legen. Ich habe ja nichts dagegen. Wann sollen wir also dann anfangen? Vielleicht macht jemand einen Vorschlag. Wann sollen wir uns also dann treffen? Es ist ja schon ganz gut, wenn wir das denjenigen zuliebe tun, die sich für diese Auswüchse interessieren und sich persönlich kulturhistorisch unterrichten über das Zugrundegehen der Schauspielkunst.

Eighteenth Lecture

It seems to me that in our time it is particularly necessary for the members of our movement to know something about the conditions of the world. The considerations we have made here have served this purpose to a greater or lesser extent. When we speak of spiritual science in our sense, it is necessary that we penetrate deeply into the knowledge that our world, which we perceive with our physical mind and senses, is the revelation of the spiritual world. As long as the spiritual world is understood only in the abstract, by dividing human beings into their various components and engaging in all kinds of theoretical speculations about karma and reincarnation—which we have never done in a purely theoretical way—spiritual science cannot really bear fruit in life. That is why I have directed your gaze in various ways to external reality, always keeping in mind what lies behind this external reality, whether it be directly occult factors, occult impulses, or whether occult impulses are needed by people in this or that relationship.

For those who see through the current circumstances a little, it will become increasingly clear in the future, when looking back on our times, that the old historical way of looking at things, as it prevails today, is no longer sufficient to understand what is happening in the present. Certain occult teachings will emerge as necessary from the maturing knowledge of human beings through the circumstances, and those who close their minds to such things will in the future be branded with the stamp of ignorance and lack of knowledge.

Since the 19th century, it has been customary to construct history in a purely materialistic way, from the records, as they say, based on the circumstances of the past. People still do not realize that this does not lead to a true presentation of historical impulses, but merely to a description of materialistic ghosts — however paradoxical that may sound, that is what it is: a description of materialistic ghosts. What appears today in standard textbooks and other accounts as history, the descriptions of people and conditions of the past up to the present, are — however realistic they may be intended — ghosts without real life. They can only be ghosts because all reality is based on occult impulses, and if you leave these out, you are left with nothing but ghosts. That is why the presentation of history to date has been a ghostly one, but in a certain sense it has filled people's minds; it has had an effect in a certain sense. And the tragedy of the present age is in many respects precisely a living out of karma in such untrue, ghostly ideas that people have gradually adopted. But even within our movement, the course of the world must not, so to speak, fall into two unmediated halves, as some people in our movement would like: On the one hand, there is the indulgence in so-called supersensible ideas, which remain more or less abstract concepts, and on the other hand, there is the persistent adherence to the ordinary views of external reality developed by the vulgar mind, which is completely saturated with materialism. The two things—outer physical reality and spiritual existence—must be connected, that is, one must realize that the previous view of history must be replaced by what I have called symptomatic history, through which one will learn that historical development is expressed more strongly in certain phenomena than in others.

Now, in recent times I have perhaps hinted at some things in an overly realistic manner, but only overly realistic for a perception that says: Why is he describing things to us that we hear elsewhere? If you look more closely, you will find that you cannot hear them in the way they are described here, especially not in this kind of compilation, in this kind of symptom observation, in which the various characteristic details come together to form a vivid picture of reality. The question now arises: How do symptoms such as those I have described to you come about in the first place? I would like to go into this a little.

Over time, I have shared with you a series of facts, some of which people would call tiny little facts, such as those concerning the offspring of the Herzegovinian voivode Voidarevich, or what I told you about the Russian-Slavic charity committee, and so on. On the one hand, such things can easily be regarded as insignificant, but on the other hand, one might ask: How do such things come together at all? How is it that a view of history is gaining ground among us which attempts to combine widely disparate details into an overall picture? — To put the question more vulgarly, if someone were to ask me, it might be: How did you come to know precisely these things, which must be considered characteristic of present-day events, and to have gathered them in this way in your life? I would like to give an answer that will show you vividly how spiritual science can intervene in life.

One gains knowledge of such things in the course of one's life if karma brings it about and if one allows karma to run its course in a truly sincere and truthful manner. Many people think that they are allowing karma to run its course, that they are surrendering themselves to karma, so to speak; but this can be a great delusion. No one can follow external events in such a way that the truth reveals itself to them unless they truly surrender to karma, unless they leave much behind in their subconscious, allow much to pass by their soul, for all kinds of sympathies and antipathies cloud one's free view. Nothing is so likely to cloud free observation as what is today called the historical method. This historical method gives rise to ghosts, because today's historian cannot surrender himself to his karma. If he surrendered himself to his karma from early youth, he would of course fail every exam; that is quite clear. He must not abandon himself to his karma and know what karma brings him, but must know what the exam regulations and so on prescribe for him. But they prescribe all sorts of things that naturally destroy a person's karma, so that anyone who simply follows the stream prescribed for him can never arrive at the real truth. One can only arrive at the real truth if one takes these things that are spoken of in spiritual science seriously, if one does not merely regard them as theory, but takes them seriously. Of course, one does not take things seriously if one allows one's clear view to be clouded by all kinds of sympathies and antipathies. One must face them more or less objectively, then the stream of the world will bring you what is necessary for understanding.

Now, part of this surrendering to karma in relation to the events of our present time is indeed connected with the fact that you, my dear friends, have been carried into the Anthroposophical Society through your karma. Therefore, it must be possible in the Anthroposophical Society to talk about facts without being hindered by sympathies and antipathies; otherwise, karma would not be taken seriously within this society.

I wanted to preface the considerations we are about to make with this introduction because I want to show you certain important occult facts which we cannot understand unless we know how to relate them to life, and unless we can penetrate the richly tangled thicket of untruths that are swirling around the world today. The world today is full of untruths, and the sense of truthfulness must be cultivated within the Anthroposophical Society if it is to have a meaning, a real meaning in life, during its existence, regardless of how long it may continue under the present conditions.

I have now presented you with various remarks that I have made recently, not merely for the sake of bothering you, so to speak, in order to show you this or that in this or that light, but because I am deeply convinced that it is important to correct certain concepts. Anyone who believes that I am saying these things out of some kind of nationalistic fervor simply does not understand me.

Now, among the serious accusations that are repeatedly hurled at the center from the periphery of today's world, and which, as I have often said, fade away into phrases expressed in one form or another—people are embarrassed to express them in their true form: “Do nothing, the Germans will be burned” — it is also customary in the widest circles to cite certain people, whose works one naturally does not know, as the corrupters and distorters of the German people. And one of those cited in the first instance is the German historian Heinrich Treitschke. Now, as I said, I do not want to consider such a personality from a national point of view, but from a completely general human point of view. I have mentioned to you that I did not have much to do with Treitschke, but only met him once; I indicated at the time that he had something boisterous about him. Today, I would just like to say that I was able to form an impression of his nature and character from that meeting with Treitschke, because he did not, of course, only talk about what I quoted to you as his opening remarks, but also about his view of history and about historical publications that were causing quite a stir at that time, in the 1890s, and we were able to discuss discuss many fundamental questions about scientific history and the like in a few hours—banquets always last a few hours—and it was entirely possible for me to get to know the man, who was, so to speak, at the end of his life—he died soon after—apart from the fact that I am well acquainted with his work as a historian in every detail.

Now I would like to point out above all that Treitschke was a person who gives cause to view him a little from an occult point of view. In the positive sense in which Socrates spoke of a kind of daemon, one could also say of Treitschke that something of a daemon lived in him, not an evil daemon, but something of a daemon. And one did not have the feeling that he was merely driven by the considerations of the materialistic mind, but that he was driven from within, precisely by what Socrates calls demonic forces. This is what guided him, I would say, throughout his entire life. The Saxon is an enthusiastic singer of the nascent German state, for Treitschke had already made a very significant contribution when this German state had not yet been founded. However, he did not write his “German History” until after the state had been founded. He embodied in a characteristic way, as is often the case in Central Europe, something that is unknown in his surroundings—not only unwanted, but unknown and incomprehensible. He embodied, if I may say so, a sense of concreteness, of reality. A certain aversion to mere abstract theories and to all rhetoric lived in him with such demonic force that, I would say, one could see through his personality to the spiritual forces that spoke from within him. In addition, Treitschke had become completely deaf at a relatively early age, so that he could hear neither the voice of another nor his own, and he actually communicated only with his own inner self. Such a fate in life points man back to himself. The complete absence of hearing makes it much easier for people who are predisposed to it than would otherwise be the case with the complete absence of a sense to come into contact with the occult forces at work, which are only ignored because people are distracted by their senses from what speaks to the soul beyond the senses. Such karma, to become completely deaf at an early age, therefore has a certain significance and is connected with what I call in this case a demonic nature.

Now, this nature, this human being, was really in contrast to many, indeed to most people of our time, as if formed out of a unified whole. In him, it was never mere intellect that was at work, but always, in essence, the whole soul. We have enough homespun truths in the world that can be proven at any time with so-called “logical proofs”; but truths that are steeped in human blood, that are imbued with warm human feeling, must be taken seriously, whether one stands on the same or on a different point of view. For man is the channel through which the sensory world is connected to the spiritual world, and one does not reach the spiritual world merely through the study of spiritual theories, but through the acquisition of the sense of how the individual human being represents a channel between the sensory world and the spiritual world.

Above all, Heinrich Treitschke was a personality who sought to form his knowledge and thoughts on the basis of broad insight, an insight that was always built on soul-critical, not intellectual judgment. His judgments were always warm with this soul-critical spirit. They certainly had something boisterous about them, but they were warm with this soul-critical spirit. From this point of view, the question of human freedom was at the center of Treitschke's considerations. For him, as a historian who had prepared himself early on to become the historian of his people, this question was always linked to the question of political freedom, of state freedom.

Now there is a work in German literature—you can easily obtain it, because it has been published in Reclam's Universal Library—which deals in the most penetrating way with the question of the relationship between state omnipotence and human freedom, that is, freedom not only as it lives from within the human soul, but freedom as it is realized in social life. I know of no other work in world literature that deals with this question in such a compelling manner. This work is called “Ideas for an Attempt to Determine the Limits of the Effectiveness of the State” and was written by Wilhelm von Humboldt, a friend of Schiller and brother of the writer Alexander von Humboldt. In this work, written at the turn of the 18th to the 19th century, the human personality is beautifully defended in its full, humane, free development against all state omnipotence. It points out that the state should not interfere in the realm of human existence any more than is necessary to remove obstacles to the free development of the personality. The text stems from the same source as Schiller's beautiful letters “On the Aesthetic Education of Man.” And I would like to say that Wilhelm von Humboldt's writing on the limits of the state's effectiveness is a sister work to Schiller's writing “On the Aesthetic Education of Man.” It originates from a time when attempts were being made to bring together all the ideas from intellectual life that could truly place man on the ground of freedom. For certain reasons, this work was not widely used in the 19th century, but it nevertheless became a subject of study for those who, in the course of the 19th century, sought to enlighten themselves about the outer aspects of the concept of freedom. Of course, the 19th century was a time when the concept of freedom was being buried in many respects, but people still wanted to orient themselves toward the concept of freedom, and it was precisely from this point of view that Wilhelm von Humboldt's work “Ideas for an Attempt to Determine the Limits of the State's Effectiveness” gained a certain international significance in Europe. Both the Frenchman Laboulaye and the Englishman John Stuart Mill took their starting point from this work; for both of them, Wilhelm von Humboldt's writing was an important point of departure. And they, in turn, each in their own field, attempted to orient themselves toward the concept of freedom. Laboulaye found that the structure of his country, in terms of the relationship between the state and the individual, was such that it buried any real freedom, that is, any real development of the personality, under the concept of the state; John Stuart Mill, starting from Wilhelm von Humboldt after discovering him, explained in his work on freedom in a compelling manner how English society is suited to undermining the real experience of freedom. This question is precisely the subject of John Stuart Mill's work—in Laboulaye it is the state, in Mill it is society: How can the development of the individual be achieved in the absence of freedom, which has been created by society?

Treitschke, again with the soul-searching manner I just mentioned, following on from Laboulaye and John Stuart Mill, wrote his treatise on freedom in the early 1860s. And this work by Treitschke on freedom is of particular interest because, as a historian and politician, Treitschke lives entirely in the conflict into which the human soul is thrown when, on the one hand, it recognizes the necessity of that social structure called the state and, on the other hand, is enthusiastic about what is called human freedom. In the 1860s, Treitschke, in particular, attempted to grapple with Laboulaye and John Stuart Mill on the concept of freedom. In his work “Die Freiheit” (Freedom), he attempted to develop a concept of the state that did not negate the necessity inherent in the state structure, but at the same time ensured that the state became not the gravedigger but the promoter and guardian of freedom. Such a concept of the state was what Treitschke had in mind. It was a time when, in response to the question, “What is your immediate fatherland?”, a German might answer “Schwarzburg-Sondershausen” or “Reuss-Schleiz younger line.” At the beginning of the 1860s, what is now called the German Empire did not yet exist. At that time, when a large number of people were thinking about a kind of union of the various individual entities in which Germans lived, Treitschke also thought about the necessity of a state structure. But for him, it was, I would say, an axiom that no state should come into being that did not allow the human personality to develop as freely as possible. And even if one cannot say that Treitschke arrived at fully developed philosophical concepts, his writings on freedom contain many things that are very worthy of consideration, particularly with regard to this point of view.

If one wants to appreciate Treitschke and focus on what is important for the occultist, one must not ignore the fact that Treitschke was a fearless personality who wanted to serve no other god than the god of truth. It is the height of folly when people today judge Treitschke using terms that have nothing to do with objectivity, because the judgments that are circulating are mostly incapable of gaining even the slightest point of view, for the simple reason that they lack what I pointed out recently when I said that if one were to engage a little with the differentiation of national characters that arises from spiritual science, one would not talk so much nonsense. I was referring to the various foolish things that have been said, partly by him and partly through Romain Rolland. I had to say this because a thorough examination of what can be called the national spirit is really only possible today through spiritual science. Those who do not want to engage in this can only arrive at such completely subjective and therefore foolish judgments as Romain Rolland.

If one now engages with what follows from the spiritual-scientific consideration of national spirits, then one must above all be clear that certain typical national characteristics also emerge in a person who is typical of his people—and this is precisely what Treitschke was, because he had a demonic nature. This is also the case with Treitschke, and one can truly say: If you understand Treitschke, you understand much of the German character of the second half of the 19th century, not everything, but a great deal. Once you have the opportunity to gain a perspective from occultism, you must approach the fundamental difference between Western European and Central European judgments, not in cosmopolitan but in national natures. Mind you, such things cannot be considered for the general human condition, but they can be considered when the demonic-folk element lives in the spirits. It is only with this reservation that I say what I now have to say. If this folk element is viewed in this way, as something that permeates people, then what an American means when he says — perhaps it is better if I do not use my own words here, but those of an American, because my words might be taken badly — The French judgment, insofar as it is folk-like—that is, not the judgment of the individual Frenchman, who may well be cosmopolitan, but the judgment that emerges from the substance of the people, from the people themselves—lives in words; the English judgment lives in political-practical concepts; the German judgment lives in the anational, in the non-national search for knowledge. — So says an American who has traveled through Europe. But this means that certain judgments made in the West appear different within the German national character than they do in the West. In the West, they have an abstract character. As Germans, Germans are inclined to translate judgments into concrete terms and thereby call many things by their true names, which in the West are never actually referred to by their true names. Let us take a concept that is now at the center of our considerations: the concept of the state.

Treitschke spoke about the state in his lectures on politics, which have also been published. Of course, many people talk about the state, but let us now consider only talk about the state insofar as it takes place within the national substance of the people. In the West, people like to talk about the state by taking the word and then attaching all sorts of concepts to it that they want to associate with the concept of the state for whatever reason. Thus, one attaches to the state as such the concepts of freedom, justice, and all sorts of other things, and even goes so far as to utter the strange phrase: “The state must be stripped of all concepts of power; the state must be a constitutional state.” One can say this as long as one is not forced to look at the concept of the state in reality. But if one approaches the concept of the state as Treitschke does, one arrives at the secret of the state. One does not then demand that the state be based on the principle that power takes precedence over law—an assertion that is slanderously attributed to Treitschke—but one arrives at the conclusion that the concept of the state is inconceivable without the concept of power. One simply becomes true because there is no way to establish a state other than to base it on power. And if one does not admit this, then one is not representing the truth. Thus, Treitschke was compelled to speak about the state in connection with power. This is “twisted,” one might say, to claim that Treitschke asserted that power comes before law according to the German conception of the state. But there is no question that Treitschke ever had this in mind; rather, he was still too strongly influenced by Humboldt's debates: “Ideas for an attempt to determine the limits of the state's effectiveness.” Because the state must necessarily exercise power, it must not become omnipotent. One cannot speak of a constitutional state, because that means as much as—well, not exactly wooden iron, but at least copper iron. The two concepts are, as one says in logic, disparate; they have nothing to do with each other. But only those who take things seriously come to this conclusion.

And it was from this point of view that Nietzsche arrived at his concept of the “will to power.” It is, once again, nothing more than boundless slander to accuse Nietzsche of advocating the “principle of power.” He advocated nothing other than that one should consider the extent to which power actually exists under the impulses of human beings. — It is characteristic that Nietzsche puts forward the following from this point of view. He says: There are people who, out of certain principles of asceticism, advocate the thesis that power must be fought. Why do they do this? Because, according to their particular nature, they attain a special power precisely by fighting power! This is merely their particular will to power, to emphasize powerlessness! For this gives them, precisely in their nature, a particular power to emphasize powerlessness in an ascetic manner. What underlies Nietzsche's thinking, and what also haunts Treitschke's reflections, is: not to take X for U, but to tell things as they really are, not to spin phrases.

This shows you, however, that neither Treitschke nor Nietzsche were concerned with introducing any principle into social life as a principle of power, but simply with showing how power lives wherever there is a state, and how, if one wants to tell the truth, one cannot help but say so. This, I would say, is the karma under which Treitschke worked: to come to the conclusion that it is absurd to pretend to believe in mere abstract, empty concepts and trumpet them to the world. He wanted to attack reality directly, and that is precisely what makes his writings so appealing. From this point of view, he also viewed the concept of freedom in such a way that he said: The question of whether the state exists to promote freedom or not to promote freedom is not a question at all. — So he set out to look for things where they exist in reality. I do not wish to defend this, but only to characterize it today; and one cannot truly denounce as agitatory a fearless man who wanted to say things as they appeared to him in accordance with his sense of truthfulness. But agitational denigration is practiced everywhere today. Treitschke is a fearless spirit who really does set out to speak his mind everywhere and in every situation. And it would be smarter—I have to say it again—to point out how Treitschke became a kind of educator for those who wanted to hear him. There weren't as many of them as people today would have you believe. Because when Treitschke talks about freedom, he does so much less as a critic of other nations than as an educator of his own people. I would like to share with you a passage from his work “Die Freiheit” (Freedom), which should be as well known as some of the things that are taken out of context and are not understood at all when taken out of context. After first discussing the social factors that promote freedom, Treitschke writes:

“It is still very much the time to talk about class prejudices,” i.e., at the beginning of the 1860s. ‘It is indeed a depressing thought that this great cultured people’ — he means the Germans — ”still knows the barbaric legal concept of misalloyed marriage, which the ancients threw overboard at the beginning of their cultural life. We are not talking about that crude Junker class, for whom a career in the stables seems more respectable than a scientific profession, and who consider the law of the jungle to be more noble than the legal sense of a free citizen. This caricature of the nobility has had its day. But even the motley crowd of the so-called educated and wealthy classes cherishes and nurtures a wealth of unfree, intolerant class concepts. What a loveless harshness of judgment on the shamefully so-called dangerous classes! What heartless condemnation of the “luxury of the lower classes, when a free and noble man should rejoice that even the poor are beginning to care about themselves and the decency of their appearance! What base fear at every stir of defiance and self-awareness among the lower classes! German kindness of heart has indeed prevented these attitudes of the educated from taking on such a crude form among us as among the more brusque British; but as long as aristocratic tendencies, from which no refined mind has ever been completely free, appear in this form, the state of our inner freedom is very sad.

We enter a realm where lack of freedom and intolerance flourish in abundance when we inquire into the class concepts of the most powerful and closed of the “classes” — or whatever else we may call this natural aristocracy — of the male sex. There is an incredibly widespread conspiracy among us, the lords of the earth, to deny women a part of the harmonious education that is fundamental to human beings. For women can only attain part of their education through us. Among us, however, it goes without saying that religious enlightenment is a duty for educated men, but ruin for the mob and women, and how many find a woman quite peculiar, “poetic,” when she displays the crudest superstitions. Now, “politicizing women” are an abomination; we will say no more about that. Is this our manly belief in the divine nature of freedom? Is religious enlightenment really only a matter of sober reason and not much more a need of the heart? And yet we believe that the warmth of women's hearts will suffer if we allow them to enjoy in their own way the great intellectual achievements of the last hundred years. Do we really know German women so little that we think they would ever “get involved in politics,” ever rack their brains over property taxes and trade agreements? And yet the political misery of this people offers a purely human side that can perhaps be understood more deeply, more subtly, more intimately by women than by us. Should not a poor fraction of this abundance of enthusiasm and love, before which we so often stand cold, destitute, and heartless, be given to the fatherland? Must the shame of the French period be repeated before our women, like all their neighbors in the East and West, feel themselves to be the daughters of a great people? But in our unfree narrow-mindedness, we have for too long kept silent before them about what moved us most deeply; we considered them just good enough to tell them the most insignificant of trivialities; and because we thought too small to grant them the freedom of education, only a minority of German women today are capable of understanding the grave seriousness of this momentous time.

You see, Treitschke can also express things that are quite universal to humanity, but which he demands as a national spirit for his nation. If one of the nations that rebuke Treitschke today could claim for itself a spirit such as he had for the Germans, then one would see how he would be exalted. Imagine an Italian Treitschke, and what the Italians would say if the Germans treated an Italian Treitschke the way the Italians and many others treated Treitschke. But what characterizes our time—and this is infinitely sad—is ignorance and counting on ignorance. It would be completely impossible for such untruths to circulate around the world today if one could not always count on people's ignorance. By ignorance, I do not mean, of course, that which necessarily arises from the fact that not all people have time to educate themselves about everything; but what is necessary is a little self-knowledge. Certain circumstances cannot be judged if certain things are unknown, and judgments about entire peoples that arise from ignorance have the most terrible effects. And today, an infinite amount of things arise from ignorance. This is, of course, due to that black magic—I have already characterized it on other occasions—which is called journalism today; for it is a kind of black magic, and it was not incorrect that when the art of printing arose with all the perspectives it opened up, popular legend regarded its originators as black magicians.

Of course, you may say: Now, in addition to all the follies and complexities of anthroposophically oriented spiritual science, there is also this one, that the art of printing is described as black magic. But I only say “a kind of.” I have often emphasized that it is wrong to always say: Ahriman, oh, he must not come near me; away with him! Lucifer, oh, he must not come near me! I only want to associate with the good gods. — Then you cannot associate with the world, because the world is in balance between Ahriman and Lucifer. You cannot associate with the world if you want to have this attitude, which is so prevalent in our circles in particular. One must acquire truthfulness in the smallest things. That must be the practical result of our spiritual scientific endeavors — the practical result. You can already feel this now: if one does not develop this urge for truthfulness within oneself, then one will always be exposed to the danger of being infected by the untruthfulness that lives in the world, of being influenced by it. That is why I said recently: Things will turn out in such a way that in the future everything that existed as a striving for peace will be forgotten, and only those on the periphery will remember the shouting against peace; but they will not perceive this as shouting, but as something entirely justified. Everything else will be forgotten. — That is how it will be. And at least these reflections should contribute to creating an opportunity to perceive things in their truth. For today, it is one of the most fundamental requirements of people who are sincerely concerned with human welfare and progress not to allow themselves to be duped by untruthfulness.

Let us consider a fact of the present day, I would say, quite sine ira, if not sine studio; without sympathy or antipathy, but based on the facts. You have all certainly read what has become known as the Entente's note to President Wilson. Well, from a certain point of view, this note, of all previous ones, can perhaps be regarded as a favorable symptom for the future. For if things are taken too far, the bow is overstrung, and then there is again some hope, the hope that where intellectual forces are challenged, the counterblow may also come from the intellectual side. It was precisely this note that surpassed everything that had gone before.

Let us now consider the facts. This would be roughly the Austria-Hungary of today (it is drawn). Here, for example, would be the Danube, and here would be Vienna. Let us now assume that what the Entente's note demands would be realized. It says that the Italians—meaning the Austrian Italians—want to be freed. What this note from the Entente suffers from most is the internal dishonesty that comes from complete ignorance. That is why it is difficult to draw the picture I now want to draw. As you will soon see, there will be some difficulties. But let us assume that the Italian Austrians are liberated. Now, the South Slavs are also to be liberated. That is difficult, of course, because the liberation of the South Slavs would result in something like this: they live everywhere.

Now, strangely enough, they are talking about liberating the Czechoslovaks. Everyone knows the Czechs and the Slovaks, but of course only the Entente knows the Czechoslovaks. So perhaps they mean the Czechs and the Slovaks. Liberation would then result in the following, according to the terms that prevail among the Czechs themselves. Then the liberation of the Romanians. That would result in this. Then, as it says there, “according to the will of His Majesty the Tsar,” the Poles living in Galicia would also have to be liberated, but that is to be carried out by Austria itself. That would then be Hungary, that would be Austria.

This map emerges if one considers realistic what is said about Austria in the Entente note. And besides, it is said that no harm is to be done to the peoples of Central Europe!

The entire note shows that there is, for example, no awareness whatsoever of the difficulties involved in reconciling the majority of the Slavic population in these areas with the disappearing minority in those areas. This entire note betrays the most arrogant, unscrupulous ignorance of the circumstances! And that is how historical notes are written today. And then they say that they are actually aiming for nothing other than I don't know what, because it is almost repugnant to repeat the phrases that are being used.

But what could better prove that Austria was forced to defend itself than this note from the Entente? What could provide better proof? In short, this note can only be regarded as pathological. It is a challenge to truth and reality itself. That is going too far. There is hope that, since it is a challenge to the intellectual world, this intellectual world itself will necessarily have to set things right, even if people in this intellectual world must, of course, relinquish the tools.

It is high time that an illustration such as the one I have attempted here was disseminated throughout the world to show the absolute ignorance and lack of knowledge about Central Europe that exists in the world at large. It goes without saying that where violence prevails, reason cannot have much effect. But we must begin by realizing that when we speak of justice and freedom, we mean violence, and we mean violence in the true sense of the word. Things must be called by their proper names. And it is precisely this that our age suffers from, that people are unwilling to call things by their proper names. Many people do not understand many things. When one encounters something like this utterly foolish division of the Austrian peoples, it becomes quite clear that it comes from people who know nothing about Central Europe, but who have the arrogance to judge things they do not know and want nothing more than to extend their tyranny over these areas; people who are completely indifferent to the realities of the situation. But one wonders: how can such things happen at all? For example, there are some versions that say: liberation of the Slavs and the Czechs and the Slovaks; but the local newspapers, which probably translate more accurately than others, say Czecho-Slovaks. Surely, if someone says something correct, one is not curious to know where they got it from; but if someone says something completely ridiculous, such as the division of peoples in the Entente note, then one looks for the source of the nonsense. And it is not uninteresting to point out a certain parallelism, without, of course, basing a hypothesis on it or drawing any conclusions from it. I naturally asked myself: Where do these nonsensical terms come from? — Well, I emphasize once again: no hypothesis, no conclusion, nothing of the sort, just an aperçu.

In recent days — again, I am not judging the facts, but merely reporting them — the verdict was published in Austria on the Czech leader Kramarz, who was one of the most influential figures in Austria for a long time. He was sentenced to death and then pardoned to fifteen years in prison. The verdict also mentions that certain articles that appeared in The Times – in English, of course – found their way into Kramarz's language. Dr. Kramarz's friend is the university professor Masaryk, who fled Austria and now lives in London and Paris. On the occasion of the verdict, let us take certain sentences from Kramarz's program on the basis of which he was convicted and dwell on them. If one knows nothing about the situation in Austria, reads these sentences in The Times or elsewhere (they also appeared in Paris in the Revue tchäque) and distorts them – Kramarz, of course, uses the correct terms – one curiously ends up with the sentences from the Entente note on the Austrian peoples. And if the term “Czechoslovaks” really is in there, this would paint a strange picture, namely that Kramarz is inclined to found a state out of the Czechs and Slovaks, which makes sense; but anyone in Western Europe who knows nothing about these circumstances would turn this into “Czechoslovaks.”

Yes, it is indeed necessary in this day and age, when so many underground channels are at work, to clarify certain questions about connections. I do not wish to base what I have said on hypotheses or consequences, but the fact remains that there is a strange coincidence between a judgment that has been made and the Entente note. Of course, depending on which side you're on, you can have all kinds of opinions about a judgment like that; you can think someone's a martyr or a criminal, depending on how you look at it. I don't want to judge that; but what matters is being able to see this weird coincidence. As I said, this only occurred to me when I wanted to get to the bottom of where, apart from everything else, the grandiose ignorance underlying this note actually comes from.

This grandiose ignorance must be mentioned, for it is significant and characteristic of our time that a judgment based on such a foundation of reality should be made by those who rule half the inhabitable part of the earth. This is a challenge to the spirit of truth itself.

[The next sentences of this lecture refer to a quotation that was unfortunately not recorded by the stenographer and are therefore incomprehensible. It is a “document” dated July 25, 1914, which refers to Rasputin. The editor.)

When one has the power to do so – and one has that power on the periphery – one can always brazenly slap the facts in people's faces. But one cannot slap the truth in the face. And the truth speaks and will hopefully also be an impulse that, when things are at their worst, can lead humanity to some kind of salvation.

We will continue tomorrow. Well, I don't know, some of our friends who want to continue looking at Reinhardt's unartistry tomorrow have expressed the wish that we hold our meeting here earlier. I have no objection. So when shall we start? Perhaps someone would like to make a suggestion. When shall we meet? It would be good to do this for the sake of those who are interested in these excesses and want to learn about the decline of the performing arts from a cultural and historical perspective.