The Rudolf Steiner Archive

First Lecture

[ 1 ] It is quite plausible—and you probably agree—that at this very moment, various developments of great significance for Europe are taking shape, and that, in a sense, decisive turning points are imminent. This may justify our discussing today, in a piecemeal and—I must emphasize, for given the passage of time, there is simply no other way—aphoristic manner, some of the events leading up to the current catastrophic occurrences. We will certainly attempt—as is fitting within our anthroposophical movement—to use what I will have to say, which is, in a sense, a collection of historical observations presented in aphoristic form, as a basis for linking to more in-depth spiritual-scientific and spiritual-historical reflections, perhaps as early as tomorrow. However, we cannot assume that each of you has access to the factual, outwardly perceptible material necessary for further insights—insofar as these are to be derived from spiritual-scientific foundations—and therefore I would like to discuss some of this factual material here with you today in a very unpretentious manner. It is, after all, necessary to develop a sense that humanity will gradually lose the inner right to pass sleepily by contemporary history and let whatever happens simply happen; rather, in our age of the development of the conscious soul, the opposite sentiment must prevail: that each person should keep their eyes open and, with an alert consciousness, at least without prejudice. It is, of course, natural that not everyone is in a position from which they can somehow make use of such knowledge. But none of us can know when we might be called upon, on a smaller or larger scale, to help deliberate on this or that, to help influence it—and for that very purpose, we need an open, unprejudiced knowledge of events.

[ 2 ] Now, of course, much of what are currently recent events will quickly become outdated in their context with the rest of historical development; some of what are recent, significant events will be of little consequence for the further course of even the external history of humanity in the civilized world. Nevertheless, in the future it will be necessary to face what is happening with open eyes and an alert consciousness. Therefore, it will be beneficial to follow some of the events that have already taken place in order to gain a sense of how one should face such events.

[ 3 ] To begin with, I would just like to say: Over the course of time—during which these catastrophic events have been outwardly visible, clearly visible even to those who are asleep, in the form of the so-called war of the past four and a half years—I have spoken many words to you, touching on this or that, to shed light on one thing or another. And that is why I would like to note right at the outset that now, at a time when decisive events are unfolding—though not necessarily leading to a conclusion (I would certainly not wish to give rise to the belief that we are on the verge of a conclusion)— but at a time when, in a certain sense, facts decisive for the assessment of the entire situation are unfolding—at this very moment, I would like to emphasize explicitly that I stand on exactly the same position with regard to the analysis of events as I did at the very beginning of the outbreak of the so-called war catastrophe. For one of the most significant facts that humanity has been able to bring to light over the course of these last few years is this: how infinitely, how immeasurably powerful the forces were capable of corrupting human judgment on all sides, of leading this human judgment astray—namely, by constantly striving from various quarters to steer the principles of judgment, the directions of judgment from false perspectives. Isn’t it true that, over the course of these years, judgments have been made from the most diverse spheres of interest? Every so-called nation ultimately had its own sphere of interest and judged with more or less—mostly with less—knowledge of the facts that had occurred. And by authoritative bodies—or at least by bodies of questionable authority—though one might ask: where were the others over the past four and a half years?—this misguided direction in which these judgments were moving was frequently fueled and frequently exploited to achieve one goal or another.

[ 4 ] Above all, from the outbreak of this so-called war to the present day, the so-called question of blame in these events has played a major role from a wide variety of perspectives—one might say, from a wide variety of interests. In the judgments people have made here and there, this so-called question of blame has played a significant role. But one cannot say that this so-called question of blame has played a favorable role in any way. It is precisely this question of blame—and the way in which it has steered public opinion—that has had such a tremendously corrupting effect on people’s intellectual and moral judgment. And there will be an infinite amount to make amends for—and it can only be made amends for through the humanities—if the corruption that has taken hold throughout the entire civilized world in terms of the distortion of intellectual and moral judgment is to be set right, even to some extent. In this regard, one thing must be emphasized. Among the various judgments that have been made, there are indeed those that were made in so-called good faith—albeit not always with a true conscience, that is, a conscience truly aware of its responsibility toward the Word. There are those that were made in so-called good faith, based on what was known at the time, so that no accusation should be leveled against one line of judgment or another. But above all, the course of events itself will not, at first, have a corrective effect on judgment. The course of events may rather influence judgments in an unfavorable direction, and it would be fitting, particularly for an anthroposophically oriented spiritual movement, to correct certain things—both in oneself and in others—simply by truly lifting the entire level of judgment, the entire level of assessment, out of those spheres in which judgments about the whole world have been made up to now, and placing them in an entirely different light.

[ 5 ] The main issue here is that, certainly aided by the course of events, a large number of people will now agree with those who can say: “We always said so—the European Central Powers staged a war without having been provoked in any way.” The Central Powers must be held responsible. — Well, steering the judgment in this direction makes absolutely no sense in light of the actual facts. And if one were to start from the question of immediate—I am speaking now of immediate—responsibility, a fair assessment would certainly not lead one to address the issue at all from the perspective just mentioned. The question: Were the Central Powers to blame for the outbreak of this war? — this question actually has no serious meaning whatsoever. And if one objects to it, one does so mainly because passing judgment in this direction has no real, tangible substance or meaning.

[ 6 ] It makes the least sense, in light of the facts—which will inevitably come to light at some point—to speak, for example, of the Central Powers’ intention to wage a preventive war, or of the fact that a so-called preventive war was to be waged. This view—which would essentially mean that the Central Powers had said: “The war is bound to come eventually, and if it does, it will come under less favorable conditions for us, so we’d better start it sooner, since we’ll then have a certain advantage”—this view makes absolutely no sense in light of the facts. There can be no question whatsoever of reaching a judgment on the situation if one steers that judgment in this direction. In a matter such as this, it is truly a matter of looking at the facts entirely without prejudice. And there—and I am putting this aphoristically today—one must, of course, point out details, specifically those details that are symptomatically serious. Of course, I cannot go all the way back to Adam and Eve. One is always, in a sense, tempted to do so when giving a historical account intended to convey a certain point. But I cannot go all the way back to Adam and Eve. For now, I will say only a few things and limit my reflections to a short period of time.

[ 7 ] This leads us to a sort of framework for our aphoristic reflections: outwardly, the starting point—I would say, the initial impetus—for this so-called war originated in the ultimatum fabricated in Austria and sent to Serbia. It might therefore be wise to trace the historical context back to this starting point of the so-called war-related events under consideration. Now, this very starting point leads all the way back to the 1870s. One cannot examine what took place between the former Austria and Serbia without going back to the so-called occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1878. This occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1878 marked the beginning of a certain Austrian policy, which, as it unfolded, ultimately led to what might be called the Austro-Serbian ultimatum. The so-called Congress of Berlin had emerged from the turmoil that had arisen in Europe as a result of the Russo-Turkish War of the 1870s. And this Congress of Berlin, among other “actions”—and primarily under the influence of British policy at the time—conferred upon Austria the mandate to provisionally occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[ 8 ] Essentially, much of what has taken place in the Balkans is linked to this occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. One must therefore ask: How did it actually come to pass that Austria was prompted to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina? — This is even somewhat related to the causes of the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War. To the southeast, the Balkan Slavic peoples border Austria-Hungary. But Austria-Hungary itself has a Slavic population to the southeast. It has the South Slavs, it has the Croats, it has the Slavonians, who—especially the latter, the Croats and Slavonians—feel a strong kinship with the Serbs. In Bosnia and Herzegovina—which, after all, until the 1870s were in a somewhat dubious, yet still subordinate relationship to Turkey—the Slavic and Turkish populations were intermingled. Unrest arose there that initially appeared to the European world to be directed against Turkish rule. Of course, I would have to go into much greater detail if I wanted to do more than just sketch out the situation, but I only want to outline a few points for you. Now, it is certainly interesting to learn how these disturbances—the final suppression of which was to consist precisely in the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—actually came about at that time. For it is precisely the manner in which these disturbances arose that is of extraordinary historical significance.

[ 9 ] If, back then, the Herzegovinians and the inhabitants of Bosnia—the Bosniaks—had been left to their own devices, unrest would probably not have broken out that would have particularly alarmed Europe. But such things were, after all, often—one might even say deliberately—fabricated under the old regime, which was not merely the old regime in that particular place, but which, in essence, had been the old regime throughout the entire civilized world until now. Certainly, unrest had broken out among the Bosniaks and the people of Herzegovina; they were dissatisfied with Turkish rule. But if they had been left to their own devices, this would not actually have been necessary to throw Europe into turmoil or cause unrest. What did happen, however, certainly occurred at the instigation of numerous meetings held in Vienna by generals and lieutenant generals from a wide variety of nations, notably Slavic ones. For those who took the leading part in that uprising—which preceded the Turkish-Russian War in those disputed provinces—were mostly people from neighboring Austria and Dalmatia, that is, Dalmatians and Dalmatian-Austrian Montenegrins, who had been sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina. From Vienna, matters were manipulated in such a way that the Dalmatian population—in order to stir up unrest—was sent over to neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina. The necessary ammunition and military supplies were also transported through the numerous mountain passes. The government behaved at that time in such a way that, in order to appear justified in the eyes of Europe, it stationed gendarmes at one pass to intercept anyone who was driving through the pass to Bosnia with even a small amount of ammunition, while at the same time allowing people from Dalmatia and also from Trieste to pass unhindered through other passes with ammunition and military supplies.

[ 10 ] Then the unrest was staged, and stock market telegrams detailing the course of these terrible disturbances were constantly sent from Trieste to Europe. And when the journalists from the *Neue Freie Presse*—you know, journalists don’t just want to interview prominent figures, but also cover events—came over, the events were staged for them. They were positioned in a spot where it was possible to showcase large, rebellious crowds—though not as many as had actually been sent there. But it was set up this way, you see—I’ll sketch it out (he sketches)—: There stand the good journalists, and there the insurgents marched past. But the arrangements were such—you know, like in the theater: they go out here and come back in there—that they were paraded past three times. That’s how such an earth-shattering uprising was staged! Of course—the journalists were also able to cite the enormous numbers they saw there—what else could the European public, which doesn’t trust authority but believes the newspapers, do but conclude that there were immense crowds of insurgents and that something must be happening there.

[ 11 ] Well, events then led to the military conflict and culminated in the Congress of Berlin. There, Austria-Hungary was given the mandate to restore order in those provinces where the situation was so unstable—where one always had to fear that unrest might break out. And it was not annexation that was granted to it—it was already a time when people could not bring themselves to make radical decisions—but rather occupation. That is something of a half-measure or a quarter-measure. This marked the beginning of a process that, in a certain sense, arose in Central Europe as a matter of necessity from the preceding differences that had erupted in 1866 between the Central European population, the North German population, and Austria and the South German states—a process that had led to the emergence of a certain trend in Berlin’s policy to push Austria, as the Habsburg Empire, further eastward, toward the Slavic side. And you may believe that a man like me, who was right in the thick of it just as the decisive sentiments among the Germans of Austria were developing in response to these events, is now able to speak about this matter impartially, after so many years—I can almost say decades. The point was that, as a consequence of this shifting of the Habsburg Empire toward the Slavic East, the Germans of Austria had to be pushed against the wall. This, of course, was in keeping with the spirit and style of Berlin’s policy, again for the reason that there cannot be two empires in Central Europe with a distinctly German character; therefore, Austria was to take on a more Slavic character.

[ 12 ] This, however, created certain preconditions which—had they been steered in the right direction—would have been well-suited, indeed extraordinarily well-suited, to transforming this so-called Danube Monarchy into a European entity with a magnificent mission. One could not imagine anything more beautiful than if, within this trend of gradually pushing the Habsburg Monarchy eastward—effectively cornering the Austrian Germans, though they would have been able to set their own course—a true mission had been instilled into the framework thus created at the right moment in world history. That would have been—one can truly say—of immense significance not only for Europe but for the entire civilized world. For there was good material in this part of Europe. One must not, in fact, overlook the following: The Austrians of German descent themselves are so disposed—I have already pointed out some of their character traits recently—that any imperialist impulse is as far removed from them as possible. In fact, it is perhaps not even an exaggeration to suggest that one could hold a vote—not merely on the word itself, but on the very impulse that constitutes imperialism: one would truly find very few people among the actual German-Austrian population who have the slightest inkling that one could even turn to such a cause. That is also why this German-Austrian population resisted tooth and nail the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, even if it was a sort of sham, was nonetheless a sort of outburst of Austrian-imperialist policy—a policy that was, in fact, a historical impossibility, because Austria is not of such a nature that it could ever have developed an imperialist policy out of its own essence. This German-Austrian population, as I mentioned recently, lived—corrupted by clericalism—in many respects a sort of vegetative existence. But it is precisely from this vegetative existence that the possibility arises for strong individualities to develop. And in terms of spiritual depth, a great deal has indeed developed in individualities from these very German regions of Austria, even during the period when German-Austria was pushed to the wall by Germany—precisely because the Habsburg Empire was to be Slavicized.

[ 13 ] Now, one must not forget that within this territory there is, in fact, an extraordinarily strong chauvinistic element that embodies the specific nature of chauvinism itself: this is the Magyar element, which has always sought to carry out its chauvinism in the most ruthless manner and has also known how to do so. This has always been a very troublesome element, and would have remained so even if the Austrian framework had been filled with some kind of mission. But then there are the most diverse Slavs in Austria, the most diverse Slavic population, and this Slavic population of Austria—during the period relevant to the preparation of the current catastrophic events, in which it certainly played a very large part—did not in the least possess any imperialist-style policies in its disposition. The Slavic population—including the Polish segment of the Austro-Slavic population—was entirely removed from any imperialist-style policy. And I will always remember that speech delivered in 1879 by Otto Hausner, the Polish liberal member of parliament at the time, against the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, precisely from the standpoint of condemning imperialist policy.

[ 14 ] What the Slavs in Austria were engaged in was, in essence, always—and this is the worst part—a national cultural policy. By fostering their national identity—not in a chauvinistic way, which is what distinguishes them, or at least has always distinguished them, from the Magyars—they sought to advance as peoples and to develop, as peoples, what lies within their inherent nature. Had one been able to unite, within a single mission, all that lies within the inherent potential of Austria’s various peoples—and which was precisely encompassed by the framework of Austria—then something truly great and significant could indeed have emerged from it. For the Slavic population of Austria was never—not even at the outset of this war-torn global catastrophe—inclined to enter into any kind of confederation with the Slavic population of Russia. The Slavic population of Austria—perhaps with the exception of the Poles, who wished to have their own unified kingdom—but the rest of the Slavic population of Austria, above all else, was still, well into this time of war—this time of war has various phases that are not yet taken into account or distinguished—by no means sympathetic to Russia. What the Slavic population of Austria—as expressed through their leaders—wanted was precisely a Slavic cultural policy for the Austro-Slavic peoples, perhaps extending somewhat to the Balkan Slavs, but explicitly directed against Tsarism. Certainly, individual instances deviate from this, but on the whole they are of no consequence; and that is why, fundamentally speaking, that rapid and significant shift of the Austrian Slavs toward Russia only occurred with the fall of tsarism. The fall of tsarism had an immensely decisive effect on Austria, for with a tsarist Russia, the Slavs of Austria could never have been united—in their sympathies, I mean—and that was what mattered; for the Czechoslovak question became one of the most important issues in the entire course of events.

[ 15 ] Now, in Austria, people failed to see all of this and to unite it into a single mission, and that was Austria’s tragic fate. They simply did not understand this at all. Of course, there was great unrest among the Slavic population of Austria, aimed at bringing about what I have just hinted at: the liberation of the Slavs as a nation, so that they could freely develop their potential within the framework of Austria. Instead of being channeled into a grand cultural mission, all of this was, under the influence of the Habsburgs’ power-base politics and clericalism, unfortunately forced into a policy that Moriz Benedikt—not without good reason—called an “Arian policy.” There is really no better way to describe it. It is a policy that is a jumbled mixture of sloppy military organization, even sloppier bureaucracy, a pedantry that is not quite perfected but which, in turn, also tends toward sloppiness, and so on.

[ 16 ] That is precisely the element I recently described as something that was really none of one’s business. But now, we must not forget: Such unrest, which knows no territorial boundaries, is the fuel for future events. Isn’t it true that if unrest is brewing somewhere—let’s say, among both Czechs—and people there want something, then certain great powers may, so to speak, compete for the sympathies of such a community—including the genuine sympathies that then lead to something. Great powers that have absolutely no business there seize control of such a territory. This creates unnatural conditions in the world. So, in the example I’ve chosen, the Czechs then sympathize with a great power from which they expect support for their aspirations—a great power with which they otherwise could not have developed any sympathies at all. As a result of these preconditions that are in place, there are numerous opportunities for those who are shrewd—for those who understand politics in the traditional sense—to stir up trouble, depending on what they want to achieve. This creates fuel for conflicts that can then be exploited. Now, the long-serving Austrian Prime Minister Count Taaffe, who was tasked with implementing a so-called policy of reconciliation among the various peoples of Austria, described the fundamental nature of his own policy as “fortwursteln.” Yes, “fortwursteln” may be difficult to translate; perhaps it means something like: to carry on in a slapdash manner, without forming any idea of how things should proceed from here. One just keeps going, going, going, until the cart can go no further. — Count Taaffe called “fortwursteln” the very essence of his own policy. Then others came along who replaced Count Taaffe, but they, too, muddled along. They always viewed reconciliation in such a way that one time they would grant a university to one nationality, another time they would grant some kind of provincial committee or something similar to another nationality, or they would establish a bank or the like. In doing so, they only served to further confuse the nationalities and alienate them from a genuine mission that could have been found—one that would have been understood, had it only been truly pursued.

[ 17 ] And that was essentially how things went until the ill-fated year of 1914 arrived. One cannot even say that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was much more than an external trigger for what was then presented as the so-called ultimatum issued by Austria-Hungary to Serbia. For things had long since moved beyond the stage where events such as those that have now unfolded were directly determined by the existence of this or that conflict. These conflicts were merely exploited to achieve entirely different ends. Now, if one were to ask: Did anyone within Austria want the war that subsequently broke out? — one would be steering the question in entirely the wrong direction if one sought to accuse one or another of Austria’s peoples, or even if one sought to accuse the Austrian government itself. For the Austrian government in 1914 consisted of: an emperor well over eighty years old, no longer capable of rational thought, for whom waging war was truly of no concern; a Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, who was pathologically incompetent—suitable, perhaps, for being shuffled from one post to another, but from whom one certainly cannot expect that he could have conceived the initiative to unleash any war whatsoever. And those who surrounded him as his minions, especially in his inner circle, were certainly also ill-suited to ignite a war. So anyone who looks for the blame for this war within the Austrian government or within the Hofburg in Vienna is actually steering the question in entirely the wrong direction, for such incompetence does not start wars. I am not saying this out of emotion, nor am I saying it to pass judgment, but rather as a summary of facts.

[ 18 ] But we must not forget the other side of the story. After all, we can still turn our attention in other directions. We must be clear that, underlying everything that has happened in recent years, there was the possibility of war—a possibility that could have played out in a wide variety of ways. And this possibility of war lies, I would say, in historical development itself. I have often spoken of this here. It simply lies in the fact that the English-speaking population of the world, based on certain premises, is striving for world domination. This is a fact that must be accepted as such. But isn’t it true that not all people who are not part of this quest for world domination react entirely passively to such a fact; rather, they have all sorts of aspirations, and as a result, all manner of things can happen. So that simply through the existence of English imperialism—which, after all, has become increasingly visible, especially in the twentieth century—numerous possibilities for war have naturally arisen. These possibilities of war were, of course, always something that could be exploited by those who needed wars. Now, the situation for Austria was such that there were indeed financial circles in Vienna and Austria that, for several years already, would have welcomed the opportunity to boost their economy through a war—circles that were interested in bringing about a war. And one can say: It is, of course, incredibly easy for the Entente governments to prove that they did not cause the war. Nothing could be easier, but that does not mean much, because that is not the point. The actual instigators of the war, particularly at that time, were by no means the ruling authorities, but rather the powers standing behind them. I spoke at length here a year ago about the significant powers that were now fully behind the scenes. But then, of course, there were the figureheads, and these were essentially financial circles and business leaders, particularly large industrialists.

[ 19 ] Now, these circles of big business were able to exploit all manner of differences and discord that existed in order to steer world history, so to speak, in their direction. Such consortia naturally existed in Vienna as well. They were, in fact, the driving forces there. I wouldn’t even want to investigate the origins of such consortia. Such consortia need not necessarily be from one’s own country; they can come from elsewhere. But territorially speaking, such consortia were certainly present. In a certain sense, they were already the driving forces. And since whatever was brewing among the Slavic population—both in Austria and further east—could be exploited, and since Austria’s entirely non-existent mission could be exploited as well, it was naturally possible to take advantage of such existing tendencies if one wished to contribute to bringing about some kind of war. Among the driving forces that made it possible for this war catastrophe to take the form it did, the differences and aspirations of the Slavic peoples of Austria and the East certainly played a very, very strong role; but, strictly speaking, they were merely objects to be used, things that were exploited.

[ 20 ] If one wants to consider the next major forces at play, they are essentially financial powers, capital powers—not so much in the conventional sense, but rather the powers of big capital, venture capital, and the like. That was what lay behind it all. Of course, this has been the dominant force in contemporary humanity for decades. More than anyone who is asleep could believe, the international financial world—the world of entrepreneurs on a grand scale—stands behind the events of the last few decades. Isn’t it true that the powers I have spoken of here, in turn, used the financial world, but it was the financial world that delivered the next blows? And it was from this financial world that the situation in Austria—which had been simmering as a powder keg for years—finally erupted. They pushed things forward. A favorable time had indeed arrived for financial powers—who were very clear about their profit opportunities but otherwise operated in a very, very murky environment—to arrange something for themselves. A favorable time had arrived. And precisely the way in which this catastrophe broke out shows that an extraordinarily favorable time had arrived for these powers. They also knew how to exploit this favorable time in the right way. One need only consider what it means to be able to set the machinery of entire empires in motion to achieve something purely business-related. Such things have long been in the making in recent times, and the timing was particularly favorable precisely at the outbreak of our war-torn catastrophe. Much has been stirred up that lay dormant in the depths of the nations, but one can hardly imagine anything more diabolically ingenious than this exploitation of the global economic situation in recent decades by international financial powers.

[ 21 ] You see, the power of the Central European empires—and, in fact, of the Russian Empire as well—not the empire’s power as such, but rather its financial power—has, in fact, gradually waned. The empires were, in essence, nothing special, nothing that brought about decisions in the course of world history. Decisions in the course of world history were brought about by the transactions of the major financial powers—the international major financial powers—which used the empires as instruments. And the global economic climate, just as the year 1914 was approaching, was exceptionally favorable for this. Austria gradually came to be nothing more than an instrument of financial consortia. But Germany, too—so-called Germany—came to be nothing more than an instrument of financial consortia. This was brought about by the fact that in Austria, on the so-called throne, sat an old man who was, in truth, scarcely capable of comprehending what was happening around him, who no longer knew what was happening around him, and who could be persuaded to do anything that was made to seem plausible to him from the outside; that, due to these circumstances—as I have described to you—and this muddling through, it had gradually become possible to bring only the most utterly incompetent individuals into the ministries. For if one wanted a menagerie of nothing but incompetents, one need only assemble them from the various Austrian ministries of recent times. That was fertile ground that could be used as a tool. For one need only steer events in such a way that a military organization—respectable, at any rate—was utilized in a manner that allowed a financial consortium to promise itself a corresponding global transaction through this utilization. Behind what happened in Austria in July/August 1914 stand financial powers that may not even have originated in Austria itself, but for whom Austria served as an instrument to achieve certain goals. If one was a true financial strategist, one could really maneuver Count Berchtold wherever one wanted, just like a chess piece. That was one thing.

[ 22 ] The other point was that, due to the unfortunate circumstances of the past decades, the German Empire, too, had gradually become an instrument for financial and industrial operations. The gravest mistake one can make when raising questions of debt or other issues on this occasion is to succumb to the belief that a German government—a powerful government—wanted anything of its own accord. It really wanted nothing in particular. For most of those in Germany—the so-called rulers of Germany—could be lumped in with the others I just mentioned, and they would not differ all that much from them, particularly with regard to their political qualities. Added to this was another circumstance. Added to this was the fact that, particularly within the German Empire, the fact that a very insignificant ruler—in fact, one who was, in terms of his entire intellectual capacity, highly insignificant—was staged in a sort of—one may use the word again, since it has been used so often today—“theatrical politics” played a major role in lulling the general consciousness to sleep. And no less so than the old Emperor of Austria, the German Emperor—who is quite wrongly regarded by many as significant—served as the ideal instrument within the global context I have outlined and characterized. The greatest error to which civilized humanity has succumbed is the belief that the German imperial throne—one cannot speak of a “German imperial throne” in terms of constitutional law, but you know what I mean—was occupied by any significant, suitable individual. That was certainly not the case. So even there, the industrial world—which, admittedly, was more in the background here—but in conjunction with the financial world, provided the actual manipulators. Thirdly, of course, one must consider that no less insignificant was the ruler of Russia, who was an instrument in exactly the same way and could now be used not only by all manner of financial and industrial powers, but also by certain other shadowy powers. Added to all this is the fact that behind all these developments, as reflected in the global economic situation, lay the expansion of imperialism by the English-speaking empires. This must not be overlooked. For all these contradictions I have just listed are intertwined with other contradictions, such as the European impasse that can be described as the Alsace-Lorraine question, and the like. These factors play a role in a certain way. But what could have led to the causes of war from all sides—if one so desired—is the transformation of British politics, which had become so liberal in the mid-nineteenth century, into twentieth-century British imperialism.

[ 23 ] Naturally, all of this created all sorts of—I would say—powder kegs that just needed a spark to ignite them. It also gave rise to those peculiar ideas that the financial puppet-masters rely on so heavily. You see, one must not overlook the fact that as certain financiers in Austria became increasingly convinced that a war would be good for us—they thought above all else: We can achieve whatever we want in terms of business transactions and their consequences, as well as what will follow from them, if we wage a Balkan War. — Naturally, once the prospect of a Balkan War had been raised, there were two significant possibilities. One possibility was this: How might such a financier in Vienna—for whom the war was, for example, quite welcome—speculate? — He asked himself: Is it likely that, if we use Austria as our instrument, we will be attacked by Russia? Is that likely? It is just as likely as it is unlikely. It doesn’t have to happen. One takes a risk, but it is not unreasonable to take that risk, for it is not impossible under all circumstances that Russia might even leave us alone if, for example, we invade Serbia. — That was one thing that had to be considered. So the person in question said to himself: It is not entirely certain that Tsarist Russia will attack us, for the fact is that there is a certain solidarity of dynastic interests, and—unless some forces in Russia intervene, which one might perhaps take less into account—it is not entirely unlikely that the Tsar, out of dynastic solidarity with the Emperor of Austria and the Austrian dynasty, will indeed mobilize, put on a grand show, but only so that he can claim to be the protector of the Slavs. He certainly won’t launch an attack. He may, however, take the risk that his mobilization will prevent the Austrians from going too far. — But you know, too, that in 1914 there was a lot of talk about a private letter that the Austrian Emperor wrote—or rather, one that was written through the Austrian Emperor—how does one put it?—to whom the Austrian Emperor wrote; one can’t really say for sure, but you’ll perhaps understand what I mean—isn’t that right? There was a lot of talk about such a private letter that was written to the Russian Tsar. That fits in line with such considerations. Well, that was, of course, the assessment of a financier like that.

[ 24 ] Then such a financier said to himself: “Yes, well, one must try everything to make what is possible a reality—to use the instruments of government, the instruments of the empire.” — But then again, Count Berchtold certainly didn’t possess great abilities, but he certainly had a terrible fear. Having been pushed into this situation, he must have been absolutely terrified. And so what emerged—viewed purely from the outside (though one must, of course, always take into account the deeper motives in such matters, the historical motives; but one must first gain clarity on these things from an external perspective)—proved disastrous; that is what happened. Don’t you think I must point out the other unfortunate matter that such a financier also had to consider? He had to ask himself: “But what will become of the German Empire, with which we are allied? Risking that the German Empire invokes the alliance clause would actually be disastrous for Austria. For if the German Empire seeks to invoke the alliance clause, then a world war will ensue. Then we’ll be crushed; then we’ll be risking too much.” — It was certainly much more in the interest of financial circles not to let the matter become entangled in any way with the German Empire. But still, there is a certain distance between the intentions of the financiers and what Count Berchtold—who was overcome by fear—was supposed to do. And the other people who had dealings with Count Berchtold were, of course, no less afraid, were they? Well, there is a certain path, and in following that path, it came about that an inquiry was made in Berlin as to whether, should Russia attack, the alliance clause would be considered to have been triggered. They apparently inquired specifically of the very figure who had always been in the hands of German and international industrialism and of international and German financial circles—they inquired of the Kaiser. Now, a peculiarity of this Kaiser was that he spoke without thinking, blurting things out in a bombastic, self-aggrandizing manner. And there, too, of course, the intentions of industrialists and financiers lay behind the matter.

[ 25 ] This whole situation led to the Emperor declaring—in a non-binding manner, of course, since it was not an act of government—that he would not allow himself to be pushed around this time, and that if Russia were to mobilize in any way, he would most certainly mobilize as well, and so on. Now, one must not forget that this particular figure could very easily be turned into a tool by other circles, for there were entire circles in the entourage of this very figure who were constantly preoccupied with keeping him in good spirits and distracting him from what he was supposed to be doing.

[ 26 ] Isn’t it true that anyone of sound judgment among the German people never paid any attention to the words of this figure? Foreign countries have done the German people a great injustice precisely with their judgment of this head of state—regardless of whether some were enchanted by the German Emperor or whether others later, particularly during the war, considered him a devil—he was far too insignificant for either, and remains far too insignificant— foreign countries have done the German people the greatest injustice with all these judgments, and will presumably continue to do them the greatest injustice. For even his most loyal entourage—that entourage which is particularly accustomed to his less-than-straight spine—this loyal entourage demonstrated most clearly through its behavior how things actually stand. One need only recall the palace revolution in Berlin in 1908. This palace revolution in Berlin in 1908, which, of course, has an extraordinary connection to this world conflict when one considers the external historical events, actually, I would say, expresses everything that should immediately catch the eye at this point in our discussion. It is what I mean by the famous Daily Telegraph affair. An English journalist from the Daily Telegraph set out to interview Kaiser Wilhelm. Perhaps Kaiser Wilhelm found this a bit tedious, so he told the journalist: “Oh, I’ve already talked so much about my relationship with England.” — He then told him a few things and advised him to compile the other remarks he had already made about England. And so the journalist put together a detailed interview.

[ 27 ] This interview is a political gem. In this interview—I can only summarize it briefly, as otherwise it would become too lengthy—it was said: “You English are actually all a bunch of crazy chickens, because you’re completely misjudging me and my policies.” If you wanted to know the truth, you’d have to realize that there’s only one true friend of the English in all of Germany, and that’s me; otherwise, you’re actually the most hated people in the rest of Germany. And you mustn’t for a moment believe that I’ve ever done anything against English policy. For just consider this one thing: When the Boer War broke out, I took a closer look at the situation among the Boers, then I took a pen and quickly sketched out the campaign the English would have to wage against the Boers in order to bring it to a successful conclusion. Then I handed over the map I had drawn to my General Staff. They worked it out in more detail; you can actually still find it in your archives over there. I have also been able to observe how the British war against the Boers was conducted and unfolded according to this map I drew. Incidentally, you must by no means believe that I have ever in any way acted against British policy, for I was offered alliances by France and Russia; they instructed me not to speak of it, but I told my grandmother right away, and from this you can see how much I actually love the British, and how I am truly England’s only friend. It is thanks to me alone that this alliance between France, Germany, and Russia did not come to pass. And if you believe that I am building a fleet against you, you are mistaken; my fleet is intended to counter Japan’s interests in the Pacific Ocean. — Well, this entire interview was transcribed by the English journalist and shown to Wilhelm II, who thought it was very good. He sent it to Prince Bülow, who was his so-called Imperial Chancellor at the time. Prince Bülow was on his summer retreat in Norderney and said: “Oh yes, that’s a lengthy interview with His Majesty; surely he can’t expect me to spoil my summer retreat by reading his superfluous remarks. I don’t need to concern myself with what His Majesty says.” — He handed it to a junior official without any specific instructions. And the matter soon came to light, since the English journalist actually published it in the Daily Telegraph. And now the story was complete, wasn’t it—a masterpiece of German politics. It then came to pass that even the conservatives rebelled against His Majesty, and that at the time, abdication was a very real possibility. But he then agreed to stop speaking out—which was phrased as his commitment to ensuring the continuity of policy. It was simply another way of putting it. Well, that lasted three months, then he started speaking out again; it was the same old story. Just to illustrate his character. But now we must not forget: All these events had brought about a situation that can essentially be characterized as follows: Central European financial consortia, which had become very familiar with the situation, had engaged in machinations in which Austria and Germany were to be used as instruments. These machinations—they were quite ordinary business machinations—competed with English business schemes. There was a conflict. This conflict existed. It goes without saying: In England, no one could understand that Central European financial consortia would want to carry out transactions and undertake ventures that rightfully belonged only to England. Isn’t that so? It goes without saying—no one there can understand that! One understands this oneself, that no one can grasp it.

[ 28 ] All these events, however, had led to the Russian mobilization, and it was impossible to know exactly what was intended. How could anyone have known what was intended! The Tsar certainly did not know what was intended; some wanted one thing, others wanted another. Things were in disarray.

[ 29 ] Now, we must not forget: In Berlin, there was a government that didn’t really exist at all, that was completely devoid of any understanding of the course of events, that had been pursuing the worst possible policies for years, and that, particularly in 1914, had reached the point where it was no longer governing at all—where it simply let whatever happened, happen. — It was a terrible situation; a truly terrible situation. In fact, the entire burden of events had now been shifted onto the German Army High Command. We must not forget this: the entire burden of events and the full responsibility for them had been shifted onto the German Army High Command. — For whatever may be said about any conference proposals and the like that were made by the Entente powers, all of that is nonsense; it could never have led to anything, because what it might have led to could, of course, never have been accepted by the Central Powers in their state at that time. Of course, one can very easily prove from the course of these conference proposals and so on that the Entente governments are not to blame for the outbreak of the war. But this proof accomplishes absolutely nothing. It is a ‘triviality’ that one can peddle, using it to claim all sorts of things, but in doing so, one steers all the issues at hand in completely the wrong direction.

[ 30 ] One must know exactly, hour by hour, what happened in Berlin during the last days of July 1914 and perhaps even during the first days of August. And the time will come to speak before the world about what happened hour by hour in Berlin, and it will become clear that what happened there was driven by no other impulse than this: What must be done in this terrible situation that has arisen? — Had there been a government that had kept an eye on things, the situation would, of course, have turned out quite differently. Had there been a monarch who had done even the slightest thing, who had taken even the slightest part in the decision, who had not kept himself entirely aloof from any initiative even though he was present, then, naturally, everything would have turned out differently. But everything other than the military command—which, of course, could have had no other obligation than to simply do its duty—simply shut itself down. So that what was done could never, under normal circumstances, have looked anything like a declaration of war.

[ 31 ] It has often been said recently—though there are very few people, in fact an incredibly small number of people, who truly understand the circumstances—that Berlin slipped into the war more than it actually sought it. It is true that we did slip into it. Nor should one forget that, in a certain sense, it was only natural that the Army High Command, at the very moment when the full weight of responsibility rested upon it, told itself: Every hour lost means an immense loss. — One must take into account that at that time—when the Central Powers were expected to want to wage a preventive war, which is really utter nonsense—the German Army was by no means in a state that would allow an expert to have much confidence that it would survive what was bound to happen. For it was known: the moment the alliance clause was invoked, everything else would follow automatically. — And indeed it did, and it was entirely natural that it happened automatically. But one must not forget that precisely those who knew the situation well did not intend to lose a single hour—nor could they afford to—for the simple reason that it was utterly impossible to believe that this army, given what had happened in the preceding years, could in any way stand up to the most formidable global coalition that would inevitably be summoned, naturally, once the decision to go to war was made. One must not forget: By the end of September, this army had already run out of ammunition! — Two days before the declaration of war on Russia, the Ministry of War had received an urgent request from the Foreign Office to reduce ammunition orders. After all, these are not the kinds of things one does when planning a preemptive war, are they? And one could list hundreds and thousands of such examples, were it not for the fact that we already know that no one was thinking of a preemptive war.

[ 32 ] But one must consider that, given how much it was taken for granted in this dire situation—with the mobilized Russian Empire and its ally France—that this German army was, after all, a dubious instrument. For one must not forget: For many years, under the leadership of General von Schlieffen, the training of this army had been conducted in the most unbelievable manner. The situation was only rectified—as nonsense—when Moltke became Chief of the General Staff. For this army was drilled in such a way that, during the large-scale maneuvers under General Schlieffen, the Emperor would always lead units without having the slightest clue about warfare or anything of the sort. All the arrangements were made in such a way that, of course, His Majesty would emerge victorious. So just imagine how an army could be trained when such theatrical stunts had to be performed that anyone in a unit where His Majesty was not present was necessarily forced to arrange matters in such a way that he would suffer a defeat, so that His Majesty could win. Such things cannot be improved in a short time; rather, they require, once again, a great deal of work. But this, of course, creates the sentiment that one must take matters into one’s own hands when one is compelled to do something where the competent authorities are doing nothing at all. So what happened in Berlin in July 1914—and again in the first days of August 1914—is not in the remotest sense what one might, as Harden suggests, regard as a textbook case of a preventive war; rather, it is, in the most eminent sense, what one must call: Something happens at the hands of people who have been forced into impossible situations under immensely difficult circumstances. One may condemn it as one wishes: since success is decisive in warfare—when one wins—failure is, of course, also decisive when one is defeated, when one fails to achieve what one had hoped for in any military endeavor. It goes without saying that from the moment—and I say this quite impartially, even though I may be running the risk that such a judgment will be considered strange—when nothing could be achieved by the invasion of Belgium, when it was ruined by the days of the Battle of the Marne, that invasion was a mistake. One might view this one way or another from some philistine standpoint, but it has never been judged otherwise. And if an agreement is now reached on the part of America and the Entente—well, it won’t exactly be peace, but something like that; one would have to find a new name for such things—then it will become clear that the considerations at stake are none other than those that have always been at the heart of human development whenever such matters were taken into account, where questions of power and the like were decided. The other perspective corrupts judgment in the most terrible way. But one must not forget that what I have often emphasized here can be historically proven—and it will one day have to be historically proven, and it can be historically proven— and perhaps I should not shy away from saying that among the many things I have striven for in recent years, this was one of them: that a straightforward account of what took place in Berlin on July 28, 29, 30, July 31, and August 1 in Berlin—without passing judgment—a simple account of the actual events. I have not achieved this. But much would have been accomplished if this simple account had truly been provided.

[ 33 ] With evidence such as I have already presented here, one can demonstrate this with near-indisputable certainty; but with this simple presentation, one could demonstrate with complete certainty—with the most absolute certainty—that if the English government had seriously intended to do so, the invasion of Belgium would have been avoided. Please, do not interpret this in any way other than how I am stating it! I have always been careful not to express this in any other way. I am not saying that the British government acted differently with regard to this matter, and above all, I am not saying anything about Germany’s role in the invasion of Belgium. But this is what can be strictly proven to the world: that if the British government had wanted to—and above all if Sir Grey, Lord Grey, who is not exactly like Count Berchtold but is nonetheless quite foolish, had wanted to—the invasion of Belgium would not have taken place. This is something that can be proven quite simply by a straightforward account of the events.

[ 34 ] Of course, this does not diminish the view one might form regarding this invasion of Belgium, but it may nevertheless shift the focus of the question in another direction: Why was it not prevented, since it could have been prevented? — For it was precisely after this moment—when it became clear in Berlin that England would not prevent the invasion of Belgium—that all events actually began to take on an irrational character. From that point on, it was no longer possible to follow the events with any kind of rationality.

[ 35 ] Those are a few aphorisms. It’s getting late; we’ll continue our conversation tomorrow.