The Rudolf Steiner Archive

Sixteenth Lecture

[ 1 ] The fact that I am speaking today stems from a question raised in the previous history seminar. This question concerns the issue of blame for the last war catastrophe, and it is certainly such an important matter—and one can already say today that it is also of great historical significance—that the answer to this question, to the extent that it is possible within such a limited framework and in a short time, must not be withheld from you.

[ 2 ] I would just like to preface this with a few remarks so that you are aware of the perspective from which I intend to speak on this issue. I have never held back from expressing the views I have formed on the subject of today’s debates in the lectures I have given at the Goetheanum in Dornach, and I have never made any secret of the fact that these views seem to me to be the ones that, above all else, must be articulated before the whole world. I do not believe that, on this important issue, the situation today is such that one should repeatedly say that an objective judgment must first be left to history, or that an objective judgment on this matter can only be formed at some future time. Over time, particularly due to the lingering effects of prejudice, just as many opportunities to arrive at a sound judgment on this question will be lost as might perhaps be gained through one or the other. I say expressly “perhaps”; for I myself do not believe at all that a better judgment on this question will be possible in the future than is already possible in the present.

[ 3 ] That is the first thing I would like to say. I must say it for the following reason: As you know, those attacks—I do not wish to label them with any epithet at this time—which relate specifically to the cultural-political aspect of my activities within Germany come mainly from the camp that might be called the “Pan-German” camp, and I must, of course, expect that on that side, everything I say in any way will be interpreted in the wildest manner. But on the other hand, I do not believe it necessary to offer any special words of defense in this regard, for the absurd accusations that something is being done against German identity are refuted by the very fact that, even during the war, the Goetheanum was established in the northwesternmost corner of Switzerland, a symbol of what German spiritual life is meant to achieve—not merely within Germany, but before the whole world. When one has borne witness in such a way to what German culture is, I think there is no need to say much to refute malicious accusations in any way.

[ 4 ] What I have to say further is this: I have always endeavored not to influence in any way the judgments of those who hear what I say on this subject, and I would like—as far as possible—to adhere to that today as well, though of course this is only possible to a limited extent when one must be brief. In everything I have said, my aim has been to provide everyone with a basis for forming their own judgment by listing these or those facts, these or those points. And just as I do throughout the entire field of spiritual science—never anticipating a judgment, but merely attempting to provide the materials necessary for forming one—so I would like to proceed in these matters relating to the historical external world as well.

[ 5 ] Well, let me now turn to the matter at hand: It seems to me that the discussions taking place today regarding the question of blame are, more or less everywhere in the world, fundamentally based on impossible premises. For my part, I believe that using these very same premises—if one applies them in one way or another—one can easily prove that the entire blame for the war lies with the somewhat peculiar Nikita, the King of Montenegro. I believe that, ultimately, one could even use these arguments to prove that Helfferich is an extraordinarily wise man, or that the formerly portly Mr. Erzberger did not, during the war, wind his way in a remarkably lively manner through all manner of underground passages and cellars of European will. In short, I believe that these arguments are of very little use. On the other hand, I believe that what the current German Foreign Minister Simons said in his recent speech in Stuttgart is entirely correct: that it is necessary to address the question of guilt seriously. However, I hold the supplementary view that this should actually be done. For merely emphasizing that the matter is necessary does not mean that what needs to be done has been done; rather, it is precisely necessary that it be done. And the fact that it is necessary to address the question of guilt is evident from the fact that, so to speak, at the forefront of these latest, unfortunate London negotiations, the most cunning statesman of our time, Lloyd George, placed—how should one even put it? One is at a loss to find the right words to describe what is currently taking place—the following statement: “Everything we are negotiating is based on the assumption that, for the Entente allies, the question of guilt has been settled.”

[ 6 ] Well, if everything we can negotiate is based on the assumption that the question of guilt has already been decided, then—if it has not been decided—it is all the more important to begin the negotiations by seriously raising the question of guilt and addressing it in a serious manner. It must be emphatically stated that, in reality, nothing else has happened so far with regard to this question of guilt other than a very peculiar decision by the victorious powers. This decision is based—entirely in keeping with the rules of today’s world affairs—not on an objective assessment of the facts, but simply on a diktat by the victors. In order to capitalize on their victory in an appropriate manner, the victors need to dictate to the world that the other side is to blame for the war. After all, one cannot capitalize on the victory as the Entente would like to—and as one must, in fact, capitalize on it from that standpoint, as can be conceded—unless one places the full blame on the other side. You will readily see that one could not act as one is acting here if one were to say: “Yes, these people should not actually be judged the way they were, let’s say, during the catastrophe of the war.”

[ 7 ] So the point is—since everything else has remained mere literature, or has not even become literature—that, for the time being, nothing has been done regarding the question of guilt other than the imposition of a victor’s diktat. And the fact that, in some incomprehensible way, what should never have happened in the first place did happen—that this victor’s diktat was signed—has created a reality that one cannot regret enough. For one cannot say: This signature had to be given in order not to make the misfortune even greater. — Anyone who looks closely at the actual events knows that one can navigate the current world situation only through the truth and the will to the full truth. Even if what initially flows from necessity may lead to tragic situations, one cannot get through today with anything else. The times are too serious; they demand decisions too momentous to be resolved in any way other than with a full commitment to the truth.

[ 8 ] I would like to emphasize: Since, in the short time available to me, I am unable to present the matter in such a way that the content of my statements alone could fully and convincingly demonstrate what I am saying, I will at least, through the way in which I endeavor to present these matters, through the nuances and the way in which I present them, I will try to provide you with a basis for forming a judgment in this area. Now, through many years of experience and through careful observation of what is unfolding in the course of world history, I have come to understand how, above all among the Anglo-Saxon people—and particularly among certain groups within that population—there exists a political outlook that, in a certain sense, is quite broad in its world-historical perspective. Among certain power brokers—if I may call them that—behind Anglo-Saxon politics, there exists a political outlook that I would like to summarize in two main points: First, there is the view—and a large number of figures standing behind the actual public politicians, who are sometimes mere figureheads, are imbued with this view—that certain forces of world development have bestowed upon the Anglo-Saxon race the mission to exercise world domination, true world domination, for the present and for many centuries to come. This is deeply rooted in these individuals—even if, I might say, it is rooted in a materialistic way and in materialistic conceptions of world affairs—but it is so deeply rooted in those who are the true leaders of the Anglo-Saxon race that it can be compared to the inner impulses that once drove the ancient Jewish people toward their world mission. The ancient Jewish people, however, conceived of the matter in more moral, more theological terms; yet the intensity of this conception is no different among the true leaders of the Anglo-Saxon race than it was among the ancient Jewish people. We are therefore dealing first and foremost with this principle—which you can also observe externally—and with the particular outlook on life that exists among the Anglo-Saxon people, especially among their representative figures. The prevailing view is that, when such a situation arises, everything must be done that is in keeping with such a world impulse, and that one must not shy away from anything that is in keeping with such a world impulse. This impulse is instilled—in a manner that must be described as intellectually extraordinary—into the minds of those who then conduct political life in the lower echelons—which still include the state secretaries. I believe that anyone who is unaware of the fact just mentioned cannot possibly understand the course of world development in recent times. |

[ 9 ] The second aspect on which this world policy—which is so sad and destructive for Central Europe—is focused is the following. They are far-sighted. From the Anglo-Saxon perspective, this policy is indeed magnanimous; it is permeated by the belief that global impulses govern the world, and not the petty practical impulses by which this or that politician often allows himself to be guided with arrogance. In this sense, this Anglo-Saxon policy is a magnanimous one; even in individual practical measures, it takes into account the impulse of world history. The second point is this: They know that the social question is a global historical impulse that must inevitably run its course. There is not a single one of the leading Anglo-Saxon figures in question who has not said to himself, with what I would call an extraordinarily cold, sober gaze: The social question must run its course. — But he also tells himself: It must not run its course in such a way that the Western, the Anglo-Saxon mission, might suffer harm as a result. He says, almost verbatim—and these words have often been spoken: “The Western world is not meant to be allowed to be ruined by socialist experiments. The Eastern world is meant for that.” — And he is then driven by the intention to turn this Eastern world—namely, the Russian world—into a testing ground for socialist experiments.

[ 10 ] What I am about to tell you is an observation I have been able to confirm—perhaps it goes back even further, though I do not know that for certain at this point—all the way back to the 1880s. The Anglo-Saxon peoples knew full well that the social question had to run its course, that they did not want Anglo-Saxon civilization to be ruined by it, and that Russia, therefore, had to become the testing ground for socialist experiments. And political trends moved in this direction; there was a very clear tendency toward this policy. And in particular, all Balkan issues—including those through which Bosnia and Herzegovina were handed over to the unsuspecting Central Europeans in the Treaty of Berlin—all these issues were already being addressed from this perspective. The entire approach to the Turkish problem on the part of the Anglo-Saxon world is based on this perspective, and it was hoped that the socialist experiments, by unfolding as they inevitably must when the misguided proletariat follows Marxist or similar principles—that these socialist experiments would then serve as a clear lesson for the working class as well—in their outcome, in their futility, in their destruction—a clear lesson that things cannot be done that way either. The Western world will thus be protected by demonstrating in the East what socialism does when it is allowed to spread in a way that is undesirable for the Western world.

[ 11 ] You see, these things—which it will certainly be possible to justify fully from a historical perspective—are what have underlain the European situation, and indeed the global situation as a whole, for decades. And from these things, I would say, emerges what points to a level of world-historical events that is now situated more in opposition to the physical world. We need only read very carefully what the visionary Woodrow Wilson—who is, after all, a good historian in the modern sense—allows to shine through in his various speeches. But we need this only to have a symptom of what I wish to say. Throughout recent history, it has become apparent that the Orient—even if this is not usually noticed—is a kind of subject of debate for the entire European civilization. The objective observer has no choice but to conclude: Through the world-historical events of recent times, England has been favored in a certain inauguration of the mission I have characterized for you. This goes back a long way, all the way back to the discovery of the possibility of reaching India by sea. From this discovery, in fact, the entire configuration of modern English politics essentially stems—albeit via various detours—and there you have—if I may briefly outline this schematically; what I am saying now would, of course, require many hours to explain in detail, but in this response I can only touch upon the matter— there you have what I would like to call the trajectory of the world current driven by the English mission; there you have it: it runs from England across the ocean, around Africa, to India. There is an immense amount to learn from this line. This is the line for which the Anglo-Saxon world mission is truly fighting and will fight to the bitter end—even if it means fighting to the bitter end against America, if necessary. The other line, which is just as important, is the overland route, which played a major role in the Middle Ages but has become impractical for modern economic developments due to the discovery of America and the Turkish incursions into Europe. But between these two routes lies the Balkans, and Anglo-Saxon policy is aimed at handling the Balkan problem in such a way that this route is completely eliminated in terms of economic development, so that only the maritime route can develop. Anyone who wishes to see it can recognize what I have just indicated in everything that took place from the year 1900 and even earlier, up to the Balkan Wars—which immediately preceded the so-called World War—and up to the year 1914.

[ 12 ] There is another issue at hand: the relationship between England and Russia. This policy, of course, does not interest Russia at all; but Russia is interested in its own conduct with regard to this policy. As you have already seen, England has something special in mind for Russia—the socialist experiment—and must therefore gear its entire policy toward ensuring, on the one hand, that this economic policy is implemented, and on the other hand, that Russia is so constrained and contained that it can provide the very ground for these socialist experiments. That, in essence, was the world situation. Everything that was done up to the year 1914 in the realm of world politics was influenced by this global trend. As I said, it would take many hours to explain this in detail; but I wanted at least to hint at it here for the time being.

[ 13 ] What stands in contrast to this—and what I sought to shed light on when I wrote my appeal “To the German People and the Cultural World” in 1919—is the other fact that, unfortunately, Central Europe has always been resistant to the idea that one must adopt a political stance informed by such generous historical impulses. Unfortunately, within Europe, within the continent, it was not possible to get anyone to agree to view the measures that were taken from the perspective that they were driven by such generous tendencies. You see, then people come along and say: You have to engage in practical politics! A politician must be a pragmatist!” — Now let me use an example to clarify what the “practicality” of such people actually means. There are many people who say: “It’s all nonsense, what the Stuttgart people are doing with their threefold social order, with their *Kommender Tag* and so on. It’s all impractical; they’re impractical idealists!” — Well, now picture these people in your mind’s eye and imagine—as we hope will be the case—that the years will come when we—if I may put it that way—have been fortunate, when we have accomplished something, achieved something that stands in the world. Then you will see that the very same people who now say, “All that is impractical nonsense”—will come and want to be taken seriously, wanting to use their practical knowledge to spread, with all their eloquence and energy, what they previously denounced as impractical nonsense. Then the matter will suddenly be regarded as practical. That is the only perspective these people have for their practice. What this always comes down to is this: one must realize that things must be considered at their source, and that what the “practical” impractical people call “impractical” is often precisely what is sought as the foundation of their practice. They simply do not want to put themselves in the situation, and as a result, they are initially useless for what is actually happening.

[ 14 ] This was roughly the kind of approach that European politicians had followed. There is simply no other way to put it. And it is indeed a matter of recognizing that the futility—the reaching of a dead end—with regard to this policy was a tragic reality for Central Europe as events came to a head. What is at stake here, then, is that we must also recognize this: it is absolutely essential that we in Central Europe rise to the level of a magnanimous, spirit-driven political perspective. Without that, we will certainly not be able to extricate ourselves from the turmoil of the present. If we do not resolve to do so, then the only outcome will be what we are now witnessing unfold. I am of the opinion that the political problems, which are still being addressed today under the influence of the old maxims, are so tangled and so confused that they cannot be solved at all—at least not initially—by drawing on these old impulses. And let us suppose that the Entente statesmen had sat down together—I am telling you this as something I have formed into an honest opinion—and had, for my sake even under the leadership of Lloyd George, concocted those peace demands that they put out into the world before the London Conference; but let us suppose that, due to some event, they had lost the drafts of these peace demands and had even forgotten what those demands had been—of course, this is an impossible hypothesis, but I want to illustrate a point with it—and now let us suppose that Simons had received this document and, for his part, had put forward these very same demands, word for word, even, I am convinced they would have been rejected with the same indignation with which Simons’s proposals were rejected at the London Conference. For these are not solvable problems, but rather a matter of beating around the bush regarding problems that are, from this point of view, insoluble to begin with. This is precisely what must be stated for anyone seeking the truth in this area.

[ 15 ] Well, now let’s go—I would say—one level deeper, down to the purely physical events. As you know, the war catastrophe began externally with the Serbian ultimatum. I have spoken so often about the reasons behind it—about everything that preceded this ultimatum—and you will be able to inform yourselves about these matters, so that today I can speak in a much more cursory manner. The entire chain, the entire circle of complications, stemmed from the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Now, anyone familiar with Austrian politics—and specifically with the historical development of that policy in the second half of the 19th century—knows that while this Austro-Serbian ultimatum was indeed a high-stakes gamble, it was, given the course of the policy that had been pursued, a historical necessity. One can say nothing other than this: Austrian politics unfolded in a territory where, from the 1870s onward, it was simply impossible to muddle through with the old principles of government; and that they did muddle through—this is not an expression I invented—was stated in Parliament by Count Taaffe himself, whose name is often written “Ta-affe” in Austria. He said: “We can do nothing else but muddle through.”

[ 16 ] Well, precisely because of the complicated Austrian circumstances, it was necessary to arrive at a clear understanding of the question: How is any association of nations to study matters of the intellect—and in a federal state such as Austria, national issues certainly involved manifestations of intellectual life. Austrian politics has not even begun to properly examine this question, let alone study it in earnest. And when I take stock of the situation with a certain willingness to weigh things carefully—rather than merely grouping them according to passions or deriving them from external history—it seems to me that, in the events leading up to the Serbian ultimatum, other factors were even more decisive than the culmination of events, namely the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand. I am referring, for example, to the fact that from the fall of 1911 into 1912, economic debates took place in the Austrian Parliament—debates that had significant repercussions even on the streets—and which were always tied to the conditions prevailing in Austria at the time. On the one hand, a large number of businesses were shut down at that time because Austrian politics as a whole had been driven into such a corner that it was at a loss and tried in vain to find new markets, but was unable to do so. This then led in 1912 to the closure of numerous businesses and to a tremendous rise in prices. Inflation-related unrest, which bordered on the revolutionary, broke out at that time in Vienna and other parts of Austria, and the debates on inflation—in which the late Member of Parliament Adler played such a major role in the Austrian Parliament—led to five shots being fired at the Minister of Justice from the gallery. These shots served as a signal: the economy cannot continue to be managed this way in Austria; economic life cannot be sustained under these conditions. What did Acting Minister Gautsch identify as the main thrust of his speech at that time? He said that every effort—that is, using Austria’s traditional administrative measures—must be made to ensure that the agitation against inflation subsided. This attests to the prevailing sentiment on the other side.

[ 17 ] Intellectual life unfolded amid the national struggles. Economic life had been driven into a dead end—you can study this in detail—but no one had the heart or the mind to recognize the necessity of studying the conditions for the further development of spiritual and economic life separately from the old conceptions of the state, which were proving to be utterly worthless, particularly in Austria. In Austria, the need arose to approach the study of world-historical affairs in such a way that it would lead to a threefold division of the social organism. This simply follows from facts such as those I have just described. No one wanted to think about this, and because no one wanted to think about it, that is why things unfolded as they did. You see, what took place in Austria in the 1880s—at the very beginning of that decade—under the influence of the Berlin Congress, need only be briefly outlined to reveal the forces at work there. In Austria, conditions had already developed to such an extent by the beginning of the 1880s—indeed, even earlier—that the Polish representative Otto Hausner uttered the following words in a public parliamentary session: “If we continue down this path in Austrian politics, in three years we will no longer have a parliament at all, but something entirely different.” — He was referring to state chaos. Of course, in such debates people tend to exaggerate and use hyperbole. What he had predicted for the next three years did not happen in three years, but it did come to pass within a few decades.

[ 18 ] I could cite countless examples, particularly from the Austrian parliamentary debates at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s, which would show you how people in Austria recognized that the agricultural problem was also becoming increasingly acute. For example, I remember very well how, at that time, following the justification for the construction of the Arlberg Railway, individual politicians of various political stripes stated that the construction of this railway had to be undertaken because it was becoming clear that it was simply no longer possible to continue farming properly if the immense influx of agricultural products from the west continued in the same way as before. Of course, the problem was not addressed in the right way, but a true prophecy had been spoken. And all these things—one could cite hundreds of examples—would show how Austria, in the end, in 1914, had reached the point where it had to say to itself: Either we can go no further, we must abdicate as a state, we must admit we are helpless! — or we must somehow extricate ourselves from the situation through a high-stakes gamble, through something that would bring prestige to the upper class. — Anyone who took the position that Austria should continue to exist—and I would like to know how an Austrian statesman could have remained a statesman if he had not held this position—even if he was such a fool as Count Berchtold, could not help but say to himself: “Something like this must happen”—one simply had no choice but to take a gamble. No matter how strange it may seem from certain perspectives, one must understand this in terms of its historical impulses.

[ 19 ] Well, there we have, so to speak, the starting point in one place. Let’s consider this starting point in another place, namely Berlin. Now, to give you an idea of what was at work there, I’d like to begin by stating a few purely factual points quite objectively: You see—please don’t hold it against me if I describe this quite objectively as well—in 1905, the man on whose shoulders the decision regarding war and peace in Berlin in 1914 ultimately rested—the then-general and later Colonel General von Moltke—was appointed Chief of the General Staff. At the time of the appointment, the following scene took place—I’ll describe it as briefly as possible—: General von Moltke was convinced that he could not assume the responsible office of Chief of the General Staff unless he first discussed the conditions for accepting this office with the supreme commander, the Emperor. And this discussion unfolded roughly as follows. The issue was that, up to that point, due to the general staff’s relationship with the supreme commander—as you may have read here and there—he often held the supreme command on one side or the other during maneuvers, and as you know, this supreme commander regularly emerged victorious. Now, the man who was to be appointed in 1905 to assume the responsible office of Chief of the General Staff said to himself: Of course, under such conditions one cannot accept it; for things could become serious at some point, and then one would have to see how to wage war under the same conditions under which one must organize maneuvers when the supreme commander is the commander-in-chief, who, after all, must win. — General von Moltke then decided to present this to the Emperor in a completely frank, open, and honest manner. The Emperor was extraordinarily astonished that the man he was about to appoint as Chief of the General Staff was telling him it simply wouldn’t work, since the Emperor did not actually understand how to wage war in a real emergency. Therefore, he said, matters must be prepared in such a way that they would hold up in a real emergency, and he could only assume the office of Chief of the General Staff if the Emperor refrained from leading either side. The Emperor said: “Yes, but what is the situation? Haven’t I really been victorious? Is that how it was done?” — He knew nothing of what those around him had done, and only when his eyes were opened to the reality of the situation did he realize that things could not continue as they were; indeed, one must even say that he then agreed to the conditions with considerable willingness; this should by no means be concealed.

[ 20 ] So, ladies and gentlemen, having presented this fact to you so that you may form your own judgment, I ask you—and may I perhaps add in parentheses, there is ample reason today for me not to distort the facts in any way, since I can be verified at any moment by a person present here—after I have presented this fact to you, I also ask you now to consider where any errors may have occurred, and whether it was not also a rather peculiar circumstance that, around the supreme commander, there were individuals—who have since found their successors—who, at the very least, did not speak as the future Colonel General von Moltke did in 1905, but who, after assuming office, acted in a different manner. Today, it is by no means necessary to constantly pretend to the world that one must wait until the objective facts can be established; the only thing that matters is having the sincere will to point out these objective facts.

[ 21 ] And now there is really no need to speculate about a Crown Council meeting in 1914—one that Colonel General von Moltke certainly had no idea had taken place, since he was away in Karlsbad for a spa treatment from July 1914 until shortly before the outbreak of the war. It is important to emphasize this because, when the topic of Germany’s warmongers comes up, one must say the following: Certainly, such warmongers existed, and if one were to tackle the specific problem of warmongering, one would run into difficulties with the figures I mentioned earlier if one were to try to completely exonerate them. And finally, what I said—that one can also attribute a heavy share of the blame for the war to Nikita of Montenegro (I don’t know whether he is white or black)—may be evident from the fact that as early as July 22, 1914, his two daughters—these, forgive the expression, “demonic” women—in St. Petersburg, in the presence of Poincaré, at a particularly lavish court celebration, told the French ambassador—who, curiously enough, took the liberty of recounting the incident himself in his memoirs in a fit of senile rambling: “We are living in a historic moment; a letter has just arrived from our father, and it indicates that we will have war in the coming days. It will be magnificent. Germany and Austria will disappear; we will shake hands in Berlin.” Now, this is what King Nikita’s daughters, Anastasia and Militza, said to the French ambassador in St. Petersburg on July 22—please note the date. This is also a fact that can be pointed out.

[ 22 ] Well then, I would say that, basically, there is no need to worry about all the less important details. On the other hand, the fact that the situation in Berlin had come to such a head by July 31, 1914, that virtually all decisions regarding war and peace in Berlin had been placed on the shoulders of Colonel General von Moltke will certainly play a significant role—and he could, of course, form his judgment of the situation based on nothing other than purely military considerations. This is what one must take into account; for in order to assess the situation in Berlin at that time, it is actually necessary to know precisely—I would almost say, hour by hour—what took place in Berlin from about four o’clock in the afternoon on Saturday until eleven o’clock at night. Those were the decisive hours in Berlin, during which an immense tragedy of world-historical proportions unfolded. This tragedy of world-historical proportions unfolded in such a way that the then Chief of the General Staff, based on what had happened—or at least on everything that could be known in Berlin about the events—could do nothing other than have the General Staff plan carried out, a plan that had been prepared for years in the event that something like this might occur—something that, in the end, could only have been foreseen as the inevitable outcome.

[ 23 ] The various alliances were such that one could not conceive of the European situation in any other way than this: If the turmoil in the Balkans spreads to Austria, Russia will inevitably get involved. Russia has France and England as its allies. They must get involved in some way. But then the situation would automatically unfold—there was no need to ask any further questions—in such a way that Germany and Austria would have to join forces, and one had the most definitive assurance from Italy—even stipulated in detail by an agreement reached shortly before, down to the number of divisions—as to how it would participate in a possible war. These were the facts that were known in Berlin; these were the facts available to a man who, in view of the world situation, really had only two starting points. These were the two maxims that Colonel General von Moltke held: First, if war breaks out, it will be terrible; something horrific will unfold. And anyone who knew the very refined soul of Colonel General von Moltke knew that such a soul could truly not throw itself lightheartedly into what it regarded as the most terrible of events. The other was, however, a boundless devotion to a sense of duty and responsibility, and that, in turn, could not help but have the effect it did.

[ 24 ] If, at that time, what happened was to have been prevented, then it would have had to be prevented by German policymakers; it would have had to be prevented—that which you yourself might judge to be preventable—if I draw your attention to the following facts: It was Saturday afternoon; the moment that would lead to a decision was approaching, and then, shortly after four o’clock, Chief of the General Staff von Moltke met with the Emperor, Bethmann-Hollweg, and a number of other gentlemen in a mood that actually seemed quite optimistic. A message had just arrived from England—though I believe it is unlikely that this message was read properly, for otherwise it could not have been interpreted the way it was—and in the view of German politicians, this message suggested that England could still be brought to heel. No one had the slightest inkling of the unshakable faith in the mission of Anglo-Saxon civilization; on the contrary, they had always pursued a policy of burying their heads in the sand—which was tragic. Now, with light hearts, they believed they could infer from such a telegram that things might turn out differently, and so it came to pass that the Emperor did not sign the mobilization decree. So, I expressly note that, initially, on the evening of July 31, the mobilization order was not signed by the Emperor, even though the Chief of the General Staff, based on his military judgment, had been of the opinion that no heed should be paid to such a dispatch, but that the war plan must be carried out without fail. Instead, on that very day, the officer was ordered, in the presence of Moltke, to telephone that the troops in the west were to hold back from the enemy border, and the Emperor said: “We certainly do not need to march into Belgium now.”

[ 25 ] Now, what I am telling you is contained in notes that Colonel General von Moltke himself wrote down after his very peculiar dismissal; these were to be published with Mrs. von Moltke’s consent in May 1919, at that decisive moment when Germany was on the verge of telling the world the truth, immediately before signing the Versailles Dictate. And anyone who reads what was to be published at that time—words that flowed from von Moltke’s own pen—will not for a moment be able to form a judgment against him, for these words are so deeply imbued with inner honesty and integrity that they would not have made a significant impression on the world prior to the Versailles Dictate. Well, the document had been printed—printed on a Tuesday afternoon—and was scheduled to appear on Wednesday. I do not wish to go into further details. A German general came to see me, intending to use a thick bundle of files to show me that three points in these records were incorrect. I had to tell the general: I have worked as a philologist for a long time. Bundles of files do not impress me until they have been evaluated from a philological perspective, for one must not only know what is contained within them, but also what is not contained within them; and anyone conducting a historical investigation examines not only what is contained within them, but also what is missing. — But I had to say the following: You were involved in this; the world naturally assumes that you know the facts precisely. Will you swear under oath, if I publish the pamphlet containing Moltke’s memoirs, that these three points are incorrect? — And he said: Yes! — I am completely convinced that the three points are correct, for they can also be established as correct from a psychological standpoint. But of course it would have been of no use at the time to have published the pamphlet—on top of all the other harassment—the pamphlet would simply have been confiscated; that was perfectly clear. I could not publish a pamphlet in response to which a solemn oath had been sworn before the whole world that the three points contained therein were incorrect. For we live, after all, in a world where it is not a matter of what is right or wrong, but where power decides.

[ 26 ] I know that what I wrote on page V of this pamphlet was taken particularly badly, but I considered it necessary in order to shed light on the situation in the proper way. I wrote: The unfortunate invasion of Belgium—which was a military necessity and a political impossibility—shows just how everything in Germany was geared toward the extreme of military judgment in the period leading up to the outbreak of war. The author of these lines asked Mr. von Moltke, with whom he had been friends for years, in November 1914: “What did the Kaiser think of this incursion?”—and the reply was: “He knew nothing of it in the days leading up to the outbreak of war, for, given his temperament, one would have had to fear that he would have blabbed the whole thing to the world. That could not be allowed to happen, for the incursion could only succeed if the enemy was caught off guard.” — And I asked: “Did the Reich Chancellor know about it?” — The answer was: “Yes, he knew about it.” — Politics in Central Europe, then, had to be conducted in such a way that one had to take a tendency toward loose talk into account, and I ask you: Isn’t it a terrible tragedy when politics must be conducted in this manner? — Therefore, based entirely on these underlying facts, it can be fully demonstrated that what Tirpitz—whom I otherwise find unpleasant—says about Bethmann-Hollweg is true: that the latter had sunk to his knees and had already expressed the futility of his politics outwardly, even in his facial expression. This insignificance was also later evident in the fact that he emphasized to the British ambassador that, if England were to strike after all, his entire policy would prove to be a house of cards. That is indeed what it was, and this house of cards collapsed; and the Chief of the General Staff had to write in his memoirs about the situation he found himself in that Saturday evening: “The atmosphere grew increasingly agitated, and I stood there all alone.”

[ 27 ] The military judgment thus stood entirely on its own; politics had fallen into insignificance. This was brought about by the fact that the Germans no longer wished to rise to the great perspectives to which they had been particularly called—perspectives evident in the great, significant epochs of German cultural development, which people did not want to acknowledge at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. The realization that only disaster could result from such a situation now weighed heavily on the mind of the Chief of the General Staff, and when an officer came to him to have him sign the order—which was to be sent following the telephone directive to withdraw the troops from the Belgian-French border— the Chief of the General Staff slammed the pen down on the table so hard that it broke, and said he would never sign such an order; the troops would lose confidence if such an order were issued, even by the Chief of the General Staff. And it was from this most painful, most desperate state of mind that the Chief of the General Staff was then summoned away. By then, it was well past ten o’clock. Another telegram had arrived from England, and—I’d rather not go into the details—the supreme commander then said: “Now you can do whatever you want!”

[ 28 ] As you can see, one really has to go into the details, and I have only outlined a few main points of what happened, so to speak, on the continent. I’d also like to mention the counter-reaction that took place on the other side. It will one day be confirmed—and again, I can assure you that I’m not telling you this lightly—it will one day be confirmed that Asquith and Grey, at the very same time that the events I’ve just described were taking place in Berlin, said: “Well, what on earth is this?” Have we been conducting English politics blindfolded until now? They believed that this English policy had been shaped by a completely different force; their eyes had been blindfolded. And they said: “Now the blindfold has been removed—that was Saturday evening—now that we can see, we are standing on the brink of the abyss; now we have no choice but to go to war.” — That is the reflection on the other side of the Channel, and I ask you to take all of this in such a way that it might be greatly expanded upon, for in the time allotted to me I can do nothing more than convey a certain mood, to present to you that which at least sheds some light on the events that have taken place.

[ 29 ] And then, once you have taken all of this into account, I ask you to read—with this in mind—what I wrote in my “Thoughts During the War,” which I carefully titled “For Germans and Those Who Do Not Believe They Must Hate Them.” Every detail therein has been carefully considered. I ask you to reflect on what I wrote there from these perspectives—that it is not a matter of what is commonly called moral guilt or moral innocence, but rather that these matters must be elevated to the level of historical development, in which extraordinarily tragic events unfolded, in which something took place that allows one to begin speaking of historical necessities—necessities into which, fundamentally speaking, one should not blunder with judgments such as those I indicated at the outset. The situation is far more serious than the world on both sides still believes today; yet they are such that they absolutely must become known to the world, and that the path out of the turmoil must actually be taken from them. But at present, one truly finds no possibility that anything undertaken in this direction will be presented to the world in any way other than by being distorted and slandered.

[ 30 ] What I have told you today about Colonel General von Moltke provides an opportunity to assess this man at this decisive moment; but, as you know, there are people—who are said to have served on the General Staff themselves—who manage to say the most slanderous things about Colonel General von Moltke, including the fabricated absurdity that anthroposophical events took place in Luxembourg before the Battle of the Marne, and that because of this, the Colonel General failed to fulfill his duty. If such things can be said by such people, then one can see from this the moral state into which we have fallen today, and it is difficult to carve out a proper path for the truth within this moral state. To do so, we actually need many—quite a few—distinguished figures; and only after I have provided you with the background I have been discussing would I now like to read a passage from Moltke’s memoirs that will show you what lived in this man’s soul—first, with regard to his view on the necessity of war, and second, with regard to his sense of responsibility. For the point is certainly not to construct a brutal concept of guilt, but rather to address what was alive in people’s souls at that time. It is a very simple sentence that Moltke wrote—a sentence that has been uttered many times—but there is a difference between it being spoken by just anyone and by the man upon whose soul the decision regarding the war rested at that time. He wrote: “Germany did not bring about the war; it did not enter into it out of a lust for conquest or with aggressive intentions toward its neighbors. The war was forced upon it by its adversaries, and we are fighting for our national existence, for the survival of our people and our national life.”

[ 31 ] When examining facts, one cannot arrive at the truth by starting anywhere; one must begin where the realities and facts are at play, and if one can demonstrate that an essential aspect of those facts is at play in a man’s soul, then the fact that such a consciousness prevailed in that soul is part of the circumstances that created the situation. It is also essential, when assessing the situation, to look directly at what was taking place among the forty to fifty individuals who were actually involved in the outbreak of this horrific catastrophe, and anyone who forms an opinion on these matters not out of prejudice but out of expertise knows that, fundamentally speaking, everyone was actually quite clueless except for the forty to fifty individuals who brought about the outbreak of war—those who were actively engaged in the constellation of European affairs.

[ 32 ] During the war, I truly had the opportunity to discuss these matters with many people who were already in a position to assess the situation, and I never minced words. For example, I said to a prominent figure who was close to the leadership of a neutral state: It can be considered a well-known fact that in our so-called democratic age, some forty to fifty individuals—among whom were certainly women, and not only within the Anthroposophical Society, but in fact a not insignificant number—were directly responsible for this catastrophe in the international arena. — It would be necessary for people to first elevate their perspective to the vantage points from which this situation could actually be properly assessed. Instead, an enormous amount is said about these serious, world-shaking events based on the superficialities of the White Papers and the like, and it has always been extraordinarily difficult for someone who would not speak out if he did not know the facts differently from many others to bring the necessary points to light here and there, wherever judgments have been made about the situation since 1914. For me, this began back when I was confronted everywhere in Switzerland with the “J’accuse” books, and I—you know how dangerous the situations sometimes were—could say nothing else to people but what is true, even though that was often the least understood: “Read,” I said, “in such a book, not what is written there with legal sophistry, but read what is implied in the style; read the entire structure, the entire presentation of the book, and if you have any taste, you must say: political back-alley literature!”—I have had to say this again and again to people from both neutral and non-neutral territories. Of course, I am not saying that there isn’t a great deal of truth in this *J’accuse* book; but it is certainly not written from a perspective suited to assessing the tragic situation in world history in which—one might well say—the world found itself in 1914. And one must point out the underlying causes if one is compelled, even in the slightest, to discuss the question of guilt.

[ 33 ] Yes, but this question of guilt should also teach us something. You see, right after Germany issued that ill-fated declaration of intent to make peace in the fall or winter of 1916, and then the whole fantastical sequence of events surrounding Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points unfolded, I approached—at that very time—those in positions of responsibility with a proposal that admittedly seemed paradoxical to some, that, in the face of Wilson’s unworldly Fourteen Points—which, despite their unworldliness, were capable of mobilizing ships, cannons, and people in abundance—the idea of the threefold social order could be put forward to the world. And I had to witness that, while some did indeed understand quite well that something like this had to happen, no one actually had the courage to do anything in this direction—no one, strictly speaking. As for the conversation I had with Kühlmann, I believe the witness who was present is here again today. So I cannot in any way be disingenuous about these matters. But I do have to explain this, and even here I would certainly not tell you anything incorrect today, since it is known exactly how the matter unfolded.

[ 34 ] Here, too, I must say the following, for example: You see, as early as January 1918, I considered the spring offensive of 1918 to be an absolute impossibility, and during a trip I had to make from Dornach to Berlin, I found myself in the position of speaking with a certain individual —it was known that, when the decisive moments approached, this person would be called upon to lead the affairs—about the circumstances that actually did not arise until November 1918, and when I had actually found a certain understanding there for the threefold social order, I arrived in Berlin. There I had to speak with a certain person. Those who were able to inform themselves at the time about how things were really going already knew about the offensive in January 1918; it was just that one could not speak of it. And I had to speak with a military figure who was extremely close to General Ludendorff. The conversation took a turn in which I said: I do not wish to run the risk of being accused of meddling in military-strategic matters, but I do wish to speak from a certain vantage point from which any military amateurism on my part would be out of the question. — I said that in a spring offensive, Ludendorff might well achieve everything he could possibly dream of; but I nevertheless consider this offensive to be an absurdity—and I cited the three reasons I had for this. The man I was speaking to became quite agitated and said: “What do you want? Kühlmann has your report in his pocket. He took it with him to Brest-Litovsk. That’s how politics treats us. Politics is nothing to us. We military men can do nothing but fight, fight, fight.” — In 1914, the Chief of the General Staff found himself in a situation where he had to write about the situation in the evening: “The mood grew increasingly agitated, and I stood there all alone.” Regarding the mood between ten and eleven o’clock, he had to write: The Emperor said, “Now you can do whatever you want!” — And in 1918, one could be told: Politics is out of the question altogether; it is non-existent; we can do nothing but fight, fight. — Ladies and gentlemen, it has not changed, and it has not changed today either, and I would like to provide you with negative—albeit purely subjective—evidence that it has not changed.

[ 35 ] Once again, remarks have been made with the same naivety, the same abstractness, with which Woodrow Wilson spoke—a fact demonstrated by the way Woodrow Wilson conducted himself at Versailles. Once again, Harding has spoken from the same perspective, and I see in Harding’s speech—which is as confused as can be, delivered with a complete lack of any sense of reality, and which once again offers only the old clichés—now that we face economic decisions just as we once faced political ones—I see nothing in this speech to suggest that people are in any way grappling with what is once again looming on the horizon. It is almost impossible to get people to form a judgment. Whether we have the first Wilson, who displays his confusion at Versailles, or whether we have spoken from the same region a little later, that is not the point. What matters is that one should keep a watchful eye with a sense of reality.

[ 36 ] Then one would also look at such things as the fact—which is downright unheard of for anyone with a sense of how to assess political situations—that Lloyd George, a statesman who is so characteristic of the modern era, said just recently: “One cannot, in the old sense, attribute moral blame for the war to Germany; people simply slipped into it out of their own stupidity.” — That is what he said a few weeks ago, and you know how he spoke in London to Simons. You can gauge from this how much truth there is in the speeches people give, and people still lack the impetus to look at these things—they must gain it, must gain it by developing an understanding of the big picture. These broader perspectives have played a role in this catastrophe, and our misfortune is that no one had any inkling of these broader perspectives. There must be a possibility that the broader perspectives on which things depend will also be brought into the decision-making process in Central Europe today.

[ 37 ] But as long as the truth is slandered by those who believe they have a sort of exclusive claim to German identity, as long as one is called a traitor to German identity by such people, even though what is said there—if it were truly understood—would be the only thing capable of securing for genuine German culture the status it deserves, things cannot improve. People who have a completely different will—who, above all else, are determined to recognize the truth—must come together.

[ 38 ] Certainly, there were warmongers in Germany as well; but nothing they did had any significance at the decisive moment. What was significant, however, was what I explained in the last chapter of my *Key Points*: that by losing sight of the big picture, we had reached the zero point of political effectiveness. We will rise as a German people only when we rise to the level of the big picture; for anyone who is truly part of the German spirit—with a warm heart, not just with their mouth—pardon the somewhat crude expression—knows that true German spirit means precisely this: being deeply rooted in the big picture. — But we must once again find our way back to the grand perspectives of the German people. And, fundamentally speaking, it is also based on experience that I am speaking to you about these things today. Despite the way the question was phrased, I might not have needed to answer it; but I wanted to answer precisely this question, and you will see what leads to the answer to such questions when I present to you the concluding passage that the questioner provided to me in an addendum. He writes: “I would consider it very valuable to publish and widely disseminate the correct, clear perspective on this entire issue of war guilt, for example in a memorandum.” — Well, that should have happened in May 1919. The memorandum had even been printed. The political climate within Germany prevented this memorandum from being published. Let us not merely stop at forming the judgment that something like this should have happened; let us support those who are not content to rest with this judgment, but who have already attempted—long ago—to do precisely what is proposed here at the very decisive moment. Then we will make progress.

[ 39 ] Ladies and gentlemen, because I do believe that among German youth there are individuals who are finding their way back to true German identity, who have the intellect, the heart, and the open-mindedness to receive the truth, and because I felt I might have a reasonable chance here of speaking directly to younger people—perhaps the very best of our youth—I have decided to share these thoughts with you today.