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From Symptom to Reality in Modern History
GA 185

19 October 1918, Dornach

Lecture II

Yesterday I attempted to sketch in broad outline the symptoms of the recent historical evolution of mankind and finally included in this complex of symptoms—at first not pursuing this in greater detail, for we shall have time for that later on, but confining ourselves more to the general characteristics—the strange figure of James I, King of England, at the beginning of the seventeenth century. This enigmatic figure appeared on the stage of history midway between the beginning of the fifth post-Atlantean epoch and the nineteenth century, a century that was important and decisive. It is not my task today—we can discuss this later—to speak of the many mysteries associated with the personality of James I. I must, however, draw your attention to the strange part, strange in a symptomatic manner, which James I plays in contemporary history. He was a man who was a bundle of contradictions and yesterday I attempted to show two contradictory aspects of his character. One can point to his virtues or his defects, according to one's point of view.

James's whole environment, the framework of the political and social conditions which developed out of the conditions I have described to you—his reign which saw the emergence of the idea of the state born of the national impulse and witnessed the rise of the parliamentary system of government or at least of a democratic system tending towards liberal ideas—this world was wholly alien to him, it was a world in which he was never really at home. If we look a little more closely at what characterizes the entire post-Atlantean epoch from the point of view of the birth of the Consciousness Soul, we shall have a clearer understanding of James I. We then see him as a personality who exhibits that radical contradiction that we so easily associate with personalities of the era of the Consciousness Soul. In the epoch of the Consciousness Soul the personality lost the value it owed in former times to the instinctive life, because it had not yet fully developed self-awareness. In earlier epochs the personality expressed itself with elemental force—and I hope I shall not be misunderstood if I say this—with brute force, with an animal force that was nonetheless endowed with soul and human attributes. The personality expressed itself instinctively, it had not yet emerged from the group soul. And now it had to break free, to become self-sufficient and stand on its own feet. Consequently the personality was faced with a strange and paradoxical situation. On the one hand, everything that had formerly existed for the purposes of personal satisfaction was sloughed off, the instincts were blunted and henceforth the soul had gradually to become the seat of the personality. In brief, the soul had to take full command.

That a contradiction exists is evident from what I said yesterday. Whereas in earlier times, when the personality had not developed self-consciousness, men had been creative and had assimilated the creative forces of their culture, these creative energies were now exhausted and the soul had become sterile. And yet the soul occupies the central place in man's being; for the essence of the personal element is that the self-sufficient soul becomes the focal point of man's being. Consequently great personalities of antiquity such as Augustus, Julius Caesar, Pericles—and I could mention many others—will never be seen again. The dynamic, elemental energy of the personality declines and there emerges what is later called the democratic outlook which, with its egalitarian doctrine, standardizes the personality. And it is precisely in this egalitarian process that the personality seeks to manifest itself—truly a radical contradiction!

Now everyone's station in life is determined by his Karma. It was the karmic destiny of James I to occupy the throne. In the epoch of the Persian Kings, of the Mongol Khans and even in the century when the Pope crowned the Magyar Istwan I1Stephen I (992–1038) King of Hungary, patron saint of Hungary. He brought Hungary into the orbit of Western Culture. The ‘sacred crown’ is now in America. with the sacred crown of St. Stephen, the personality counted for something in a position of authority, he regarded himself as the natural heir to his position. In the position he occupied, even in his position as Sovereign, James I resembled a man dressed in an ill-fitting garment. One could say that in relation to the duties and responsibilities that devolved upon him he was, in every respect, like a man dressed in a garment that ill became him. As a child he had been brought up as a Calvinist; later he was converted to Anglicanism, but fundamentally he was indifferent to both confessions. In his heart of hearts he felt all this to be a masquerade which was foreign to him. He was called upon to rule as sovereign in the coming age of parliamentary liberalism which had already been in existence for some time. In conversation with others he was intelligent and shrewd, but nobody really understood what he wanted because all the others wanted something different. He came of an old Catholic family, the Stuarts. But when he ascended the throne of England the Catholics were the first to realize that they had nothing to hope for from him. In 1605 a group of Catholics drew up plans to blow up the Houses of Parliament when the King and his chief ministers were present. They planted twenty barrels of gunpowder in the cellar beneath the parliamentary building. This was the famous Gunpowder Plot. The conspiracy failed because a Catholic fellow-conspirator betrayed the plot, otherwise James I would have been blown up together with his parliament. James I was a misfit because he was a personality, and the personality has something singular, something unusual in its make-up. It is characterized by a certain detachment, a certain self-sufficiency.

But in the era of the personality everyone wishes to be a personality and that is the inherent contradiction of this epoch. We must always bear this in mind. It is not that one rejects the idea of king or pope; it is not a question of suppressing these offices, but simply that if a king or a pope already exists, everyone would like to be pope, everyone would like to be king. Thus papacy, royalty and democracy would be realized at the same time. All these things come to mind when we consider the symptom typified by this strange personality, James I. He was in every respect a man of the new age and was involved in this age with all the contradictions latent in the personality. As I mentioned yesterday those who characterized him from the one angle were mistaken, and those who characterized from the other angle were equally mistaken; and the picture of him which we derive from his writings is also misleading. For even what he himself wrote does not give us any clear insight into his soul. Thus, if we do not consider him from an esoteric point of view he remains a great enigma on the threshold of the seventeenth century, occupying a position which, from a certain point of view, revealed in the most radical fashion the dawn of the impulse of modern times.

I spoke yesterday of the developments in Western Europe and of the difference between the French and English character. This differentiation began to show itself in the fifteenth century, and this turning point was signalized by the appearance of Joan of Arc in 1429. And we saw how, in England, the emancipation of the personality was associated with the aspiration to extend the principle of the personality to the whole world, how in France the emancipation of the personality—in both countries originating in the national idea—was associated with the aspiration to lay hold of the inner life as far as possible and to make it autonomous. This was the situation in which James I found himself at the beginning of the seventeenth century, a personality who typified all the contradictions inherent in the personal element. In characterizing symptoms one must never seek to be over scrupulously explicit, one must always leave room for something unexplained, otherwise one makes no headway. And this is why I prefer not to provide you with a neatly finished portrait of James I, but to leave something to the imagination, something to reflect upon.

A radical difference between the English and French make-up became increasingly evident. Out of the chaos of the Thirty Years' War there developed in France an increasing emphasis upon what may be called the idea of the state. If one wishes to study the consolidation of the state idea one need only take the example, though the example is somewhat unusual, of the French national state and its rise to power and splendour under Louis XIV and its subsequent decline. We see how within this national state the first shoots then develop into that widespread emancipation of the personality which is the legacy of the French Revolution.

The French Revolution brought to the fore three impulses of human life which are fully justified—the desire for fraternity, liberty and equality. But I have already indicated on another occasionT1In the lecture of 18th October, 1916 in Inner Entwicklungsimpulse der Menschheit (Bibl. Nr. 171). how, within the framework of the French Revolution, this triad, fraternity, liberty and equality, conflicted with the genuine evolution of mankind. When dealing with the evolution of mankind one cannot speak of fraternity, liberty and equality without relating them in some way to the tripartite division of man. In relation to the community life at the physical level mankind must gradually develop fraternity in the epoch of the Consciousness Soul. It would be the greatest misfortune and a sign of regression in evolution if, at the close of the fifth post-Atlantean epoch, the epoch of the Consciousness Soul, mankind had not developed fraternity at least to a large extent. But we can only fully understand fraternity if we think of it in connection with community life, the physical bond between man and man. Only at the level of the psychic life is it possible to speak of liberty. It would be a mistake to imagine that liberty can be realized in the external, corporeal life of the community; liberty, however, can be realized between individuals at the psychic level. One must not envisage man as a hybrid unity and then speak of fraternity, liberty and equality. We must realize that man is divided into body, soul and spirit, that men only attain to liberty when they seek to become inwardly free, free in their soul life, and can only be equal in relation to the spirit. That which lays hold of us spiritually is the same for all. Men strive for the spirit because the fifth post-Atlantean epoch, the era of the Consciousness Soul, strives for the Spirit Self. And in this aspiration to the spirit all men are equal, just as in death all men are equal, as the popular adage says. But if one does not apportion fraternity, liberty and equality rightly amongst these three different vehicles of man, but simply assigns them indiscriminately, saying: man shall live fraternally on earth, he shall be free and equal—then only confusion results.

Considered as a symptom, the French Revolution is extraordinarily interesting. It presents—in the form of slogans applied haphazardly and indiscriminately to the whole human being—that which must gradually be developed in the course of the epoch of the Consciousness Soul, from 1413 to the year 3573, with all the spiritual resources at man's disposal. The task of this epoch is to achieve fraternity on the physical plane, liberty on the psychic plane and equality on the spiritual plane. But without any understanding of this relationship, confusing everything indiscriminately, this quintessence of the fifth post-Atlantean epoch appears in the French Revolution in the form of slogans. The soul of this epoch is comprised in three words (fraternity, liberty and equality), but they are not understood. It is unable therefore at first to find social embodiment and this leads to untold confusion. It cannot find any external social embodiment, but significantly, is present as the ‘demanding soul,’ a soul in search of embodiment. All the inner soul life which must inform this fifth post-Atlantean epoch remains uncomprehended and cannot find any means of expression. And here we are confronted with a symptom of immense importance.

When that which is to be realized in the course of the coming epoch manifests itself almost violently at first, we are far removed from that state of equilibrium which man needs for his development, far removed from those forces which are innate in men through their connection with their own particular hierarchies. The beam of the balance dips sharply to one side. In the interplay between the Luciferic and Ahrimanic influences it dips sharply to the side of Lucifer as a result of the French Revolution. This provokes a reaction. I am here speaking more than figuratively, I am speaking imaginatively. You must not read too much into the words; above all you must not take them literally. In what appeared in the French Revolution we see, to some extent, the soul of the fifth post-Atlantean epoch without social embodiment, without corporeal existence. It is abstract, purely emotional, a soul in search of embodiment ... and this can only be realized in the course of millennia, or at least in the course of centuries. But because in the course of evolution the balance inclines to one side, it provokes a reaction and swings to the other pole. In the French Revolution everything is in a state of ferment, everything runs counter to the rhythm of human evolution. Because the balance inclines to the opposite pole a situation now arises where everything (no longer in a state of equilibrium, but alternating between the Luciferic and Ahrimanic poles) is once again fully in accordance with the human rhythm, with the impersonal claims of the personality. In Napoleon there appears subsequently a figure who is fashioned entirely in conformity with the rhythm of the personality, but with a tendency to the opposite pole. Seven years of sovereignty, fourteen years of imperial splendour and harassment of Europe, the years of his ascent to power, then seven years of decline, the first years of which he spent once again in disrupting the peace of Europe—all in accordance with a strict rhythm: seven years, then twice seven years and then again seven years, a rhythm of septennia.

I have been at great pains (and I have alluded to this on various occasions) to trace the soul of Napoleon. It is possible, as you know, to undertake these studies of the human soul in divers ways by means of spiritual scientific investigation. And you will recall no doubt how investigations were undertaken to discover the previous incarnations of Novalis.2Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg) (1772–1802). His unfinished novel Heinrich von Ofterdingen 1802 is an allegory of Novalis' spiritual life and was the representative novel of early Romanticism. I have been at great pains to follow the destiny of Napoleon's soul in its journey after his death. I have been unable to find it and do not think I shall ever be able to find it, for it is probably not to be found. And this no doubt accounts for the enigma of Napoleon's life that unfolds with clockwork precision in seven-year rhythms. We can best understand this soul if we regard it as the complete antithesis of a soul such as that of James I, or again as the antithesis of the abstraction of the French Revolution: the Revolution all soul without body, Napoleon all body without soul, but a body compounded of all the contradictions of the age. In this strange juxtaposition of the Revolution and Napoleon lies one of the greatest enigmas of contemporary evolution. One has the impression that a soul wanted to incarnate in the world, appeared without a body, clamoured for incarnation amongst the revolutionaries of the eighteenth century, but was unable to find a body ... and that only externally a body offered itself, a body which for its part could not find a soul, i.e. Napoleon. In these things there are more than merely ingenious allusions or characterizations, they harbour important impulses of historical development. They must of course be regarded as symptoms. Here, amongst ourselves, I use the terminology of spiritual science. But what I have just said could equally well be said anywhere if clothed in slightly different terminology.

When we attempt to pursue further the symptomatology of recent times we see the English character unfolding in successive stages in relative peace. Up to the end of the nineteenth century it developed fairly uniformly, it shaped the ideal of liberalism in relative peace. The development of the French character was more tempestuous, so much so that when we follow the thread of events in the history of France in the nineteenth century we never really know how a later event came to be associated with the previous event; they seem to follow each other without motivation so to speak. The major feature of the historical development of France in the nineteenth century is this absence of motivation. No reproach is implied here—I am speaking quite dispassionately. I merely wish to characterize.

We shall never be able to understand the whole symptom-complex of contemporary history if we do not perceive, as I mentioned yesterday, that in everything that takes place, both on the external plane or on the plane of the inner life, something else to be at work which I would like to characterize as follows. Even before the dawn of the fifth post-Atlantean epoch, the epoch of the Consciousness Soul, one already sensed its approach. Certain sensitives had a prophetic intimation of its advent and they felt its true character. They felt that the epoch was approaching when the personality was destined to emancipate itself, that in a certain respect it would be an unproductive era, an era without creative energy, that especially in the cultural field which fertilizes both the historical and the social life, it would be compelled to live on the legacy of the past.

This is the real motive behind the Crusades which preceded the epoch of the Consciousness Soul. Why did the people of Europe take up arms in order to recover the Holy Land and the City of Jerusalem with the Holy Sepulchre? Because they were neither able, nor willing, in the era of the Consciousness Soul, to search for a new mission, for an idea that was new and original; they endeavoured to recover the true form and substance of the ancient traditions. ‘To Jerusalem’ was the watchword—in order to rediscover the past and incorporate it in evolution in a form different from that of Rome. People sensed that the Crusades marked the dawn of the era of the Consciousness Soul with its characteristic sterility. And it was in connection with the Crusades that there was founded the Order of the TemplarsT2See note 3 to Lecture I. which was suppressed by Philip the Fair. With this Order the oriental mysteries were introduced into Europe and left their impress on European culture. It is true that Philip the Fair had the members of the Order executed as heretics and their wealth confiscatedT3Also discussed in Kosmische und menschliche Geschichte Vol III, Lecture VI; Vol IV, Lecture I. but the Templar impulses had penetrated into European life through various channels and continued to exercise an influence through the medium of numerous occult lodges which then began to work exoterically and so gradually built up opposition to Rome. On the one side stood Rome, alone at first; then she allied herself with the Jesuits. On the other side was ranged—closely connected with the Christian element and completely alien to Rome—everything that of necessity had to stand in opposition to Rome and which even Rome felt, and still feels, to be a powerful body of opposition. How is one to account for the fact that, in the face of what I described yesterday as the suggestive power of this universalist impulse which emanated from Rome, people in the West came to accept and adopt gnostic teachings, ideas, symbols and rites which were of oriental provenance? What was the deeper underlying impulse behind this phenomenon? If we look into this question we shall be able to discover the real motive behind it.

The Consciousness Soul was destined to emerge. As a bulwark against the Consciousness Soul Rome wished to preserve, and still preserves today, a culture based on suggestionism, a culture that is calculated to arrest man's progress towards the development of the Consciousness Soul and keep him at the level of the Rational or Intellectual Soul. This is the real battle which Rome wages against the tide of progress. Rome wishes to cling to an outlook which is valid for the Rational Soul at a time when mankind seeks to progress towards the development of the Consciousness Soul.

On the other hand, in progressing towards the Consciousness Soul mankind in effect finds itself in a most unhappy position which for the vast majority of people during the first centuries of the era of the Consciousness Soul and up to our own time was felt at first to be rather disturbing. The epoch of the Consciousness Soul demands that man should stand on his own feet, be self-sufficient and, as personality, emancipate himself. He must abandon the old supports. He can no longer allow himself to be persuaded into what he should believe; he must work out for himself his own religious faith. This was felt to be a dangerous precedent. When the epoch of the Consciousness Soul dawned it was instinctively felt that man was losing his former centre of gravity ... and must find a new one. But on the other hand if he remains passive, what are the possibilities before him? One possibility is simply to give him a free hand in his search for the Consciousness Soul, to set him free to develop in his own way. A second possibility is that, if left to himself, Rome then assumes great importance and may exercise considerable influence upon him, if it should succeed in curbing his efforts to develop the Consciousness Soul in order to keep him at the stage of the Rational Soul. And the consequence of that would be that man could attain neither to the Consciousness Soul nor to the Spirit Self and would therefore sacrifice his possibility of future development. This would be only one of the paths by which future evolution might be imperilled.

A third possibility is to proceed in a still more radical fashion. In order that man may not be caught between the striving for the Consciousness Soul and the limitations of consciousness imposed upon him by Rome, attempts were made to stifle his aspiration for the Consciousness Soul, to undermine this aspiration even more radically than Rome. This is achieved by emasculating the progressive impulses and substituting for their dynamism the dead hand of tradition which had been brought over from the East, though originally the Templars, who had been esoterically initiated, had had a different object in view. But after the leaders had been massacred, after the suppression of the Templar Order by Philip the Fair, something of this culture which had been brought over from the East survived, not amongst isolated individuals, but in the field of history. What the Templars had brought over gradually infiltrated into Europe through numerous channels (as I have already indicated), but to a large extent was divested of its spiritual substance. What the Templars transmitted was, in the main, the substance of the third post-Atlantean epoch ... Catholicism transmitted the substance of the fourth epoch. And that from which spiritual substance had been extracted like the juice from a lemon, that which was transmitted in the form of exoteric freemasonry in the York and Scottish Lodges and pervaded especially the false esotericism of the English speaking peoples—this squeezed out lemon which contained the secrets of the Egypto-Chaldaean epoch, the third post-Atlantean epoch, now served as a means of implanting desiccated impulses into the life of the Consciousness Soul.

Thus there arises a situation which is a travesty of the future course of evolution. Recall for a moment what I said to you on a former occasionT4The Spiritual Guidance of Man and Humanity, Anthroposophic Press, 1970. when speaking of the seven epochs of evolution. We start from the Atlantean catastrophe; then follow the post-Atlantean epochs with their corresponding relationships. 1=7, 2=6, 3=5, 4. The fourth epoch constitutes the centre without any corresponding relationship. The characteristics of the third epoch are repeated at a higher level in the fifth epoch, those of the second epoch at a higher level in the sixth epoch and those of the old Indian epoch reappear in the seventh epoch. These overlapping correlations occur in history. Isolated individuals were conscious of this. For example, when Kepler attempted in the fifth post-Atlantean epoch to explain after his own fashion the harmony of the Cosmos by his three laws saying, ‘I offer you the golden vessels of the Egyptians ...’ etcetera—he was aware that in the man of the fifth post-Atlantean epoch there is a revival of the substance of the third epoch. In a certain sense, when one takes over the esotericism, the rites of the Egypto-Chaldaean epoch, one creates a semblance of what is destined to be realized in the present epoch. But what one takes over from the past can be used not only to suppress the autonomy of the Consciousness Soul by the power of suggestion, but also to blunt, even to paralyse its dynamic energy. And in this respect a large measure of success has been achieved; the incipient Consciousness Soul has been anaesthetized to a large extent.

Rome—I am now speaking figuratively—makes use of incense and induces a condition of semi-consciousness by evoking a dreamlike state. But the movement to which I am now referring lulls people to sleep (i.e. the Consciousness Soul) completely. Moreover as history bears witness, this condition penetrated also into contemporary evolution. Thus on the one hand we have what is created through the tempestuous emergence of fraternity, liberty and equality, whilst on the other hand the impulse already exists which prevents mankind in the course of the fifth post-Atlantean epoch from perceiving clearly how fraternity, liberty and equality are to lay hold of man; for they can only perceive this clearly when they are able to make use of the Consciousness Soul in order to arrive at true self-knowledge, i.e. when they awake in the Consciousness Soul. And when men awake in the Consciousness Soul they become aware of themselves in the Body, the soul and the spirit; and this is precisely what must be prevented. We have therefore two streams in contemporary history: on the one hand, since the impulse towards the Consciousness Soul already exists, there is the chaotic search for fraternity, liberty and equality. On the other hand we see the efforts on the part of widely differing Orders to suppress this awakening in the Consciousness Soul for their own ends. These two currents interact throughout the whole history of modern times.

Now as the new era bursts upon the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth century, something new is being prepared. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century we see at first a powerful urge towards the emancipation of the personality because, when so many currents are active, the new development does not unfold gradually and smoothly, but ebbs and flows. And we see developing, on a basis of nationalism, and in response to the other impulses I have already mentioned in connection with the West of Europe, that which tends towards the emancipation of the personality, that which seeks to overcome nationality and to attain to the universal-human. But this impulse cannot really develop independently on account of the counter-impulse from those Orders which, especially in England, contaminate the whole of public life much more than people imagine. And so we see strange personalities appear, such as Richard Cobden and John Bright,3Richard Cobden (1804–54) and John Bright (1811–89), leaders of ‘Manchesterism’, the school of radical free trade principles. who were ardent advocates of the emancipation of the personality, of the triumph of the personality over nationalism the world over. They went so far as to touch upon something which could be of the greatest political significance if it should ever find its way into modern historical evolution! Differentiated according to the different countries, this principle of non-intervention in the affairs of others became the fundamental principle of English liberalism, and these two personalities of course defined it in terms of their own country. It was something of great significance, and scarcely had it been formulated before it was stifled by that other aspiration which stemmed from the impulse of the third post-Atlantean epoch. Thus up to the middle of the nineteenth century there emerged what is usually called liberalism, liberal opinion ... soon to be called free-thinking according to one's taste. I am referring to that outlook which, in the political sphere, expressed itself most clearly in the eighteenth century in the form of political enlightenment, in the nineteenth as the struggle for political liberalism4German liberalism. In 1848 the German liberals attempted to establish a constitutional state and the National Assembly offered the crown to Frederick William IV who refused to meet liberal demands. Later the movement split into moderates and radicals (the German Progressive Party). Finally the National Liberals supported Bismarck's anti-clericalism and imperialism. By the end of the century liberalism was a spent force. which gradually lost momentum and died out in the last third of the century.

The liberal element which was still prevalent everywhere in the sixties gradually ceased to be a vital force in the life of the country and was replaced by something else. We now touch upon significant symptoms of recent history. For a time the impact of the Consciousness Soul was such that it threw up a wave of liberalism. But a flood tide is followed by an ebb tide (blue). And this ebb tide is the counter-thrust to liberalism (arrow pointing downwards). Let us look at this more closely. Liberalism was born of self-discipline; its representatives tried to free themselves from constraint. They cast off the fetters of narrow prejudice and conventional ideas; they cut their moorings, if I may use the nautical expression, and refused to allow their ship to he boarded. They were imbued with universal, human ideals, but socialism was active in the preparation of the new age and gradually attracted to itself these so-called liberal ideas which found so little support. By the middle of the nineteenth century there was no political future for liberal ideas, for their representatives in later years give more or less the impression of casualties of political thinking. The latter-day liberal parties were simply stragglers, for, after the middle of the nineteenth century, the effect of what emerged from the Orders and secret societies of the West began to make its influence increasingly felt, namely, the anaesthetization, the stifling of the Consciousness Soul. Under these circumstances spirit and soul are no longer active, and only the forces of the phenomenal or sensible world are operative. And so from the middle of the nineteenth century these forces manifested in the form of socialism of every kind, a socialism that was conscious of itself, of its power and importance.

But this socialism is only possible if imbued with spirit, not with pseudo-spirit, with the mask of spirit, with mere rationalism that can only apprehend the inorganic, i.e. dead forms. It was with this ‘dead’ knowledge that Lassalle5Friedrich Lassalle (1823–64), architect of the German labour movement. In his ‘Open letter’ 1863 he urged the proletariat to form an independent political party. Founder and president of the ‘General Association of German Workers’. first wrestled, but it was Marx and Engels who elaborated it. Thus, in socialism which endeavoured to translate theory into practice, and in practice was a total failure because it was too theoretical, there appeared one of the most important symptoms of the recent historical evolution of mankind. I now propose to examine a few characteristic features of this socialism.

Modern socialism is characterized by three tenets or three interrelated tenets—the materialist conception of history, the theory of surplus value and the theory of the class struggle.6‘The materialist conception of history starts from the principle that production, and with production the exchange of its products, is the basis of every social order ... the ultimate causes of all social change and political revolutions are to be sought not in the minds of men ... but in changes in the mode of production and exchange’ (Marx: Anti-Dühring). ‘The mode of production of the material means of existence conditions the whole process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but it is their social existence which determines their consciousness’ (Marx: Preface to the Critique of Political Economy). ‘The division of labour implies from the outset the division of the conditions of labour, of tools and materials and thus the splitting up of accumulated capital among different owners, and thus, the division between capital and labour, and the different forms of property itself’ (Marx on the class war in The German Ideology). In the main these convictions are held by millions today. In order to have a clear understanding of these symptoms which will form the basis of our study tomorrow, let us first attempt to establish what we mean by the materialist conception of history.

The materialist conception of history believes that the course of evolution is determined by economic factors. Men must eat and drink, acquire the necessities of life from various sources. They must trade, exchange goods and produce what nature does not produce unaided without man's intervention. This constitutes the driving force of evolution. How is one to explain, for example, the appearance of men such as Lessing in the eighteenth century? Since the sixteenth century, and especially in the eighteenth century, the introduction of the mechanical loom and spinning-jenny has created a sharp division—and the first signs were already apparent—between the bourgeoisie and the rising proletariat. The proletariat hardly existed as yet, but it was already smouldering beneath the surface. In the course of recent economic development the bourgeoisie had gained in strength at the expense of the former estates. Through his mode of life which entailed the employment of labour, through his refusal to recognize the former estates, through his control over the production, distribution and manufacture of commodities, the bourgeois developed a certain way of thinking that was peculiar to his class and which was simply an ideological superstructure covering his methods of production, manufacture and distribution. And this determined his particular mode of thought. The peasant, by contrast, who is surrounded by nature and lives in communion with nature has a different outlook. But his way of thinking too is only an ideology. What matters is the way in which he produces and markets his merchandise. The middle classes have a different outlook from the peasant because they are crowded together in towns; they are urbanized, no longer bound to the soil, are indifferent to nature, and their relationship to nature is abstract and impersonal. The bourgeois becomes a rationalist and thinks of God in general and abstract terms. This is the consequence of his mercantile activity—an extreme view perhaps, hut nonetheless it contains a grain of truth. Because of the way in which goods have been manufactured and marketed since the sixteenth century, a way of thinking developed which was reflected in a particular way in Lessing. He represents the bourgeoisie at its apogee, whilst the proletariat lags behind in its development. In the same way Herder and Goethe are explained as the products of their environment, by their bourgeois mentality which is merely a superstructure. To the purely materialist outlook only the fruits of economic activities, the production, manufacture and marketing of goods, are real.

Such is the materialist conception of history. It accounts for Christianity by showing how, at the beginning of our era, the conditions of commercial exchange between East and West had changed, how the exploitation of slaves and the relationship between masters and slaves had been modified and how then an ideological superstructure—Christianity had been erected upon this play of economic interests. And because men were also under the necessity of producing what they ate and what they had to sell in order to provide for their sustenance in a different way from formerly, they developed in consequence a different way of thinking. And because a radical change occurred in the economic life at the beginning of our era, a radical change also occurred in the ideological superstructure which is characterized as Christianity. This is the first of those tenets which have found their way into the hearts of millions since the middle of the nineteenth century.

The entrenched bourgeoisie has no idea how firmly the materialist conception of history has taken hold of wide sections of the population. Of course the professors who expatiate on history, on the darker face of history, find a ready audience. But even amongst the professors a few have recently felt secretly drawn towards Marxism. But they have no following amongst the broad masses of the people. That is what we have come to in the epoch of the Consciousness Soul ... meanwhile the impulse of the Consciousness Soul continues to operate. People are beginning to wake up in so far as they are permitted to do so. On the one hand attempts are made to lull them to sleep; on the other hand, however, they would like to wake from their sleep. Since they are familiar only with the purely phenomenal world they have developed a materialist conception of history. Here is the origin of those strange symptoms.

Schiller, one of the noblest and most liberal of minds, was greatly admired and for years homage was paid to his memory. In 1859 monuments were erected everywhere to commemorate the centenary of his birth. In my youth there lived in Vienna a man called Heinrich Deinhardt who, in a beautiful book, tried to introduce people to the fundamental ideas which Schiller expressed in his Letters on the aesthetic education of man. The entire edition was pulped. The author had the misfortune to be caught, I believe, by a passing tram. He fell down in the street and broke his leg. Although he suffered only a minor fracture it refused to heal because he was badly undernourished. He never recovered from the accident. That is only a symptom of the treatment reserved in the nineteenth century for those who sought to interpret Schiller to the public, to awaken the consciousness of the time to the nobility of Schiller's ideas! Of course, you will say—others will say: do we not meet with noble aspirations in all spheres? Undoubtedly, and we will speak of them later, but for the most part they only lead into a blind alley.

Such is the first of the socialist tenets; the second is the theory of surplus value. It can be summarized roughly as follows: as a result of the new method of production, the man who is employed in the production and manufacture of goods must sell his labour-power as a commodity like other commodities. Thus two classes are created—the entrepreneurs and the workers. The entrepreneurs are the capitalists who control the means of production—factories, machinery, everything concerned with the means of production. The other class, the workers, have only their labour-power to sell. And because the capitalist who owns or controls the means of production can purchase on the open market the labour power of the worker, he is in a position to pay him a bare subsistence wage, to reduce to a minimum the remuneration for the commodity labour-power. But the commodity labour power, when put to use, creates a greater value than its own value. The difference between the value of labour and its product, i.e. the surplus value, goes into the pocket of the capitalist. Such is the Marxist theory of surplus value and it has the support of millions. And this situation has arisen simply through the particular economic structure of the social life in recent times. Ultimately this leads to the class struggle, to exploiters and exploited.

Fundamentally these are the tenets which, since the middle of the nineteenth century, have increasingly won over limited circles at first, then political groups and parties, and finally millions of men to the idea of a purely economic structure of society. One may easily conclude from an extension of the ideas sketched here that the individual ownership of the means of production therefore means the end of man's future evolution, that there must be common ownership and common administration of the means of production by the workers.—Expropriation of the means of production has become the ideal of the working class.

It is most important not to become the prisoner of fixed ideas which are unrelated to reality, ideas which are still held by many members of the bourgeoisie who have been asleep to recent developments. For many of the dyed-in-the wool representatives of the bourgeoisie who are oblivious of the developments of recent decades still imagine that there are communists and social democrats who believe in sharing, in joint ownership, etcetera. They would be astonished to learn that millions of people have a carefully elaborated and clear-cut idea of how this is to be realized and must be realized, namely, by eliminating surplus value and bringing the means of production under common ownership. Every socialist agitator of today, every socialist ‘stooge’ laughs at the bourgeois who talks to them of communist and social-democratic aims, for he realizes that the central issue is the socialization of the means of production, the collective administration of the means of production. For, in the workers' eyes the source of slavery lies in the ownership of the means of production by isolated individuals, because he who is without the means of production is defenceless against the industrial employer who controls them.

The social struggle of modern times, therefore, is fundamentally the struggle for the ownership of the means of production. This struggle is inevitable since ‘the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles’ (Marx in the Communist Manifesto). This is the third of the social-democratic tenets. The rise of the bourgeoisie was achieved at the expense of the feudal aristocracy. The rising proletariat in its turn will take over the control and administration of the means of production and finally eliminate the bourgeoisie, just as the bourgeoisie had eliminated the aristocracy. History is the history of class struggles; the progress of mankind is determined by the victory of one class over another.

These three ideals—first, that material impulses alone determine the progress of mankind and the rest is simply ideological superstructure; secondly that the real evil is surplus value which can only be overcome by the collective ownership and administration of the means of production; and thirdly that the bourgeoisie must be overthrown, in the same way as the bourgeoisie had overthrown the old feudal aristocracy, in order that the means of production may become common property ... these are the three socialist doctrines which have gradually spread throughout the civilized world. And a significant Symptom of recent years is this: the surviving members of the aristocracy and of the bourgeoisie have opted out, have picked up at most a few cliches such as ‘sharing of goods’, ‘communism’—those cliches which are sometimes commented upon at length at the back of history books, though rarely is there a word about them in the text! People were oblivious of what had really happened; they were asleep whilst events took their course. And finally with great difficulty, under the compulsion of circumstances, under the influence of what has happened in the last four years (i.e. 1914–1918) a few people have begun to open their eyes. It is inconceivable how unaware people would have been but for the war, unaware that with every year thousands upon thousands were won over to the cause of socialism, never realizing that they were sitting on a volcano! It is disconcerting to have to admit that one is sitting on a volcano; people prefer to bury their heads in the sand. But that does not prevent the volcano from erupting and burying them alive.

I have here described a further symptom of contemporary history. This socialist conviction belongs to the symptoms of our time. It is a fact and not merely some vague theory. It is efficacious. I do not attach any importance to the solid body of the Lassallean and Marxist theory, but I attach great importance to the fact that millions of men have chosen as their ideal to realize, as far as possible, what is advocated in the three tenets I have mentioned. This however is something which is radically opposed to the national element which, as I indicated earlier, was in some respect the founding father of modern history. Many things have developed out of this national element. Now the programme of the proletariat was first proclaimed in 1848 in the closing words of the Communist Manifesto, workers of the world unite’. There was scarcely a socialist meeting throughout the world that did not close with three cheers for international revolutionary socialism, republican social democracy. It was an international practice. And thus, alongside the internationalism of the Roman Church with its universalist idea there arose the Socialist International. That is a fact, and these countless numbers of socialists are a fact. It is important to bear this in mind.

In order to conclude tomorrow—at least provisionally—this symptomatology of recent times we must pay close attention to the path which will enable us to follow the symptoms until they reveal to us to some extent the point where we can penetrate to the underlying reality. In addition to this we must recognize the fact that others have also created insoluble problems—you must feel how things develop, how they come to a head and end as insoluble problems! We saw how, in the nineteenth century, the trend towards a more liberal form of parliamentary government developed relatively peacefully in England; in France amidst political ferment and turmoil, or rather without motivation. And the further we move eastwards, the more we find that the national element is something imported, something transmitted from outside ... and this gives rise to insoluble problems. And that too is a symptom! The naive imagine that there is a solution to everything. Now an insoluble problem of this nature (insoluble not to the abstract intellect, but insoluble in reality), was created 1870/71 between Western, Central and Eastern Europe—the problem of Alsace. The pundits of course know how to solve it—one state conquers the territory of its neighbour and the problem is solved. This has been tried by the one side or the other in the case of Alsace. Or if that solution is excluded, one can resort to the ballot box and the majority decides! That is simple enough. But those who are realists, who see more than one standpoint, who are aware that time is a real factor and that one cannot achieve in a short space of time what lies in the bosom of the future—in short, those who stand four square on the earth were aware that this was an insoluble problem. Read, for example, what was written, thought and said upon this problem in the seventies by those who attempted to throw light upon the future course of European evolution. They saw that what had happened in Alsace strangely anticipated later conditions in Europe, that the West would feel impelled to appeal to the East. At that time there were a few who were aware that the world would be confronted by the Slav problem because the West and Central Europe held different views upon the solution of this question. I only want to point out that this situation is an obvious Symptom like that of the Thirty Years' War which I mentioned yesterday in order to show you that in history it is impossible to demonstrate that subsequent effects are the consequence of antecedent causes. The Thirty Years' War shows that the situation at the beginning, and before the outbreak of the war in 1618 was identical with the situation at the end of the war. The consequences of the war were unrelated to the antecedent causes; there can be no question therefore of cause and effect here (i.e. in the case of the Thirty Years' War). We have a characteristic Symptom, and the same applies not only to the Alsatian problem, but also to many questions which have arisen in recent times. Problems are raised which do not lead to a solution, but to ever new conflicts and end in a blind alley. It is important to bear this in mind. These problems lead to such total deadlock that men cannot agree amongst themselves; opinions must differ because men inhabit different geographical regions in Europe. And it is a characteristic feature of the symptoms of recent history that men contrive to create situations that are incapable of solution.

We are now familiar with a whole series of features that are characteristic of the recent evolution of mankind—its sterility, the birth, in particular, of collective ideas which have no creative pretensions, such as the national impulse, for example. And in the midst of all this the continuous advance of the Consciousness Soul. We see everywhere problems that end in blind alleys, a characteristic feature of modern times. For what is discussed today, the measures undertaken by men today are to a large extent simply the revolving of the squirrel's cage. And a further characteristic is the attempt to damp down the consciousness, especially in relation to the Consciousness Soul which has to be developed. Nothing is more characteristic of our time than the lack of awareness amongst the educated section of the population of the real situation of the proletariat. They do not look beyond the external facade. Housewives complain that maidservants are unwilling to undertake certain duties; they seem unconcerned that not only factory workers, but also maidservants are saturated with Marxist theory. People are gradually beginning to talk of universal ideas of humanity in every shape and form. But if we show no concern for the individual and his welfare this is merely empty talk. For we must become aware of the important developments in evolution and we must take an active part in events.

I have felt compelled to draw your attention to this Symptom of socialism, not in order to expound some particular social theory, but in order to present to you characteristic features of recent historical development.

We will continue our investigations tomorrow in order to round off this subject and to penetrate to the reality in isolated cases.

Zweiter Vortrag

Gestern habe ich versucht, Ihnen in großen Zügen ein Bild der Symptome der neueren geschichtlichen Entwickelung der Menschheit zu geben und habe zuletzt wie hineingestellt in diesen Komplex von Symptomen — den wir zunächst nicht schon so verfolgten, daß wir überall auf dasjenige etwa geschaut hätten, was er offenbart, das werden wir auch noch tun, sondern den wir mehr im allgemeinen charakterisiert haben — die merkwürdige Erscheinung Jakob I. von England. Er steht da zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts als sogenannter Herrscher in England eigentlich wie eine Art Rätselgestalt, ungefähr um die Mitte desjenigen Zeitraumes, der verflossen ist vom Beginne des fünften nachatlantischen Zeitraumes bis in das wichtige, Entscheidung bringende 19. Jahrhundert. Es wird hier noch nicht — das kann später geschehen — meine Aufgabe sein, über manches Geheimnis, das mit der Persönlichkeit Jakob I. verbunden ist, zu sprechen. Heute kann das noch nicht meine Aufgabe sein, aber ich muß schon heute darauf hinweisen, wie merkwürdig, wiederum symptomatisch merkwürdig dieser Jakob I. im Verlauf der neueren Geschichte drinnensteht. Man möchte sagen: Ein Mensch, der wirklich nach allen Seiten so widerspruchsvoll charakterisiert werden könnte, wie ich es gestern von zwei Seiten aus versucht habe. Man kann das Beste und man kann das Übelste, je nachdem man es färbt, über ihn sagen.

Man kann vor allen Dingen aber von diesem Jakob I. sagen, daß er auf dem Boden, auf dem er steht, und der sich herausentwickelt hat aus all den Verhältnissen, die ich Ihnen geschildert habe und auf dem sich besonders entwickelt ein Staatsgedanke, der aus dem Nationalimpuls herausgewachsen ist, auf dem sich das entwickelt, was wir charakterisiert haben als liberalisierenden, wenigstens dem Liberalisieren zuneigenden, zustrebenden Parlamentarismus, daß auf diesem Boden Jakob I. erscheint wie eine entwurzelte Pflanze, wie ein Wesen, das nicht so recht zusammenhängt mit diesem Boden. Schauen wir aber etwas tiefer auf dasjenige, was diesen ganzen fünften nachatlantischen Zeitraum nach einer Seite hin charakterisiert, nach der Seite der Geburt der Bewußtseinsseele, dann wird es schon in einer gewissen Beziehung heller um diesen Jakob I. Dann sieht man, daß er die Persönlichkeit ist, welche jenen radikalen Widerspruch darlebt, der so leicht verbunden ist mit Persönlichkeiten aus der Zeit des Bewußtseinszeitalters. Nicht wahr, in dieser Zeit des Bewußtseinszeitalters, da verliert die Persönlichkeit denjenigen Wert, den sie früher kraft der Instinkte gerade dadurch gehabt hat, daß sie eigentlich als selbstbewußste Persönlichkeit nicht ausgebildet war. Die Persönlichkeit lebte sich dar in früheren Zeitaltern, man möchte sagen, mit elementarer Kraft, mit einer vermenschlichten, verseelten - man wird mich nicht mißverstehen, wenn ich das sage — tierischen Kraft. Instinktiv lebte sich die Persönlichkeit dar, noch nicht herausgeboren aus dem Gruppenseelentum, noch nicht ganz herausgeboren. Und jetzt sollte sie sich emanzipieren, sollte sich auf sich selbst stellen. Dadurch ergibt sich gerade für die Persönlichkeit ein ganz merkwürdiger Widerspruch. Auf der einen Seite wird alles das, was früher da war für das individuell-persönliche Ausleben, abgestreift, die Instinkte werden hinabgelähmt, und im Innern der Seele soll sich das Zentrum des Persönlichen allmählich gestalten. Die Seele soll vollinhaltliche Kraft gewinnen.

Daß ein Widerspruch vorhanden ist, Sie sehen es vor allen Dingen an dem, was ich schon gestern sagte. Während man früher, in den Zeitaltern, in denen die Persönlichkeit noch nicht geboren war als selbstbewußte Persönlichkeit, der Kulturentwickelung ganz produktive Kräfte einverleibt hat, hört das jetzt auf. Die Seele wird steril. Und dennoch stellt sie sich in den Mittelpunkt des Menschen, denn darinnen besteht das Persönliche, daß die Seele sich auf sich selbst, in den Mittelpunkt der Persönlichkeit der Menschenwesenheit stellt. So daß solche überragenden Persönlichkeiten, wie sie dem Altertum eigen waren, Augustus, Julius Cäsar, Perikles — wir könnten alle möglichen nennen — nicht mehr möglich werden. Gerade das Elementare der Persönlichkeit verliert an Wert, und es taucht auf das, was sich später demokratische Gesinnung nennt, die die Persönlichkeit nivelliert, die alles gleichmacht. Aber gerade in diesem Gleichmachen will die Persönlichkeit erscheinen. Ein radikaler Widerspruch!

Jeder steht durch sein Karma auf irgendeinem Posten. Nun, Jakob I. stand gerade auf dem Posten des Herrschers. Gewiß, in der Zeit der Perserkönige, in der Zeit der Mongolenkhane, selbst noch in dem Zeitalter, in dem der Papst dem magyarischen Istwan, Stephan I., die heilige Stephanskrone aufsetzte, bedeutete die Persönlichkeit etwas in einer bestimmten Stellung drinnen, konnte sich auffassen als hineingehörig in diese Stellung. Jakob I. war in seiner Stellung, auch in seiner Herrscherstellung drinnen wie ein Mensch, der in einem Gewande drinnensteckt, von dem ihm aber auch gar nichts paßt. Man kann sagen, Jakob I. war in jeder Beziehung in all dem, worinnen er drinnensteckte, eben wie ein Mensch in einem Gewande, das ganz und gar nicht paßte. Er war als Kind calvinisch erzogen worden, war dann später zur anglikanischen Kirche übergegangen, allein im Grunde genommen war ihm der Calvinismus ebenso gleichgültig wie die anglikanische Kirche. Im Innern seiner Seele war das alles Gewand, das ihm nicht paßte. Er war berufen, im herannahenden Zeitalter des parlamentarischen Liberalismus, der sogar schon eine Zeitlang geherrscht hatte, als Herrscher zu regieren. Er war sehr klug, sehr gescheit, wenn er mit den Leuten sprach, aber niemand verstand eigentlich, was er wollte, denn alle anderen wollten etwas anderes. Er war aus einer urkatholischen Familie heraus, der Familie der Stuarts. Aber als er auf den Thron kam in England, da sahen die Katholiken am allermeisten, wie sie eigentlich nichts von ihm zu erwarten hatten. Daraus entsprang ja jener sonderbare Plan, der so merkwürdig in der Welt dasteht, 1605, nicht wahr, wo sich eine ganze Anzahl von Leuten, die aus dem Katholizismus herausgewachsen waren, zusammentaten, möglichst viel Pulver unter dem Londoner Parlament ansammelten, und in einem geeigneten Augenblicke sollten sämtliche Parlamentsmitglieder in die Luft gesprengt werden. Es war die bekannte Pulververschwörung. Die Sache ist nur dadurch verhindert worden, daß ein Katholik, der davon wußte, die Sache verraten hatte, sonst würde sich über diesem Jakob I. das Schicksal abgespielt haben, daß er mit seinem ganzen Parlamente eines Tages in die Luft geflogen wäre. In nichts paßte er hinein, denn er war eine Persönlichkeit, und die Persönlichkeit hat etwas Singuläres, etwas, was in der Isolierung gedacht, was auf sich selbst gestellt ist.

Aber im Zeitalter der Persönlichkeit will jeder eine Persönlichkeit sein. Das ist der radikale Widerspruch, der sich ergibt im Zeitalter der Persönlichkeit, das müssen wir nicht vergessen. Im Zeitalter der Persönlichkeit ist es nicht so, daß man zum Beispiel die Königs-Idee oder die Papst-Idee ablehnt. Es ist ja nicht darum zu tun, daß kein Papst oder kein König da sei. Nur möchte, wenn schon ein Papst oder ein König da ist, jeder ein Papst und jeder König sein, dann wären gleichzeitig Papsttum, Königtum und Demokratie erfüllt. Alle diese Dinge fallen einem bei, wenn man diese merkwürdige Persönlichkeit Jakob I. eben symptomatisch ins Auge faßt, denn er war durch und durch ein Mensch des neuen Zeitalters, aber damit auch mit allen Widersprüchen der Persönlichkeit in das neue Zeitalter hineingestellt. Und Unrecht hatten diejenigen, die ihn von der einen Seite charakterisierten, wie ich gestern mitteilte, und Unrecht hatten diejenigen, die ihn von der anderen Seite charakterisierten, und Unrecht hatten seine eigenen Bücher, die ihn charakterisierten, denn auch was er selber schrieb, führt uns durchaus nicht in irgendeiner direkten Weise in seine Seele hinein. So steht er, wenn man ihn nicht esoterisch betrachtet, wie ein großes Rätsel im Beginne des 17. Jahrhunderts gerade auf einem Posten, der von einer gewissen Seite her am allerradikalsten das Heraufkommen des neuzeitlichen Impulses zeigte.

Erinnern wir uns noch einmal an das gestern Gesagte: wie die Dinge eigentlich im Westen Europas zustande gekommen sind. Ich habe gesprochen von der Differenzierung des englischen, des französischen Wesens. Wir sehen diese Differenzierung seit dem 15. Jahrhundert. Der Wendepunkt kommt mit dem Auftreten der Jungfrau von Orleans, 1429. Wir sehen, wie die Dinge sich entwickeln. Wir sehen, wie in England die Emanzipation der Persönlichkeit Platz greift mit der Aspiration, die Persönlichkeit in die Welt hinauszutragen, wie in Frankreich die Emanzipation der Persönlichkeit Platz greift — auf beiden Böden aus der nationalen Idee heraus entspringend — mit der Aspiration, möglichst das Innere des Menschen zu ergreifen und es auf sich selbst zu stellen. Da drinnen steht zunächst, also im Beginne des 17. Jahrhunderts, eine Persönlichkeit, die wie der Repräsentant aller Widersprüche des Persönlichen dasteht, Jakob I. Wenn man Symptome charakterisiert, muß man niemals pedantisch fertig werden wollen, sondern immer einen unaufgelösten Rest lassen, sonst kommt man nicht weiter. So charakterisiere ich Ihnen Jakob I. keineswegs so, daß Sie ein schönes geschlossenes Bildchen haben, sondern so, daß Sie etwas daran zu denken, vielleicht auch zu rätseln haben.

Es ist immer mehr und mehr hervortretend ein radikaler Unterschied zwischen dem englischen Wesen und dem französischen Wesen. Gerade im französischen Wesen entwickelt sich aus den Wirren des Dreißigjährigen Krieges heraus auf nationalem Grunde dasjenige, was man nennen kann die Erstarkung des Staatsgedankens. Man kann, wenn man die Erstarkung des Staatsgedankens studieren will, dieses nur an dem Beispiele — aber das Beispiel ist ziemlich singulär — der Entstehung, des Hinaufkommens zu hohem Glanze und des Herabsteigens wiederum des französischen Nationalstaates tun, an Ludwig XIV. und so weiter. Wir sehen, wie dann im Schoße dieses Nationalstaates die Keime sich entwickeln zu jener weitergehenden Emanzipation der Persönlichkeit, die mit der Französischen Revolution gegeben ist.

Diese Französische Revolution, sie bringt herauf drei, man kann sagen, allerberechtigtste Impulse des menschlichen Lebens: das Brüderliche, das Freiheitliche, das Gleiche. Aber ich habe es schon einmal bei einer anderen Gelegenheit charakterisiert, wie widersprechend der eigentlichen Menschheitsentwickelung innerhalb der Französischen Revolution diese Dreiheit auftrat: Brüderlichkeit, Freiheit, Gleichheit. Man kann, wenn man mit der menschlichen Entwickelung rechnet, von diesen dreien, von Brüderlichkeit, Freiheit und Gleichheit, nicht sprechen, ohne daß man in irgendeiner Beziehung von den drei Gliedern der Menschennatur spricht. In bezug auf das leibliche Zusammenleben der Menschen muß die Menschheit allmählich gerade im Zeitalter der Bewußtseinsseele aufsteigen zu einem brüderlichen Element. Es würde einfach ein unsagbares Unglück und eine Zurückwerfung sein in der Entwickelung, wenn am Ende des fünften nachatlantischen Zeitraumes, des Zeitalters der Bewußtseinsseele, nicht wenigstens bis zu einem hohen Grade unter den Menschen die Brüderlichkeit ausgebildet wäre. Aber die Brüderlichkeit kann man nur richtig verstehen, wenn man sie angewendet denkt auf das Zusammenleben von Menschenleib zu Menschenleib im physischen Sein. Steigt man aber herauf zum Seelischen, dann kann die Rede sein von der Freiheit. Man wird immer im Irrtum drinnen leben, wenn man glaubt, daß sich Freiheit irgendwie realisieren läßt im äußeren leiblichen Zusammenleben; aber von Seele zu Seele läßt sich Freiheit realisieren. Man darf nicht chaotisch den Menschen als eine Mischmasch-Einheit auffassen und dann von Brüderlichkeit, Freiheit und Gleichheit sprechen, sondern man muß wissen, daß der Mensch gegliedert ist in Leib, Seele und Geist, und muß wissen: Zur Freiheit kommen die Menschen nur, wenn sie in der Seele frei werden wollen. Und gleich sein können die Menschen nur in bezug auf den Geist. Der Geist, der uns spirituell ergreift, der ist für jeden derselbe. Er wird angestrebt dadurch, daß der fünfte Zeitraum, die Bewußtseinsseele, nach dem Geistselbst strebt. Und mit Bezug auf diesen Geist, nach dem da gestrebt wird, sind die Menschen gleich, geradeso wie, eigentlich zusammenhängend mit dieser Gleichheit des Geistes, das Volkssprichwort sagt: Im Tode sind alle Menschen gleich. - Aber wenn man nicht verteilt auf diese drei differenzierten Seelenglieder Brüderlichkeit, Freiheit und Gleichheit, sondern sie mischmaschartig durcheinanderwirft und einfach sagt: Der Mensch soll brüderlich leben auf der Erde, frei sein und gleich sein—, dann führt das nur zur Verwirrung.

Wie tritt uns daher, symptomatisch betrachtet, die Französische Revolution entgegen? Gerade symptomatisch betrachtet ist die Französische Revolution außerordentlich interessant. Sie stellt dar, gewissermaßen in Schlagworten zusammengedrängt und mischmaschartig auf den ganzen Menschen undifferenziert angewendet, dasjenige, was mit allen Mitteln geistiger Menschheitsentwickelung im Laufe des Zeitalters der Bewußtseinsseele, von 1413, also 2160 Jahre mehr, bis zum Jahre 3573, allmählich entwickelt werden muß. Das ist die Aufgabe dieses Zeitraumes, daß für die Leiber die Brüderlichkeit, für die Seelen die Freiheit, für die Geister die Gleichheit erworben werden während dieses Zeitraumes. Aber ohne diese Einsicht, tumultuarisch alles durcheinanderwerfend, tritt dieses innerste Seelische des fünften nachatlantischen Zeitraumes schlagwortartig in der Französischen Revolution auf. Es steht unverstanden da die Seele des fünften nachatlantischen Zeitraumes in diesen drei Worten und kann daher zunächst keinen äußeren sozialen Leib gewinnen, führt im Grunde genommen zu Verwirrung über Verwirrung. Es kann keinen äußeren sozialen Leib gewinnen, steht aber da wie die fordernde Seele, außerordentlich bedeutsam. Man möchte sagen: Alles Innere, was dieser fünfte nachatlantische Zeitraum haben soll, steht unverstanden da und hat kein Äußeres. Aber gerade da tritt etwas symptomatisch ungeheuer Bedeutsames auf.

Sehen Sie, so etwas, wo das, was über den ganzen nächsten Zeitraum ausgedehnt werden soll, am Anfange fast tumultuarisch zutage tritt, so etwas entfernt sich sehr weit von der Gleichgewichtslage, in welcher sich die Menschheit entwickeln soll, von den Kräften, die den Menschen eingeboren sind dadurch, daß sie mit ihren ureigenen Hierarchien zusammenhängen. Der Waagebalken schlägt sehr stark einseitig aus. Luziferisch-ahrimanisch schlug durch die Französische Revolution der Waagebalken sehr stark nach der einen Seite aus, namentlich nach der luziferischen Seite. Das erzeugt einen Gegenschlag. Man spricht so, ich möchte sagen, schon mehr als bildlich, man spricht imaginativ, aber Sie müssen dabei die Worte nicht allzusehr pressen und müssen vor allen Dingen nicht die Sache wortwörtlich nehmen: In dem, was in der Französischen Revolution auftrat, ist gewissermaßen die Seele des fünften nachatlantischen Zeitraums ohne den sozialen Körper, ohne die Leiblichkeit. Es ist abstrakt, bloß seelenhaft, strebt nach Leiblichkeit; aber das soll erst geschehen im Verlauf von Jahrtausenden selbst, vielen Jahrhunderten wenigstens. Doch weil die Waagschale der Entwickelung so ausschlägt, ruft es einen Gegensatz hervor. Und was erscheint? Ein Extrem nach der anderen Seite. In der Französischen Revolution geht alles tumultuarisch zu, alles widerspricht dem Rhythmus der menschlichen Entwickelung. Indem es nach der anderen Seite ausschlägt, tritt etwas ein, wo alles nun wiederum ganz — und zwar jetzt nicht in der mittleren Gleichgewichtslage, sondern streng ahrimanisch-luziferisch - dem menschlichen Rhythmus entspricht, dem unpersönlichen Fordern der Persönlichkeit. In Napoleon stellt sich hinterher der Leib entgegen, der ganz nach dem Rhythmus der menschlichen Persönlichkeit, aber jetzt mit dem Ausschlag nach der anderen Seite, gebaut ist: sieben Jahre Vorbereitung - ich habe es schon einmal aufgezählt — für sein eigentliches Herrschertum, vierzehn Jahre Glanz, Beunruhigung von Europa, Aufstieg, sieben Jahre Abstieg, wovon er nur das erste Jahr dazu verwendet, Europa noch einmal zu beunruhigen, aber streng ablaufend im Rhythmus: einmal sieben plus zweimal sieben plus einmal sieben, streng im Rhythmus von sieben zu sieben Jahren ablaufend, viermal sieben Jahre im Rhythmus ablaufend.

Ich habe mir wirklich viel Mühe gegeben — manche wissen, wie ich da oder dort darüber eine Andeutung gegeben habe -, die Seele Napoleons zu finden. Sie wissen, solche Seelenstudien können in der mannigfaltigsten Weise mit den Mitteln der Geistesforschung gemacht werden. Sie erinnern sich, wie Novalis’ Seele in früheren Verkörperungen gesucht worden ist. Ich habe mir redlich Mühe gegeben, Napoleons Seele, zum Beispiel bei ihrer Weiterwanderung nach Napoleons Tod, irgendwie zu suchen - ich kann sie nicht finden, und ich glaube auch nicht, daß ich sie je finden werde, denn sie ist wohl nicht da. Und das wird wohl das Rätsel dieses Napoleon-Lebens sein, das abläuft wie eine Uhr, sogar nach dem siebenjährigen Rhythmus, das auch am besten verstanden werden kann, wenn man es als das volle Gegenteil eines solchen Lebens wie Jakobs I. betrachtet, oder auch als das Gegenteil der Abstraktion der Französischen Revolution: die Revolution ganz Seele ohne Leib, Napoleon ganz Leib ohne Seele, aber ein Leib, der wie zusammengebraut ist aus allen Widersprüchen des Zeitalters. Es verbirgt sich eines der größten Rätsel der neuzeitlichen Entwickelungssymptome, sagen wir, in dieser merkwürdigen Zusammenstellung Revolution und Napoleon. Es ist, als ob eine Seele sich verkörpern wollte auf der Welt und körperlos erschien, und unter den Revolutionären des 18. Jahrhunderts herumrumorte, aber keinen Körper finden konnte, und nur äußerlich ihr ein Körper sich genähert hätte, der wiederum keine Seele finden konnte: Napoleon. In solchen Dingen liegen mehr als etwa bloß geistreich sein sollende Anspielungen oder Charakterisierungen, in solchen Dingen liegen bedeutsame Impulse des historischen Werdens. Allerdings müssen die Dinge symptomatisch betrachtet werden. Hier unter Ihnen rede ich in den Formen der geisteswissenschaftlichen Forschung. Aber selbstverständlich, das, was ich jetzt zu Ihnen gesprochen habe, kann man, indem man die Worte ein bißchen anders wählt, überall sonst sagen.

Und dann, wenn wir versuchen die Symptomgeschichte der neueren Zeit weiter zu verfolgen, sehen wir, verhältnismäßig ruhig, wirklich wie Glieder aufeinander folgend, das englische Wesen sich fortentwikkeln. Im 19. Jahrhundert entwickelt sich das englische Wesen bis zum Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts ziemlich gleichmäßig, ich möchte sagen, in einer gewissen Ruhe das Ideal des Liberalismus geradezu ausprägend. Es entwickelt sich das französische Wesen etwas tumultuarischer, so daß man eigentlich, wenn man die Ereignisse der französischen Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert verfolgt, nie recht weiß: wie kam eigentlich das Folgende dazu, sich an das Vorangehende anzureihen? — unmotiviert, möchte man sagen. Das ist der hauptsächlichste Grundzug der Entwickelungsgeschichte Frankreichs im 19. Jahrhundert: unmotiviert. Es ist kein Tadel — ich spreche ganz ohne Sympathie und Antipathie —, sondern nur eine Charakteristik.

Nun wird man niemals hineinsehen können in dieses ganze Symptomgewebe der neueren Geschichte, wenn man nicht den Blick darauf wirft, wie eigentlich sich in all dem, was so mehr äußerlich — oder auch seelisch innerlich, aber doch in einem gewissen Sinne äußerlich, wie ich gestern erwähnt habe - sich abspielt, wiederum etwas anderes wirkt. Das möchte ich Ihnen so charakterisieren. Man empfindet schon in einer gewissen Weise, sogar bevor dieses fünfte nachatlantische Zeitalter beginnt, das Herannahen dieses Zeitalters der Bewußtseinsseele. Wie in einem Vorausahnen empfinden es gewisse Naturen. Und sie empfinden es eigentlich mit seinem Charakter, sie empfinden: Es kommt das Zeitalter, in dem die Persönlichkeit sich emanzipieren soll, das aber in einer gewissen Beziehung zunächst unproduktiv sein wird, nichts selbst wird hervorbringen können, das mit Bezug gerade auf die geistige Produktion, die ins soziale und geschichtliche Leben übergehen soll, vom Althergebrachten wird leben müssen.

Das ist ja der tiefere Impuls für die Kreuzzüge, die dem Zeitalter des Bewußtseinsmenschen vorangegangen sind. Warum streben die Leute hinüber nach dem Oriente? Warum streben sie hinüber nach dem heiligen Grabe? Weil sie nicht streben können und nicht streben wollen nach einer neuen Mission, nach einer neuen ursprünglichen speziellen Idee im Bewußtseinszeitalter. Sie streben danach, das Althergebrachte in seiner wahren Gestalt, in seiner wahren Substanz sogar, zu finden: Hin nach Jerusalem, um das Alte zu finden und es auf eine andere Weise in die Entwickelung hereinzustellen, als es Rom hereingestellt hat. - Mit den Kreuzzügen ahnt man, daß heraufkommt das Zeitalter der Bewußtseinsseele mit seiner Unproduktivität, die es zunächst entfaltet. Und im Zusammenhang mit den Kreuzzügen entsteht der Tempelherrenorden, von dem ich Ihnen gestern gesprochen habe, dem der König Philipp der Schöne den Garaus gemacht hat. Und mit dem Tempelherrenorden kommen nach Europa die Geheimnisse des orientalischen Wesens, und sie werden eingeimpft der europäischen Geisteskultur. Der König von Frankreich, Philipp - ich habe das im Laufe der Zeit ja von einer anderen Seite her charakterisiert —, konnte zwar die Tempelritter hinrichten lassen, konnte ihr Geld konfiszieren, aber die Impulse der Tempelritter waren durch zahlreiche Kanäle in das europäische Leben hineingeflossen und wirkten weiter fort, wirkten fort durch zahlreiche okkulte Logen, die dann wiederum ins Exoterische hinausgingen, und die im wesentlichen so charakterisiert werden können, daß man sagen kann, sie bildeten nach und nach die Opposition gegenüber Rom. Rom war auf der einen Seite, erst allein, dann mit dem Jesuitismus verbunden, und dann stellte sich auf die andere Seite alles dasjenige, was, mit dem christlichen Elemente tief zusammenhängend, Rom radikal fremd, in Opposition gegen Rom sich stellen mußte, und auch von Rom als eine Opposition empfunden wurde und empfunden wird.

Was war denn nun eigentlich der tiefere Impuls dieser Tatsache, daß man gegenüber dem, was von Rom ausströmte, gegenüber diesem suggestiven Universalimpuls, wie ich ihn gestern charakterisiert habe, orientalisch-gnostische Lehren und Anschauungen, Symbole und Kulte nahm, die man einimpfte dem europäischen Wesen? Betrachten wir einmal, was es ist, dann wird es uns auch auf den eigentlichen Impuls führen können.

Die Bewußtseinsseele sollte herankommen. Rom wollte bewahren gegenüber der Bewußtseinsseele - und bewahrt es bis heute — die suggestive Kultur, jene suggestive Kultur, welche geeignet ist, die Menschen zurückzuhalten vom Übergehen zum Bewußtseinsseelenzustand, welche geeignet sein soll, die Menschen auf dem Standpunkte der Verstandes- oder Gemütsseele zu halten. Das ist ja der eigentliche Kampf, den Rom gegen den Fortgang der Welt führt, daß es beharren will, dieses Rom, bei etwas, was für die Verstandes- oder Gemütsseele taugt, während die Menschheit in ihrer Entwickelung fortschreiten will zur Bewußtseinsseele.

Aber auf der anderen Seite bringt sich die Menschheit mit dem Fortschritt in die Bewußtseinsseele wahrhaftig in eine recht unbehagliche Lage, die für weitaus die meisten Menschen zunächst in den ersten Jahrhunderten des Bewußtseinszeitalters und bis heute unbequem empfunden wurde. Nicht wahr, der Mensch soll sich auf sich selbst stellen, der Mensch soll als Persönlichkeit sich emanzipieren. Das verlangt von ihm das Zeitalter der Bewußtseinsseele. Er muß heraus aus all den alten Stützen. Er kann sich nicht mehr bloß suggerieren lassen dasjenige, an was er glauben soll, er soll selbsttätig teilnehmen an der Erarbeitung dessen, was er glauben soll. Das empfand man, insbesondere als dieses Zeitalter der Bewußtseinsseele heraufstieg, als eine Gefahr für den Menschen. Instinktiv fühlte man: Der Mensch verliert seinen alten Schwerpunkt; er soll einen neuen suchen. — Aber auf der anderen Seite sagte man sich auch: Wenn man gar nichts tut, was sind dann die Möglichkeiten des Geschehens? — Die eine Möglichkeit besteht darinnen, daß man einfach den Menschen hinausfahren läßt auf das offene Meer des Suchens nach der Bewußtseinsseele, ihn gewissermaßen freigibt dem, was in den freien Impulsen des Fortschrittes liegt. Die andere Möglichkeit, wenn der Mensch so hinaussegelt, ist die, daß Rom dann eine große Bedeutung gewinnt, eine große Wirkung üben kann, wenn es ihm gelingt, abzudämpfen das Streben nach der Bewußtseinsseele, um den Menschen zu erhalten beim Stehen in der Verstandes- oder Gemütsseele. Dann würde das erreicht werden, daß der Mensch nicht aufsteigt zu der Bewußtseinsseele, daß der Mensch nicht zum Geistselbst kommt, daß der Mensch seine zukünftige Entwickelung verliert. Es wäre das nur eine von den Nuancen, durch welche die zukünftige Entwickelung verloren werden könnte.

Die dritte Möglichkeit ist die folgende: Man geht noch radikaler vor, man versucht sein Streben ganz abzutöten, damit der Mensch nicht in diese pendelnde Schwingung kommt zwischen dem Streben nach der Bewußtseinsseele und dem Streben, das ihm Rom auferlegt. Damit der Mensch nicht in diese pendelnden Schwingungen kommt, untergräbt man sein Streben vollständig, noch radikaler als Rom. Das tut man dann, wenn man die fortschreitenden Impulse eben gerade der Kraft des Fortschrittes entkleidet und das Alte wirken läßt. Vom Oriente hatte man es mitgebracht, allerdings ursprünglich bei den esoterisch eingeweihten Templern in einer anderen Absicht. Aber nachdem diesem Streben die Spitze abgebrochen war, nachdem der Tempelherrenorden zunächst so behandelt worden war, wie er eben von Philipp dem Schönen, dem König von Frankreich, behandelt worden ist, da war geblieben, was man so herübergebracht hatte aus Asien an Kultur. Aber es war ihm zunächst die Spitze abgebrochen, in der Historik, nicht bei einzelnen Persönlichkeiten, aber in der historischen Welt. Durch zahlreiche Kanäle, wie ich gesagt habe, war eingeträufelt das, was die Templer herübergebracht haben, aber der eigentliche spirituelle Gehalt war ihm vielfach genommen worden. Und was war es denn? Es war im wesentlichen der Inhalt der dritten nachatlantischen Zeit. Die Katholizität brachte den Inhalt der vierten. Und dasjenige, woraus der Geist ausgepreßt war wie der Saft aus einer Zitrone, was sich fortpflanzte als exoterisches Freimaurertum, als schottische oder Yorklogen oder wie immer, was namentlich ergriff der falsche Esoterismus der englischsprechenden Bevölkerung, das ist die ausgepreßte Zitrone, die daher, nachdem sie ausgepreßt ist, die Geheimnisse des dritten nachatlantischen, des ägyptisch-chaldäischen Zeitraumes enthält, und was nun angewendet wird, um Impulse hineinzusenden in das Leben der Bewußtseinsseele.

Da entsteht sogar etwas, was wirklich wie im bösesten Sinne ähnlich sieht dem Entwickelungsgange, der stattfinden soll. Denn erinnern Sie sich nur an folgendes, das ich Ihnen einmal dargestellt habe. Ich habe Ihnen gesprochen von der Entwickelung in den sieben Zeiträumen (siehe Zeichnung). Hier zu Beginn haben wir die atlantische Katastrophe, dann den ersten nachatlantischen Zeitraum, den zweiten, dritten, vierten, fünften, sechsten, siebenten. Die Entwickelung geschieht so, daß der vierte für sich allein dasteht, gewissermaßen die Mitte bildet. Dasjenige, was charakteristisch war im dritten, erscheint wiederum, nur auf einer höheren Stufe, im fünften. Was im zweiten charakteristisch war, tritt wiederum auf einer höheren Stufe auf im sechsten. Was im ersten, im urindischen Zeitraum charakteristisch war, erscheint wiederum im siebenten. Solche Übergreifungen finden statt. Erinnern Sie sich, wie ich gesagt habe, daß es einzelne Geister gibt, die sich bewußt sind dieses Übergreifens, wie in Kepler — als er versuchte, in seiner Art im fünften nachatlantischen Zeitraum die Harmonien im Kosmos durch seine drei Keplerschen Gesetze zu erklären, indem er sagte: Ich bringe herbei die goldenen Gefäße der Ägypter und so weiter — das Bewußtsein auftaucht, daß wiederersteht im Menschen des fünften nachatlantischen Zeitraumes dasjenige, was Inhalt des dritten nachatlantischen Zeitraumes war. In gewissem Sinne schafft man also etwas Ähnliches, wie es sich vollziehen will in der Welt, wenn man den Esoterismus, die Kulte des ägyptisch-chaldäischen Zeitalters, herübernimmt. Aber man kann das, was man da herübernimmt, dazu benützen, um jetzt nicht nur durch Suggestion der Bewußtseinsseele die Selbständigkeit zu nehmen, sondern um die eigentlich treibende Kraft der Bewußtseinsseele abzudämpfen, zu lähmen. Und das ist von dieser Seite aus vielfach gelungen: einzuschläfern die Bewußtseinsseele, die heraufkommen soll. Das ist von dieser Seite aus vielfach gelungen.

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Rom - ich spreche jetzt bildlich - braucht den Weihrauch und schläfert die Leute halb ein, indem es ihnen Träume verursacht. Diejenige Bewegung, die ich jetzt meine, die schläfert die Leute, das heißt die Bewußtseinsseele, vollständig ein. Das sickerte auch in die Entwickelung der neueren Menschheit geschichtlich hinein. Und so haben Sie auf der einen Seite dasjenige, was sich bildet, indem tumultuarisch Brüderlichkeit, Freiheit, Gleichheit auftreten, indem auf der anderen Seite aber der Impuls da ist, der die Menschen im Laufe des fünften nachatlantischen Zeitalters verhindert, das klar einzusehen, wie Brüderlichkeit, Freiheit und Gleichheit die Menschen ergreifen sollen. Denn das können sie nur klar einsehen, wenn sie die Bewußtseinsseele zur rechten Selbsterkenntnis verwenden können, wenn sie aufwachen in der Bewußtseinsseele. Wachen die Menschen auf in der Bewußtseinsseele, so fühlen sie sich zunächst im Leibe, in der Seele und im Geiste. Das aber soll gerade eingeschläfert werden. So daß wir diese zwei Strömungen in der neueren Geschichte drinnen haben: Auf der einen Seite will man, nun der Impuls nach der Bewußtseinsseele da ist, chaotisch Brüderlichkeit, Freiheit, Gleichheit. Auf der anderen Seite ist das Bestreben der verschiedensten Orden, auszulöschen das Aufwachen in der Bewußtseinsseele, damit einzelne Individualitäten dieses Aufwachen in der Bewußtseinsseele für sich benützen können. Diese zwei Strömungen gehen ineinander im ganzen Verlauf des geschichtlichen Lebens der Neuzeit.

Und nun bereitet sich etwas vor. Indem die neuere Zeit ins 18. Jahrhundert hineinstürmt und in den Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts, bis ungefähr in die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, ist zunächst stark ein Anhub nach der Emanzipation der Persönlichkeit da, weil, wenn so viele Strömungen da sind, wie ich Ihnen charakterisiert habe, sich die Sache nicht sukzessiv bequem, sondern in Flut und Ebbe vollzieht. Und wir sehen auf nationalem Grunde und aus den anderen Impulsen heraus, die ich Ihnen für den Westen von Europa charakterisiert habe, wie sich entwickelt das, was hin will zu der Emanzipation der Persönlichkeit, was aus der Nationalität heraus und ins Allgemein-Menschliche hinein will. Nur kann es sich nicht ordentlich selbständig entwickeln, weil immer die Gegenströmung ist von jenen Orden, die, insbesondere in England, furchtbar das ganze öffentliche Leben infizieren, viel mehr als die äußere Welt irgend meint. Es kann sich nicht entwickeln. Und so sehen wir, wie so merkwürdige Persönlichkeiten auftreten wie Richard Cobden, wie John Bright, die auf der einen Seite wirklich erfaßt sind von dem Impuls nach der Emanzipation der Persönlichkeit, nach der Überwindung des Nationalen durch die Persönlichkeit über die ganze Erde hin, die so weit kamen, daß sie an etwas tippten, was politisch von größter Bedeutung sein könnte, wenn es sich einmal hineinwagen würde in die neuere geschichtliche Entwickelung, aber differenziert je nach den verschiedenen Gegenden, denn natürlich haben es die Leute nur für ihre Gegend charakterisiert: das Prinzip der Nichtintervention in andere Angelegenheiten von seiten des Inselreiches als Grundprinzip eines Liberalismus. Es war etwas sehr Bedeutsames, aber es wurde, kaum entstanden, ganz abgestumpft durch das andere Bestreben, das aus dem Impuls des dritten nachatlantischen Zeitraumes heraus war. Und so sehen wir, wie bis in die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts von Westen her dasjenige entsteht, was man gewöhnlich Liberalismus nennt, liberale Gesinnung — bald nennt man es freisinnig —, nun, so wie es einem gerade gefällt. Sie wissen aber, ich meine diejenige Anschauung, die sich am deutlichsten auf politischem Gebiete ausgeprägt hat im 18. Jahrhundert als politische Aufklärung, im 19. Jahrhundert als ein gewisses politisches Streben, das man das liberale politische Streben nannte, und das so allmählich versickerte und ausstarb im letzten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts.

Das, was gerade in den sechziger Jahren zum Beispiel überall noch als liberales Element auftrat, trat ja allmählich im wirklichen Leben ganz zurück. Dafür trat etwas anderes ein. Da nähern wir uns bedeutsamen Symptomen des neueren geschichtlichen Lebens. Was mußte nun geschehen? Nicht wahr, eine Zeitlang war der Stoß der Bewußtseinsseele so, daß er eine Flut nach oben getrieben hat: die liberalisierende Flut (s. Zeichung. S.50, rot). Aber was so ausschlägt nach der einen Seite, schlägt dann wiederum nach der anderen Seite aus (blau), so daß wir auch ein Ausschlagen nach der anderen Seite haben. Das wird der Gegenschlag des Liberalismus sein (Pfeil abwärts). Stellen wir uns nur die Sache gut vor. Der Liberalismus entstand dadurch, daß sich die Menschen, die ihn vertraten, innerlich, ich möchte sagen, so recht faßten, so recht in die Hand nahmen und anstürmten gegen die Fangarme der Erde, wie ich es Ihnen charakterisiert habe. Sie machten sich los, ließen sich nicht kapern, wenn ich den trivialen Ausdruck gebrauchen darf, waren einfach von allgemeinen menschlichen Ideen erfaßt. Aber das andere war doch da, wirkte im Werden der neueren Zeit und brachte allmählich diese sehr dünn vertretenen sogenannten liberalen Ideen zu sich hinüber. Und schon um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts waren an dem politischen Himmel eigentlich die liberalen Ideen aussichtslos, denn diejenigen, die später noch liberale Ideen vertraten, machen doch eigentlich mehr oder weniger den Eindruck von Invaliden des politischen Denkens. Die liberalen Parteien der späteren Zeit waren so mehr die Nachhumpler nur, denn seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts machte sich immer mehr und mehr geltend die Frucht desjenigen, was aus jenen Orden und Geheimgesellschaften des Westens heraus kam: die Einschläferung, Einlullung der Bewußtseinsseele als solcher. Dann wirkt das Seelische und Geistige gar nicht mehr, dann wirkt zunächst nur dasjenige, was in der äußeren sinnlich-physischen Welt da ist. Und das trat auf in der neueren Zeit seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts als der seiner selbst bewußte Sozialismus in allen möglichen Formen.

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Dieser Sozialismus, der da auftrat, kann nur geistig durchdrungen werden: mit Pseudogeist, mit der Maske des Geistes, mit der bloßen Verstandeskultur, die das Tote nur erfassen kann, nicht. Und mit einer solchen toten Wissenschaft hat zunächst Lassalle gerungen, aber Marx und Engels haben sie ausgebildet, diese tote Wissenschaft. Und so bildete sich im Sozialismus, der als Theorie sich bestrebte, praktisch zu werden und in der Praxis nichts Rechtes zusammenbrachte, weil er auf dem Standpunkt der Theorie immer stehenblieb, eines der bedeutendsten Symptome der neueren geschichtlichen Entwickelung der Menschheit heraus. Wir müssen schon einige charakteristische Dinge dieses Sozialismus vor unsere Seele hinstellen.

Es sind ja drei Überzeugungen oder Überzeugungsteile, besser gesagt, die den neuzeitlichen Sozialismus charakterisieren. Er fußt erstens auf der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, zweitens auf der Anschauung von dem Mehrwert im Wirtschaftlichen, im volkswirtschaftlichen Zusammenhange, und drittens auf der Theorie der Klassenkämpfe. Das ist im wesentlichen dasjenige, was Millionen von Menschen heute als Überzeugung erfüllt über die Erde hin, was sich in diesen drei Dingen zusammenfassen läßt: Theorie der Klassenkämpfe, volkswirtschaftliche Anschauung von der Entstehung des Mehrwertes, materialistische Geschichtstheorie.

Versuchen wir uns ganz klar zu machen, damit wir die Symptome, die ich hier meine, gut verstehen als Unterbau für das, was wir eben morgen darauf bauen wollen, erstens: Was ist materialistische Geschichtsauffassung? — Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung meint: Alles was geschieht im Laufe der Menschheitsentwickelung, geschieht nur aus äußeren, rein materiellen Impulsen. Die Menschen müssen essen, müssen trinken, die Menschen müssen das, was sie zu essen und zu trinken brauchen, von da- und dorther holen. Sie müssen also miteinander handeln, sie müssen das erzeugen, was die Natur nicht selbst erzeugt. Aber das ist dasjenige, was überhaupt menschliche Entwickelung erzeugt. Wenn in irgendeinem Zeitalter, sagen wir, ein Lessing auftritt - ich will einen bekannten Namen wählen -, warum tritt Lessing auf, wie er im 18. Jahrhundert aufgetreten ist? Nun, seit dem 16. Jahrhundert, aber insbesondere auch im 18. Jahrhundert ist durch die Einführung des mechanischen Webstuhls, der Spinnmaschine und so weiter eine starke Scheidung entstanden — sie war im Entstehen -, die sich da vorbereitet hat zwischen Bürgertum und dem nachrückenden Proletariat. Das Proletariat war noch kaum da, aber es war gewissermaßen schon glimmend unter der Oberfläche des sozialen Daseins. Aber gegenüber den früheren Ständen war im Verlauf des wirtschaftlichen Lebens der Neuzeit der Bürgerstand erstarkt. Durch die Art und Weise, wie man als Bürger lebt, so daß man den Arbeiter unter sich hat, daß man nicht mehr recht anerkennt die früheren Stände, daß man es dazu gebracht hat, die Gütererzeugung, die Güterverarbeitung, die Güterverteilung so zu machen, wie es eben der Bürger macht, dadurch wird eine gewisse Denkweise allgemein, die nichts anderes ist also ein ideologischer Oberbau für die Art, wie das Bürgertum Güter produziert, verarbeitet und verhandelt. Das bedingt, daß man in einer gewissen Weise denkt. Derjenige, der nicht ein Bürger ist, der noch ein Bauer ist, der von der Natur umgeben ist, mit der Natur zusammenlebt, der denkt anders. Aber es ist nur eine Ideologie, wie er denkt, denn das, worauf es ankommt, das ist die Art, wie er Güter erzeugt, verarbeitet und verhandelt. Der Bürger denkt dadurch, daß er in Städten zusammengepfropft ist, anders als der Bauer. Er löst sich los von der Scholle, sieht nicht die Natur, daher ist der Zusammenhang für ihn abstrakt. Er wird ein Aufgeklärter, der so im Allgemeinen, im Abstrakten von Gott denkt. Aber das ist alles die Folge davon, daß er Güter erzeugt. — Ich spreche die Sache etwas kraß aus, aber in einer gewissen Weise ist es so. — Dadurch, daß man in einer gewissen Weise seit dem 16. Jahrhundert Güter verarbeitet und verhandelt, hat sich ein Denken herausgebildet, das in einer besonderen Art bei Lessing zum Vorschein kommt. Lessing ist der Repräsentant des auf seiner Höhe stehenden Bürgertums, hinter dem das Proletariat nachhinkt in seiner Entwickelung. — So ähnlich ist Herder, Goethe und so weiter zu erklären. All das ist ein Oberbau; wirklich ist für die elementare materialistische Auffassung nur dasjenige, was aus der Gütererzeugung, Güterverarbeitung, aus dem Güterverhandeln kommt.

Das ist materialistische Geschichtsauffassung. Will man das Christentum erklären, so hat man zu erklären, wie in der Zeit, als unsere Zeitrechnung begonnen hat, die Handelsverhältnisse zwischen dem Orient und dem Okzident andere geworden sind, man hat zu erklären, wie die Ausbeutung der Sklaven, die Verhältnisse der Herren zu den Sklaven sich verwandelt haben, und dann daraus zu erklären, wie sich über all diesem wirtschaftlichen Spiel ein ideologischer Oberbau entwickelt: das ist das Christentum. Weil die Menschen zu einer anderen Notwendigkeit gekommen sind, das zu erzeugen, was sie essen und was sie zum Essen verhandeln sollen, als das früher der Fall war, deshalb haben sie anders gedacht. Und weil ein radikalster wirtschaftlicher Umschwung im Beginne unserer Zeitrechnung war, so trat auch jener radikale Umschwung im ideologischen Oberbau ein, der sich als Christentum charakterisiert. — Das ist der erste Teil jener Überzeugungen, die sich seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts durch Millionen und Millionen Herzen Bahn gebrochen haben.

Diejenigen, die im Bourgeoistum geblieben sind, haben eigentlich keine Ahnung, wie tief, tief eingefressen in weitesten Kreisen diese Anschauung ist. Gewiß, die Professoren, die von den Ideen der Geschichte sprechen, die von allerlei historischen Schatten sprechen, die haben ein Publikum. Aber selbst unter den Professoren haben sich einzelne in der letzten Zeit zum Marxismus schon leise hingezogen gefühlt. Aber unter den breiten Menschenmassen haben sie kein Publikum. Das ist aber im Zeitalter der Bewußtseinsseele, und der Impuls der Bewußtseinsseele wirkt fort. Die Leute wachen auf, sofern man sie aufwachen läßt. Man versucht, von der einen Seite sie einzuschläfern; von der anderen Seite verlangen sie aber, ich möchte sagen, mitten im Schlafe, wieder aufzuwachen. Da sie nichts anderes haben als die Hinlenkung des Sinnes auf die rein materielle Welt, bilden sie sich die materialistische Geschichtswissenschaft aus. Und so entstanden jene eigentümlichen Symptome: Einer der edelsten, liberalsten Geister, Schiller, wurde lange gefeiert, wurde äußerlich ungemein bewundert. 1859 wurden zur Jubelfeier seiner Geburt überall Denkmäler errichtet. In meiner Jugend lebte in Wien ein Mann, Heinrich Deinhardt hieß er, der bemühte sich, in einer sehr schönen Schrift die Menschen einzuführen in wirkliche Ideengänge Schillers, in seine Ideengänge, die er niedergelegt hat in den Briefen über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen. Die ganze Auflage dieses Werkes ist eingestampft worden! Der Verfasser, dieser Heinrich Deinhardt, hatte einmal das Malheur, daß er berührt wurde, glaube ich, von einem vorüberfahrenden Wagen - kurz, er fiel um auf der Straße, brach sich das Bein, und konnte nicht kuriert werden — obwohl es ein leichter Beinbruch war -, weil er so unterernährt war, daß man ihn nicht gesundmachen konnte. Er konnte das nicht überstehen. Das ist nur ein Symptom für die Art und Weise, wie das 19. Jahrhundert jene behandelt hat, die nun wirklich Schiller haben verständlich machen wollen, die die großen Ideen Schillers haben einführen wollen in das allgemeine Zeitbewußtsein. Gewiß werden Sie sagen, oder werden andere sagen: Gibt es denn nicht schöne Bestrebungen auf allen Gebieten? — Die gibt es schon, wir werden auch davon noch im Laufe der Zeit sprechen, aber sie führen alle zum großen Teile in Sackgassen hinein.

Das ist das eine Glied der sozialistischen Überzeugung. Das zweite ist die Theorie des Mehrwertes. Man kann sie kurz etwa in folgendem charakterisieren, daß man sagt: Die neuere Produktionsweise hat es dahin gebracht, daß derjenige, welcher verwendet werden muß, um Güter zu erzeugen, um Güter zu verarbeiten, seine eigene Lebenskraft zur Arbeitskraft machen muß, die dann ebenso eine Marktware wird wie andere Marktwaren. Denn es entstehen zwei Klassen von Menschen: die Unternehmer und die Arbeiter. Die Unternehmer sind die Kapitalisten, und die haben daher die Produktionsmittel. Sie haben die Fabrik, sie haben die Werkzeuge, sie haben alles, was zu den Produktionsmitteln gehört. Das ist die eine Sorte von Menschen, die Arbeitgeber; sie haben die Produktionsmittel. Dann sind die Arbeiter da; die haben keine Produktionsmittel, sondern nur das einzige auf den Markt zu bringen: ihre Arbeitskraft. Dadurch, daß dieser Gegensatz besteht zwischen dem Unternehmer und dem Arbeiter, daß dem Unternehmer, welcher der Besitzer der Produktionsmittel ist, der besitzlose Arbeiter gegenübersteht, der nur seine Arbeitskraft auf den Markt bringen kann, dadurch ist es möglich, die Entschädigungen für die Ware Arbeit - Ware Arbeit! - auf ein Minimum herabzudrücken, und alles übrige fließt dem Besitzer der Produktionsmittel, das heißt dem Unternehmer, als Mehrwert zu. Dadurch verteilt sich dasjenige, was produziert wird für den Markt und für die Menschheit, also für den Konsum, im ganzen so, daß der Arbeiter nur Entschädigungen bekommt, ein Minimum; das andere fließt als Mehrwert dem Unternehmertum zu. — Das ist marxistische Theorie. Und das ist die Überzeugung wiederum von Millionen Menschen. — Und dies ist lediglich durch die ganz bestimmte wirtschaftliche Struktur herbeigeführt, welche das soziale Leben der neueren Zeit angenommen hat. Das führt zuletzt dazu, daß es Ausbeuter und Ausgebeutete gibt.

Es sind im wesentlichen diese Kategorien, mit denen, seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts zunehmend, erst in kleinen Zirkeln, dann in Sekten, nun aber unter Millionen und Millionen Menschen, die Herzen gewonnen werden für die Anschauung einer rein wirtschaftlichen Struktur im sozialen Zusammenleben. Denn man kann sehr leicht zu der Überzeugung sich aufschwingen, wenn man diese Anschauungen, die ich Ihnen nur skizziere, weiterentwickelt, daß man sagt: Also ist der Besitz der Produktionsmittel durch den einzelnen der Verderb der sich entwickelnden Menschheit. Produktionsmittel müssen Gemeingut werden. Alle, die arbeiten, müssen die Produktionsmittel zusammen verwalten können. — Expropriation der Produktionsmittel ist das Ideal des Arbeiterstandes geworden.

Dies ist sehr wichtig, daß man erstens nicht bei den eingerosteten, eben keine Wirklichkeit treffenden Vorstellungen stehenbleibt, welche viele Menschen noch haben, die dem Bürgertum angehörig geblieben sind und sich so durchgeschlafen haben über die neuzeitliche Entwickelung. Denn, nicht wahr, sehr viele so im Bourgeoistum eingerostete Menschen, die sich so durchgeschlafen haben durch das, was eigentlich geschehen ist in den letzten Jahrzehnten, haben heute noch die Vorstellung: Ja, es gibt Sozialdemokraten und Kommunisten, die wollen teilen, die wollen, daß alles gemeinschaftlich wird und so weiter. — Diese Leute müßten eigentlich nun erstaunt sein, wenn sie hören, daß eine sorgfältig ausgebaute, scharfsinnige Anschauung, wie es werden soll und werden muß, unter Millionen und Millionen von Menschen ist: die Theorie vom Mehrwert, der nur dadurch überwunden werden kann, daß die Produktionsmittel Allgemeingut werden. Jeder, der heute sozialistischer Agitator ist, oder auch nur einer, der nachläuft dem sozialistischen Agitator, lacht natürlich den Angehörigen der Bourgeoisie aus, der ihm redet von Kommunismus und was alles die Sozialdemokraten wollen, denn der versteht, daß es sich um die Sozialisierung, das heißt um die gemeinsame Verwaltung der Produktionsmittel handelt. Denn den Verderb sieht der heutige Arbeiter in dem Besitz der Produktionsmittel durch einzelne menschliche Individuen, weil derjenige, der keine Produktionsmittel hat, ausgeliefert ist dem, der die Produktionsmittel hat.

So ist im wesentlichen der soziale Kampf der neueren Zeit ein Kampf um die Produktionsmittel, und Kampf muß sein, denn das ist die dritte Überzeugung der Sozialdemokratie, daß sich alles, was sich entwickelt hat, durch den Kampf entwickelt. Die Bourgeoisie ist heraufgekommen, indem sie den Adelsstand überwunden hat. Das Proletariat wird heraufkommen und wird sich die Verwaltung über die Produktionsmittel erringen, indem es mit der Bourgeoisie es so macht, wie es die Bourgeoisie mit dem alten Adelsstande gemacht hat. Alles ist Kampf der Klassen. In der Überwindung der einen Klasse durch die andere liegt der Fortschritt der Menschheit.

Diese dreifache Anschauung: erstens, daß dasjenige, was die Menschheit vorwärts bringt von Epoche zu Epoche, nur materielle Impulse sind, alles andere nur ideologischer Oberbau ist, zweitens, daß der eigentliche Verderb der Mehrwert ist, der nur überwunden werden kann durch die gemeinsame Verwaltung der Produktionsmittel, und drittens, daß eine Möglichkeit, die Produktionsmittel gemeinschaftlich zu machen, nur die ist, die Bourgeoisie ebenso zu überwinden, wie die Bourgeoisie den alten Adel überwunden hat — das ist es, was sich allmählich als die sogenannte sozialistische Bewegung über die zivilisierte Welt verbreitet hat. Und man hatte dann als ein bedeutsames geschichtliches Symptom der allerjüngsten Jahre auch dieses, daß sowohl die Mitglieder des gebliebenen Adels wie auch die Mitglieder der gebliebenen Bourgeoisie sich auf ihre Ruhebetten legten, höchstens Schlagworte aufnahmen wie vom Teilen und vom Kommunismus, nun, diejenigen Schlagworte, über die manchmal ganz hinten in den Geschichtsbüchern so lange Anmerkungen stehen. Aber sehr selten steht überhaupt etwas drinnen darüber! Das also wurde verschlafen, was wirklich geschah. Und das entwickelte sich dann dahin, daß, außerordentlich schwierig, aber unter dem Zwang der Verhältnisse, unter dem Einflusse dieser letzten vier Jahre, einige Leute angefangen haben, auf manches hinzuschauen. Es ist gar nicht auszudenken, wie unbekümmert die Leute weitergeschlafen hätten, wenn die letzten vier Jahre nicht eingetreten wären, wie unbekümmert darum, daß mit jedem Jahre neue Tausende und Tausende gewonnen wurden für diese sozialistischen Anschauungen, die ich Ihnen eben charakterisiert habe, und daß endlich die Leute auf dem Vulkan tanzen. Aber es ist unbequem, sich zu gestehen, daß man auf einem Vulkan tanzt, und die Leute vermeiden es, sich klar zu machen, daß sie auf einem Vulkan tanzen. Aber der Vulkan vermeidet es nicht, auszubrechen und diejenigen, die auf ihm tanzen, zu verschütten.

Damit habe ich Ihnen wieder ein Symptom der neueren Geschichte charakterisiert. Denn sie gehört zu den Symptomen der neueren Geschichte, diese sozialistische Überzeugung. Sie ist eine Tatsache, sie ist nicht bloß irgendeine Theorie. Sie wirkt. Ich lege keinen Wert auf das Feste der Lassalleschen oder der Marxistischen Theorie, aber natürlich einen großen Wert auf das Vorhandensein von Millionen von Menschen, die zu ihrem Ideal erkoren haben, das zu tun, was sie doch erkennen können aus den drei Punkten, die ich angeführt habe. Das aber ist etwas, was radikal entgegengesetzt ist dem Nationalen, das ich Ihnen als eine gewisse Grundlage beim Ausgang der neueren Geschichte gezeigt habe. Da hat sich aus dem Nationalen allerlei herausentwickelt. Nun, was das Proletariat anstrebt, so wurde ja schon, als 1848 Karl Marx zunächst das Programm dieses Proletariats veröffentlichte, das im wesentlichen die Punkte enthielt, die ich jetzt angeführt habe, es wurde da geschlossen mit dem Ruf: «Proletarier aller Länder, vereinigt euch!» Und fast keine Versammlung über die ganze Erde hin unter diesen Leuten wurde geschlossen, ohne daß sie geschlossen wurde mit einem Hoch auf die internationale revolutionäre Sozialdemokratie, auf die republikanische Sozialdemokratie. Das war ein internationales Prinzip. Und so tritt neben die römische Internationale mit ihrer Universalidee die Internationale des Sozialismus. Das ist eine Tatsache, denn diese so und so vielen Menschen sind eine Tatsache. Es ist wichtig, daß man das ins Auge faßt.

Um morgen wenigstens vorläufig diese Symptomatologie der neueren Zeit zu krönen, müssen wir schon scharf den Weg ins Auge fassen, der uns gestatten wird, die Symptome zu verfolgen, bis sie uns einigermaßen zeigen: da können wir durchbrechen und in die Wirklichkeit hineinschauen. Zu all diesem schufen andere Menschen daneben geradezu unlösbare Probleme — Sie müssen empfinden, wie die Dinge verlaufen, wie die Dinge sich zuspitzen — unlösbare Probleme. Wir sehen, wie sich im 19. Jahrhundert verhältnismäßig ruhig die liberalisierende parlamentarische Richtung in England entwickelt; tumultuarisch, besser gesagt, unmotiviert in Frankreich. Je weiter wir nach Osten gehen, desto mehr müssen wir sagen: Das Nationale wird hinübergetragen, hinübergeleitet, so wie ich das gestern schon erwähnt habe. Aber dabei entstehen unlösbare historische Probleme. Und das ist auch ein solches Symptom. Freilich, diejenigen Menschen, die nicht nachdenken, die halten alles für lösbar, die glauben, man kann alles lösen.

Ein solches unlösbares Problem — ich meine jetzt nicht für den abstrakten Verstand, da ist es selbstverständlich lösbar, aber ich meine Wirklichkeiten — wird geschaffen 1870/71 zwischen West-, Mittel- und Osteuropa. Das ist das sogenannte Elsässische Problem. Selbstverständlich, die gescheiten Menschen, die können es lösen. Entweder erobert der eine Staat oder der andere, besiegt den andern, dann hat er die Sache gelöst, nicht wahr. Das hat man ja mit Bezug auf das Elsaß von der einen oder von der anderen Seite lange versucht. Oder wenn man das nicht will, stimmt man ab unter der Bevölkerung. Das geht sehr leicht, die Majorität entscheidet. Nicht wahr, auf diese Weise geht es, so sagen die gescheiten Menschen. Aber diejenigen, die in der Wirklichkeit stehen, die nicht bloß einen einzelnen Zeitpunkt sehen, sondern die da sehen, wie die Zeit überhaupt ein realer Faktor ist, und wie man nicht, was im Laufe der Zeit sich entwickeln muß, in einem kurzen Zeitraum zur Entwickelung kommen lassen kann — kurz, die Menschen, die in der Wirklichkeit stehen, die wußten schon, daß dies ein unlösbares Problem ist. Man lese nur, was die Menschen, die hineinzuschauen versuchten in den Gang der europäischen Entwickelung, über dieses Problem in den siebziger Jahren dachten und schrieben und sagten. Vor ihren Augen, vor ihren Seelenaugen stand, wie durch das, was da geschah, der Zukunft Europas sonderbare Vorbedingungen geschaffen wurden, wie der Drang entstehen wird im Westen, den ganzen Osten aufzurufen. Dazumal gab es schon Leute, welche wußten: Das slawische Problem wird in die Welt gesetzt dadurch, daß man im Westen die Sache anders wird lösen wollen als in Mitteleuropa. — Ich will nur hindeuten darauf, wie die Sache ist. Ich will hindeuten darauf, daß es ein solches handgreifliches Symptom ist, wie ich Ihnen gestern den Dreißigjährigen Krieg vorgeführt habe, um Ihnen zu zeigen, daß man in der Geschichte nicht das Folgende als eine Wirkung des Vorhergehenden zeigen kann. Gerade der Dreißigjährige Krieg zeigt: Das, womit es angefangen hat, was vor dem Ausbruch des Krieges war, das ist genauso wie nach dessen Ende; aber mit dem, was dann entstanden ist, hat es nicht angefangen. Von Ursache und Wirkung ist nicht die Rede. Sie sehen da etwas Charakteristisches an diesem Symptom, ebenso an dem Elsässischen Problem. Für viele Fragen der neueren Zeit könnte ich Ihnen das gleiche zeigen. Die Dinge werden aufgeworfen, führen aber nicht zu einer Lösbarkeit, sondern zu einer Unlösbarkeit, zu immer neuen Konflikten, führen in Sackgassen des Lebens. Das ist wichtig, daß man das ins Auge faßt. Sie führen so in Sackgassen des Lebens, daß man nicht einerlei Meinung sein kann in der Welt, daß der eine eine andere Meinung haben muß als der andere, einfach wenn er an einem anderen Orte von Europa steht. Und wiederum gehört das zu charakteristischen Seiten neuzeitlicher Geschichtssymptome, daß die Menschen es dazu bringen, sich Tatsachen zu schaffen, die unlösbare Probleme sind.

Jetzt haben wir schon eine ganze Reihe von charakteristischen Dingen der neuzeitlichen Menschheitsentwickelung: das Unproduktive, das Heraufdämmern insbesondere solcher Gemeinschaftsideen, die kein Produktives beanspruchen, wie die des nationalen Impulses und so weiter. Dazwischen doch das fortwährende Anstürmen der Bewußtseinsseele. Und jetzt das Charakteristische des Hineingehens in Sackgassen, überall das Hineingehen in Sackgassen. Denn ein großer Teil dessen, was heute verhandelt wird, was heute die Menschen unternehmen, ist ein Sich-Bewegen in Sackgassen. Und ein weiteres Charakteristisches: die Bestrebung, sich abzudämpfen das Bewußtsein für dasjenige, was gerade als Bewußtsein entwickelt werden soll. Denn es gibt nichts Charakteristischeres als das Abdämpfen des Bewußtseins bei der heutigen sogenannten gebildeten Schichte der Bevölkerung über die wahren Zustände in dem sogenannten Proletariat. Alles schläft nämlich gegenüber den wahren Zuständen im Proletariat. Man sieht höchstens das Äußerliche. Die Hausfrauen schimpfen über die Dienstmädchen, daß sie nicht mehr dies und das tun wollen, haben keine Neigung, sich darum zu bekümmern, daß heute nun nicht bloß die Fabrikarbeiter, sondern auch schon die Dienstmädchen von marxistischer Theorie erfüllt sind. Man redet allmählich von allem möglichen Allgemein-Menschlichen. Das ist aber eine reine Rhetorik, wenn man sich nicht wirklich für den einzelnen Menschen interessiert und um den einzelnen Menschen kümmert. Dann muß man aber wissen, was Wichtiges vorgeht in der Menschheitsentwickelung, dann muß man sich wirklich einlassen auf die Dinge.

Wahrhaftig nicht, um irgendeine soziale "Theorie vorzutragen, sondern um Ihnen Symptome der neueren Geschichtsentwickelung darzustellen, habe ich neuerlich auch dieses eine Symptom des Sozialismus vor Ihre Seele hinstellen müssen. Wir wollen morgen dann mit unseren Betrachtungen weiterfahren, um das zu krönen und an einzelnen Stellen, ich möchte sagen, zur Wirklichkeit durchzubrechen.

Second Lecture

Yesterday I attempted to give you a broad outline of the symptoms of the recent historical development of humanity, and finally, as if inserted into this complex of symptoms—which we did not initially pursue in such detail that we looked everywhere for what it reveals, which we will do later, but rather characterized it more generally—I presented the remarkable phenomenon of James I of England. of England. At the beginning of the 17th century, he stands there as the so-called ruler of England, actually like a kind of enigma, roughly in the middle of the period that has elapsed from the beginning of the fifth post-Atlantean epoch to the important, decisive 19th century. It is not my task here — that can be done later — to discuss some of the mysteries surrounding the personality of James I. That cannot be my task today, but I must point out how strange, and again symptomatically strange, James I appears in the course of recent history. One might say: a man who could truly be characterized as contradictory in every way, as I attempted to do yesterday from two perspectives. One can say the best and one can say the worst about him, depending on how one colors it.

Above all, however, one can say of this James I that he stands on the ground that has developed out of all the circumstances I have described to you, and on which a concept of the state has developed that has grown out of the national impulse, on which what we have characterized as liberalizing, or at least inclined toward liberalization, striving for liberalism, that on this ground James I appears like an uprooted plant, like a being that does not really belong to this ground. But if we look a little deeper at what characterizes this entire fifth post-Atlantean period on one side, on the side of the birth of the consciousness soul, then things become a little clearer with regard to James I. Then we see that he is the personality who embodies that radical contradiction that is so easily associated with personalities from the age of consciousness. Isn't it true that in this age of consciousness, the personality loses the value it formerly had by virtue of its instincts, precisely because it was not actually developed as a self-conscious personality? In earlier ages, the personality lived, one might say, with elemental force, with a humanized, soulful—you will not misunderstand me when I say this—animal force. The personality lived instinctively, not yet born out of the group soul, not yet fully born. And now it was supposed to emancipate itself, to stand on its own. This gives rise to a very strange contradiction, especially for the personality. On the one hand, everything that was previously there for individual, personal expression is cast off, the instincts are paralyzed, and within the soul the center of the personality is to gradually take shape. The soul is to gain full power.

You can see that there is a contradiction, above all in what I said yesterday. Whereas in earlier times, when the personality had not yet been born as a self-conscious personality, the development of culture incorporated very productive forces, this has now come to an end. The soul becomes sterile. And yet it places itself at the center of the human being, for that is what the personality consists of: the soul placing itself at the center of the personality of human beings. As a result, outstanding personalities such as those found in ancient times—Augustus, Julius Caesar, Pericles—we could name many—are no longer possible. It is precisely the elementary element of personality that loses value, and what later comes to be called democratic sentiment emerges, which levels personality and makes everything the same. But it is precisely in this levelling that personality wants to appear. A radical contradiction!

Everyone stands in some position through their karma. Well, James I was in the position of ruler. Certainly, in the time of the Persian kings, in the time of the Mongol khans, even in the age when the Pope placed the Holy Crown of St. Stephen on the head of the Magyar Istwan, Stephen I, personality meant something in a certain position, could be understood as belonging to that position. James I was in his position, even in his position as ruler, like a man wearing a garment that did not fit him at all. One could say that James I was, in every respect, in everything he was involved in, like a man wearing a garment that did not fit him at all. He had been raised as a Calvinist as a child, then later converted to the Anglican Church, but basically he was as indifferent to Calvinism as he was to the Anglican Church. Deep down, it was all a garment that did not fit him. He was called to rule as a monarch in the approaching age of parliamentary liberalism, which had even reigned for a time. He was very clever, very intelligent when he spoke to people, but no one really understood what he wanted, because everyone else wanted something else. He came from a deeply Catholic family, the Stuart family. But when he came to the throne in England, the Catholics realized that they had nothing to expect from him. This gave rise to that strange plan, which seems so bizarre to us today, in 1605, when a number of people who had grown out of Catholicism got together, gathered as much gunpowder as possible under the London Parliament, and planned to blow up all the members of Parliament at an opportune moment. It was the famous Gunpowder Plot. The whole thing was only prevented by a Catholic who knew about it and betrayed the plot, otherwise James I would have met his fate and been blown up one day with his entire Parliament. He did not fit in anywhere, because he was a personality, and personality has something singular about it, something that is conceived in isolation, that is self-reliant.

But in the age of personality, everyone wants to be a personality. That is the radical contradiction that arises in the age of personality, and we must not forget that. In the age of personality, it is not the case that one rejects the idea of kings or popes, for example. It is not a question of there being no pope or no king. It is just that if there is a pope or a king, then everyone wants to be pope or king, and then the papacy, kingship, and democracy would all be fulfilled at the same time. All these things come to mind when one considers the remarkable personality of James I, because he was a man of the new age through and through, but at the same time, with all the contradictions of personality, he was placed in the new age. And those who characterized him from one side were wrong, as I said yesterday, and those who characterized him from the other side were wrong, and his own books that characterized him were wrong, because even what he himself wrote does not lead us in any direct way into his soul. Thus, if one does not view him esoterically, he stands at the beginning of the 17th century like a great enigma, precisely in a position that, from a certain point of view, most radically demonstrated the emergence of the modern impulse.

Let us recall what we said yesterday: how things actually came about in Western Europe. I spoke of the differentiation between the English and French natures. We see this differentiation since the 15th century. The turning point comes with the appearance of the Maid of Orleans in 1429. We see how things develop. We see how in England the emancipation of the personality takes hold with the aspiration to carry the personality out into the world, how in France the emancipation of the personality takes hold — in both cases springing from the national idea — with the aspiration to grasp as much as possible of the inner life of the human being and to place it on its own. There, at the beginning of the 17th century, stands a personality who represents all the contradictions of the individual: James I. When characterizing symptoms, one must never try to be pedantic, but always leave something unresolved, otherwise one will not get anywhere. So I am not characterizing James I in such a way that you have a nice, neat picture, but rather in such a way that you have something to think about, perhaps even to puzzle over.

There is an increasingly radical difference between the English and French characters. It was precisely in the French character that the turmoil of the Thirty Years' War gave rise to what can be called the strengthening of the idea of the state on a national basis. If one wants to study the strengthening of the idea of the state, one can only do so using the example—but it is a rather unique example—of the emergence, rise to glory, and subsequent decline of the French nation state under Louis XIV and so on. We see how, in the bosom of this nation state, the seeds developed into the far-reaching emancipation of the individual that came about with the French Revolution.

This French Revolution brought forth three impulses that can be said to be the most legitimate impulses of human life: brotherhood, liberty, and equality. But I have already characterized on another occasion how contradictory to the actual development of humanity within the French Revolution this triad appeared: brotherhood, liberty, and equality. When considering human development, one cannot speak of these three—brotherhood, liberty, and equality—without referring in some way to the three members of human nature. In relation to the physical coexistence of human beings, humanity must gradually ascend to a brotherly element, especially in the age of the consciousness soul. It would simply be an unspeakable misfortune and a setback in evolution if, at the end of the fifth post-Atlantean epoch, the age of the consciousness soul, brotherhood had not developed to at least a high degree among human beings. But brotherhood can only be properly understood when it is applied to the coexistence of human bodies in physical existence. However, when one rises to the level of the soul, then one can speak of freedom. One will always live in error if one believes that freedom can somehow be realized in external physical coexistence; but freedom can be realized from soul to soul. One must not chaotically conceive of human beings as a mishmash entity and then speak of brotherhood, freedom, and equality, but one must know that human beings are divided into body, soul, and spirit, and one must know that human beings only attain freedom when they want to become free in their souls. And human beings can only be equal in relation to the spirit. The spirit that touches us spiritually is the same for everyone. It is strived for by the fifth period, the consciousness soul, which strives for the spirit self. And in relation to this spirit that is strived for, human beings are equal, just as, in connection with this equality of spirit, the proverb says: In death, all human beings are equal. But if one does not distribute brotherhood, freedom, and equality among these three differentiated soul members, but instead mixes them together in a mishmash and simply says: Man should live brotherly on earth, be free and be equal—then this only leads to confusion.

How, then, does the French Revolution appear to us from a symptomatic point of view? From a symptomatic point of view, the French Revolution is extremely interesting. It represents, in a manner of speaking, condensed into slogans and applied indiscriminately to the whole human being, that which must be gradually developed by all means of spiritual human evolution during the age of the consciousness soul, from 1413, that is, 2160 years more, until the year 3573. It is the task of this period to achieve brotherhood for the bodies, freedom for the souls, and equality for the spirits. But without this insight, tumultuously throwing everything into confusion, this innermost soul of the fifth post-Atlantean period appears in slogans in the French Revolution. The soul of the fifth post-Atlantean period stands there misunderstood in these three words and therefore cannot initially gain an outer social body, leading basically to confusion upon confusion. It cannot gain an external social body, but stands there like a demanding soul, extraordinarily significant. One might say: everything internal that this fifth post-Atlantean period is supposed to have stands there misunderstood and has no external form. But it is precisely here that something symptomatically enormously significant appears.

You see, something like this, where what is to be spread out over the entire next period comes to light almost tumultuously at the beginning, something like this moves very far away from the state of equilibrium in which humanity is supposed to develop, from the forces that are inherent in human beings because they are connected with their very own hierarchies. The scales tip very strongly to one side. Through the French Revolution, the Luciferic-Ahrimanic forces caused the scales to tip very strongly to one side, namely to the Luciferic side. This produces a counter-reaction. One speaks, I would say, more than figuratively, one speaks imaginatively, but you must not press the words too much and, above all, you must not take things literally: What occurred in the French Revolution is, in a sense, the soul of the fifth post-Atlantean epoch without the social body, without physicality. It is abstract, purely soul-like, striving for physicality; but that is only to happen over the course of millennia, or at least many centuries. However, because the scales of development are tipped so far, it gives rise to a contrast. And what appears? One extreme after another. In the French Revolution, everything is tumultuous, everything contradicts the rhythm of human development. By swinging to the other side, something emerges where everything now corresponds completely — not in a middle position of equilibrium, but strictly in an Ahrimanic-Luciferic way — to the human rhythm, to the impersonal demands of the personality. In Napoleon, the body opposes this, built entirely according to the rhythm of the human personality, but now with a swing to the other side: seven years of preparation — I have already listed them — for his actual reign, fourteen years of glory, unrest in Europe, rise, seven years of decline, of which he uses only the first year to once again unsettle Europe, but strictly following a rhythm: once seven plus twice seven plus once seven, strictly following a rhythm of seven to seven years, four times seven years in rhythm.

I have really tried very hard — some of you know how I have hinted at this here and there — to find Napoleon's soul. You know that such studies of the soul can be carried out in many different ways using the tools of spiritual research. You will remember how Novalis' soul was sought in earlier incarnations. I have made a sincere effort to search for Napoleon's soul, for example, in its further journey after Napoleon's death—I cannot find it, and I do not believe that I will ever find it, for it is probably not there. And that will probably be the mystery of Napoleon's life, which runs like clockwork, even according to a seven-year rhythm, which can best be understood when viewed as the complete opposite of a life such as that of James I or as the opposite of the abstraction of the French Revolution: the Revolution as pure soul without body, Napoleon as pure body without soul, but a body that seems to have been concocted from all the contradictions of the age. One of the greatest mysteries of modern development is hidden, let us say, in this strange combination of revolution and Napoleon. It is as if a soul wanted to incarnate itself in the world and appeared incorporeal, rumbling among the revolutionaries of the 18th century, but could not find a body, and only outwardly did a body approach it, which in turn could not find a soul: Napoleon. Such things contain more than just witty allusions or characterizations; they contain significant impulses of historical development. However, things must be viewed symptomatically. Here among you, I am speaking in the forms of spiritual scientific research. But of course, what I have just said to you can be said anywhere else by choosing words a little differently.

And then, when we try to trace the history of symptoms in more recent times, we see, relatively calmly, really like links in a chain, the English character developing. In the 19th century, the English character developed fairly evenly until the end of the 19th century, I would say with a certain calmness, virtually embodying the ideal of liberalism. The French character developed somewhat more tumultuously, so that when one follows the events of French history in the 19th century, one never really knows how one thing came to follow another — unmotivated, one might say. This is the main feature of France's development in the 19th century: unmotivated. This is not a criticism — I speak without any sympathy or antipathy — but merely a characteristic.

Now, one will never be able to see into this whole web of symptoms of recent history unless one looks at how, in all that is happening so outwardly—or inwardly, spiritually, but still outwardly in a certain sense, as I mentioned yesterday—something else is at work. I would like to characterize it for you in this way. Even before this fifth post-Atlantean epoch begins, one senses in a certain way the approach of this epoch of the consciousness soul. Certain natures sense it as if in a premonition. And they actually sense its character; they sense that an age is coming in which the personality will emancipate itself, but which will initially be unproductive in a certain sense, unable to produce anything of its own that will have to live off the old traditions, especially with regard to spiritual production, which is to pass into social and historical life.

This is the deeper impulse behind the Crusades that preceded the age of conscious human beings. Why do people strive for the Orient? Why do they strive for the Holy Sepulcher? Because they cannot and do not want to strive for a new mission, for a new, original, special idea in the age of consciousness. They strive to find the traditional in its true form, even in its true substance: they go to Jerusalem to find the old and to bring it into development in a different way than Rome did. With the Crusades, one senses that the age of the consciousness soul is dawning, with the unproductivity that it initially unfolds. And in connection with the Crusades, the Order of the Knights Templar arose, which I spoke to you about yesterday, and which King Philip the Fair put an end to. And with the Order of the Knights Templar, the secrets of the Oriental nature came to Europe and were instilled into European intellectual culture. The King of France, Philip — I have characterized this from another perspective over time — was able to have the Knights Templar executed and confiscate their money, but the impulses of the Knights Templar had flowed into European life through numerous channels and continued to have an effect, continuing through numerous occult lodges, which in turn went out into the exoteric world and can essentially be characterized as gradually forming the opposition to Rome. Rome was on one side, at first alone, then connected with Jesuitism, and then on the other side stood everything that, being deeply connected with the Christian element, was radically foreign to Rome, had to oppose Rome, and was and is perceived by Rome as opposition.

What was the deeper impulse behind this fact, that in opposition to what emanated from Rome, to this suggestive universal impulse, as I characterized it yesterday, Oriental Gnostic teachings and views, symbols and cults were taken up and instilled into the European essence? Let us consider what this is, and it will lead us to the actual impulse.

The consciousness soul was to come into being. Rome wanted to preserve — and still preserves to this day — the suggestive culture, that suggestive culture which is suited to holding people back from passing over into the consciousness soul state, which is suited to keeping people at the level of the intellectual or emotional soul. This is the real battle that Rome is waging against the progress of the world, that it wants to persist in something that is suitable for the intellectual or emotional soul, while humanity wants to progress in its development toward the consciousness soul.

But on the other hand, with its progress into the conscious soul, humanity truly brings itself into a rather uncomfortable situation, which was felt to be uncomfortable by the vast majority of people, at least in the first centuries of the age of consciousness and up to the present day. Is it not true that human beings are supposed to stand on their own two feet, that they are supposed to emancipate themselves as personalities? This is what the age of the consciousness soul demands of him. He must break free from all his old supports. He can no longer allow himself to be told what to believe; he must participate actively in working out what he should believe. This was felt to be a danger to humanity, especially as the age of the consciousness soul dawned. Instinctively, people felt: Human beings are losing their old center of gravity; they must seek a new one. — But on the other hand, people also said to themselves: If we do nothing at all, what are the possibilities for what might happen? — One possibility is to simply let human beings sail out onto the open sea of the search for the consciousness soul, to free them, as it were, to the free impulses of progress. The other possibility, if people sail out like this, is that Rome will then gain great significance and be able to exert a great influence if it succeeds in dampening the striving for the conscious soul in order to keep people standing in the intellectual or emotional soul. Then what would happen is that human beings would not ascend to the consciousness soul, that human beings would not come to the spirit self, that human beings would lose their future development. That would be just one of the nuances through which future development could be lost.

The third possibility is as follows: one proceeds even more radically, attempting to kill off all striving so that human beings do not enter into this pendulous vibration between striving for the consciousness soul and the striving imposed on them by Rome. In order to prevent human beings from falling into this pendulum-like oscillation, their striving is completely undermined, even more radically than in Rome. This is done by stripping the progressive impulses of the very force of progress and allowing the old to take effect. It had been brought over from the Orient, although originally by the esoterically initiated Templars with a different intention. But after this striving had been broken off at the top, after the Order of the Temple had been treated as it was by Philip the Fair, King of France, what remained was what had been brought over from Asia in terms of culture. But it had first been broken off at the top, in history, not in individual personalities, but in the historical world. Through numerous channels, as I have said, what the Templars had brought over was instilled, but the actual spiritual content had been taken away from it in many ways. And what was it? It was essentially the content of the third post-Atlantean era. Catholicism brought the content of the fourth. And that from which the spirit was squeezed out like juice from a lemon, which propagated itself as exoteric Freemasonry, as Scottish or York lodges or whatever, which particularly seized the false esotericism of the English-speaking population, that is the squeezed lemon, which therefore, after being squeezed, contains the secrets of the third post-Atlantean, Egyptian-Chaldean period, and which is now being used to send impulses into the life of the consciousness soul.

Something even arises that really looks, in the worst sense, similar to the course of development that is to take place. Just remember what I once described to you. I spoke to you about the development in the seven periods (see drawing). Here at the beginning we have the Atlantean catastrophe, then the first post-Atlantean period, the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh. The development takes place in such a way that the fourth stands alone, forming the center, so to speak. What was characteristic of the third reappears in the fifth, only at a higher level. What was characteristic of the second reappears at a higher level in the sixth. What was characteristic of the first, the primordial Indian period, reappears in the seventh. Such overlaps take place. Remember how I said that there are individual spirits who are aware of this overlap, as in Kepler — when he attempted, in his own way, to explain the harmonies in the cosmos in the fifth post-Atlantean period through his three Keplerian laws, saying: I bring forth the golden vessels of the Egyptians, and so on — the awareness arises that what was the content of the third post-Atlantean epoch is being resurrected in the human being of the fifth post-Atlantean epoch. In a certain sense, therefore, one creates something similar to what is about to take place in the world when one adopts esotericism, the cults of the Egyptian-Chaldean age. But what one takes over can be used not only to take away independence through the suggestion of the consciousness soul, but also to dampen and paralyze the actual driving force of the consciousness soul. And from this point of view, this has been achieved in many ways: to put the consciousness soul that is supposed to arise to sleep. This has been achieved many times from this side.

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Rome — I am speaking figuratively now — needs incense and puts people half to sleep by causing them to have dreams. The movement I am referring to now completely puts people, that is, the consciousness soul, to sleep. This also seeped into the historical development of the newer humanity. And so, on the one hand, you have what is formed by the tumultuous emergence of brotherhood, freedom, and equality, but on the other hand, there is the impulse that prevents people in the course of the fifth post-Atlantean epoch from clearly seeing how brotherhood, freedom, and equality should affect them. For they can only clearly see this if they can use the consciousness soul for true self-knowledge, if they awaken in the consciousness soul. When people awaken in the consciousness soul, they first feel themselves in the body, in the soul, and in the spirit. But this is precisely what is to be put to sleep. So we have these two currents in recent history: on the one hand, now that the impulse toward the consciousness soul is there, people want chaotic brotherhood, freedom, and equality. On the other side, there is the striving of various orders to extinguish the awakening in the consciousness soul, so that individual personalities can use this awakening in the consciousness soul for themselves. These two currents intertwine throughout the entire course of modern historical life.

And now something is preparing itself. As the modern era rushes into the 18th century and into the beginning of the 19th century, until about the middle of the 19th century, there is initially a strong push toward the emancipation of the personality, because when there are so many currents, as I have characterized them to you, things do not happen gradually and comfortably, but in waves of ebb and flow. And we see on a national basis and from the other impulses that I have characterized for you for Western Europe how that which wants to move toward the emancipation of the personality, which wants to move out of nationality and into the universal human, is developing. But it cannot develop properly on its own because there is always the countercurrent of those orders which, especially in England, infect the whole of public life terribly, much more than the outside world realizes. It cannot develop. And so we see the emergence of such remarkable personalities as Richard Cobden and John Bright, who, on the one hand, are truly seized by the impulse toward the emancipation of the personality, toward the overcoming of the national through the personality throughout the whole world, who went so far as to touch upon something that could be of the greatest political significance if it were to venture into the newer historical development, but differentiated according to the different regions, for naturally people have characterized it only for their own region: the principle of non-intervention in other affairs on the part of the island kingdom as the basic principle of liberalism. It was something very significant, but as soon as it emerged, it was completely dulled by the other aspiration that arose from the impulse of the third post-Atlantic period. And so we see how, until the middle of the 19th century, what is commonly called liberalism, liberal sentiment — soon to be called freethinking — emerged from the West, well, just as one likes it. But you know what I mean: the view that emerged most clearly in the political sphere in the 18th century as political enlightenment, in the 19th century as a certain political aspiration that was called liberal political aspiration, and which gradually trickled away and died out in the last third of the 19th century.

What was still appearing everywhere as a liberal element in the 1860s, for example, gradually receded completely in real life. Something else took its place. Here we are approaching significant symptoms of recent historical life. What had to happen now? For a time, the impulse of the consciousness was such that it drove a flood upward: the liberalizing flood (see drawing, p. 50, red). But what swings to one side then swings back to the other (blue), so that we also have a swing to the other side. This will be the counterblow of liberalism (downward arrow). Let us just imagine the situation clearly. Liberalism arose because the people who represented it, inwardly, I would say, really took hold of themselves, really took themselves in hand and stormed against the tentacles of the earth, as I have characterized it to you. They broke free, did not allow themselves to be captured, if I may use the trivial expression, were simply seized by general human ideas. But the other side was still there, working in the making of the new era and gradually bringing these very thinly represented so-called liberal ideas over to its side. And already by the middle of the 19th century, liberal ideas were actually hopeless in the political arena, because those who still advocated liberal ideas later on actually give the impression of being invalids of political thought. The liberal parties of later times were thus more like lame followers, for since the middle of the 19th century, the fruit of what had come out of those orders and secret societies of the West became more and more apparent: the lulling and lulling of the consciousness soul as such. Then the soul and spirit no longer have any effect; initially, only what is present in the external sensory-physical world has an effect. And this occurred in more recent times, since the middle of the 19th century, as self-conscious socialism in all its various forms.

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This socialism that emerged can only be understood spiritually: with pseudo-spirit, with the mask of the spirit, with the mere culture of the intellect, which can only grasp what is dead. Lassalle initially struggled with such a dead science, but Marx and Engels developed this dead science. And so socialism, which strove as a theory to become practical and achieved nothing right in practice because it always remained at the level of theory, gave rise to one of the most significant symptoms of the recent historical development of mankind. We must first consider some characteristic features of this socialism.

There are three convictions, or rather parts of convictions, that characterize modern socialism. It is based, first, on a materialistic view of history; second, on the view of surplus value in economics, in the economic context; and third, on the theory of class struggle. This is essentially what millions of people around the world today believe, which can be summarized in these three things: the theory of class struggle, the economic view of the origin of surplus value, and the materialist theory of history.

Let us try to make ourselves perfectly clear so that we can understand the symptoms I am referring to here as the foundation for what we want to build on tomorrow. First: What is the materialist conception of history? — The materialist conception of history means that everything that happens in the course of human development happens only as a result of external, purely material impulses. People have to eat, they have to drink, they have to get what they need to eat and drink from here and there. So they have to interact with each other, they have to produce what nature does not produce itself. But that is what human development produces in the first place. If, in any age, let us say, a Lessing appears—I want to choose a well-known name—why does Lessing appear as he did in the 18th century? Well, since the 16th century, but especially in the 18th century, the introduction of the mechanical loom, the spinning machine, and so on, has brought about a strong division—it was in the making—between the bourgeoisie and the emerging proletariat. The proletariat was hardly there yet, but it was already smoldering beneath the surface of social existence, so to speak. But in contrast to the earlier classes, the bourgeoisie had grown stronger in the course of modern economic life. Through the way of life of the bourgeoisie, in that they had the workers beneath them, in that they no longer really recognized the earlier classes, in that they had managed to the production, processing, and distribution of goods in the way that the bourgeoisie does, a certain way of thinking becomes commonplace, which is nothing other than an ideological superstructure for the way in which the bourgeoisie produces, processes, and negotiates goods. This requires a certain way of thinking. Those who are not citizens, who are still farmers, who are surrounded by nature and live in harmony with it, think differently. But the way they think is only an ideology, because what matters is the way they produce, process, and trade goods. The citizen thinks differently from the farmer because he is crowded together in cities. He breaks away from the soil, does not see nature, and therefore the connection is abstract for him. He becomes an enlightened person who thinks about God in general, in abstract terms. But all this is a consequence of the fact that he produces goods. — I am expressing this somewhat crudely, but in a certain sense it is true. — The way in which goods have been processed and traded since the 16th century has given rise to a way of thinking that is particularly evident in Lessing. Lessing is the representative of the bourgeoisie at its height, behind which the proletariat lags behind in its development. — Herder, Goethe, and so on can be explained in a similar way. All of this is a superstructure; in reality, the only thing that matters for the elementary materialistic view is what comes from the production, processing, and negotiation of goods.

This is the materialistic view of history. If one wants to explain Christianity, one must explain how, at the beginning of our era, trade relations between the Orient and the Occident changed, one must explain how the exploitation of slaves and the relations between masters and slaves changed, and then explain how an ideological superstructure developed above all this economic activity: that is Christianity. Because people came to have a different necessity to produce what they eat and what they trade for food than was previously the case, they thought differently. And because there was a radical economic upheaval at the beginning of our era, there was also a radical upheaval in the ideological superstructure, which is characterized as Christianity. — That is the first part of those convictions that have swept through millions and millions of hearts since the middle of the 19th century.

Those who have remained in the bourgeoisie have actually no idea how deeply, deeply ingrained this view is in the widest circles. Certainly, the professors who speak of the ideas of history, who speak of all kinds of historical shadows, have an audience. But even among the professors, some have recently felt quietly drawn to Marxism. But they have no audience among the broad masses. However, this is the age of the consciousness soul, and the impulse of the consciousness soul continues to have an effect. People are waking up, provided they are allowed to wake up. On the one hand, attempts are being made to lull them back to sleep; on the other hand, they are demanding, I would say, in the midst of their sleep, to wake up again. Since they have nothing else but the direction of their senses toward the purely material world, they form a materialistic view of history. And thus those peculiar symptoms arose: one of the noblest, most liberal spirits, Schiller, was long celebrated and outwardly admired. In 1859, monuments were erected everywhere to celebrate the anniversary of his birth. In my youth, there lived a man in Vienna named Heinrich Deinhardt who endeavored, in a very beautiful writing, to introduce people to Schiller's real ideas, to the ideas he had set down in his letters on the aesthetic education of man. The entire edition of this work was pulped! The author, this Heinrich Deinhardt, once had the misfortune of being hit, I believe, by a passing car—in short, he fell down on the street, broke his leg, and could not be cured—even though it was a minor leg fracture—because he was so malnourished that he could not be nursed back to health. He did not survive. This is just one symptom of the way in which the 19th century treated those who really wanted to make Schiller understandable, who wanted to introduce Schiller's great ideas into the general consciousness of the time. Surely you will say, or others will say: Are there not beautiful aspirations in all areas? — There are, and we will talk about them in the course of time, but they all lead, for the most part, to dead ends.

That is one aspect of socialist conviction. The second is the theory of surplus value. It can be characterized briefly as follows: The newer mode of production has led to a situation in which those who must be employed to produce goods, to process goods, must turn their own life force into labor power, which then becomes a market commodity like other market commodities. For two classes of people arise: the entrepreneurs and the workers. The entrepreneurs are the capitalists, and they therefore own the means of production. They have the factory, they have the tools, they have everything that belongs to the means of production. That is one type of people, the employers; they own the means of production. Then there are the workers; they have no means of production, but only one thing to bring to the market: their labor power. Because of this contrast between the entrepreneur and the worker, because the entrepreneur, who owns the means of production, is opposed by the worker, who has no property and can only offer his labor power on the market, it is possible to reduce the compensation for the commodity labor—commodity labor!—to a minimum, and everything else flows to the owner of the means of production, that is, to the entrepreneur, as surplus value. As a result, what is produced for the market and for humanity, i.e., for consumption, is distributed in such a way that the worker receives only compensation, a minimum; the rest flows to entrepreneurship as surplus value. — That is Marxist theory. And that is the conviction of millions of people. — And this is brought about solely by the very specific economic structure that social life has taken on in modern times. Ultimately, this leads to the existence of exploiters and exploited.

It is essentially these categories that, since the middle of the 19th century, first in small circles, then in sects, but now among millions and millions of people, have won hearts for the view of a purely economic structure in social coexistence. For it is very easy to become convinced, if one develops these views, which I am only sketching out for you, that the ownership of the means of production by individuals is the ruin of developing humanity. The means of production must become common property. All who work must be able to manage the means of production together. — The expropriation of the means of production has become the ideal of the working class.

It is very important, first of all, not to get stuck in the rusty, unrealistic ideas that many people who have remained part of the bourgeoisie and have thus slept through modern developments still hold. For, isn't it true that many people who are so entrenched in bourgeois ideology, who have slept through what has actually happened in recent decades, still have the idea that there are social democrats and communists who want to share, who want everything to be communal, and so on? These people should actually be astonished when they hear that a carefully developed, astute view of how things should and must be is held by millions and millions of people: the theory of surplus value, which can only be overcome by making the means of production common property. Anyone who is a socialist agitator today, or even just someone who follows socialist agitators, naturally laughs at members of the bourgeoisie who talk to them about communism and what the social democrats want, because they understand that it is about socialization, that is, the collective management of the means of production. For today's worker sees corruption in the ownership of the means of production by individual human beings, because those who have no means of production are at the mercy of those who do.

Thus, in essence, the social struggle of modern times is a struggle for the means of production, and struggle is necessary, because it is the third conviction of social democracy that everything that has developed has developed through struggle. The bourgeoisie rose to power by overcoming the aristocracy. The proletariat will rise and win control of the means of production by doing to the bourgeoisie what the bourgeoisie did to the old aristocracy. Everything is class struggle. The progress of humanity lies in the victory of one class over another.

This threefold view: first, that what drives humanity forward from epoch to epoch are only material impulses, everything else is only ideological superstructure; second, that the real corruption is surplus value, which can only be overcome by the common administration of the means of production; and third, that the only way to make the means of production common is to to overcome the bourgeoisie just as the bourgeoisie has overcome the old aristocracy—this is what has gradually spread throughout the civilized world as the so-called socialist movement. And then there was also this significant historical symptom of the most recent years, that both the members of the remaining nobility and the members of the remaining bourgeoisie retired to their resting places, at most taking up slogans such as sharing and communism, well, those slogans about which there are sometimes long notes at the very back of history books. But very rarely is anything at all written about it! So what really happened was slept through. And this then developed to the point where, with great difficulty but under the pressure of circumstances, under the influence of these last four years, some people began to take a closer look at certain things. It is impossible to imagine how carefree people would have continued to sleep if the last four years had not happened, how carefree they were about the fact that with each passing year thousands upon thousands were won over to these socialist views that I have just characterized for you, and that people are finally dancing on a volcano. But it is uncomfortable to admit that one is dancing on a volcano, and people avoid realizing that they are dancing on a volcano. But the volcano does not avoid erupting and burying those who dance on it.

With this I have again characterized a symptom of recent history. For this socialist conviction is one of the symptoms of recent history. It is a fact, not just some theory. It has an effect. I do not attach any importance to the permanence of Lassalle's or Marxist theory, but I do, of course, attach great importance to the existence of millions of people who have chosen as their ideal to do what they can recognize from the three points I have mentioned. But this is something that is radically opposed to nationalism, which I have shown you as a certain basis at the beginning of recent history. All sorts of things have developed out of nationalism. Now, what the proletariat is striving for was already clear when Karl Marx first published the program of the proletariat in 1848, which essentially contained the points I have just mentioned, and it ended with the cry: “Proletarians of all countries, unite!” And almost no meeting of these people anywhere in the world ended without a cheer for international revolutionary social democracy, for republican social democracy. That was an international principle. And so, alongside the Roman International with its universal idea, there arose the International of Socialism. That is a fact, because these so many people are a fact. It is important to bear this in mind.

In order to crown this symptomatology of recent times, at least for the time being, we must already clearly see the path that will allow us to follow the symptoms until they show us, to some extent, where we can break through and look into reality. In addition to all this, other people have created virtually insoluble problems—you must feel how things are going, how things are coming to a head—insoluble problems. We see how, in the 19th century, the liberalizing parliamentary movement developed relatively calmly in England; tumultuously, or rather, unmotivated in France. The further east we go, the more we have to say: the national is being carried over, transferred, as I mentioned yesterday. But this gives rise to insoluble historical problems. And that is also a symptom of this. Of course, those people who do not think, who believe that everything can be solved, who believe that everything can be solved.

Such an insoluble problem—I don't mean for the abstract mind, where it is of course solvable, but I mean in reality—was created in 1870/71 between Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. This is the so-called Alsace problem. Of course, intelligent people can solve it. Either one state conquers the other, defeats the other, and then it has solved the problem, right? That is what has been attempted for a long time with regard to Alsace, by one side or the other. Or if you don't want that, you put it to a vote among the population. That's very easy; the majority decides. That's how it works, according to the clever people. But those who are grounded in reality, who do not see just a single moment in time, but who see how time itself is a real factor, and how it is impossible to bring about in a short period of time what must develop over time — in short, the people who are grounded in reality — they already knew that this was an unsolvable problem. Just read what people who tried to look into the course of European development thought, wrote, and said about this problem in the 1870s. Before their eyes, before the eyes of their souls, they saw how the events of that time were creating strange preconditions for the future of Europe, how the urge would arise in the West to call upon the entire East. Even then, there were people who knew that the Slavic problem would arise because the West wanted to solve the issue differently than in Central Europe. I just want to point out how things are. I want to point out that it is such a tangible symptom, as I showed you yesterday with the Thirty Years' War, that one cannot show in history that what follows is an effect of what preceded it. The Thirty Years' War shows precisely this: what started it, what happened before the outbreak of the war, is exactly the same as what happened after it ended; but what emerged then did not start with it. There is no question of cause and effect. You can see something characteristic in this symptom, as you can in the Alsace problem. I could show you the same thing with many questions of recent times. Things are raised, but they do not lead to a solution, but to insolubility, to ever new conflicts, to dead ends in life. It is important to realize this. They lead to such dead ends in life that one cannot be of the same opinion in the world, that one person must have a different opinion from another simply because he stands in a different place in Europe. And again, it is one of the characteristic features of modern historical symptoms that people bring themselves to create facts that are insoluble problems.

Now we already have a whole series of characteristic features of modern human development: unproductivity, the dawning of community ideas that claim to be unproductive, such as the national impulse and so on. In between, however, there is the constant onslaught of the conscious soul. And now the characteristic feature of entering into dead ends, everywhere entering into dead ends. For a large part of what is being negotiated today, what people are undertaking today, is moving into dead ends. And another characteristic: the effort to dampen awareness of what is currently supposed to be developed as consciousness. For there is nothing more characteristic than the dampening of consciousness among today's so-called educated class of the population about the true conditions in the so-called proletariat. Everyone is asleep to the true conditions of the proletariat. At most, they see only the outward appearance. Housewives complain about their maids, saying that they no longer want to do this or that, but they have no inclination to worry about the fact that today it is not only factory workers but also maids who are filled with Marxist theory. People are gradually talking about all kinds of general human issues. But this is pure rhetoric if one is not really interested in the individual human being and does not care about the individual human being. Then one must know what is important in the development of humanity, then one must really get involved in things.

Truly, it is not in order to put forward some social “theory” that I have had to present this one symptom of socialism to you again, but rather to show you the symptoms of recent historical developments. Tomorrow we will continue our reflections in order to crown this and, in individual places, I would say, to break through to reality.