The Rudolf Steiner Archive

Mr. von Tisza answered the questions put to him in the Hungarian Diet on January 28 by the deputies Helfy and Perczel of the extreme left about the general situation. Tisza's speech did not bring any revelation or remarkable news, but it once again described Austria's position in foreign policy and the relationship of the empire to Germany and Russia with considerable clarity - as clearly as the responsible head of a government is able to express himself in the critical conditions of the present. Right at the beginning of his speech, the Prime Minister declared that he would have to impose considerable restraint on himself, even a government like the British one was forced to do so at the moment. He warned everyone not to be alarmed by the often contradictory newspaper rumors. One must not allow oneself to be misled by them; there was no truth in the rumor that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was subject to interference and conflict with regard to his political decisions, and there was not a word of truth in the rumor that the Minister of War had asked for a loan for military preparations during his, Tisza's, last visit to Vienna, which had been denied him as a result of Tisza's opposition. The same applied to the question of whether Austria-Hungary could count on its allies. It must obviously be in someone's interest to disturb the peace, as rumors were constantly being spread that could shake the confidence of the allied powers in each other. "These rumors," assured Tisza, "are counterbalanced by the fact that there is not the slightest reason for anyone to doubt the mutual bona fides of the powers allied for the maintenance of peace and their own security. It is well known that Russia," he then continued, "is undertaking a drastic dislocation and transfer of her troops towards the West, and that this plan, which has existed for some time, has recently been carried out to a greater extent in the direction of the frontiers of this monarchy. For this very reason, however, without placing any doubt in the peaceable declarations of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia and in his benevolent intentions, and since we ourselves accept the interpretations given by the Russian side, which deny any aggressive belligerent intention with regard to those troop movements, as far as prudence for our own security permits, it is our duty to ensure that, while avoiding everything that could have the appearance of provocation, what is necessary for the security of our borders and the ability of our army to defend itself is done in all cases. The aims and principles of our foreign policy are known to the peoples of the Monarchy and to the whole world. In this respect I have spoken out and the Minister of Foreign Affairs has also spoken out. Everyone knows that we are not seeking anything for ourselves, neither an extension of our influence contrary to the treaties nor any territorial expansion, as is mendaciously attributed to us. Standing on the basis of the international treaties, we wish above all to maintain peace and, in the interests of peace, we will always be prepared to cooperate in the most conciliatory manner with the other European powers in order to maintain the conditions laid down in the treaties. I can only repeat what has already been said repeatedly by the governments that the alliance of the Central European Powers has never been anything other than a resolute peace alliance on a purely defensive basis and is therefore just as far removed from the forcible implementation of certain political questions as it is from any aggressive action. Since the most peaceful intentions are also proclaimed by Russia's most authoritative authority, we can, while at the same time safeguarding the vital interests of our monarchy, despite some elements driving to discord and war, base our hopes on this that the peace-loving monarchs and governments will succeed in maintaining peace and freeing Europe from the feeling of insecurity that weighs heavily on it."

Tisza's reply was greeted with lively applause by the House of Deputies, who unanimously took note of it. Mr. Helfy and Mr. Perczel also declared themselves satisfied with it. Helfy added to his approving remarks that people abroad were forgetting Hungary if they thought that public opinion in that country was guided by hatred and a thirst for revenge in its attitude towards Russia: "The day on which the Hungarian people were reconciled with their ruler consigned past events to history. When we speak against Russia's policy of expansion, we are not thinking of Vilagos, not of the past, but of the future not only of Hungary but of the entire monarchy and the throne."

It would be extremely desirable if the Hungarian Prime Minister's statements about the Tsar's love of peace were confirmed. No matter how influential the war party may be in Russia, a Russian monarch remains master of his decisions, the circumstances are already desperate, and a peaceful attitude on the part of the Tsar would probably be able to protect Europe from the disaster of a great war for a long time to come. But the uninterrupted military activity in Russia is not conducive to spreading reassurance abroad. One cannot help but get the impression that the Russian army administration is taking every precaution to be able to mobilize immediately at a given moment, so that it does not lag behind its more agile neighbors in terms of speed. A daily order from the Russian Minister of War decrees the previously decided assignment of general staff officers to all brigade administrations; the task of these officers, as is expressly emphasized, is to prepare the material for mobilization, to direct the exercises of the reserve battalions, etc. According to unofficial reports, there is no doubt that the armaments will also be continued elsewhere. At the same time, an annual meeting of governors-general and district commanders under the chairmanship of Grand Duke Nicholas the Elder, the commander-in-chief in the war against Turkey, is being "used" for special conferences. The best-known troop commanders were among the advisers. It may be that there is no immediate danger from such facts, but the European states have not the slightest reason to regard them as promising peace.

In the meantime, the Austrian Reichsrat was reopened, and at the first session of the House of Representatives on January 25, Prince Alois Liechtenstein presented the long-announced bill on the reintroduction of denominational schools on behalf of the Center Club. This "Reichsvolksschulgesetz" (Imperial People's School Act) defined the "principles" that were to govern the education system and stated, among other things, that the elementary school had the task of educating children according to the teachings of their religion; it consisted of two sections, the elementary school with six years of instruction and the middle school, technical school, etc.; it was the task of the church or the relevant religious cooperative to provide, direct and supervise religious instruction; at the same time, the church or the religious cooperative exercised joint supervision over the entire school; the teachers' creed had to correspond to that of the children; the enactment of all legal provisions in detail was reserved to the state legislature. In a word, the elementary school was to be placed anew under the influence of the Church and otherwise, i.e. above all in national terms, at the mercy of the various provincial majorities in the provinces, which latter provision was called upon to interest the Slavs in the new law and to make them compliant for its introduction. It is only natural that the German side immediately put up determined resistance to the Liechtenstein bill. The executive committees of the German-Austrian Club, the German Club and the German National Association met for a discussion in which a joint action of the German parties against the bill was determined, and in a large part of the German cities, associations, etc., with the Vienna Municipal Council at the head, rallies have already been decided which speak out in the strongest possible terms against the clerical demands. A large assembly of citizens will soon be held in Vienna to protest against them. How the Slavic parties will react to the matter is still completely unclear. Only the Young Czechs, who recently united to form a "Club of Independent Bohemian Deputies" under the chairmanship of Dr. Engels, appear to be unequivocally opposed to Liechtenstein. The Old Czechs, Poles, Slovenes, etc., are waiting, and it is not impossible that the majority of them will be won over to the bill in exchange for further concessions or promises in other areas. Nothing is yet known about the government's position. Fortunately, all in all, the prospects for the bill's passage are bad enough so far. At the same time as the Liechtenstein school proposal, the government submitted a number of bills to the House of Representatives, including a border regulation treaty with Romania, a law on the tightening of the rights of academic authorities vis-à-vis student associations and assemblies, the bill on the conscription of reservists for training with the repeating rifle and the trade agreements with Germany and Italy. During the first session, several questions were put to the government by members of parliament, and Dr. Sturm tabled a motion on some amendments to the summary procedure in civil proceedings. After a few more interpellations from earlier times had been answered by the ministerial bench, the House moved on to the agenda, firstly to discuss the Bärnreither motion on relief funds. In the second session, too, the ministers returned to outdated interpellations, the answers to which would have been of considerably greater value at the time; the debate then turned to sugar taxation, which was introduced with a major, in-depth speech by Plener. Among the proceedings on the third day of the hearing, an interpellation by the German Club on the excessive confiscation of newspapers should be highlighted. This time, however, the clerical school motion was also touched upon. Dr. Sturm touched on this during the debate on the law concerning the conscription of reservists, pointing out that a decline in the educational level of the people should not be the least noticeable in the efficiency of the soldiers, and the Minister of Defence fully agreed with Sturm. The law was adopted unchanged and the discussion on the tax law continued, with Dr. v. Dunajewski taking the floor on behalf of the government. So far, the negotiations have passed in a fairly businesslike manner.

The Hungarian Chamber of Deputies has entered into the special debate on the state budget, and deliberations are also progressing briskly there. The law on the conscription of reservists was already passed on January 25. The magnate's board has a new president in the form of the crown guardian Baron Vay. in place of the deceased Sennyey.

In general, the parliamentary events in Germany are more important than in the Danube Empire. The Prussian House of Representatives again had a major debate on Poland, in which Minister v. Gossler explained the position of the Prussian authorities on the Polish question in a way that was strangely different from the Austrian situation. Goßler explained that the Prussian administration only had to deal with the province and not with the Grand Duchy of Posen. The Poles had to learn German and the German language had to become the common property of all members of the state. Among the closer friends of the Poles, Windthorst expressed his astonishment that excitement was being stirred up in Posen when war was threatening on the borders. The whole debate was prompted by an interpellation from the Poles about the decree of September 7, 1887, concerning the abolition of Polish language teaching in the Posen, West Prussian and Silesian elementary schools. In the German Reichstag, after a hearing on the clerical-conservative motions for the introduction of a certificate of qualification for the skilled trades, it was the Socialist Law that occupied the parties most vividly. The Social Democrat Singer was the first to speak out against the law in the strongest terms, and he used as his greatest trump card the reports confirmed by Swiss officials that the Berlin police maintained agents in Switzerland who not only reported on the Social Democratic propaganda there, but also incited people and incited them to commit crimes. The Minister of the Interior, von Puttkamer, replied that no state could do without the secret police, but that it was an unworthy suspicion that the government was inciting people to commit crimes. In Switzerland, too, the government had agents to monitor anarchism, and this had put the Prussian police in a position to inform the Petersburgers of the impending attack in the Winter Palace. The cases referred to by Singer were unknown to the Minister. Incidentally, it was sad that the Swiss authorities so often allowed foreign private individuals to inspect the files. Puttkamer then spoke in favor of the new law in order to protect Germany from social upheaval. Reichensperger spoke for the Center, Bamberger for the Liberals, and Marquardsen for the National Liberals, all against the law. Bebel confirmed and expanded on Singer's revelations about German agents abroad. After another rebuttal by Puttkamer and speeches by Kardorff and Windthorst, the hearing was closed and the law referred to a committee. Judging by the mood in the Reichstag, it seems that the German government will only be able to push through an extension of the existing Socialist Law, not the proposed tightening of it. In the commission discussing the military law, the Minister of War announced that the one-off expenditure for this law would amount to approximately 280 million marks, while the permanent expenditure would probably amount to 15,000,000 marks annually. However, he could not make a declaration that this would be the last military requirement. The law was adopted by the Commission.

The governments of Germany and Austria decided to take a step which, rare in the history of diplomacy, could also be of unusual significance for the shaping of relations between the major European powers. On the evening of February 3, the "Reichsanzeiger" in Berlin, the "Wiener Abendpost" and the "Pester Amtsblatt" simultaneously published the text of the German-Austrian Alliance Treaty, which was concluded on October 7, 1879. The publication was ordered in order to, as the introduction states, "put an end to the doubts which are being cherished on various sides about the purely defensive intentions of the alliance and which are being exploited for various purposes". Both allied governments were guided by the desire to preserve peace and to ward off disturbances of it as far as possible; they were convinced that the announcement of the contents of their treaty of alliance would dispel any doubt about this. The text of the highly important document, which will be regarded for all time as an outstanding monument in the history of Germany and Austria, must also find its place in the "Deutsche Wochenschrift". It reads verbatim:

"Whereas Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, and the German Emperor, King of Prussia, must consider it their irrefutable monarchical duty to ensure the security of their empires and the tranquillity of their peoples under all circumstances;

Considering that both monarchs will be able to fulfill this duty more easily and more effectively by firmly holding together both realms, as in the former Confederation;

Finally, considering that a close union between Austria-Hungary and Germany can threaten no one, but is likely to consolidate the European peace established by the Berlin Stipulations, Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, and the Emperor of Germany, by

They have solemnly promised each other that they will never add to their purely defensive agreement an aggressive tendency in any direction, have resolved to form a league of peace and mutual defense.

For this purpose, the Most Highs have appointed as your Plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary,

Highest your truly Privy Councilor, Minister of the Imperial Household and of Foreign Affairs, Field Marshal-Lieutenant Julius Count Andrassy of Csik-Szent-Kiraly and Kraszna-Horka, etc., etc.

His Majesty the German Emperor,

Highest Your Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador, Lieutenant-General Prince Henry VII Reuss, etc., etc., who have met in Vienna this day, and after exchanging their powers, which they have found to be good and sufficient, have agreed as follows:

Article I

Should one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia against the hope and sincere desire of the two High Contracting Parties, the High Contracting Parties are bound to assist each other with the entire military power of their Empires and accordingly to conclude peace only jointly and in agreement.

Article II

If one of the High Contracting Parties should be attacked by another power, the other High Contracting Party hereby undertakes not only not to assist the attacker against his High Ally, but at least to maintain a benevolent neutral attitude towards the co-contractor.

If, however, in such a case the attacking power should be supported by Russia, either in the form of active cooperation or by military measures which threaten the attacked power, the obligation of mutual assistance with full military power stipulated in Article I of this treaty shall also come into force immediately in this case, and the warfare of the two high adversaries shall then also become a joint one until the joint conclusion of peace.

Article III

In accordance with its peaceful character and in order to avoid any misinterpretation, this treaty shall be kept secret by both High Contracting Parties and shall be communicated to a third Power only with the consent of both parties and in accordance with special agreement.

According to the sentiments expressed by Emperor Alexander at the meeting in Alexandrovo, both High Contracting Parties hope that the armaments of Russia will not in reality prove to be a threat to them, and for this reason have no reason to make any communication at present; Should, however, this hope prove to be erroneous contrary to expectations, the two high adversaries would recognize it as a duty of loyalty to inform Emperor Alexander at least confidentially that they would have to consider an attack on one of them as directed against both of them.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty with their own hands and affixed their coats of arms.

Done at Vienna, October 7, 1879

LS. signed: Andrassy LS. signed: Heinrich VII Reuß

The first impression produced by the publication of this document was everywhere an exciting and serious one, for one could not conceal from oneself that such documents are usually only revealed to the whole world in dangerous times.

In the meantime, the sensational publication was followed by an announcement that almost equaled it in importance. It is the speech that Prince Bismarck gave three days later in the German Reichstag on the occasion of the discussion of the military loan and the defense bill, and which we discuss in the leading place.

It is quite impossible to give in brief an exhaustive picture of the same, which breathed the full freshness of his brilliant mind. It was enough that it did its duty and persuaded all parties in the Reichstag, including the clericals and libertarians, to approve the defense bill en bloc. Bismarck expressed his thanks for this unanimity with the words that the Reichstag had thus given an essential guarantee of peace.

The publication of the treaty of alliance and Bismarck's speech pushed back all interest in other matters. Crispi also described the situation as serious after the publication of the treaty, but no threat had been intended, merely a warning to the peace-disturbing elements. The revelation also came in handy in another respect, for it was precisely at this time that one of France's most respected statesmen, President Floquet, who is described as the only possible prime minister of the future, sought a rapprochement with Russian diplomacy by expressing the wish to enter into more intimate social relations with the Russian ambassador in Paris, Baron Mohrenheim, which was granted with the express permission of the Tsar's government. At the time, Floquet had lost favor with Russia by shouting "Long live Poland!" in front of Tsar Alexander II, and every Russian ambassador was instructed to avoid him in society.

As was to be expected, a motion was soon tabled in the Austrian House of Representatives calling on the government, in agreement with Hungary, to initiate negotiations with the German government which should lead to the approval of the treaty of alliance by the parliaments of the allied empires and to the constitutional incorporation of this treaty into the basic laws of the state. The motion was submitted by Dr. Knotz and the German National Association.

The political material that is otherwise available is pretty much limited to the usual negotiations in the parliaments of Vienna and Berlin. In the German Reichstag, the military bill and the extension of the legislative periods were on the agenda, while in the Austrian House of Representatives it was mainly a sugar tax bill. Deliberations continued diligently on both sides. The Austrian deputies received strong support for their position from the numerous demonstrations organized by the population against Prince Liechtenstein's proposal. And this movement will not come to rest for a long time to come.

The effect of the unveiling of the German-Austrian treaty of alliance and Bismarck's great speech was an extraordinarily profound one everywhere, and the excitement it caused is still reverberating in the European press. It is understandable that the two events gave rise to manifold conjectures concerning the position of the foreign powers with regard to the alliance of the two Central European empires, all the more so as the German Chancellor was expressly mindful of the agreements made with "other" states and especially with Italy. It was to be expected that the alliance with Italy would have similar features to the German-Austrian one, and the Roman correspondent of the "Neue Freie Presse" believes he can vouch for reports confirming this assumption. His statements are given weight by the fact that they were printed in full by the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung". They describe the following as the content of the treaties that Italy concluded with Germany and Austria: With Germany, that the two states must stand by each other with their entire war power until a joint peace is concluded if one of them is attacked by France; the treaty is aimed at preserving national independence and freedom, and the parties to the treaty give assurances that they will not arbitrarily break the peace. It was agreed with Austria that benevolent neutrality would be observed on both sides if Austria became involved in a war with Russia or Italy with France; Austria also undertook to support Italian interests in the Mediterranean and not to take any action on the Balkan peninsula without first reaching an agreement with Italy. In the event that France and Russia were to strike simultaneously, the entire military power of all three allied empires would have to be mobilized. These treaties are to be supplemented by agreements made between Italy, Austria and England for the protection of the Austrian and Italian coasts against any enemy landings. These communications still lack an official seal, but their intrinsic probability has been fairly generally recognized. Only as far as England is concerned, Under-Secretary of State Fergusson had previously declared in the House of Commons that the Government had not entered into any agreement committing England to any material action of which the House was unaware.

It is difficult to say what the European situation is now after the events of the last few weeks. It seems that Prince Bismarck and the German-Austrian treaty have really put a strong damper on the agitators and agitators in Russia and France. On the other hand, there has been no substantial change in the attitude of the individual powers towards each other, and Russia in particular has not ceased to complete its armaments. At the moment, relations between Italy and France are also still rather bad, as evidenced by the breakdown of negotiations on the renewal of the trade treaty. The customs war is imminent. According to a speech made by Lord Salisbury in the English House of Lords, there is nothing to fear for peace at present; England has the most concise assurances that Russia has no unlawful action in mind.

The Speech from the Throne, with which the English Parliament was opened on February 9, also contains no disquieting remarks, and the mere fact that it does not consider the European situation at all can be regarded as a sign of the seriousness of the times. But nowhere does one feel relieved of the worries that have been weighing on people's minds for months, and it can hardly be assumed that the fatal clouds of war will clear any time soon.

The extent to which the allied powers are endeavoring to destroy any belief that they are planning attacks can also be seen in a toast that Prince Wilhelm recently made at a banquet, in which he said, among other things said that he knew that reckless thoughts of war, lusting for glory, were being imputed to him, especially abroad: "God save me," the prince added, "from such criminal recklessness - I reject such accusations with indignation!"

Rather unpleasant news has since arrived from San Remo. In order to prevent the danger of suffocation that has arisen, Dr. Bramann had to perform a tracheotomy on the German crown pince-nez, and although the operation is not too serious and in this case also passed off happily, it nevertheless proves that the ailment does not justify the cheerful views that were held not long ago about a speedy and complete recovery of the tall patient. It is to be sincerely hoped that this operation will remain without bad consequences, and that the art of the doctors will not have to be called upon again for such an intervention.

In the parliaments of Germany and Austria, work continued with brief interruptions. The Reichstag, against the votes of the Center, the Liberals and the Poles and Danes, adopted the motion of the Cartel parties to introduce five-year legislative periods; the Prussian House of Representatives opted for the same change. After this, the Reichstag approved without debate the law concerning the raising of a loan for military purposes, and finally the extension of the Socialist Law in its present form, without the tightening of the law requested by the government, was adopted for two years, i.e. until September 30, 1890. The Austrian Chamber of Deputies first concluded its deliberations on the new Sugar Tax Act, after which the trade agreements with Italy and Germany were concluded. The former was soon concluded. On the other hand, a lively debate ensued on the convention with Germany, in which the German National deputies warmly advocated the extension of the alliance with the German Empire in political and economic terms. The speakers of the German-Austrian Club were much cooler towards this idea, and the Slavs did not deal with it at all, unless it had been to express their dislike of the German alliance in its present form, as the Young Czech Herald did. The bill was of course adopted. Then the matter of coal supplies for the Southern Railway came up for negotiation. The House of Lords met on ııı. The House of Lords met on February and concluded its discussion of the Health Insurance Bill, which had been returned from the House of Representatives.

The deadlock which occurred a few months ago in the diplomatic negotiations between the Powers over the existing difficulties, and which gave the crisis such an alarming character, is now to be remedied by Russian proposals concerning Bulgaria. Russia wants to return to the origin of the entanglements and make the situation in Bulgaria the subject of a European intervention in order to remove one of the most important obstacles to understanding. Accordingly, Russian diplomacy reportedly proposed to the powers that a joint decision be taken to declare Ferdinand von Koburg's government in Bulgaria illegal and to force the current actual prince to leave the country in order to facilitate a reorganization of the situation. Nothing reliable is yet known about the details of the Russian proposals, the means they envisage to implement Europe's resolutions and, above all, the attitude of the authoritative empires towards the Russian openings. Even now, however, there is no hiding the fact that a Platonic resolution, even if it were passed by all the states of Europe, need not necessarily result in the removal of Ferdinand, since his popular support might prove too strong for that. And what if the prince does not leave voluntarily? Not to mention the question of what kind of successor he should be given and whether someone could be found to replace him who would also be acceptable to Russia, the signatory powers of Berlin and the Bulgarians. Russia's applications therefore do not offer any particular prospect of a smooth settlement of the matter. Nevertheless, it is regarded as extremely gratifying that at least the diplomats have something to do again and that it is not just a matter of military armaments. A faint hope, but a hope nonetheless.

Furthermore, there is a great silence in general European politics, and unfortunately the illness of Frederick William must again attract more public attention than all political events. Not as if the news from San Remo heralded a decisive turn for the worse. However, the progress of his recovery after the operation is so slow that people are once again giving in to fears which the doctors are unable to dispel.

After a lengthy debate, the German Reichstag has now finally approved the extension of the Socialist Law in its current form for two years. The tightening of the law proposed by the government was rejected on the whole, and unless unexpected events occur, it can be expected that after two years the Socialists will again be subject to the common bourgeois law. In the last sessions of the Austrian House of Representatives, it was the law on academic associations and assemblies presented by the Minister of Education that was the focus of interest. The first reading, which ended with the bill being referred to a committee for preliminary deliberation, was carried out with an unusual turnout from the public and, in particular, the student body, which filled the galleries to capacity. Dr. von Gautsch represented the point of view of the education administration, describing the aim of the law as a "step back towards order", as the academic youth were guilty of all too serious excesses. The speech by the deputy Pernerstorfer, who first drew a comparison between the morality of middle-class young people and that of the youth of the "very high" aristocratic circles and then sharply criticized the actions of the Minister of Education in his appointments etc., caused the greatest stir both in parliament and among the population. Pernerstorfer was interrupted several times by the President. Dr. Kopp also spoke against the law in a very effective manner and concluded by expressing the wish that it be buried in the school committee for good. Shortly before, the House of Lords had given its approval to the trade agreement with Germany, on which occasion A. von Schmerling warmly commemorated the alliance that unites Austria with Germany.

On February 18, a large assembly of citizens took place in Vienna, which took a decisive stand against Prince Liechtenstein's school proposal, and the next day a significant part of the Viennese working class followed the representatives of the bourgeoisie. Both times, strong resolutions against the clerical attack on the school were adopted unanimously.

The following skeleton of ideas was based on three lectures I have recently given on the deceased philosopher and poet at three events in various guises. The first took place in the circle of the "Kommenden" society founded by L. Jacobowski, the second at the friendly request of the "Verein zut Förderung der Kunst", at their Nietzsche celebration on September 15 in the town hall, the third at a Nietzsche celebration organized by the reciter Kurt Holm in association with me on September 18 in the Architektenhaus. The senior director Moest and the reciter Max Laurence also took part in the first celebration by reciting Nietzsche's creations; at the "Verein zur Förderung der Kunst" I had the great pleasure of working with L. Manz, who recited Nietzsche poems, and with Conrad Ansorge and Eweyk. The latter sang two songs composed with true greatness by Ansorge, accompanied by the composer himself. A harmonium recital completed the celebration. On Tuesday the 18th, I was assisted by Kurt Holz with his recitations from "Zarathustra" and Nietzsche's poems.

"Better to live in the ice than under modern virtues and other south winds!" These words, uttered by Friedrich Nietzsche in the first chapter of his unfinished work "Umwertung aller Werte", reflect the sentiment under which he always lived. He felt himself to be an outmoded personality who had to take a different path than the entire contemporary community. He cannot appear to us as the Messiah, nor as the herald of a new world view. However brilliantly, however ravishingly he expresses his powerful ideas, they are not original ideas that have sprung from his spirit; they are ideas that have already been expressed in this or that form by other spirits of the nineteenth century; they are ideas that are deeply rooted in the intellectual life of the last decades. What distinguishes him from others are the sensations, the experiences of the soul that he experienced under the influence of these ideas. The collapse of centuries-old ideas under the force of modern scientific views had such a shattering and personal effect on few as on Nietzsche. What most people only experienced in their heads, the transformation of an old belief into a new one: for Nietzsche this became a very personal, heart-wrenching, individual experience. And with this experience he stood alone, apart from the path that his contemporaries took with their feelings and ideas. His own view of ancient culture grew out of the thoughts that were passed on to him during his student days about the art and world view of the Greeks. Unlike others, he did not see in Socrates, Plato, Sophocles and Euripides the great representatives of the true Greek spirit; he imagined a higher, more comprehensive art and wisdom at home in Greece in the age before Socrates, a culture that had suffered a dilution, a weakening since Socrates. He longed for this ancient culture with all his soul. It has been lost to mankind. Only in the age of the Renaissance did it experience a brief rebirth. In Schopenhauer's philosophy, he believed he could once again hear a wisdom like that of the Greeks before Socrates, and in Richard Wagner's art he thought he could hear sounds that had not been heard since those ancient times of mankind. It was a high point in Nietzsche's life when, at the beginning of the seventies, he formed an intimate friendship with Richard Wagner. Nietzsche still idealized what lived in this genius, what broke free from him as his art. He transformed Wagner into an ideal into which he placed everything that he believed had been realized in the Greece of the pre-Socratic era. It was not what Wagner really was that he revered, but the ideal idea, the image he had of Wagner. Just as Wagner was about to achieve what he was striving for in 1876, Nietzsche realized that he was not worshipping Wagner's true art, but an ideal that he had formed for himself. Now this ideal appeared to him as something alien, something that did not correspond to his innermost nature at all. He now became an opponent of his own earlier ideas. It was not Wagner that the later Nietzsche fought against, but himself, his world of ideas that had become alien to him. Thus Nietzsche was basically lonely with his thoughts even at the time when Wagner's friends counted him among their own; and he must have felt completely lonely when he became an opponent of his own earlier ideas. In the past he had at least cherished feelings that were connected to a powerful cultural phenomenon; now he struggled with himself as a completely abandoned man. In the mood that resulted from such abandonment and loneliness, he absorbed the ideas of modern natural science. Unlike others, he could not come to terms with the idea that man had gradually evolved from lower organisms. This idea grew in his mind. If animality had made it as far as man, it was only natural that man should progress beyond himself to an even higher being than himself, to the superman. The modern spirit of the age had enough to do with initially allowing the far-reaching ideas of the new natural science to have an effect on it; it stopped at understanding man from his past. Nietzsche, however, immediately had to process the idea of the development of mankind with a view to the distant future. Thus he also stood alone with the experience that modern natural science evoked in him.

Whoever is familiar with the intellectual life of the last half century can say that all the ideas that appear in Nietzsche are also present elsewhere; but he must admit that the way in which they have affected Nietzsche is such as can be found in no other personality. Nietzsche is therefore not the herald of a new world view, but a genius who, as an individual personality with his very own soul, arouses our deepest interest.

Died on August 25, 1900

You may think what you like about Nietzsche's world view: the way he has become popular cannot be described as anything other than a profound aberration of our contemporary culture. A striking characteristic of almost all of his followers is their lack of objective judgment and their fluttering interest in the ideas of a personality whose personal destiny makes him interesting. Anyone who really reads Nietzsche's writings with understanding will above all realize that he is dealing with a man who was completely removed from the real life of the present, from the great needs of the time. Everything he came to know was based on the views he had acquired through a one-sided classical and philosophical, in some respects quite abnormal, course of education, to the exclusion of all experience of life, without any knowledge of the real needs of the present. He was preoccupied with himself and his thoughts and feelings in complete spiritual isolation. That is why he could only arrive at ideas that could be of interest as expressions of a strange individual personality, but to which no one else, in the true sense of the word, should profess to be a follower in the form in which he expressed them. Anyone who nevertheless presents him as a spirit that is characteristic of our time only proves that a lack of understanding for the actual needs of the present is also a characteristic phenomenon of this present for many people.

An examination of Nietzsche's development may confirm this assertion. He was born in Röcken on October 5, 1844. His father was a Protestant preacher. Nietzsche was five years old when his father died. He described him himself with the words: "He was tender, amiable and morbid, like a being destined only to pass by - more a kind reminder of life than life itself." - Nietzsche grew up in a pious Protestant family. He was a pious boy in the orthodox sense. We know from the biography provided by his sister that he was called the "little pastor" by his classmates because of his religious way of thinking. He spent his school years at the grammar school in Schulpforta, the model institution for classical education. At the universities of Bonn and Leipzig he devoted himself to the study of classical antiquity and became so familiar with the world of ideas of ancient Greece that this ancient culture appeared to him as an ideal of human development, as the epitome of everything great and noble. He later went so far in his appreciation of Greek culture that he praised the existence of slavery, a side effect of an early stage of education, as something particularly exemplary and valuable. At the end of his academic career, he became acquainted with the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner. The writings of the former and the personality of the latter had a downright fascinating effect on him. Due to his enthusiastic nature, sensitive to strong impressions, he was literally addicted to both spirits.

His appreciation of Greek culture, which he regarded as truly great only for the time before Socrates appeared, was combined with his unreserved admiration of Schopenhauer and Wagner. He now saw in ancient Greece a culture through which man was closer to the eternal powers of the world than was later the case. He said to himself: in these ancient times, people were completely under the spell of their original instincts and drives, they lived out to the full what nature had placed in them. Socrates turned them away from this culture. Socrates had one-sidedly cultivated the spirit, the mind. He had restricted people's primal instincts through thinking; virtue, which was thought out, was to take the place of fresh, primal instincts. Nietzsche believed that Schopenhauer's teachings justified this way of looking at things. For Schopenhauer also calls the human imagination, the mind, merely a result of the blind, unreasoning will that reigns in all natural phenomena. And in Wagner's music, Nietzsche believed he heard sounds that once again came from the depths of human nature, from which the education of the past centuries had alienated itself. He glorified ancient Greece from the standpoint of Schopenhauer's philosophy and at the same time celebrated Wagner's music drama as the rebirth of this lost culture in his first essay "The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music" (1872). In the following period, he undertook a campaign against the whole of modern education from this point of view in his four "Unzeitgemäßen Betrachtungen". In a Festschrift, which he wrote in 1875 for the performances in Bayreuth, he achieved the most extreme expression for this view of his.

At the same time, he also realized that he had become hypnotized by the influences of Wagner and Schopenhauer. He perceived the whole view as a foreign element that he had implanted in himself. He became the fiercest opponent of what he had previously advocated. He now fought for a strictly scientific view of life. By studying works written in the scientific spirit of the time, he was dissuaded from his earlier view. He had immersed himself in Friedrich Albert Lange's "History of Materialism", in Dühring's writings, and in the explanations of the French moral writers. Anyone familiar with these writings will see in the viewpoints Nietzsche professes in his works "Menschliches, Allzumenschliches", "Morgenröte" and "Die fröhliche Wissenschaft" extreme conclusions from the ideas advocated by the aforementioned writers. Nietzsche now sees false ideals in the ideas he had previously taught, which shroud the sober, rational observation of things in a romantic fog. His antipathy towards Schopenhauer and Wagner grew ever stronger. In 1888, he wrote his essay "The Wagner Case", which ends with words like these: "Adherence to Wagner pays dearly. I observe the young people who have long been exposed to his infection. The next, relatively innocent effect is that of taste. Wagner acts like the continued use of alcohol. It dulls, it mucouss the stomach... . The Wagnerian finally calls rhythmic what I myself, using a Greek proverb, call 'moving the swamp'."

Once again, something gains a strong influence on Nietzsche. It is Darwinism. Here, too, he immediately advances to the most extreme conclusions. There is no doubt that a book published in 1881 by a brilliant natural scientist, W. H. Rolph, who unfortunately died young, "Biological Problems", gave him far-reaching inspiration. He was fascinated by the idea of the "struggle for existence" of all beings, which plays a powerful role in Darwinism. But he did not adopt this idea in its Darwinian form; he reshaped it in the sense in which Rolph had developed it. Darwin was of the opinion that nature produces far more beings than it can sustain with the available food. The beings must therefore fight for their existence. Those that are the most perfect, the most purposefully organized, remain; the others perish. Rolph is of a different opinion. He says: it is not the need of existence that is the driving force of development, but the fact that every being wants to acquire more than it needs for its preservation, that it not only wants to satisfy its hunger, but to go beyond its needs. Living creatures not only fight for what is necessary, they want to become ever more powerful. Rolph replaces the "struggle for existence" with the "struggle for power". Nietzsche now places this thought at the center of his world of ideas. He expresses it paradoxically: "Life itself is essentially appropriation, violation, overpowering of the foreign and the weaker, oppression, harshness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and, at the very least, mildest exploitation." He transfers this idea to the moral world order. He combines it with a view that he had already adopted earlier from Schopenhauer's philosophy: that the masses of people are not important, that the masses are only there to make it possible for selected individuals, as serving beings, to climb the paths on which they rise to the highest power. History should not lead to the happiness of the individual, but should only be a detour to promote the power of a few outstanding individuals. On this detour, man is to develop into a "superman", just as he has developed from ape to man. In his half-poetic, half-philosophical work "Thus Spoke Zarathustra", Nietzsche sang the high song of this "superman". Once again, as in his youth, he finds a great error in the development of culture to date. The "superior type of human being has existed often enough: but as a stroke of luck, as an exception, never as desired. Rather, it has been feared the most, it has almost been the most fearsome; - and out of fear the opposite type has been desired, bred, achieved: the domestic animal, the herd animal, the sick human animal, - ...." Nietzsche was now so hypnotized by his idea of the "will to power" that he became indifferent to everything else apart from the brutal struggle to suppress the weaker, that he saw in the Renaissance man Cesare Borgia, who spared no means, the model of a superhuman.

Under the influence of such ideas, Nietzsche increasingly drifted into a paradoxical world view that was far removed from contemporary culture. His position on the "workers' question" is characteristic. He says: "The stupidity, basically the degeneration of instinct, which is the cause of all stupidity today, lies in the fact that there is a workers' question. One does not ask about certain things. -- The worker has been made fit for military service, he has been given the right of coalition, the right to vote politically: what wonder if the worker today already feels his existence to be a state of emergency (morally expressed as injustice -)? But what do you want? asked again. If one wants an end, one must also want the means: if one wants slaves, one is a fool if one drags them to herds." From Nietzsche's point of view, this is all consistent. However, those who see in this point of view not a highly interesting, extreme formulation of a dying world of ideas due to Nietzsche's personality, but a viable creed, must be blind to the demands of the present. A strange thinker died on August 25; not one of the leading spirits into the future.

I. The publication of Nietzsche's works

It is probably known in wider circles that there is a Nietzsche archive in Weimar, in which the manuscripts left behind by the unfortunate philosopher are kept, and which is managed by the sister of the ill man, Mrs. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. For a number of years, a complete edition of Nietzsche's works has also been in the process of publication, which reached its twelfth volume in 1897. The first eight volumes comprise all the works that had already been printed before Nietzsche fell ill, as well as the Antichrist, which was available as a completed work at the time of his illness. The following volumes are to contain the estate, namely earlier drafts of the writings that were later completed in a more perfect form, and drafts, notes etc. on works that remained unfinished. The four volumes of Nietzsche's estate that have been published to date contain everything from Nietzsche's estate that was written up to the end of 1885. No new volume of the edition has appeared since 1897.

A Dr. Ernst Horneffer has just appeared with a brochure: "Nietzsche's Doctrine of the Eternal Second Coming and its Previous Publication" (Leipzig, C. G. Naumann), in which he explains the reasons why nothing of Nietzsche's works has appeared in such a long time, and why the 11th and 12th volumes have been withdrawn from the book trade. This brochure by Dr. Horneffer and a book that has also recently been published are the reason why I am taking the opportunity here to say something about the way in which the Nietzsche Archive handles the dissemination of the achievements of the thinker who was so tragically afflicted. Unfortunately, I will be forced to include some personal details in this essay. I do not like to do so. But in this case, the personal is certainly part of the matter, and the experiences I have had with the Nietzsche Archive are suitable for shedding light on how the people in charge deal with the estate of one of the most remarkable personalities in modern intellectual history.

The second publication I mentioned above is a German translation of the French book: "La philosophie de Nietzsche" by Henri Lichtenberger. The translation was done by Friedrich von Oppeln-Bronikowski. Mrs. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche mentions this in her preface. The translator himself also told me so. Nevertheless, the book bears the words on the title page: "Die Philosophie Friedrich Nietzsches von Henri Lichtenberger. Introduced and translated by Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche." But that is only incidental. The main thing is that in her introduction, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche makes this shallow, superficial presentation of her brother's teaching the official interpretation of his world view, so to speak. Anyone who has only an inkling of Friedrich Nietzsche's great intentions must be deeply offended when he sees that the responsible guardian of the estate takes this book under her special protection. For connoisseurs of Nietzsche's ideas, I need say nothing more about this book. It is one of the many Nietzsche publications that one puts aside with a smile after reading a few pages. You will believe me when I say that I do not oppose this work of art out of personal animosity, because my own writing on "Nietzsche as a fighter against his time" is not only described as "significant" by Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche on the first page of her introduction, but is also praised by Henri Lichtenberger himself in the course of his presentation. I will not say another word about Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche's "Introduction". It is like everything that is said about her brother by this woman; and I will unfortunately be forced to deal with it in the following.

Horneffer's writing is written for the purpose of characterizing the previous editor of the Nietzsche edition, Dr. Fritz Koegel, as a scientifically incompetent person who has made this edition badly, indeed, who has made so many gross mistakes in editing the 11th and 12th volumes that these volumes had to be withdrawn from the book trade. Horneffer goes so far as to claim: "It is a bad fate, but a truth that cannot be suppressed, that Nietzsche also encountered this: he first fell into the hands of a scientific charlatan." I do not have to defend Dr. Koegel. He may do that himself. But the matter at issue here is a matter of public interest. And someone who knows things from close observation, as I do, must say what he has to say.

I note from the outset that it is not true what has often and now again recently been reported in the newspapers that I myself was ever Nietzsche's editor. I must state this untruth here all the more because Richard M. Meyer in his recently published literary history of the nineteenth century refers to me as Nietzsche's editor, although he should actually know that this is untrue, because he is a frequent visitor to the Nietzsche Archive and a friend of Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche. This is just a sample of the carelessness with which books are written today. Even though I was never a Nietzsche editor, I did spend a lot of time in the Nietzsche Archive and got to know Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche well enough. The following remarks will prove this.

But I have also observed Dr. Fritz Koegel at work; I have discussed countless Nietzsche problems with him. I know him and also know what happened when he was dismissed from the Nietzsche Archive and I know how it came about that the further publication of his works was taken away from him. Before I proceed to the presentation of the true facts, I would like to comment on the official statement given by Dr. Ernst Horneffer of the Nietzsche Archive.

Dr. Fritz Koegel is a man of artistic ability and true scientific spirit. He has a deep understanding of Nietzsche's world view. I disagree with him on some points, and we have had many a controversy. He did the Nietzsche edition with ever-increasing enthusiasm. He worked like a man who, in the course of his ongoing work, lives through the problems fully and recreates them in his mind. Since he was busy with the estate volumes, he has informed me in detail about almost every step of his work. I never studied Nietzsche's manuscripts myself. We only discussed individual matters. I had no official relationship with the edition, only a friendly one with Dr. Koegel. I still have to remember the hours in which we talked a lot about the most enigmatic part of Nietzsche's teaching, about the "eternal return" of all things. There are only scanty hints of this idea in the completed Steps. We impatiently awaited the time when Koegel would come to work on the "Wiederkunfts" papers. The first of these papers date from 1881, and Koegel has now published them in the ı2nd volume of the edition. And this publication provides Dr. Horneffer's main point of attack and allegedly the main reason why Dr. Koegel was stripped of his editorship.

Koegel found notes in a manuscript notebook by Nietzsche, written down in the summer of 1881, which refer to the "Eternal Second Coming". There are 235 aphorisms. The same notebook also contains a disposition by Nietzsche for a book entitled "The Second Coming of the Same". Koegel has now said to himself: Nietzsche wanted to "compose a book according to this disposition. The aphorisms represent the content of this writing in a completely unorganized sequence and in an unfinished form. This is because Nietzsche has abandoned the drafting of this work. We therefore only have its content before us in an unfinished form. Nietzsche soon turned to other works. Since the estate is to give a picture of Nietzsche's intellectual development and for this purpose is also to contain the unfinished writings, Dr. Koegel naturally had to print the unfinished "Wiederkunft des Gleichen" in an appropriate form. The disposition was there and 235 aphorisms in quite arbitrary succession, as Nietzsche had thought of the individual points of the disposition. Koegel went through the aphorisms, which was natural, assigned to each point of the disposition what was intended for it, and sought a thread of thought for the individual sections so that the aphorisms formed a coherent whole as far as possible.

Now Dr. Horneffer, Koegel's successor, is getting to grips with it. He explains that most of the aphorisms did not belong to the "Eternal Reappearance" at all, but that it was initially about the "Zarathustra", whose first flash of inspiration in his thought process Nietzsche records in the same booklet. Only a few, namely 44 aphorisms, belonged to the "eternal thought of return". Horneffer recently published these 44 aphorisms as a "supplement" to his brochure. Furthermore, he accuses Koegel of not having understood the content of the doctrine of the "eternal return" and therefore proceeding in a completely absurd manner when assigning the individual aphorisms to the points of the disposition. Another of Horneffer's assertions is that "Nietzsche's plan to write a prosaic essay on the return of the same, as Koegel imagines it, could only have existed for a very short time, that it never existed." Excuse me, Dr. Horneffer, you are writing something quite outrageous. What do you actually mean? Did the plan only exist for a short time, or did it never exist? You seem to think it was the same thing. Then allow me to question your common sense. If the plan existed for a short time, then it was Dr. Koegel's duty to record the form it took in accordance with the layout of the estate. If it never existed, then of course nothing could be published as a "return of the same". Because then the aphorisms belong to other writings. Dr. Horneffer manages the sleight of hand of claiming in two consecutive lines both that he has passed and that he has not passed.

Such an organized mind is a fine prerequisite for the editor of a Nietzsche edition! This gentleman immediately reveals himself in all his greatness. He undertakes to prove in individual cases that Koegel has assigned the wrong aphorisms to the individual points of the disposition. In all of these cases Dr. Horneffer shows that he does not know what is important in these aphorisms; and that his opinion that the aphorisms do not belong in the relevant section is based only on his total lack of understanding. Let me pick out a few cases. Horneffer takes the 70th aphorism listed by Koegel and claims that it says: "that morality can only be understood physiologically. All moral judgments are judgments of taste. There is no such thing as healthy or unhealthy taste; it always depends on the goal." Koegel assigns the aphorism to which these words belong to the chapter "Incorporation of the passions". Horneffer says: "This is an independent, self-contained thought from the field of morality; I am at a loss to understand how this can be brought under the heading of the incorporation of the passions." I believe that Mr. Horneffer has run out of understanding, for he has never had any understanding of the aphorism at all. Horneffer simply omits what is important, namely, that man errs in his judgment of the value of food, because instead of looking at its usefulness as nourishment, he is guided by taste. It is not what nourishes better, but what tastes better that man wants to enjoy. He is therefore on the wrong track with his passion; he has incorporated a misguided passion through various conditions. Because of this sense, the aphorism belongs in the chapter "Incorporation of the passions". Another example. Horneffer claims: "Aph. 33, 34, 35 state that we unjustifiably despise the inorganic, although we are very dependent on it." To this he makes the remark: "I do not know how this is connected with the fundamental errors and their incorporation." Horneffer doesn't know because, again, he doesn't know what the aphorisms mean. Well, I will tell him. Nietzsche speaks of the fact that we hold the inorganic in low esteem, that in explaining our organism we take too little account of the inorganic in it. "We are three quarters a column of water and have inorganic salts in us." If we do not take this into account, we are subject to a fundamental error. We believe that the organic does not require consideration of the inorganic in order to explain it. That is why these aphorisms are rightly placed here. Another "achievement" of Dr. Horneffer is the sentence: "We read Aph. ı2ıı and 122 that we should not be tolerant, in Aph. 130 that egoism need not always be interpreted badly. It is really incomprehensible what caused Koegel to bring this and similar things under the incorporation of knowledge." Yes, it is incomprehensible to Dr. Hornefler because he again has no idea what is important. Otherwise he would have written in Aph. ı2r: "Truth for its own sake is a phrase, something quite impossible." What this means is that man gives himself over to the error of striving for the truth in order to know it; whereas it is quite different, quite selfish reasons that cause him to do so. The belief in "knowledge for its own sake" is thus incorporated.

So one could prove to Dr. Horneffer in every single case that he only accuses Koegel of having brought the aphorisms under false points of view because he - Horneffer - understands absolutely nothing of the meaning of these aphorisms.

But with Mr. Horneffer's logic there is a huge problem. At the beginning of the "Eternal Return" manuscript, Nietzsche speaks of the fact that man is compelled by the conditions of life to form false conceptions of things. Such ideas do not correspond to the facts, because the right concepts would be less conducive to life than the wrong ones. It is not at all important to man whether an idea is true or false, but whether it is life-sustaining, life-promoting. And Nietzsche remarks that the most primitive ideas, such as subject and object, like and like, free will, are such false ideas, but they are necessary for life. In truth, there are no two equal things. The idea of equality is therefore false. However, it helps us to apply the concept of equality in our considerations. According to Nietzsche, we do this not only with the most primitive ideas, but even more so with the complicated ones. Nietzsche only mentions the primitive ones in order to say: see, even the simplest, most transparent ideas are false. How does Dr. Horneffer interpret this? He says: "So only the most primitive concepts are meant by these basic errors, which were formed in ancient times." He accuses Koegel of also bringing more complicated ideas under the term "incorporation of basic errors". The new Nietzsche editor cannot even read Nietzsche.

Dr. Horneffer presents some more bogus reasons for his assertion that Koegel's compilation of the "Eternal Return" aphorisms is incorrect. There is another disposition in the manuscript booklet, which Horneffer considers to be a disposition on Zarathustra, because the information under this disposition is supposed to refer to the "first flash of Zarathustra thought": "Sils-Maria August 26, 1881". Under the above-mentioned disposition of the "Wiederkunft des Gleichen" it says "Anfang August ı88ı in Sils-Maria". Horneffer now claims that the disposition of August 26th gives "moods with which the various chapters of a work are to be written." Certainly; Horneffer has to admit that. The first point of this disposition, for example, is entitled "In the style of the first movement of the ninth symphony. Chaos sive natura. "Of the dehumanization of nature. Prometheus is forged against the Caucasus. Written with the cruelty of Kratos, "the power;." So are the other points of this disposition. At the same time, however, Dr. Horneffer says: "The whole character of this disposition proves its belonging to Zarathustra." But this is one of the worst assertions that I have come across in the entire Nietzsche literature. For nothing indicates that the Disposition belongs to the Zarathustra; according to its entire content, however, it can only belong to a work that is not the Zarathustra, for it does not contain the main idea for the sake of which the Zarathustra is written: the idea of the superman. Rather, it contains the "eternal return" as the main idea, which is only mentioned temporarily in Zarathustra. Nietzsche quite obviously deviated from a planned main work on the "eternal return" because the "superman" became the focus of his thoughts, and this prompted him to write Zarathustra. The words "Gaya Scienza" (Happy Science) can also be found in the "Wiederkunft" booklet. Horneffer says: "Thus it follows from external and internal characteristics that this booklet is a preliminary work of happy science ... .. In the happy science at the end of the fourth book and thus at the end of the original work in general - the fifth book was only added later - Aph. 341 expresses the thought of the eternal return." For Dr. Hornefler, this is the "obvious" thought. For any other, better logical mind, this is by no means the obvious thought. For the last manuscript of the "happy science" was written in January 1882, which Nietzsche therefore calls the "most beautiful of all Januaries". Why should he not have used thoughts from a manuscript notebook that corresponds to a work planned and abandoned in August of the previous year? This is, of course, the "obvious assumption" for any logical person. It is not the case for Dr. Horneffer. But he has something else to say in support of his opinion. In a letter that Peter Gast "only recently made available to the archives", Nietzsche wrote to him from Sils-Maria on September 3, 1883: "This Engadin is the birthplace of my Zarathustra. I have just found the first sketch of the thoughts connected with it; below it is written "At the beginning of August 1881 in Sils-Maria, 6000 feet above the sea and much higher above all human things." Now this sentence is not even under the disposition that Horneffer thinks belongs to Zarathustra; it is under the disposition that undoubtedly belongs to a work on the "Return of the Same" - for this disposition is so titled. It therefore follows from this passage in the letter that Nietzsche was mistaken. He remembered that the idea of Zarathustra had taken root in him in the summer of 1881, found the remark in the old notebook, glanced at it, and believed that the words underneath referred to Zarathustra. Dr. Horneffer, however, does not look at the disposition fleetingly, but very closely, and also believes that the words refer to Zarathustra. In his case, it is not an error of memory, but something else.

II On the Characteristics of Mrs. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche

The first signs that Mrs. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche wanted to bring about a change in Dr. Fritz Koegel's relationship with the publisher of the Nietzsche edition came to light very shortly after the latter's engagement in the autumn of 1896. A few days after this engagement to a lady from Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche's circle of friends, the latter told me that this engagement was causing her difficulties. She did not know how she should arrange Dr. Koegel's position so that she could provide support for his marriage. From this point on, I, who was in contact with both Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche and Dr. Koegel, found myself in a real crossfire. There were constant arguments between the two, and when I spoke to Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche I had to listen to all sorts of strange allegations about Dr. Koegel; when I met Dr. Koegel, I heard constant bitter complaints that he could not explain Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche's behavior towards him in any other way than that she wanted to force him out of his position in one way or another. I tried to reassure both sides and found my situation quite disgusting. At that time I came to Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche twice a week. She had let me give her private lessons on her brother's philosophy. I would certainly never have spoken about these private matters if they had not been suitable for giving the public a more accurate picture of the qualities of the director of the Nietzsche estate than can be obtained from the official and official announcements of the archive that appear today. What I am presenting is suitable to show in which hands Nietzsche's writings are. And one has a right to know something about this today, since Friedrich Nietzsche's teachings exert such a great influence in the present. The private lessons I had to give Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche taught me one thing above all: that Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche is a complete layperson in everything concerning her brother's teaching. She does not have any independent judgment about the simplest of these teachings. The private lessons taught me something else. Mrs. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche lacks all sense for finer, even for coarser logical distinctions; her thinking does not have the slightest logical consistency; she lacks all sense of objectivity and objectivity. An event which takes place today has tomorrow assumed a form in her mind which need have no resemblance to the real one; but which is formed in such a way as she needs it for what she wants to achieve. I expressly emphasize, however, that I have never suspected Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche of deliberately distorting facts or deliberately making untrue assertions. No, she believes what she says at every moment. Today she tells herself that yesterday was red, which was certainly blue. I must say this expressly in advance, for it is only from this point of view that everything I am about to say can be understood.

Soon after Dr. Koegel's engagement, Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche used my presence in the Nietzsche Archive during a private lesson to tell me that she had doubts about Dr. Koegel's abilities. She held him in high esteem as an artist and "aesthete", she said, but he was not a philosopher. Therefore, she could not imagine that he was capable of editing the last volumes of the edition in which the "Umwertung aller Werte" was to be published. She thought that I, being a philosopher and fully initiated into Nietzsche's circle of thought, should be consulted on the edition. She also gave details of how she envisioned my future relationship with the Nietzsche Archive. I did not attach any particular importance to such a conversation and such information from Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche. For I knew her and knew that she wants this today and that tomorrow and that it is quite pointless to argue seriously with her if such an argument involves some logic. I only said that what she was saying had no meaning at all, because Dr. Koegel was the editor of the Nietzsche edition by contract. There could be no question of a declaration on my part that I was prepared also to become editor, because such a declaration would be meaningless if a discussion had not first taken place with Dr. Koegel. It should be noted here that I not only gave my consent to the publication of Nietzsche's writings not at that time, but also proceeded from the point of view that with the contracts between Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche and the publisher of the Nietzsche edition, which I knew, such a commitment on my part would have been nonsense. Now I knew Dr. Koegel's irritability and bitterness in those days. He had been driven into an almost pathological state of agitation by Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche's unbelievable behavior. I knew that in this situation he could no longer bear to hear about the completely pointless conversation between Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche and myself. Besides, there was no point in telling him about it, as it had been completely fruitless. I therefore asked Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche to give me her word that this conversation would never be discussed. She gave this word. That was on a Saturday. Dr. Koegel's sister was staying with Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche at the time. On the following Tuesday, Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche said the following to her. I had agreed to publish the "Umwertung aller Werte" together with Dr. Koegel. She, the sister, should ask Dr. Koegel whether he would agree to this. Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche did not say this to Dr. Koegel himself, who in the meantime had repeatedly visited the Nietzsche Archive, but had his sister tell him. Thus, Mrs. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche not only spoke of the conversation three days later; she communicated the result in a completely false form. This peculiar view that Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche had of a given word was often mentioned afterwards. And Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche expressed this view of hers in an unsolicited letter to me on September 23, 1898 in the following way: "I believed that the promise (it was not just a promise, but a pledged word) was only valid for the interim period before I proposed the whole arrangement to Dr. Koegel. Koegel the whole arrangement, for of course, when I offered a second editor, I had to say who I had in mind and that the prospective one would agree." Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche therefore believed that she no longer needed to keep a word she had given on the following Tuesday. Dr. Förster-Nietzsche finds it natural that, when offered a second editor, she said that I had accepted, although this was not correct, and although anyone with a logical mind must have thought, given the contractual circumstances, that first things had to be sorted out with Dr. Koegel before a second editor could be discussed. Since there were no objective reasons for appointing a second editor to Dr. Fritz Koegel, a promise on my part could only have been interpreted as a plot against him. Everything that Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche said in the conversation on December 6 was not an attack on what he had achieved up to that point, but only the very vague assumption, not justified by anything factual, that Dr. Koegel would probably not be able to produce the volumes following ı2 alone. So that I would not appear to Dr. Koegel as an intriguer, Mrs. Elisabeth Förster had to be induced to declare explicitly in front of witnesses and in Dr. Koegel's and my presence that I had not given a promise. She also explained this. Later she wanted to blur the unpleasant impression that such a statement had made on her. That is why she has been telling and spreading the story ever since: a conversation took place on December 6 and she denied this conversation out of consideration for me. Due to her lack of logical discernment, she doesn't seem to realize what was important. What mattered was not whether she had spoken to me at all on December 6 about Dr. Koegel and her intentions with him, but the fact that I did not give a promise. I did not make such a commitment because I tried to make it clear to Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche that any commitment on my part would be an understanding in view of the existing contractual relationships. I was also unable to make a commitment because it was my firm conviction at the time that it was only personal reasons that prompted Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche to make a change with regard to Dr. Koegel. To this day, nothing has shaken this conviction in me. I consider everything later put forward as factual to be merely a mask intended to make an objective goal originally pursued by Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche purely for personal reasons - the removal of Dr. Koegel from the editorship - appear to be an objectively justified action due to Koegel's alleged incompetence.

The conversation between Mrs. Fötster-Nietzsche and myself took place on Saturday, December 5, 1896. All the unpleasant negotiations that followed this event dragged on for many weeks. I expressly note that during this entire time there was never any talk of Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche doubting the soundness of what Dr. Koegel had until then worked on for the Nietzsche edition. And Koegel's manuscript of the "eternal return" for the twelfth volume had long since been completed. I knew this Koegel manuscript, but never got to know the documents for it, the Nietzsche booklets. I don't know what Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche knew of the latter at the time, but she knew Koegel's manuscript very well. She often spoke about it and never once during this time expressed any doubt to me that there might be something wrong with it. I have to say this, because in Horneffer's brochure it says: "In justification of Dr. Förster-Nietzsche, who first recognized the unscientific nature of Koegel's work (as early as autumn 1896)..." So this statement cannot be correct. But how Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche later corrected the whole matter can be seen from a passage in the aforementioned unsolicited letter to me. It reads: "I gave you the manuscript on the Second Coming in October 1896 for examination because I was so concerned about it. You yourself have stated the incoherence of the content on various occasions and justified and mentioned my concern. Nevertheless, you did not say a word to Dr. Koegel about your doubts about the manuscript's status." In this passage everything is incorrect. The matter was like this. During a longer absence of Dr. Koegel from Weimar, Dr. Franz Servaes visited the Nietzsche Archive. Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche asked me to read him some of Koegel's manuscript, the "Eternal Return", which was ready for printing. I didn't want to do this unprepared and asked her to leave the manuscript with me until the next day so that I could prepare for the lecture. I didn't read out the whole manuscript, but just a series of aphorisms. By chance, I skimmed over the ones that are now claimed not to belong to "The Eternal Return". Later, in the spring of 1898, when Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche wanted to get in touch with me again, I heard that Mrs. Förster had heard some critics of the now printed "Wiedergeburt" criticize Koegel's work, and that now, after a year and a half, she was thinking of withdrawing the twelfth volume. I said at the time that it was a strange coincidence that those aphorisms were now considered not to belong in the book, which I had skipped at the time because a partial understanding of the basic idea was possible even without reading them aloud. When I first heard of the withdrawal of the volume, I believed that, after examining Nietzsche's manuscripts, quite different errors had emerged than those claimed by Horneffer. I do not know these manuscripts. I am not indifferent to the fact that Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche makes the above false assertion regarding an examination of the manuscripts, for she not only addressed the letter mentioned to me, but, as I now know, also communicated its contents to others. I must therefore state: 1) It is not correct that Mrs. Förster expressed doubts to me about the quality of Koegel's work. 2. it is not correct that Mrs. Förster ever gave me Koegel's manuscript to examine. 3. it is not correct that I ever "stated the incoherence of the content".

As a result of the incorrect and inadmissible communication of my conversation with Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche to Dr. Koegel's sister, the tension in the Nietzsche Archive grew ever greater. The disputes took on ever broader dimensions. Other personalities were also drawn into the matter. In the course of the whole affair, however, I am convinced that doubts about Koegel's abilities played no role. Mrs. Fötster-Nietzsche's aversion to Koegel grew ever greater. She was initially unable to change Koegel's position due to the existing contracts. He initially remained editor. But Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche made publishing difficult for him in every way. She restricted him in the free use of Nietzsche's manuscripts. This ultimately led to the relationship becoming untenable. One day Dr. Koegel was no longer Nietzsche's editor. Later, friends of Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche repeatedly approached me, hinting at the latter's intention to make me editor under certain conditions. I had already foreseen such an eventuality earlier and agreed with Dr. Koegel that if one day his relationship with the Nietzsche Archive became impossible, I would follow any call from Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche. However, I never applied for the editorship, neither earlier nor later. But since the aforementioned friends of Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche had always emphasized that I was the most suitable Nietzsche editor, and that it would be a pity if the edition were to fall into less professional hands due to personal disagreements, I decided to travel to Weimar twice, after my arrival had been expressly requested each time by the aforementioned friends of Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche by telegraph after they had negotiated with her. The details of the negotiations that now took place are of no interest. I will only mention that during my last conversation with Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche, she demanded that I write a "simply true" account of the conversation of December 6, 1896 to her cousin as her confidant. A draft of a letter to the cousin in the Nietzsche archive was also attempted in the presence of a third party. I soon saw that Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche did not want the truth as I had presented it above, but something else. I went away and said: I want to think things over. But I had the feeling that nothing could be done with this woman. I have never dealt with the matter again since then; I simply wanted to ignore Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche. On Sept. 23, 1898, she wrote me the above-mentioned letter. What else is written in it is just as incorrect as the one passage I mentioned. I left this unsolicited, completely indifferent letter unanswered. Later I learned that Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche had seen to the dissemination of its incorrect content.

I would have kept silent even now if I had not been driven to indignation by Horneffer's brochure and by the protection that Lichtenberger's book received: In what hands is Nietzsche's estate.

It could be that Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche still has letters from me in which there is something that she could point out against my current assertions. Although I soon recognized Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche, I have always taken into consideration that she is Friedrich Nietzsche's sister. Perhaps out of politeness and consideration I have done too much in praising her qualities. Now I declare that this was a great stupidity on my part and that I am gladly prepared to formally retract any praise I may have bestowed on Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche.

A defense of the so-called “Second Coming of the Same” by Nietzsche

By Dr. E. Horneffer

The former editor of Nietzsche's unpublished writings, Dr. Fritz Koegel, has compiled what he believes to be a coherent, but in reality completely meaningless book from incoherent aphorisms, which he publishes as having been written by Nietzsche, or at least planned by Nietzsche. The most foolish ideas continued to be based on this publication. It was therefore imperative for the current editors in the Nietzsche Archive to provide public proof of this erroneous publication, which incidentally had also been reversed in the meantime, in order to warn against it. On the other hand, the errors made by Koegel here, as everywhere else, were so serious and so numerous that it was absolutely impossible to leave his procedure unchallenged. I, at least, was not able to watch calmly how Nietzsche's creation had been mistreated by this editor. I therefore gave a preliminary account of Koegel's working method in a small paper: "Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return and its publication to date". At the center of this exposition is the proof of the completely unsuccessful reconstruction of Nietzsche's falsely attributed writing "The Second Coming of the Same", which ends in crude distortions of Nietzsche.

I expected Koegel to reply to my brochure. But that someone else would be found to defend Koegel's nonsense - I confess I did not expect that. Otherwise, as far as I know, all those capable of judgment have turned away in horror from such editorial activity as I have uncovered there. - Dr. Rudolf Steiner, who lived here in Weimar at the time and was co-editor of the Nietzsche Archive when Dr. Koegel's philosophical supplement was envisaged, a project that later came to nothing, undertook to defend Koegel's work ("Magazin für Literatur" 1900 No. 6). I think that was not very clever of him. He compromises himself with this defense; he compromises himself by the very fact that he dares to defend such things at all, but even more by the way he does it. To judge the former, one must read his writing. Only a few hints about the latter.

First Steiner admits that he does not even know the manuscript in question by Nietzsche. But I have asked every scholar who wants to form an independent judgment on the questions raised to look at the manuscript here in Weimar. I do not know that I would have made an exception. Steiner, too, would have found ways and means of inspecting the manuscript. So he talks like a blind man about color. If he saw the manuscript, he would perhaps come to his senses and accept that this is a coherent book, as colorful and jumbled as the aphorisms are here. He would be surprised, for example, to find an aphorism that begins with the words: "There is a lot of blue music in Lohengrin", etc., immediately after the decisive sketch of the idea of the return. But the aphorisms are so incoherent throughout the booklet. So before he spoke, he should have taken a look at it. Koegel's publication is - objectively - a complete forgery.

Steiner accuses me of not having made it clear whether I believed in the book reconstructed by Koegel or not. He refers to a passage where I draw the conclusion from certain data "that Nietzsche's plan to write a prosaic work about the return of the same, as Koegel imagines it, could only have existed for a very short time, that it never existed." I confess, however, that I wrote my book for readers who can at least think a little. I assumed that one would understand that the second sentence is an amplification of the first and that the whole means: never. To state a contradiction here is ridiculous.

Steiner's main objection is this: I seek to prove in my book that the writing reconstructed by Koegel is a false hypothesis, that he falsely brings under the rubrics of a disposition originating from Nietzsche aphorisms that do not belong to it. Steiner now claims that I have only incompletely reproduced the aphorisms in question, which I took offense at; he says that I have omitted important thoughts from them. But if these are added, it follows that the aphorisms belong to the heading in question. I will discuss one case that Steiner mentions in more detail. We will see by what means Steiner proves the affiliation.

The content of aphorism 70 in Koegel (Nietzsche Werke Vol. XII) is this: We are insensitive to the essence of every food; we must first be seduced to the food by seasonings that are accessible to our taste. It is the same with morals. Moral judgments are the condiments of actions; nothing is said about the actual value of the actions. An action can taste very good to us, but be very harmful to us. Nietzsche goes on to speak of the conditions of the change of taste, i.e. of moral taste, that judgments such as "healthy" and "ill" have no meaning in morality, that it depends on the goal of the respective development, and so on. Steiner unhesitatingly brings the secondary and auxiliary thought at the beginning to the fore and says: "It is not what nourishes better, but what tastes better that man wants to enjoy. He is therefore on the wrong track with his passion (sic!); he has incorporated a false passion through various conditions. Because of this sense, the aphorism belongs in the chapter "Incorporation of the passions". In this way one can prove the blue from the sky. Taste and flavor are only mentioned here parable by parable. The whole thing is about morality and moral judgments. Steiner's introduction of the word "passion" is completely arbitrary; it is a rape of thought that I cannot go along with. Such arts of interpretation go against my scientific conscience. And even if one brings the idea of taste and tasting to the fore, the insinuation of the word "passion" is unjustified. I also consider this to be a highly forced continuation of the idea. If one takes into account the general constitution of our manuscript, where the most diverse thoughts from all areas of philosophy stand side by side, one sees that this aphorism is also a completely self-contained thought from the area of morality, which begins with an epistemological sketch: "what is truth?", as it is presented here, has not the slightest thing to do with it. Interpretations such as Steiner's are, as I said, objectively tantamount to falsification for me.

Aph. 121, ı22 could be in the right place if the thought in question, which Steiner cites, that there is no objective truth, were roughly the opposite. At this point a will to truth, which in a certain sense appears unconditionally and whose value and consequences are to be judged later, is presupposed. I would have to repeat myself laboriously if I wanted to prove this in more detail. See my writing. I regret that Steiner did not understand any of this.

Another case can be dealt with here, which shows Steiner in an even worse light. Nietzsche speaks of fundamental errors and by this he means the very first human ideas, such as the concepts of an object, subject, free will, equal things, similar things, etc. Nietzsche gives these examples himself. But these ideas, on which all human judgment and action are based, are false ideas, and thus all human knowledge, which always operates and must operate with such concepts, rests on a false foundation. Now I say that in a passage where the faultiness of the general basis of human knowledge is thus demonstrated, the correction of any individual errors of later science can never take place, e.g. the correction of the error that we unjustifiably despise the inorganic, while we are very dependent on it. "We are three quarters a column of water and have inorganic salts in us." Steiner says: "If we do not pay attention to this, we are subject to a fundamental error." I can only laugh at this. I very much believe that Koegel had something like this in mind when he made his statement; however, I am surprised that Steiner defends such nonsense and openly expresses it. When Steiner says that Nietzsche wanted to imply that if even these most primitive ideas are errors, how much more so the complicated later ones, I do not deny this in the least. The basis of all human knowledge is shown to be erroneous. But that apart from this general assertion and conclusion individual errors of later science could have been corrected here seems to me ridiculous. Nietzsche could have searched the whole field of human knowledge in order to give a collection of human errors here! What an absurd idea! But even if he had wanted to make such corrections, he would have achieved nothing in this context; for these corrections could only have been made with the help of the erroneous basic concepts that are indispensable to human thought and action. In this context it would have been completely pointless. But I am reluctant to waste another word on such nonsense.

Steiner says that in this way Koegel's order could be justified in every single case. Possibly - in this way. Nevertheless, I am curious to know by what right, for example, an aphorism stating that continuous coffee consumption is questionable is placed in a section dealing with the question of whether the unconditional will to truth is a life-promoting principle, whether science, carried out without restraint, does not undermine the vital force, by what right an aphorism which says that one should experience death as a celebration, and another which says that egoism need not always be interpreted badly, stand in a section which is supposed to describe the emergence of the will to truth, why a last one, where it is said that mankind will put Nietzsche's suggestions into practice, e.g. also in the question of the treatment of the sick. For example, also in the question of the treatment of criminals, why this aphorism is in a section that should deal with the eternal return (Koegel makes such monstrosities in abundance, Steiner calls this Koegel's "true scientific spirit"!) - I would really like to see the proof of the coherence of these thoughts. So out with the proof! The three examples that Steiner gives - because that is all he gives and they are also wrong - are not enough.

The whole structure of Steiner's refutation is flawed. If you want to refute me, you have to refute my reconstruction of the sketch or design that Koegel bases his book on. Steiner does not say a word about this. He completely avoids this question. If my reconstruction of this sketch is correct, then Koegel's book falls irrevocably. If it is wrong, then perhaps we can go on talking. But then it must be replaced by another. And Koegel's aphorisms must then be strung together with this train of thought. This does not mean writing a commentary on Nietzsche; we do not want to expect Koegel to do that. But Koegel did this book himself. He will know what he meant by it. In a continuous presentation, he briefly outlines the train of thought of his book. You can demand that. If he does not, then my assertion remains that he was not thinking about anything at all when he arranged it.

Steiner holds out the prospect that Koegel will defend himself. I have waited a long time for this; I had hoped that I would be able to answer both gentlemen together. But we must be prepared for Koegel's unbreakable silence, which is a sign of complete helplessness. He would have to respond to such outrageous attacks as I have directed at him.

Steiner makes a few more objections to which I would like to draw particular attention. They characterize the whole nature of his refutation. Koegel bases his writing "The Second Coming of the Same" on a disposition that deals with the idea of the eternal return, and I maintain that this disposition was not meant for a specific work, but is the first fleeting sketch of Nietzsche's main idea, which then, after a short time, gave the impetus for Zarathustra. As direct proof of this, I cite a statement in a letter by Nietzsche himself, where he alludes to this disposition. He writes about it two years after it was written: "This Engadin is the birthplace of my Zarathustra. I have just found the first sketch of the thoughts connected in it; underneath it is written "At the beginning of August 1881 in Sils-Maria, 6000 feet above the sea and much higher above all human things." These words are now under our disposition. The matter is thus settled, one would think. Steiner says: Nietzsche was "mistaken" here. I would like to draw attention to Steiner's evasion of this way of refuting. In the assessment of his main work, his main idea, whether a sketch of it belongs to this main work or not, Nietzsche is said to have made a mistake! Koegel was not mistaken, God forbid! Nietzsche was wrong! One must resort to such means to save a nonsensical hypothesis! But there is proof that Nietzsche could not have been mistaken about this sketch. I cite another direct testimony by Nietzsche that Steiner simply ignores. In "Ecce homo" Nietzsche writes five years later about the same sketch: "The basic composition of the work (i.e. of Zarathustra!), the eternal idea of return, this highest formula of affirmation that can be achieved at all - belongs to August of the year 1881: it is thrown down on a sheet, with the signature: 6000 feet beyond man and time." It is evident that Nietzsche is referring to the same sketch; it is also evident that he is quoting it here from his head. It follows from this that this sketch had deeply impressed itself on him, that he could never have been mistaken about it, neither earlier nor later, as an extremely important record. Moreover, Nietzsche judges it in the same way here. I do not understand how Steiner can completely conceal this quotation. If one engages in scientific polemics, one must at least read the book in question that one is attacking. But Steiner is bold; he will say: here Nietzsche is wrong for the second time. And Steiner must assume that Nietzsche was wrong a third time about his own creation. Steiner accuses me of saying that not the eternal return but the superman is the main idea of Zarathustra, and that therefore my constructions are invalid. I do not deny that the superman occupies a large part of the present Zarathustra; but nevertheless the starting point for the Zarathustra, the thought that gave the impetus to this work, is at least the idea of the Second Coming. My entire writing contains the proof. But Nietzsche also says it here quite unambiguously: "The basic composition of the work (i.e. of Zarathustra), the Eternal Reappearance Thought" and so on. Well, Steiner knows better. Here Nietzsche is "mistaken" again. I must remark here that it would be expedient to maintain a certain scientific decorum. If one continues to refute me in this way, it must simply seem unworthy of me to reply at all. In his assessment of the disposition "towards the outline of a new way of life", which I draw from Zarathustra, Steiner ignores my main reason that the word "Zarathustra" itself appears in our manuscript in the immediately following and only formally altered heading "Hints for a new life". In general, Steiner's main art of refutation lies in concealment. I am by no means only reproaching Koegel for the incorrect compilation of his book; I have also uncovered countless other errors of Koegel of the most diverse kind, which have nothing to do with this compilation. Steiner conceals all but one of these errors, which he admits. What does Steiner think, for example, about Koegel's edition of Volume II, where he concocts a text from Nietzsche's original edition, from later sketches by Nietzsche from various years and, unbelievably, from the first preliminary stages and preparatory work by Nietzsche, which predate the printed manuscript? Steiner has not a word of justification for this and cannot have it. Steiner only mentions that I criticize Koegel's reading errors, and Steiner makes fun of this. And what meaning-distorting reading errors I mention! When a layman tells me that it doesn't matter, that these are trifles, I understand, although everyone should be suspicious here. But Steiner was here in the Goethe Archive. He must know what an edition is. I don't understand how you can cross out your own scientific past with such cynicism.

The motives for Steiner's appearance are perfectly visible. Steiner already recognized the flawed nature of Koegel's compilation at the time; however, he does not want to let this fact arise now. That he had recognized the flawed nature of Koegel's work is clear from the following reasons: During a lecture of Koegel's printed manuscript, Steiner skipped over the things that did not fit in. Steiner, who admits this fact, explains that it was pure coincidence! However, Dr. Förster-Nietzsche will publish a passage from Steiner's letter in which he himself vividly laments the inadequacy of Koegel's work. No, Steiner had already recognized the untenability of Koegel's work at that time, but, threatened and intimidated by Koegel - evidence of this will also be provided - he did not have the courage to say so openly, which could have prevented this unfortunate publication. The same method of covering up his work that Koegel used against Dr. Förster-Nietzsche, he also used against Steiner, with the latter, however, with somewhat more success than with Dr. Förster-Nietzsche. Steiner now defends Koegel to ensure that this version does not emerge, so that people believe that he never, neither before nor now, doubted the correctness of Koegel's position. I doubt whether this improves his position. Or perhaps Steiner really does consider Koegel's compilation to be correct - well, then he is just as incompetent as Koegel, and I must ask him to transfer everything I have said about Koegel as a scientific authority to himself. In any case, he has identified himself with Koegel's publication, and thus at least participates in his scientific bankruptcy. I wish him luck with that!

Before I enter into the factual content of Dr. Horneffer's remarks, I must characterize the "love of truth" that currently prevails in the Nietzsche Archive. Dr. Horneffer says in his essay above: "Steiner holds out the prospect that Koegel will still defend himself." Any unbiased reader who does not reread my essay published on February ıo. February, this sentence must give the impression that I made my attack on the Nietzsche Archive and its current management in agreement with Dr. Koegel. However, this is completely incorrect. I literally wrote in my essay: "I do not have to defend Dr. Koegel. He can do that himself." In truth, Dr. Koegel knew not the slightest thing about my attack before it was printed. I have given the reasons for this attack myself at the end of my essay. There are none other than the purely factual ones given there. When I received Dr. Horneffer's manuscript, I thought the assertion that I held out the prospect of defending Dr. Koegel was based on a cursory reading of my attack. Since I wanted to avoid any unnecessary discussion in public, I wrote to Dr. Horneffer that his assertion was based on a complete error, that I could not have held out any prospect of Dr. Koegel when I wrote my essay. He would now have had the opportunity to delete the incorrect sentence in the proof sent to him later. He did not ask for it. Dr. Horneffer thus claims that I acted in agreement with Dr. Koegel, despite the fact that this assertion was described to him as untrue.

Secondly, Dr. Horneffer writes: "The motives for Steiner's appearance are completely visible. Steiner has already recognized the flawed nature of Koegel's compilation; however, he does not want to let this fact arise."

"That he had recognized the flawed nature of Koegel's work is clear from the following reasons: When reading Koegel's printed manuscript aloud, Steiner skipped over the things that did not fit in. Steiner, who admits this fact, explains that this was pure coincidence! However, Dr. Förster-Nietzsche will publish a passage from Steiner's letter in which he himself vividly laments the inadequacy of Koegel's work. No, Steiner had already recognized the untenability of Koegel's work at that time, but, threatened and intimidated by Koegel - evidence of this will also be provided - he did not have the courage to say so openly, which could have prevented this unfortunate publication." These accusations by Dr. Hornefler against me are of course based on allegations made by Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche. And I therefore feel compelled to return to the latter's letter to me dated September 23, 1898, which I already mentioned in my essay of February 10 of this year. In this letter you will find, among other assertions, the following, which now recur in Dr. Horneffer's essay: "I gave you the manuscript on the Second Coming in October 1896 for examination because I was so concerned about it. You yourself have repeatedly noted the incoherence of the content and justified and increased my concern. Nevertheless, you did not say a word to Dr. Koegel about your doubts about the composition of the manuscript, but on the contrary praised him for it. If you had had the courage to express your doubts to Dr. Koegel, a revision of the entire manuscript would have been unavoidable. But since you did not have this courage, I had to let things take their course. I lacked the scientific language to prove the errors." It must be said very clearly for once: ı. It is not true that Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche gave me the manuscript on the Second Coming for examination in October or at any other time. 2. it is equally untrue that I have stated the incoherence of the content on various occasions. Both assertions are an invention of Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche. Furthermore, it is untrue that I have been intimidated in any way by Dr. Koegel. Dr. Koegel did nothing more to me than write a letter after he had received the information mentioned in my attack through his sister, which he could not understand as anything other than proof of an intrigue on my part. On the contrary, it must be emphasized that I have never been in a position to undertake any "examination" of Koegel's work. If Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche intended such an examination - which, after all that has happened, I cannot assume - then it can only have been she who did not have the courage to have one carried out. I had to shed some light on the fairy tale of "intimidation", which was invented to cast a dubious light on my correct attitude in what was a very delicate situation at the time. How Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche intends to prove that I was threatened and intimidated by Koegel: let us wait and see, and then talk further; likewise the publication of the letters in which I vividly describe the inadequacy of Koegel's work. Koegel's work. I can wait and see; for I can only wish for full clarity on this matter, in which I am not aware of any wrongdoing.

I come to a third assertion, which Dr. Horneffer faithfully parrots from Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche: "Dr. Rudolf teiner, who lived in Weimar at the time and was envisaged as co-editor of the Nietzsche Archive, as a philosophical complement to Dr. Koegel, a project that later came to nothing...". If "in prospect" is somehow supposed to imply that I would have agreed to such a proposal, then I must reject such an implication in the strongest possible terms. This "prospect" existed only in Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche's imagination. When she spoke to me of such a thing, I never said anything other than what can be summarized in the words: "Even if I wanted to - because I never wanted to - it would be impossible to stage such a co-editorship", because according to the existing contracts between Nietzsche's heirs and the Naumann company (the publishers of Nietzsche's works), this was impossible at the time. I could never be considered as Dr. Koegel's co-editor. And at that time it was merely courtesy against Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche that I listened to her fantasies, which went off into the blue. She then used the fact that I had listened to her to involve me in a completely improper manner in the matter, with which I officially had nothing to do whatsoever.

And because I had nothing to do, because I had no mandate from anyone to examine Koegel's work, no such examination ever took place. There could never have been any official collaboration with Dr. Koegel for the very reason that I explained in my attack (dated 10 February) with the words: "I do not agree with him on some points, and we have had many a controversy." I also expressed myself quite clearly in the sentence: "Someone else might have made the arrangement somewhat differently than Dr. Koegel." Well, it is probably not difficult to guess that by such an other I also mean myself. I cannot know what would have become of the "Wiederkunft des Gleichen" if I had been the editor; probably not quite the same as what it has become through Dr. Koegel.

I just don't understand one thing. I could now boast so wonderfully that, without seeing Nietzsche's manuscripts, I recognized the flawed nature of Koegel's work. I need not have feared the objection that I should have prevented the publication. For I had no possibility of such an objection in my relationship with the Nietzsche Archive, which was as unofficial as possible. Dr. Koegel and the Naumann company could have forced the publication of Koegel's work at any moment. I could therefore rest happily on the laurel that would be woven for me by the untruth that I had recognized the badness of Koegel's editorship if I wanted. Now I prefer the truth and leave the representation of untruth to others.

When I heard in the spring of 1898 that the volume with the "Return of the Same" had to be withdrawn from the book trade because of the inadequacy of Koegel's work, I thought: this assertion was well-founded. I remembered that during the lecture for Dr. Servaes I had skimmed over some of Koegel's manuscript. I openly confess that I now had the feeling that my skimming had sprung from a correct view of the matter at the time. I believed this until Dr. Horneffer's paper appeared. It was only this paper that taught me that Dr. Koegel's errors were not as substantial as had been proclaimed by the Nietzsche Archive. And this brings me to Dr. Horneffer's above reply. First, he accuses me of not having looked at Nietzsche's manuscripts before I made the attack, but I did not need to see the manuscripts for what I had to say. In order to prove to Dr. Hornefler that he misinterprets Nietzsche's aphorisms, an inspection of the manuscripts was of no use to me. For I do have the wording of these aphorisms. I will now turn to aphorism 70 (in Koegel's edition), which Dr. Hornefler mentions in his reply. It reads: "The essence of every action is as unpalatable to man as the essence of every food: he would rather starve than eat it, so strong is his disgust for the most part. He needs seasoning, we must be seduced to all food: and so also to all actions. The taste and its relation to hunger, and its relation to the needs of the organism! Moral judgments are the condiments. Here as there, however, taste is regarded as something that determines the value of nourishment, value of action: the greatest error! How does taste change? When does it become indolent and unfree? When is it tyrannical? - And likewise with the judgments of good and evil: a physiological fact is the cause of every change in moral taste; but this physiological change is not something that necessarily demands what is useful to the organism at all times. Rather, the history of taste is a history in itself, and degenerations of the whole are just as much the consequences of this taste as progress. Healthy taste, diseased taste, - these are false distinctions, - there are innumerable possibilities of development: whatever leads to one is healthy: but it may be contrary to another development. Only with regard to an ideal that is to be attained is there a sense of "healthy and "ill". The ideal, however, is always highly changeable, even in the individual (that of the child and the man!) - and the knowledge of what is necessary to achieve it is almost entirely lacking." What are we talking about here? It is said that our taste does not choose that which is useful to the organism for physical reasons, but that which is made pleasant to it by seasoning. Moral judgments relate to the actual natural impulse of human action in the same way that condiments relate to the natural needs of the organism. We need seasoning so that we choose this and not that food. We need a moral judgment in order to perform this or that action. But it is the greatest error if we believe that this moral judgment determines the advantageousness of the action. It is also the greatest error to believe that the good taste caused by seasoning determines the nutritional value of

food is decisive. The history of morality, like the history of taste, is a story in itself. Just as we indulge in basic errors in order to master reality, we indulge in moral errors in order to do this or that. If some impulse leads me to accomplish something, and I believe that I am doing it because I am obeying a certain moral precept, I have committed an error in the sphere of action, of affects, just as I have committed an error when I look at two things, which can never be quite the same, from the point of view of equality. Just take a look at aphorism 21 of the "Joyful Science": "For the education and incorporation of virtuous habits, a series of effects of virtue are brought out which make virtue and private advantage appear to be conjoined, - and there is indeed such a conjoining! Blind industriousness, for example, this typical virtue of a tool, is presented as the path to wealth and honor and as the most salutary poison against boredom and passions: but its danger, its supreme peril, is concealed. Education proceeds in this way throughout: it seeks to determine the individual through a series of stimuli and advantages to a way of thinking and acting which, when it has become habit, instinct and passion, prevails in him and over him against his ultimate advantage, but "for the general good"." Take aphorism 13 of the same "happy science": "It depends on how one is accustomed to seasoning one's life ... one always seeks this or that seasoning according to one's temperament." It must be clear to anyone who really delves into the matter that these are related trains of thought. In the "happy science" written in January 1882, many a thought is taken from the manuscript of August 1881. All these thoughts represent how the incorporation of habits, instincts, passions happens with the help of moral errors. Dr. Hornefer puts the matter simply: this aphorism 70 says: "that morality can only be understood physiologically. All moral judgments are judgments of taste. There is no such thing as healthy and sick taste, it depends on the goal" and he adds to this banal interpretation: "I am at a loss to understand how this can be brought under incorporation of the passions." (Cf. E. Horneffer, "Nietzsche, Lehre von der Ewigen Wiederkunft" p. 38.) In the above reply, however, he accuses me of "raping" Nietzsche's thought, which he cannot go along with. But I say to him that anyone who sees nothing different from Horneffer in Aph. 70 is quite incapable of interpreting Nietzsche. It is simply dullness to see nothing here but "On the whole it is a matter of morals and moral judgments." No, it is about the extent to which morality inculcates fundamentally erroneous passions, instincts and habits.

I am actually reluctant to get involved in anything further with such an incompetent opponent, especially as he, like all people who are incompetent, suffers from an excessive scholarly conceit. But he should not be able to say again: I am concealing some of his inanities. He distorts and twists what I have said in the most incredible way. I have maintained that the disposition entitled "The Return of the Same" cannot be a disposition on Zarathustra, "for it does not contain the main idea for the sake of which Zarathustra is written: the idea of the superman." And I say that if Nietzsche, in a letter to Peter Gast on September 3, 1883, brings this disposition into a closer relationship to Zarathustra than it can be brought in terms of its content, he is mistaken. Whoever does not admit that Nietzsche is often inaccurate when he makes statements about his works after some time is not to be argued with, for such a one denies indisputable facts. In "Ecce homo" Nietzsche makes statements about earlier works that do not at all correspond to the intentions he had when he wrote them. I have said quite precisely how I think that the plan to write a work on the "Second Coming" developed into the other Zarathustra. At the beginning of August, Nietzsche was planning a work on the "Second Coming of the. Same". The disposition, which bears the title "The Second Coming of the Same", corresponds to this writing. The aphorisms that Nietzsche wrote down are preparatory work for it. What of these aphorisms would actually have been used, whether any of the notes would have been used at all, we can know nothing about that. Of course, if Nietzsche had completed the writing on the "Second Coming", it would have had a different form than an editor can give it from the first preliminary works, but Nietzsche departed from this writing. Very gradually, the idea of the "superman" came to the fore. Zarathustra came into being. You see: this assumption of mine does not even contradict what Nietzsche says: "The basic composition of the work (i.e. of Zarathustra), the eternal idea of return, this highest formula of affirmation that can be achieved at all - belongs to August 1881". This basic composition has become a completely different work from what it was originally intended for. I would like to ask Dr. Horneffer whether it is "preserving scientific decency" to make what you want out of your opponent's assertions. To find an opponent's serious objections "ridiculous" is arrogant - but is it also "decent"? Dr. Horneffer, for example, says that he finds it "ridiculous" to state a contradiction in his assertion: "that Nietzsche's plan to write a prosaic treatise on the return of the same can only have existed for a very short time, that it did exist." Well, I will tell him that I presented this monstrosity of an assertion to very thoughtful readers. They did not quite agree with me, but they all agreed that a master of style did not write this sentence.

Unfortunately, I do not have the space today to respond to Dr. Hornefler's claim: "If you want to refute me, you have to refute my reconstruction of the sketch or draft on which Koegel based his book." This "reconstruction" will be illuminated in the next issue. Then there will also be an opportunity to uncover the underlying true reasons for the whole campaign of return. Because there are such things.

A continuation of my reply to E. Horneffer's essay "A defense of the so-called ‘Wiederkunff des Gleichen’ von Nietzsche”

Ernst Horneffer makes the following claim with regard to my refutation of his pamphlet "Nietzsche's Doctrine of the Eternal Return and its Publication to Date" printed in No. 6 of this journal: "The entire structure of Steiner's refutation is flawed. If you want to refute me, you have to refute my reconstruction of the sketch or draft that Koegel bases his book on". I do not believe that I have such an obligation to uphold the objections I have raised against Hornefler. For these objections do not refer to Hornefler's reconstruction, but to his false interpretation of individual Nietzschean aphorisms. And anyone who misunderstands Nietzsche as Horneffer does does not really need to worry about his reconstruction of the "return of the same". If I have now linked individual thoughts to this reconstruction, it is because the creation of fairy tales is one of the means of the "Nietzsche Archive", and it does not seem appropriate to me to add to the many other fairy tales the one about my capitulation to Horneffer's reconstruction.

Whoever wants to understand Nietzsche's thought of the eternal return of all things and its connection with the "Draft" "The Return of the Same" printed in the ı2nd volume of the Complete Edition, p. 5, must know the source of this thought. For there is no doubt that the essay that was planned with this draft is to be understood as follows: that the idea of the return of the same formed the occasion for it, and that everything else was added to this idea in order to support it.

How did Nietzsche arrive at the idea of the eternal return of all things? I have repeatedly pointed out the source of this idea in conversations with Mrs. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and with Dr. Koegel in 1896. I still hold the conviction I expressed then today: that Nietzsche conceived the idea on the occasion of reading Eugen Dühring's "Kursus der Philosophie als streng wissenschaftlicher Weltanschauung und Lebensgestaltung" (Leipzig 1875), and under the influence of this book. On p. 84 of this work this idea is expressed quite clearly; only there it is fought against just as vigorously as Nietzsche defends it. The book is in Nietzsche's library. As numerous pencil marks in the margins show, Nietzsche read it avidly. Incidentally, even without this we know that Nietzsche was an avid reader of Dühring. Dühring says: "The deeper logical ground of all conscious life therefore demands, in the strictest sense of the word, an infinity of entities. Is this infinity, by virtue of which ever new forms are driven forth, possible in itself? The mere number of material parts and elements of force would in itself exclude the infinite accumulation of combinations if the continuous medium of space and time did not guarantee an infinity of variations. From that which is countable, only an exhaustible number of combinations can follow. But from that which by its nature cannot be conceived as something countable without contradiction, the unlimited multiplicity of positions and relations must also be able to emerge. This unlimitedness, which we claim for the fate of the formations of the universe, is now compatible with every change and even with the occurrence of an interval of approximate persistence or complete self-sameness, but not with the cessation of all change. Those who wish to cultivate the idea of a being that corresponds to the original state should remember that temporal development has only one real direction, and that causality is also in accordance with this direction. It is easier to blur the differences than to retain them, and it therefore costs little effort to imagine the end by analogy with the beginning, ignoring the gap. Let us, however, beware of such superficial hastiness; for the existence of the universe, once given, is not an indifferent episode between two states of the night, but the only firm and clear ground from which we make our inferences and anticipations." As a mathematically trained mind, Dühring must fight the idea of an eternal repetition of the same world states. For only if the number of combinations were limited would the first one have to recur after all possibilities have been exhausted. Now, in the continuous space, not a limited but an infinite number of combinations is possible. New states can therefore enter into the infinite. Dühring also finds that a perpetual repetition of states has no appeal for life: "Now it goes without saying that the principles of the stimulus of life are not compatible with eternal repetition of the same forms." If we now accept the mathematically-logically impossible thought, if we make the assumption that a countable number of combinations are possible with the material parts and force elements, then we have Nietzsche's idea of the "eternal return of the same". We have nothing other than the defense of a counter-idea taken from Dühring's view in Aphorism 203 (Volume XII in Koegel's edition and Aph. 22 in Horneffer's writing: "Nietzsche's Doctrine of the Eternal Second Coming"): "The measure of the All-Power is determined, nothing "infinite: let us beware of such excesses of the concept! Consequently, the number of positions, changes, combinations and developments of this force is indeed immense and practically "immmeasurable", but in any case also determined and not infinite, that is: the force is eternally the same and eternally active: - up to this moment an infinity has already expired, that is, all possible developments must have already existed. Consequently, the momentary development must be a repetition and so that which gave birth to it and that which arises from it and so on forwards and backwards! Everything has been there countless times, insofar as the overall situation of all forces always returns ..." And Nietzsche's feeling towards this thought is exactly the opposite of that which Dühring has with him. For Nietzsche, this thought is the highest formula for the affirmation of life. Aphotism 43 (in Horneffer, 234 in Koegel's edition) reads: "the future history: more and more this thought will triumph, - and those who do not believe in it must by their nature finally die out! - Only those who consider their existence capable of eternal repetition remain: among such, however, a state is possible that no utopian has reached!" It is possible to prove that many of Nietzsche's thoughts arose in the same way as the idea of eternal return. Nietzsche formed the counter-idea to some existing idea. Ultimately, the same tendency led him to his main work: "Revaluation of all values."

In Dühring, one can see a thinker who consistently, if one-sidedly, represents the knowledge brought forth by Western intellectual development. Nietzsche could only be inspired by him in such a way that he contrasted his statements and values with the opposite ones. Anyone who compares Dühring's "Kursus der Philosophie" with Nietzsche's aphorisms on the "Wiederkunft" can also prove this in detail.

Dühring believes in the absolute validity of certain fundamental truths. "Just as one cannot ask of a mathematical truth how long it is or will be true, one cannot make the absolute necessities of the real dependent on a duration, but must, conversely, make the duration and its respective magnitude dependent on these themselves." From such irrefutable fundamental truths, Dühring deduces the impossibility of an eternal return of the same states. Nietzsche accepts this eternal return. He must therefore also deny the absolute validity of Dühring's fundamental truths. Why does Dühting profess these basic truths? Because they are simply true for him. For Nietzsche they cannot be true. Their truth cannot therefore be the reason why they are recognized by man. Man must need them, even though they are untrue. And he needs them in order to find his way in reality with them, to master it. What is recognized as true is not true, but it gives us power over reality. He who accepts the truth of knowledge needs no other reason to justify it; its truth in itself is reason enough. Whoever denies the truth must ask: why does man take these errors into himself, why does he assimilate them? Nietzsche wants to give the answer to these questions in the first four chapters of the work on the "Eternal Return".

I will now show how this work is to be understood from such points of view. I will also show why Nietzsche abandoned the plan to write it. In doing so, a hypothesis will emerge as to the reasons why the Nietzsche Archive views this publication with such a skeptical eye, why they speak of a "so-called" "return of the same". Hornefler's reconstruction will show what it is worth.

In the last article (No. 16 column 401 ff. of this journal) I believe I proved that Nietzsche's doctrine of the "eternal return of all things" is the counter-idea to Dühring's position on this idea in his "Kursus der Philosophie". I would also like to point out that Nietzsche himself spoke out about such a formation of counter-ideas. On page 65 of the 11th volume of the complete edition of Nietzsche's works we read the following "aphorism": "What is the reaction of opinions? When an opinion ceases to be interesting, one tries to give it a charm by holding it to its counter-opinion. Usually, however, the opposing opinion seduces and now makes new supporters: it has become more interesting in the meantime." I would like to mention a few more things that prove that Nietzsche understood this idea of the "eternal return" in no other way than natural science. Mrs. Lou Andreas-Salomé first made a statement in the journal "Freie Bühne", May 1892, and then in her book "Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken" (Friedrich Nietzsche in his Works), which is interesting for clarifying the facts, even though the entire book by this woman, who was in contact with Nietzsche for several months in 1882, gives a completely skewed view of his teaching. Mrs. Lou Salomé claims: "Even a superficial study soon showed Nietzsche that the scientific foundation of the idea of reincarnation on the basis of the atomistic theory was not feasible; he thus found his fear that the disastrous idea would be irrefutably proven to be correct not confirmed and thus seemed to be freed from the task of his proclamation, from this fate awaited with horror. But now something peculiar occurred: far from feeling redeemed by the insight he had gained, Nietzsche behaved in exactly the opposite way; from the moment the dreaded doom seemed to recede from him, he resolutely took it upon himself and carried his doctrine among the people; the moment his fearful assumption became unprovable and untenable, it hardened for him, as if by a magic spell, into an irrefutable conviction. What should become scientifically proven truth takes on the character of a mystical revelation, and henceforth Nietzsche gives his philosophy in general as the final foundation, instead of the scientific basis, the inner inspiration - his own personal inspiration." Nietzsche's friend of many years, Peter Gast, opposes this view of Lou Andreas-Salomé, that in Nietzsche's mind an initially scientific idea has been transformed into a mystical inspiration, in his truly excellent, profound introduction, which he wrote a few years ago to "Menschliches, Allzumenschliches". He condemns any overplaying of Nietzsche's views into the mystical and says that the doctrine of the Second Coming is a "purely mechanistic doctrine of the exhaustibility, i.e. repetition, of cosmic molecular combinations". Mrs. Lou Salomé thus admits for the first times in which Nietzsche represented the idea of the Second Coming that it was conceived "on the basis of the atomistic theory"; Peter Gast accepts the mechanical conception with the exclusion of all mysticism, through which Mrs. Lou Salomé then confuses the matter. The mechanical conception, however, is the counter-idea to Dühring's, and we must therefore assume that Nietzsche conceived the "Eternal Return" in this mechanical version in 1881. As soon as I received his copies of the manuscript of the Second Coming through Dr. Koegel in the summer of 1896, I was a staunch advocate of Peter Gast's view. I had to fight against some people who at that time professed a mystical view. But this mechanical idea of Nietzsche's does not fit in with the rest of our mechanical science. Anyone who thinks in terms of rational mechanics must, like Dühring, fight against the "eternal return". If Nietzsche wanted to defend it, he could not do so for this one mechanical conception alone, but he had to set up the counter-opinion for the whole mechanical view of nature. He had to show that this whole mechanical conception was not as irrefutable as it was held by people like Dühring. From there he arrived at the question of the value of truth. Why are generally recognized truths believed as such? That became his question. Dühring and others would have answered simply: because they are true, because they correspond to reality. Nietzsche said to himself that this is not the case at all. Where do any of our concepts correspond to reality? Nowhere. "Our assumption that there are bodies, surfaces, lines, forms, is only the consequence of our assumption that there are substances and things, persistent things. As certain as our concepts are fictions, so are the shapes of mathematics. There is no such thing; we can no more realize a surface, a circle, a line, than a concept." (Aph. 18 p.17 of the ı2nd volume of Koegel's edition.) But these concepts, these fictions are the things with which the sciences operate. So there can be no question of the absoluteness of scientific truths. Why do we accept them after all? Because we need them in order to orient ourselves in reality. There is no circle anywhere, no surface anywhere; but we use such fiction to orient ourselves within reality. It is not the truth, but the usefulness for life that is the reason for our belief in so-called truths. In order to become aware of this usefulness, however, we must experience the applicability of our conceptual fictions in our own bodies. We have to implore these fictions and try to live with them. Until now, mankind has only believed their so-called truths because it has incorporated them and found that it is possible to live with them. If one now wants to penetrate deeper into the structure of the world's being, one cannot stop at simply going along with this incorporation as it has happened so far. It could very well be that one could also live with completely different opinions. A proof against the "eternal return" only has the meaning that it shows that one cannot unite this idea with the fictions of which one has so far found that one can live with their incorporation. But if one wants to find out whether the "eternal return" has a possibility of life, then one must try to live with the counter-opinions of the previous ideas. One must return to the state of innocence, in which no opinions have yet been incorporated; one must make oneself an "experiment" in order to see how one can live with other ideas than the previous ones. Only in this way can we really test life to see whether it is worth living in its deepest depths. When we have cast off the heaviness that we feel in ourselves through the belief in absolute truths, when we "face up like children to what used to be the seriousness of life", then we can try out how we can live with opinion and counter-opinion. (Aph. 148 in volume ı2 5.89 in Koegel's edition.) The people of the past were burdened with the confidence that it was only possible to live with the incorporated fictions. One throws off this confidence; one casts off all belief in certain opinions; one experiments with all drives and passions and waits to see how far they can be incorporated, i.e. how far one can live with them. One must lighten one's life from all the incorporated heresies. At first, however, this will result in a degradation, attenuation of life. For we are equipped to live with the armor we have accumulated so far. If we discard it, we initially weaken ourselves. But it is precisely this that enables us to try the "new heavyweight" with the "eternal return" in contrast to the old heavyweight. Once again, as "individuals", we want to take up the struggle for life on a broader basis than with the fictions we have absorbed so far. "A play of children, on which the eye of the wise looks, have power over this and that state" (Aph. 148 in Koegel's edition). What must come out of such a trying life if life is to seem worth living to us, if we do not prefer to choose annihilation? "An absolute surplus must be demonstrated, otherwise the annihilation of ourselves with regard to humanity is to be chosen as the means of the annihilation of humanity". (In the same aphorism.) We have thus gained a standard for the incorporation of a new doctrine. So far we have only ever lived with the opposite doctrine; now we want to see whether the "doctrine of the Second Coming" gives a surplus of pleasure. "This establishes the connection between point 4 of the draft" of the "Eternal Return" and point 5. The first is called: "The innocent. The individual as experiment. The easing of life, humiliation, attenuation, transition." The last is: "The new emphasis: the eternal return of the same, etc." - These last two chapters would therefore have had to describe the task Nietzsche had in mind if he wanted to create a "new center of gravity". In contrast, the first three chapters should show how humanity has developed so far. It has fought its way through life with the help of errors (incorporation of basic errors). The erroneous beliefs were believed because they proved to be useful. But not only the beliefs by which we orient ourselves in reality are incorporated errors: instincts and passions, pleasure and displeasure are also such errors. What I experience as pain is not really pain. It is only a completely indifferent stimulus, initially without pleasure or displeasure. Only when I interpret it with the help of my brain does it become pain or pleasure. "Without intellect there is no pain, but the lowest form of intellect comes to light, that of "matter, of "atoms. - There is a way of being surprised by an injury (like the one who got a shotgun pellet through the cheek while sitting on the cherry tree) that one does not feel the pain at all. The pain is a brain product." (Aph. 47 in Koegel's edition). By evaluating life according to the impressions of pleasure and pain, we are therefore not moving in a realm of reality at all, but in a sphere of our interpretation. What matters in life is not how a stimulus affects us, but how we believe that it affects us. This belief is as much an inherited one as the belief in fundamental errors. Just as these are inherited, so are the assessments, the interpretations of the stimuli. "Without imagination and memory there would be no pleasure and no pain. The affects aroused in the process immediately have at their disposal past similar cases and the bad possibilities, they interpret, they interpret. Therefore, a pain is generally quite out of proportion to its significance for life - it is inexpedient. But where an injury is not perceived by the eye or touch, it is much less painful; there the imagination is untrained." (Aph. 50 in Koegel's edition). I will now give an example to show how profound Dühring's influence was on Nietzsche's thoughts in 1881. Dühring says in his "Kursus der Philosophie": if "sensations and feelings were simple, they would have to be decided by direct axiomatic judgment in a similar way as a mathematical principle"... "The kind of applause or attunement that a completely simple excitement would bring with it would also be a fact that could not be misunderstood and would have to be just as valid in its field as a geometric or physical necessity." (Kursus der Philosophie, page 165.) As you can see, Dühring claims that a stimulus can only have one consequence, i.e. that it is pleasurable or painful in itself. Here, too, Nietzsche contrasts Dühring's opinion with the counter-opinion: "Why does a cut finger hurt? In itself it does not hurt (whether it already experiences "stimuli"), he whose brain is chloroformed has no "pain" in his finger". (Aph. 48 in Koegel's edition.) The moral drives and passions are also based on an interpretation of reality, not on a true state of affairs, but on one that is believed to be true. "If we translate the qualities of the lowest animate being into our "reason", they become "moral" drives." (Aph. 64 in Koegel's edition.) "In the desire to please is refined lust for possession, refined lust for sex, refined exuberance of the secure, etc." (Aph. 95 in Koegel.) In our actions we do not have reality in mind: the lust for possession, the refined lust for sex, but the passion of benevolence incorporated into us, which is, however, only an interpretation of reality. We see how people arrive at "truths" and "passions". They interpret reality and assimilate the interpretations. The moment people realize that they do not possess reality, but rather their interpretations of reality, they begin to doubt these interpretations. Whereas up to now people have assimilated as true that which was conducive to life, regardless of whether it was true or false, they now question the truth as such. The life-promoting has been called "true". This gave "the true" a certain prestige, a value. People began to strive for "the true". But there was nothing else to do but to make a selection among the basic errors. For there was nothing else but these. A particularly select genre of fundamental errors was called "truths". There was even nothing but errors to establish what truth is. Where can such a striving come from? Only from the belief that truth enhances life (passion of knowledge).

This may well have been the ideas that went through Nietzsche's mind when he wrote the "Draft" of the "Return of the Same" in Sils-Maria in 1881. At least this was my impression of the situation when Dr. Koegel gave me his compilation of the individual aphorisms in the summer of 1896. Anyone who now reads the volume ı2 (which Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche had withdrawn from the book trade) will gain the impression that the aphorisms arranged under the individual chapters more or less elaborate and clarify the main train of thought in individual points. There is no doubt that Nietzsche wrote these individual aphorisms in an unconstrained order. It will therefore never be possible to find an absolutely correct principle for their arrangement. Even the question of whether one or the other aphorism could be left out or not will be answered one way by one editor and differently by another. Dr. Horneffer claims that only the 44 aphorisms listed by him in his brochure "Nietzsche's Doctrine of the Eternal Second Coming" are entitled to be included in the draft. I ask myself in vain why he omits the aphorism in this way (from Koegel's edition), the content of which is in line with the aphorisms that Koegel prints as 49 and 51 and which Horneffer himself recognizes as legitimate. I do not understand why aphorism ı19 should not fall under the draft, since it clearly speaks of incorporated errors. "The great things in nature, all sensations of the high, noble, graceful, beautiful, kind, austere, powerful, enchanting, which we have in nature and in man and history, are not immediate feelings, but the after-effects of countless errors that have been incorporated into us.... " Compare this aphorism with the 51st, which Dr. Horneffer again gives a place in the " Wiederkunft": "...Likewise, the measure of pleasure is not in proportion to our present knowledge, -- but it is to the "knowledge" of the most primitive and longest pre-period of humanity and animality. We are under the law of the past, that is, its assumptions and estimations." But why argue about the individual, since it is in the nature of these aphorisms that one person can arrange them one way and another another. What matters much more is this: I believe I have shown through my explanations that Nietzsche's idea of the "Eternal Return" is correctly what Peter Gast describes it as: "The purely mechanically understandable doctrine of the exhaustibility, i.e. repetition, of cosmic molecular combinations", and that Nietzsche, in order to keep this idea in contrast to Dühring, wanted to provide a kind of new theory of knowledge in the first four chapters. This should show that the way in which the previous "truths" have come about is no obstacle to opposing them with counter-opinions. If Dr. Koegel were really quite wrong and only the 44 aphorisms cited by Horneffer belonged to the "Eternal Return", then this idea would still remain, because nothing else follows from these 44 aphorisms either. So we are dealing with a doctrine to be understood mechanically and not with a "religious idea", as Dr. Horneffer believes. And it was precisely Mrs. Lou Andreas' mistake that she allowed the transparent clarity of this idea to be drowned in a mystical fog. Rather, this Nietzschean idea is conceived in such a way that we will only incorporate it if we find, in the "experiment" we conduct with it, that we can orient ourselves with it within the whole of nature in the same way as with the previous theory of nature. And when Horneffer asks: "How could he have had the idea of invoking physics and the natural sciences in general to support it?", the answer is: "He would have had to do so if he had wanted to implement the idea in the same way in which he had conceived it. Not, however, to prove the idea, but to show that it can be incorporated. The whole of natural science would have had to take on a different face under the influence of this idea. For feeling would never have tolerated that natural science should continue to operate in the old way and that religious feeling should resign itself to an idea that contradicted the knowledge of nature. Rather, a new competition of opinions should have been fought through. The "new emphasis" can only assert itself if it proves to be more life-promoting than the old scientific truths. Dr. E. Horneffer says on p. 26 of his book: "Nietzsche's Doctrine of the Eternal Second Coming": "I would like to mention that I do not believe that Nietzsche wanted to give his doctrine of the eternal second coming a broader, scientific basis. I doubt that he ever intended to prove it in more detail through empirical knowledge. ... For why the detailed proof that we need ideas that go beyond demonstrable experience, that we need errors if they have a favorable effect on life? Why the further proof that the eternal return is an idea which, whether true or false, must have a very favorable effect on life? Does this way of recommending philosophical ideas not presuppose the assumption that they cannot be proven empirically at all?" No, certainly, it does not presuppose this proof. But it does demand to decide by incorporation whether the new opinion has a more favorable effect on life than the old scientific opinions. Nietzsche could not and was not allowed to prove his "new emphasis" with the old scientific methods, but with this new emphasis he had to defeat the old methods themselves; he had to prove the greater strength of the new idea through experiment. And because he saw himself incapable of such proof, he initially dropped the new idea; that is why an idea increasingly came to the fore in his mind that was not directed against the old scientific truths, but which lay in their direction, the idea of the superman. For the superman is an idea that is entirely compatible with all other modern scientific ideas. Read "Zarathustra": "Man is a rope knotted between animal and superman. ... I love him who works and invents, that he may build the house of the superman and prepare for him earth, animal, plant: for thus he wills his downfall." These words are spoken entirely in harmony with the great modern developmental idea of natural science. "All beings up to now have created something beyond themselves: and you want to be the ebb tide of this great flood and would rather go back to the animal than overcome man? You have made the journey from worm to man, and much in you is still worm. Once you were apes, and even now man is more ape than any ape." These words of Zarathustra were spoken by a man who was made a poet prophet not by the "Eternal Return", but by the great developmental idea of modern natural science. The fact that the plan for a work on the "Eternal Return" developed into that for "Zarathustra" has no other reason than that Nietzsche at that moment did not consider the "Eternal Return" but the idea of the superman to be more life-promoting. If the idea of the "Eternal Return" then reappears later, if we find it sporadically in the "Joyful Science", in "Zarathustra" itself, if he even presents it as the crowning glory, as the last positive thought, of his otherwise completely negative work "Revaluation of all Values", there can be no other reason for this than that the preparatory illness blunted his sense of how little life-enhancing this thought is, how little it can assert itself in the battle of opinions, and that Nietzsche had a certain weakness for the thought once it had emerged in him. I am not afraid of the scurrilous accusation that I am not a true Nietzsche admirer because I express my above conviction. I know how difficult it has become for me, this conviction that the preliminary stages of the illness play into the last phase of Nietzsche's philosophizing yet.

So it was a failed work, a work whose basic conception was untenable because it did not promote life. And Nietzsche felt that he could do nothing with this basic concept. That is why he did not complete the work. The editor of Nietzsche's estate could not produce anything other than an unsustainable work. Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche says in her introduction to Lichtenberger's book on "The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche": "The then editor Dr. Fritz Koegel, without taking note of the later still undeciphered manuscripts, brought the contents of a written notebook by my brother from the summer of 1881 under a disposition that did not belong to it. ... The manuscript compiled by Dr. Koegel instilled suspicion in me from the outset and I had requested the assistance of an expert editor to examine it before it was published. ... I myself was first prevented by my mother's fatal illness and then by my own illness from examining the matter more closely; but after various critics, for example in the "Zukunft" and in the "Frankfurter Zeitung", had expressed their astonishment and displeasure at this strange and meagre publication, which must have disappointed every sincere Nietzsche admirer, I felt compelled in the fall of 1898 to have the publishing company withdraw the XIIth volume from the book trade. Volume from the book trade." Now the "paucity" of the publication was not due to the publisher, but to the fact that the work itself was a misguided one. And no sincere Nietzsche admirer could be in any way impaired in his Nietzsche worship by the fact that he saw how Nietzsche carried on for a few weeks with the plan for an unrealizable work. And Horneffer's attack on Koegel cannot change the fact that this is the case in the slightest. The 44 aphorisms that Hornefler has now published after sifting through the manuscript also prove that Nietzsche's idea of the "Eternal Second Coming" in 1881 was a scientific-mechanistic counter-idea to Dühring's view and that as such it is untenable, mistaken. The admission of this fact has now been and is being countered by the Nietzsche Archive. The scientific character and the scientific implications of this idea are denied. But no matter how many mistakes Dr. Koegel may have made in the publication: this fact is correct and, whoever is unbiased, will find it confirmed precisely by Horneffer's attack on Koegel. And any edition of Friedrich Nietzsche's works that conceals this fact will be an objective forgery. Because the idea of the "Eternal Second Coming" is scientifically untenable: that is why the Nietzsche Archive wants Nietzsche to have never conceived it scientifically. That is why Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche, when its untenability was made clear to her, began to claim that this thought would not only have been conceived later, but also in 1881, in the same way as Mrs. Lou Andreas-Salomé claims that it was later conceived by Nietzsche: as a mystery. See what Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche wrote to me in September 1898: "If this shattering thought could not be proven splendidly, irrefutably, scientifically, then it was better and more pious (sic) to treat it as a mystery, as a mysterious idea that can have tremendous consequences." It is not the mistakes Koegel has made that form the starting point of the whole battle; no, it is the fact that he, as editor, has not made a "mystery" out of the "idea of return". Just look at Mrs. Lou Salomé's book p. 225: "What should become scientifically proven truth takes on the character of a mystical revelation". Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche is thus not only marching in perfect harmony with Mrs. Lou Salomé, whom she otherwise fiercely opposes; no, she even surpasses her with regard to the doctrine of the Second Coming. What Mrs. Salomé claims only for Nietzsche's last period; Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche applies it to Nietzsche from the moment he conceived the thought. It is amusing for me, as I have often had the opportunity to notice Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche's stormy opposition to Lou Salomé, to see how she leads Friedrich Nietzsche down the slippery slope - not of Eduard von Hartmann, but of Lou Andreas-Salomé. And Dr. Horneffer is in a position to lay a plan for the "Eternal Reappearance" work that also leads to these surreptitious paths of Mrs. Lou Salomé. After all, he says: "Nietzsche wanted to throw down his idea of the eternal return as a religious idea."