The Rudolf Steiner Archive

15. Goethe and Scientific Illusionism

[ 1 ] This essay was not written simply because *The Theory of Colors*, accompanied by an introductory essay, needed to be included in an edition of Goethe’s works (in Kürschner’s *German National Literature*). It stems from a deep intellectual need on the part of the editor of this edition. He began his studies with mathematics and physics , and was led—by the many contradictions that pervade the system of our modern view of nature—with an inner necessity to undertake a critical examination of its methodological foundations. His initial studies pointed him toward the principle of rigorous empirical knowledge, while his insight into those contradictions led him toward a strictly scientific theory of knowledge. His positive starting point protected him from veering into purely Hegelian conceptual constructs. Finally, with the help of his epistemological studies, he discovered the root of many errors in modern natural science in the entirely mistaken position that the latter has assigned to simple sensory perception. Our science attributes all sensory qualities (sound, color, heat, etc.) to the subject and holds that “outside” the subject, these qualities correspond to nothing but the motion of matter. These motions, which are supposed to be the only things existing in the “realm of nature,” can of course no longer be perceived. They are inferred on the basis of subjective qualities .

[ 2 ] However, to the consistent mind, this interpretation cannot but appear as a half-measure. Motion is, at first, merely a concept we have borrowed from the sensory world—that is, one that we encounter only in things possessing those sensory qualities. We know of no movement other than that found in sensory objects. If one now applies this predicate to non-sensory entities—such as the elements of discontinuous matter (atoms)—one must nevertheless be clearly aware that, through this application, a form of existence conceived in a manner fundamentally different from the sensory is attributed to a sensually perceived attribute. One falls into the same contradiction when attempting to assign a real content to the initially completely empty concept of the atom. One must simply ascribe sensory qualities to it, however sublimated they may be. One person attributes impenetrability and force to the atom, another attributes extension and the like; in short, everyone attributes some qualities borrowed from the sensory world. If one does not do this, one remains completely in the void..

[ 3 ] That is where the half-measure lies. One draws a line right through the realm of sensory perception and declares one part to be objective and the other to be subjective. Only one of these positions is consistent: If atoms exist, they are simply parts of matter with the properties of matter, and are imperceptible only because of their small size, which is inaccessible to our senses.

[ 4 ] This, however, eliminates the possibility of seeking, in the motion of atoms, something that could be contrasted as an objective reality with the subjective qualities of sound, color, etc. And it also eliminates the possibility of seeking, for example, anything more in the connection between motion and the perception of “red” than a relationship between two processes that belong entirely to the sensory world.

[ 5 ] For the editor, it was therefore clear: ether motion, atomic arrangement, etc., belong on the same page as the sensory perceptions themselves. To declare the latter to be subjective is merely the result of unclear reflection. If one declares the sensory quality to be subjective, one must do the same with ether motion. We do not perceive the latter not for any principled reason, but only because our sense organs are not organized with sufficient precision. This, however, is a purely fortuitous circumstance. It could be that, as the sensory organs become increasingly refined, humanity might one day come to perceive etheric movements directly as well. If, then, a person in that distant future were to accept our subjective theory of sensory perceptions, he would have to declare these etheric movements to be just as subjective as we today regard color, sound, etc.

[ 6 ] As you can see, this physical theory leads to a contradiction that cannot be resolved.

[ 7 ] This subjective view is further supported by physiological considerations.

[ 8 ] Physiology demonstrates that sensation occurs only as the final result of a mechanical process that is first transmitted from the part of the physical world lying outside our bodily substance to the terminal organs of our nervous system in the sensory organs, is relayed from there to the highest center, and is only then triggered as a sensation. The contradictions of this physiological theory are set forth in the chapter “The ˂Primordial Phenomenon˃” [see pp. 266ff. of this work]. Here, one can only describe the form of movement of the brain substance as subjective. No matter how far one may go in investigating the processes occurring in the subject, one must always remain within the realm of the mechanical. And one will find no sensation anywhere in the center..

[ 9 ] Thus, only the philosophical consideration remains to shed light on the subjectivity and objectivity of sensation. And this yields the following:

[ 10 ] What can be described as “subjective” in perception? Without a precise analysis of the term “subjective,” it is impossible to make any progress at all. Subjectivity, of course, can be determined by nothing other than itself. Anything that cannot be demonstrated to be conditioned by the subject must not be described as “subjective.” Now we must ask ourselves: What can we describe as inherent to the human subject? That which it can experience about itself through external or internal perception. Through external perception, we grasp our physical constitution; through internal experience, we grasp our own thinking, feeling, and willing. What, then, can be described as subjective in the former sense? The constitution of the entire organism—including the sense organs and the brain—which likely appears in slightly different forms in every human being. However, everything that can be demonstrated in this way is merely a specific configuration in the arrangement and function of the substances through which sensation is mediated. Thus, what is actually subjective is only the path that sensation must take before it can be called my sensation. Our organism mediates sensation, and these mediating pathways are subjective; sensation itself, however, is not.

[ 11 ] So that leaves the path of inner experience. What do I experience within myself when I identify a sensation as my own? I experience that I establish a connection to my individuality in my thinking, that I extend my sphere of knowledge to this sensation; but I am not aware that I generate the content of the sensation. I merely establish the connection to myself; the quality of the sensation is a fact grounded in itself.

[ 12 ] No matter where we start—from the inside or the outside—we cannot reach the point where we could say: “Here lies the subjective character of sensation.” The term “subjective” is not applicable to the content of sensation.

[ 13 ] It is these considerations that compelled me to reject as impossible any theory of nature that, in principle, extends beyond the realm of the perceived world, and to seek the sole object of natural science solely within the sensory world. But then I had to seek, in the interdependence of the facts of this very sensory world, what we express as laws of nature ..

[ 14 ] And this led me to the view of the scientific method that underlies Goethe’s theory of colors. Anyone who finds these considerations valid will read this theory of colors with a completely different perspective than modern natural scientists can. They will see that this is not a matter of Goethe’s hypothesis standing in opposition to Newton’s, but rather a question of whether today’s theoretical physics is to be accepted or not. If not, then the light that this physics sheds on the theory of colors must also be lost. The reader may learn from the following chapters what our theoretical foundation of physics is, in order to then view Goethe’s arguments in their proper light from this foundation.*