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Reflections on Contemporary History II
The Karma of Untruthfulness
GA 173b

30 December 1916, Dornach

Translated by Steiner Online Library

Eleventh Lecture

[ 1 ] Our recent reflections have, on the one hand, drawn on the entire history of human development, insofar as the Mystery of Golgotha has intervened in it. We have thus dealt with what is, in a sense, the highest and most significant aspect of the development of the world and humanity. On the other hand, it is certainly understandable that we have addressed contemporary phenomena. This was particularly necessary because a large number of our friends had expressed a desire to hear about precisely these contemporary phenomena. And we must also admit to ourselves that the gravity of the times already argues in favor of linking the immediate, concrete experiences of the day to that which is the nerve center, the innermost impulse, of our spiritual scientific endeavors. After all, based on various reflections we have made, we can say that the reasons why such a catastrophe—as it manifests itself around us—has come about in human development lie deep within, and that it is actually a form of superficiality to consider the causes of today’s current events only in their outermost manifestations, so to speak.

[ 2 ] Such superficial observations will never provide a fruitful understanding of current events. A fruitful understanding is one that gives people the opportunity to think about how to find a way out of the catastrophe in which the world finds itself. Therefore, let us consider a few details today; tomorrow, I hope to be able to point out to you an important connection drawn directly from spiritual science—one that, I would say, is capable of touching our souls in such a way that we can engage with it in an active, comprehending understanding of things. Let us prepare for this a little further with a few details.

[ 3 ] First of all, let me emphasize once again that nothing could be further from my mind than to engage in political speculation; that certainly cannot be our task. Our task lies in reflections on knowledge—an understanding of the interconnections, which naturally requires that we also turn our attention to individual details. For this reason, these reflections should be far, far removed from any partisanship. And it is precisely in this regard that I ask you not to misunderstand me. For whatever position one or the other among us may hold regarding this or that national aspiration must not, after all, interfere in any way with the deeper foundations of our spiritual scientific endeavors. I would like to say: I wish only to offer suggestions for evaluation, but not to influence anyone’s judgment in the slightest.

[ 4 ] It is easy for a misunderstanding to arise, especially in such a field, and it seems to me that some of what I have said in my recent reflections may indeed have been subject to misunderstanding. Therefore, since such a misunderstanding can happen to anyone, let me note right away that, for example, in the passages where I drew attention to the events related to the Belgian neutrality issue, my intention was truly not to defend or attack anything, but merely to state a fact. And when I made that remark for the first time, I did not do so on my own initiative, but rather in response to the remarks of Georg Brandes, who, as it seemed to me, had offered a truly neutral assessment.

[ 5 ] For me, these matters were not about evaluating this or that measure taken by one side or the other in a political sense, but rather about emphasizing the importance of the principle of truth in the world—emphasizing that the karma that has come to fruition for humanity is in many ways connected to the fact that, and attention in general to historical and other aspects of life in our materialistic age is not such that truth prevails. And the failure of truth to prevail—the peculiar prevalence of the very opposite of truth, the scant inclination to seek truth, the scant longing for truth—the karma of our time is connected to all of this. And this is what must be studied.

[ 6 ] Therefore, when one considers what is being claimed, especially during the years when humanity is going through what is today called a war, one must not object that this is merely being said by newspapers or the like. What matters are the effects. These things have a powerful impact. If one takes a close look at what is being said—at how things are perceived and presented—then one sees in this “how” the workings of a force that truly does not move in the direction of truth. And do not believe that thoughts, that assertions, are not objective forces! They are objective, real forces! And it is absolutely inevitable that they will bring about their effects, even if they do not translate into outward actions. For the future, what people think is far more important than what they do. For thoughts become actions over the course of time. We live today on the thoughts of times past; these are fulfilled in the actions taking place today. And our thoughts, which flood the world, will manifest themselves in the actions of the future.

[ 7 ] I would now like to address something that could easily have led to misunderstandings, and I therefore wish to preface our discussion with a few remarks. I mention this to show you, so to speak, using a model, how one seeks the truth. — One might say it is open to question whether I was correct in stating that it would have been sufficient to preserve the peace if Sir Edward Grey had answered “yes” to the German ambassador’s question in London as to whether England would remain neutral if Germany respected Belgian neutrality. I believe it cannot be denied that things would have turned out quite differently if Sir Edward Grey had answered “yes”; for then the violation of Belgium’s neutrality would not have occurred.

[ 8 ] If you recall everything I have said—and when it comes to what is said here, one must bear in mind that it all comes down to nuances—you will see that nowhere have I, even with a single word, defended the violation of Belgian neutrality. I certainly have not done so. Nor do I need to brand it as a violation of the law—that would be like carrying coals to Newcastle, to use the old, hackneyed expression— for the German Chancellor himself admitted right at the outset of the war that the violation of Belgian neutrality was a violation of the law, and it cannot be my task to add anything to that or to offer any excuse for it. The matter has been acknowledged as a violation of the law by an authoritative, externally authoritative source.

[ 9 ] But the fact remains—and let’s be clear on this today, my dear friends—that on August 1, the British Foreign Secretary was asked: Would Britain remain neutral if Germany did not violate Belgium’s neutrality? — And this question was answered evasively! Given the way the question was phrased, no one can doubt that, had the answer been “yes” at the time, Belgium’s neutrality would not have been violated.

[ 10 ] Now one might say: Belgium’s neutrality has been guaranteed since 1839, and the situation was such that there was really no need to ask; for Germany was obligated to respect Belgium’s neutrality. Therefore, England could not have been required to provide further assurances based on this respect—a reciprocal promise for a promise that already existed. Respect for Belgian neutrality could not have been made contingent on England remaining neutral. One might say that the German ambassador had merely asked: “Will England remain neutral if Germany fulfills its promise?”

[ 11 ] If someone were to say that it was formally correct of Sir Edward Grey to give an evasive answer, he would of course be right—so obviously right, in fact, that it is actually superfluous to even address the point. But the course of world history is never a matter of formal legal judgments. Such judgments never capture reality! World history unfolds in a way that makes it impossible to encapsulate its reality within formal judgments. Anyone who seeks to make formal judgments is making judgments divorced from reality; yet, if they can only speak loudly enough, if they can only assert themselves, they will always be right, because, after all, no reasonable person will object to the correctness of formal judgments anyway. Formal judgments are also very easy to understand; they simply do not capture reality.

[ 12 ] I ask you to recall that I emphasized in my latest book, The Enigma of Man, that judgments depend not merely on formal correctness, but on their correspondence to reality. What matters is that judgments capture reality. No one can object to the formal correctness of Sir Edward Grey’s answer; we do not wish to discuss that at all—it goes without saying. But let us look at the facts, and in such a way that this examination of the facts simultaneously shows how one must judge external things if one wishes to prepare oneself to gain correct understandings of occult matters as well. Occult matters must be grasped in their reality; one cannot get by with formal judgments alone. Therefore, one must accustom oneself to trying, as best as possible, to hold the facts together even when dealing with external matters.

[ 13 ] Well, I could go into lengthy discussions; one could talk about this question alone for days on end. First, if the issue were to establish a legal basis—for if neutrality is to be said to have been violated, it must have existed—the question would have to be answered as to whether Belgium’s neutrality existed at the time it was allegedly violated. I am not referring here to documents found during the war; let us not discuss that, for it is a matter open to debate, on which opinions may differ. But if this were a matter for discussion, then, upon objectively considering everything that can be brought forward regarding such questions, one would probably have to conclude—using the same criteria by which one otherwise judges matters in life—that since Belgium’s occupation of the Congo, there can be no question of the old neutrality clause of 1839 still being in force; for when new circumstances arise—such as a state entering into international relations with the ability to freely give away or sell territories as vast as the Congo, or otherwise bring them into relations with other states—the concept of neutrality is undermined.

[ 14 ] I am well aware that the Congo was also declared neutral in 1885; but the question would be whether that declaration is contestable. I do not, however, wish to decide anything; I merely want to draw your attention to the difficulties involved and to the fact that it is not so easy to form a truly objective judgment on such matters. One could cite many more examples of this nature; so this is where the difficulties begin. Nor do we wish to discuss the extent to which—given that Germany was not founded until 1871—the old agreement of 1839 was still valid. But I merely wish to draw attention to all of this as something that must also be taken into account. For it is not only the fanciful concepts that one formally constructs that flow into the objective course of events, but actual events themselves; without any human intervention, actual events flow in.

[ 15 ] But is it really true that the German ambassador made an issue out of something that should actually have been a matter of course, by asking whether Great Britain would remain neutral if Germany kept its promise of 1839—even though there was no Germany at that time!—? Belgian neutrality was not always taken for granted. The following attests to this: When war broke out in 1870 between Prussia, the allied German states, and France, an agreement was reached between Great Britain—under Foreign Secretary Gladstone—and Germany on the one hand, and between Great Britain and France on the other, whereby a treaty was concluded with each of these countries stipulating that Great Britain would remain neutral if the other two states respected Belgium’s neutrality.

[ 16 ] Great Britain was thus in exactly the same situation in 1870, but at that time it did not take the fundamental position that the old agreement of 1839 was unconditionally valid; rather, in that specific case, it actually weighed Belgium’s neutrality on one side of the scale and Great Britain’s neutrality on the other. If a precedent exists, one cannot say that the same course of action may not be taken at a later time. Let us therefore recall what I have often emphasized: There is continuity in life as it unfolds throughout history; things are interconnected. Just as an individual cannot later do something that contradicts what has gone before, nor can one undo what has happened—so it is in the life of nations. One cannot take for granted something that was not previously taken for granted.

[ 17 ] That, too, is something that must be taken into account. But even if the matter were so simple that one could simply say: “It goes without saying that the Treaty of 1839 is in force, and therefore no reciprocal commitment needed to be demanded of Great Britain”—the response to that is that, at that time, the initiative came from Great Britain itself; Great Britain asked France on the one hand and Germany on the other whether they would respect neutrality. Thus, discussions regarding neutrality were initiated at that time. When one initiates a discussion, one can link further negotiations to it. |

[ 18 ] Now, one can also say the following. As I said, I am not defending the violation of neutrality—that is not my role—but I can say this: If Belgium’s neutrality had not been violated by Great Britain’s affirmative response, the entire situation in the West would have unfolded differently. — But I did not stop at that statement; rather, I explicitly added: Furthermore, the German side offered not to harm France or its colonies if England remained neutral. And when no positive response was given to that either, the follow-up question was asked: What, then, were the conditions under which Britain would remain neutral? In other words, Britain was granted the right to set its own conditions for remaining neutral. All of this was finalized on August 2; all of this had taken place on August 1. But all of it was rejected. Great Britain refused to give any response whatsoever to any inquiries on this matter. So one can certainly say: Had Great Britain given any response at all, then—as this external course of history already shows—the entire situation in the West would have unfolded differently.

[ 19 ] I did not stop there either, but told you: I also know from other sources that even the entire war with France could have been avoided if Great Britain had given the appropriate response. — The fact that there are other, deeper reasons why this did not happen is, in turn, a matter for another consideration. But if one is to judge the opinions that have been circulating around the world over the past two and a half years, then one must consider these matters very carefully. For there are still many people today who believe that England entered the war because of the violation of Belgian neutrality. Yet it could have avoided this very violation by not entering the war in the first place!

[ 20 ] Now one might say: Yes, but the entire course of the war in the West would have been different if Germany had not violated Belgium’s neutrality. Well, but then one is not distinguishing between what is correct in a strictly legal and formal sense and what is, after all, connected to the tragedy of world history. A great deal depends on being able to distinguish the tragic from what is formally correct. Certainly, some things would have turned out differently. What would have been different? Without, please, mixing any moral judgments into the assessment, let us consider what would have happened differently.

[ 21 ] Let us assume, then, that even though Great Britain had not become involved in any way—but at the risk that it might have intervened in the war at any moment—Belgium’s neutrality would have been respected. As things stood, given Great Britain’s conduct—and anyone who examines the facts must recognize this; not just the Blue Book, but all the files must be examined—it was simply out of the question that war would not break out in the West. Whether it could have been avoided at all, given the mood in France, is perhaps open to debate—but hardly! But let us assume that, due to Great Britain’s conduct, war in the West would have broken out anyway; what would have happened then if Belgium’s neutrality had been respected? As I said, no moral judgment is to be passed, neither in one direction nor the other.

[ 22 ] Well, what would have happened is that the vast majority of the much-maligned German army would have been trapped in the western French fortresses and wiped out. And since, despite all the talk of Prussian militarism, the French army is in fact hardly any weaker than the German one—and was hardly any weaker than the German one even before the war (the numbers are almost exactly the same)—it goes without saying that the German army would have been exhausted in the west, and the invasion from the east, which began in August and September, would have taken place on the largest possible scale. For it would have been impossible—so the experts reasoned—to wage war in the west without constantly committing nearly the entire German army. That is to say, Germany would have had to be abandoned, because the invasion would have come from the east.

[ 23 ] That was the situation. One might say that this could have been a strategic misjudgment. That can no longer be said today; it was a matter for debate in the first months of the war, but not anymore. For after the failed attempt made before Verdun, it has been proven that those were right who said at the time: The German army will be worn down if it is deployed entirely in the West.

[ 24 ] So the choice was either to pass a death sentence on Germany or to accept the tragedy of breaking through Belgium, which was the only way out if war in the West was absolutely unavoidable; for in the East, it was certainly unavoidable! And if anyone today says it could have been avoided, they would have to have the audacity to say both “yes” and “no” at the same time. If there were people who, in view of the limited ability of people today to even consider whether something might be true or not, had the audacity to say both “yes” and “no” at the same time, it would sound something like this: We were attacked by the Central Powers; we are not to blame for starting the war; but we will not end this war until we have achieved our war aim: the conquest of this or that!

[ 25 ] Well, there you have both a “yes” and a “no” at the same time! We are not the ones who want anything; it is the others who want something—they want to conquer, which is why they attacked us; but we will not end this war until we have achieved our long-standing goal—to carry out this and that conquest! It’s hard to believe that there are people who have the audacity to say “yes” and “no” at the same time. Perhaps you will discover in the coming days that there is a person who, in this era, says “yes” and “no” at the same time. This is surely the worst document that has ever dared to be made public in recent times, because it represents a complete breakdown of all logical reasoning. And this is directly connected to the karma of our time.

[ 26 ] It is therefore a matter of distinguishing the tragic from the logical-formal-juridical, and not falling into the strange delusion that it is possible in Maja—that is, in the world of the physical plane—for realities to unfold in the sense of the merely formal-logical. But let us look further: It was not a matter of justifying or opposing this or that, but rather of showing that it is unjustified to trumpet this to the world while those about whom it is being trumpeted cannot defend themselves— that this war had been waged by one side because of the violation of Belgium’s neutrality, and not to say that this violation of Belgian neutrality could have been prevented. The only other way to escape the tragedy was for England to have remained neutral. For no statesman may, from the outset, pronounce a death sentence on his own state.

[ 27 ] Of course, it’s easy for all those who simply want to pass cheap judgments to say: Contracts must be honored. Well, my dear friends, if you were given a list of all the unfulfilled contracts in public and private life, and then shown what those unfulfilled contracts have brought about in the world, only then would you see which forces in Maja are actually the effective ones.

[ 28 ] But did those on the side that didn’t say “yes” really have a clear conscience? The facts don’t really support that; for when the issue of that discussion between the German ambassador and Sir Edward Grey was later put back on the agenda, and it was said that England could indeed have saved Belgium’s neutrality, the British government defended itself; but wisely did not do so—after all, there were still too many good statesmen in the British government at the time—by retreating into mere legal technicalities. Nevertheless, while I stand by the judgment—which was passed not by me but by his British colleagues regarding Sir Edward Grey, and which I have cited for you—he was still too good a statesman to simply content himself with posturing and saying: “The treaty was concluded in 1839, so Germany was obligated to maintain neutrality, even if Britain gave an evasive answer.” The English statesmen did not do that; instead, they talked their way out of it in another way. Grey said: Lichnowsky did ask that at the time, but he asked it as a private citizen, not on behalf of the German government; had he said it on behalf of the German government, it would have been different. Lichnowsky, the German ambassador, had the best of intentions to maintain peace in the West; but the German government did not stand behind him!

[ 29 ] Now just think about it: In any private context, this would rightly be called a lame excuse—a lame excuse in the most ordinary sense! For the whole world knows that when the ambassador of any state speaks to a foreign minister, he speaks on behalf of and with the full authority of his state, and his state has no choice—unless it wants to make itself impossible in the eyes of the whole world—but to ratify what its ambassador says. So this was a completely flimsy excuse that was resorted to because they did not want to retreat to the position of simply saying: it was correct. They were already feeling the weight of the fact that England could have prevented the violation of neutrality, regardless of whether it was justified by the other side or not. If an avalanche comes crashing down somewhere and the person at the top doesn’t hold it back—because he is compelled for some reason not to do so, a reason one may or may not find justified, or in any case may not find justified—and the person a little further down doesn’t hold it back either, on the grounds that the person above should have held it back—no, such an argument doesn’t hold water! But if one wants to judge these matters, it always involves weighing them up to some extent. For example, one must again take the following into account:

[ 30 ] When did that happen, then? It is now August 2. On August 2, the King of Belgium asked England to intervene—that is, he asked it to intervene with Germany. The Belgian king therefore took it for granted that England would negotiate with Germany regarding Belgium’s neutrality. But England did not do so at first; it waited a full day, during which Sir Edward Grey addressed Parliament in London, while concealing the entire discussion with the German ambassador—he didn’t say a single word about it. Had he said anything about it, that parliamentary session would have unfolded quite differently!

[ 31 ] After the meeting with the German ambassador had taken place, after the King of Belgium had called upon England to intervene, England simply waited; nothing was done. What, exactly, were they waiting for? They were waiting for Belgium’s breach of neutrality to be complete! For as long as it was not complete, events could still have unfolded in such a way that it did not happen; for there were powerful forces working to prevent it, and the matter hung by a thread. And if the King of Belgium’s request had been granted at the right time—if England had intervened—then it is questionable whether this violation of neutrality would have occurred at all. But when did Grey intervene? On the fourth, when the German armies were already on Belgian soil! Why did he wait, even after the King of Belgium’s request? These are questions that must be asked.

[ 32 ] All of this could be further expanded upon if one were to study the documents thoroughly—I would say, cross-referencing them—but that is not necessary, for I believe I have made it clear to you that these matters have been well prepared for years. It is therefore no surprise at all that events have unfolded as they have recently. Of course, if one studies the documents one-sidedly, only formalities emerge.

[ 33 ] So I did not want to take sides with one party or the other, but only to show what is necessary to form a judgment about such matters. For, in keeping with the spirit of spiritual science—which strives for a higher perspective—I would much rather discourage people from lightly passing disparaging judgments on what happens in the clash of states in world history, for that is precisely the point: it is not peoples who wage war, but states!

[ 34 ] In this area, far too little consideration is given to the fact that the forces of becoming—but also the forces of destruction and decay—must be present in the course of world events. Is it any different for the individual human being? As we develop our abilities over the course of our lives, we wear down our bodies; we destroy our bodies. And tomorrow I will show you what a profound connection exists between our spiritual life and belladonna, the deadly nightshade, and the poisons you find out in the world. These are, indeed, truths that reach into the depths of things. But one must have the courage to apply these truths to world history as well. Therefore, it is far better to understand than to judge according to so-called norms. Condemning states and peoples is generally built on rather shaky ground. For this reason alone—in order to finally ascend into the spiritual world and be able to perceive something there—one must accustom oneself to simply observing the facts without criticism, which belongs to an entirely different realm; only then does one understand which forces intervene in the development of the world.

[ 35 ] Let us consider, from this perspective, sine ira—but certainly not sine studio—certain events that I have hitherto heard discussed almost exclusively from a moral standpoint. This standpoint must certainly be applied to the actions of individual human beings, but it is an absurdity when applied to the life of states. Perhaps some may even find it strange that I wish to view these events, as Nietzsche said, “free of morality”; but it is indeed possible to view them free of morality.

[ 36 ] One of the main pillars of the mighty British Empire is its rule over India. This rule over India has a long and varied history. It originated with the East India Company, a trading company that was initially granted the exclusive privilege of conducting trade with India on behalf of England. And so, over time, England’s rule over India—and indeed, the British Empire in India—developed continuously and systematically from the various rights held by the East India Company. England’s trade with China also developed from this, beginning as early as the time of the East India Company. Incidentally, brisk trade between India and China had already been taking place since the end of the 18th century, and the British East India Company was already involved at that time. As events unfolded, however, England became the world’s leading trading power.

[ 37 ] Now, with the incorporation of this element of trade in the Orient, another element came into contact with it; the two intersected. Starting in the 17th century, the custom of opium smoking spread in China. It is likely that the Arabs taught the Chinese to smoke opium, for before the 17th century, the Chinese were not opium smokers. For those who do it, opium smoking provides a questionable but powerful pleasure; for the opium smoker creates for himself the most varied fantasies, born of the astral realm, in which he lives; it is truly another world, reached by purely material means.

[ 38 ] When the people who traded with China from England in the manner described above noticed that the custom—and the addiction—of opium smoking was becoming increasingly widespread among the Chinese, they established extensive poppy fields in Bengal, India, to produce opium; for anyone familiar with the laws governing such matters knows that not only does demand create supply, but that, conversely, supply also generates demand. If one offers a great deal of a particular commodity, a particularly strong need for that commodity arises—as every economist knows. And for this purpose, too, the East India Company was granted a monopoly by England to import opium into China. And the more that was imported, the more the scourge of opium smoking spread throughout China. Beginning in 1772, several thousand chests were imported annually, each chest valued at approximately four thousand eight hundred marks.

[ 39 ] Well, I’m choosing this particular example because something like this really has a deeper cultural-historical background when you take all the factors into account. Just think for a moment that by introducing opium—since it affects the soul—you are truly interfering with the entire spiritual life of a people or of those to whom you supply the opium. I can choose this example because it would never occur to me to claim that anyone who wants to engage in trade is in the wrong; trade must be free in the world. That, too, is a valid principle. And it would never occur to me to simply declare that someone who cultivates poppies in Bengal to produce opium for China—and to receive gold in exchange—is in the wrong.

[ 40 ] But the Chinese saw the poor, emaciated opium smokers. Opium smokers gradually fell into a state of utter decline, and it gradually became apparent what an impact opium smoking was having on the decline of broader segments of the Chinese population. When the Chinese realized this, they banned opium in 1794. They no longer wanted to allow opium into their country.

[ 41 ] Well, that’s how it goes: Prohibitions sometimes don’t stop trade in what’s banned; people find ways and means to trade in it anyway. And back then, it turned out that—even though the ban was technically in place, even though the Chinese had enacted a law prohibiting the import of opium—the opium trade was still thriving. There are all sorts of things involved; bribery is just one aspect of the matter; there are many other related factors. Well, in short, the opium trade flourished, rising from a few thousand chests in 1773 to thirty thousand chests in 1837—in just a few decades. The proceeds from this trade, amounting to about thirty million francs a year, flowed into British India.

[ 42 ] When the situation had gotten so out of hand, the Chinese saw no other way out than to have the arriving opium shipments confiscated. They sent a capable Chinese man—an energetic man named Lin—to Canton, where most of the opium shipments arrived, and he confiscated the opium chests as they arrived. The English also had a very capable man serving as a consular official in China, Captain Elliot, who was energetic; he even once succeeded in breaking through the Chinese blockade with a warship.

[ 43 ] Now he had to find a way out of the situation: The opium chests were there, in vast quantities. But the Chinese were not willing to back down just yet—it was a dire situation. So Elliot, taking advantage of his authority, had 20,283 chests transferred to his personal ownership, signed the documents, and handed them over to the Chinese government. This provided a way out, at least for the time being.

[ 44 ] But that did not put an end to the opium trade. On one side, there was simply no will to do so. The Chinese saw no other option but to enact a new law, and this law was now very strict. Lin decreed that all persons involved in the opium trade were to be sentenced to death by Chinese courts, and that all ships would henceforth be confiscated. The Chinese had thus made it clear: anyone who trades in opium will be brought before a Chinese court and sentenced to death.

[ 45 ] The British side did not say, for example: “To prevent anyone from being beheaded ‘above the brim,’ we must put a stop to the opium trade”; oh no, they did not say that, but rather—and I quote them verbatim—: “With such a demand, the Chinese government has permanently destroyed any sense of security.” First, the Englishmen in China were ordered to leave the country, and armed assistance was requested from India. They occupied the territory, so to speak. And since the Chinese quite bravely stood their ground and yet wanted to behead anyone who traded in opium, it appeared that no opium trade was taking place; and since the Chinese wanted to seize the British ships carrying opium, it appeared that no ships were being sent there. In fact, the opium was loaded onto American ships in India! And just as much—indeed, as things escalated, even more—opium was now arriving in China on American ships.

[ 46 ] Elliot, the official, said: “The issue at the heart of our dispute is now clear: whether China wishes to engage in honest and growing trade with us, or whether it is willing to bear the blame for allowing its coasts to fall prey to open piracy.” — The port of Canton was blockaded with Indian assistance. During the scuffles—catfights, one might say—that ensued, a Chinese man was killed by an English sailor. Naturally, the Chinese government demanded the extradition of the English sailor. But the fact was that the Chinese would occasionally grow weary of trade, and so one day they wanted to be in the right somehow, without, however, wronging the English. You can actually do that, too! Now, by chance, an English sailor drowned at that time, and so Elliot—who was a very clever man—reached an agreement with Lin, the representative of the Chinese government, to declare the drowned sailor to be the one who had killed the Chinese man. And so the drowned sailor was handed over, and with that, the matter was settled for the time being. But all these events ultimately led to war between England and China in 1840.

[ 47 ] Thus, the course of events was entirely inevitable; it could not have turned out any other way. However, a great influence was exerted on the spiritual life from the material side, and something took place that was connected to the entire world process. In England, people “knew” what was going on! What did they know, then? Well, in England they knew that China had “invaded” England—as they put it back then—precisely because the Chinese could not tolerate England’s opium and poppy cultivation in India, and because the Chinese themselves wanted to grow their own poppies. That’s what people said. People “knew” that very well, and they also knew that the Chinese were barbarians! That was what people in England knew back then. Lord Palmerston said: Protection of the poppy crops in India must take effect, and that was what this was all about; furthermore, it was about the fact that the economists in China did not want to let their money leave the country, even though by right it belonged to India. — These were all things that people in Europe fully understood!

[ 48 ] Now the war raged. At war, of course, atrocities occur. Atrocities were committed on the Chinese side, and atrocities were also committed on the English side. At that time, entire villages were found with the female inhabitants of the houses swimming in their own blood; the Chinese men had fought bravely, and when they saw that they would have to kill themselves or surrender, they first killed their wives and children. It was a sad war, this war of 1840. Elliot, who had witnessed the entire war and for whom it was, in a sense, a burden on his conscience, one day acquired a peculiar reputation—one that may well have been justified: he gained a reputation for being inclined to initiate peace negotiations with the Chinese. That is when he was ousted. And then came—not Lloyd George! His name was Pottinger at the time; a certain Pottinger took Elliot’s place—the one who had wanted to initiate peace negotiations. The war was to be fought to the bitter end—that is, until the island of Chusan and the cities of Ningbo and Amoy were captured, until the British had advanced as far as Nanking, and until China had lost all courage by 1842. Hong Kong also fell to England; five ports in China were opened without restriction to the opium trade; British consuls were appointed; and ninety-seven and a half million in war reparations—that is, in addition to the twenty-five million previously extorted from the Chinese—how should one put it? —I won’t say “extorted,” but I’d like to have another word for it that I can’t think of at the moment—in addition to the twenty-five million already extorted earlier, another ninety-seven and a half million in war reparations were now added.

[ 49 ] As I said, it would never occur to me to view this process as anything other than a historical necessity. It would never occur to me to accuse anyone. For anyone who can recognize necessities—who can understand how things happen on the physical plane—knows that such things do indeed exist in the normal physical course of world development. And what has been derived from opium is part of England’s national wealth, and a good part of English culture is embedded in that national wealth. And just as it would be nonsense to underestimate English culture, so too is it nonsense to doubt the necessity with which such a thing came to pass—even if perhaps the little satirical epilogue that ensued afterward does not quite belong to the realm of necessity:

[ 50 ] When the first installment of the ninety-seven and a half million in war reparations came in, there were people who said: “We are the ones whose opium crates were confiscated first, and what we received as compensation back then is only a tiny fraction of what we lost.” These were, in other words, people who had sold opium to China back then, from whom the opium had been purchased, and who had received a small amount of compensation. Now they said: “It has become clear that our homeland recognizes the sale of opium to China as legitimate; therefore, we must firmly assert our claim to full compensation, for we did nothing other than what our homeland has now gone to war for.”

[ 51 ] Once the war had been won, these gentlemen therefore considered it their right to receive full compensation. Then the minister in charge, who was tasked with deciding the matter, pulled a note from his pocket—the same one he had given to Captain Elliot at the time—and in that note it stated that as long as Chinese laws prohibited the opium trade, the English government would never agree to compensate anyone for losses incurred in the opium trade. — Since Chinese laws were in force at that time — so they said — you have no right to make any claims, for you have violated Chinese laws, which were only abolished as a result of the war.

[ 52 ] Whether this aftermath is also part of historical necessity is not for us to decide. But it is necessary to look at the facts. With the outbreak of the Anglo-Chinese War in 1840, we find ourselves at the starting point of precisely that era we have often discussed. I have just pointed to this year as the one in which materialism reached its peak. It is good to understand such things in the context of their development. And as I said: just as it would be nonsense to underestimate English culture, English life, or English civilization in any way, so it would be nonsense to believe that something like this could have been avoided in the overall context of English development. It is part of it. And to pass a moral judgment on the matter is completely incorrect. For then one would fall into the error of judging groups and collectives in the same way one judges individuals. But that is precisely what is impossible.

[ 53 ] Today, this is often claimed. I have just received another brochure—there are so many of them now, all promoting peace—which states: Nations have their own unique ways of thinking, feeling, and willing, just as individual human beings do. — That is, of course, the greatest nonsense one can say, because what is real on another, higher plane cannot simply be transferred by analogy to human beings, whose thinking, feeling, and willing lie within the physical sphere. Certainly, they have their own characteristics—the national spirits, the national souls—but in the way you’ll find described in the lecture series on national spirits that I mentioned recently. But to speak of the thinking, feeling, and willing of nations in the same way as we do of individual human beings is simply absurd.

[ 54 ] Well, my dear friends, I wanted to give you a few examples today for the simple reason that it was necessary to gather some material through striking examples. Tomorrow we will once again address some more in-depth perspectives.