The Rudolf Steiner Archive

41. Methods for Teaching the Law of Conservation of Energy in College Classes

Science and Epistemology in Higher Education.

By Dr. Hans Schmidkunz.

[ 1 ] When the sciences experienced a great boom in modern times, especially in the seventeenth century, the universities remained virtually unaffected by this development, both as institutions of teaching and education and as centers of research. When the sciences then experienced a renewed surge—especially since the end of the first half of the nineteenth century—German universities were significantly affected by this development: They participated in this surge so vigorously—partly as creators and partly as recipients—that they reached a much-admired level as centers of research. This was not the case as institutions of teaching and education: their progress in the art of teaching—and, even more so, their theoretical interest in it—lagged far behind those advances, and their educational mission was increasingly neglected. This imbalance appears all the more serious given the considerable pedagogical advances in the rest of our school system, and in recent years has led to calls for a distinct “university pedagogy” and to the emergence of the so-called university pedagogy movement. On the one hand, Professor Ernst Bernheim in Greifswald and the local association of all teachers advocate enriching university instruction with the achievements of contemporary pedagogy; on the other hand, the Association for Higher Education Pedagogy (business address: Dr. Hans Schmidkunz, Berlin-Wilmersdorf) aims to address the full range of problems arising from the application of the current state of pedagogy to the transmission of the sciences and arts as such. In particular, regular lectures ensure a gradual exploration of this entire field. Two such recent lectures, along with the main points of the discussions that followed them, are likely to be of particular interest here.

[ 2 ] On March 17, Dr. Rudolf Steiner spoke on “Methods for Addressing the Law of Conservation of Energy in University Teaching”; he briefly elaborated on the following. The historical development of this law shows the role that empirical research plays in such matters; and yet it is also a prime example of a task for the philosopher. Usually, this field is neglected and adequately addressed only in physics; yet it also belongs, for example, to physiology and is, above all, a fundamental problem of philosophy. The factor m in the formula ½ m v² has given rise to so many misunderstandings; the question of its significance for the natural scientist is usually answered quite unsatisfactorily and can likely be answered only through philosophical thinking. The fact that heat is converted into work that can be expressed numerically merely shows us the possibility of transforming one form of force into another and the constancy of the numerical ratios involved. No individual case suggests anything else to the physicist. Julius Robert Meyer’s deduction of the law, on the other hand, stems from our original intellectual need to find an element common to all individual phenomena. Now, this very law demonstrates all the more clearly that we cannot grasp its cognitive value without making a precise distinction between what the human mind contributes to its insights and what it receives from them. Kinetic energy can be converted into work both by a falling weight and by heat. Here, we measure the “destroyed” heat directly in terms of work, without being able to identify any residue; there, something weighable—the weight itself—is still present. There, we relate the work to a clearly defined entity; here, we do not. Here, although such an agent may be assumed in the second case as well due to the fundamental similarity of both cases, we do not include the factor m but rather the quantity of heat. From a purely empirical standpoint, I am comparing an analyzed entity there with an unanalyzed entity here, and in both cases can only establish numerical constancy without finding any common ground. Beyond that, only hypotheses are possible—for example, du Bois’s triumphantly asserted axiom that all processes are ultimately mechanical, whereas J[ulius] R[obert] Meyer rejected the notion of heat as a form of motion. “Transformation” consists precisely in one thing becoming another; the mere fact that something further underlies both is a postulate of the mind. From the perspective of higher education, the task is, first of all, to gain empirical knowledge of all the facts that precondition the law—which is the task of the individual sciences; the law must govern all knowledge, from the lowest to the highest phenomena. First of all, even for the physicist himself, rational mechanics must be addressed as the foundation of all mechanics of motion; only philosophical discussion leads beyond this, beyond the purely physical composition of motions. It is only here that the question of “forces” begins; the physicist must, for example, have grasped the distinction between the parallelogram of motions and that of forces. Thermodynamics was and remains an intermediate link between that pure mechanics and the branches of physics built upon it; of course, we are still seeking the underlying connections. Parallel to empirical instruction, a philosophical education in the relevant field must—secondly—complement it. Given the lack of critical judgment among today’s specialists in the natural sciences in this regard, philosophical instruction in the right context is absolutely necessary for everyone—especially so that the cognitive value of the formulas may be understood and so that—precisely with regard to this law—it may be shown where the hypothetical ends and lasting insight begins in our knowledge. It is strange, for example, to insist on understanding every real change in the external world solely as a change of location, otherwise one would have to account for the creation and destruction of energy. But just as a change in quality is difficult to grasp, so too is a change in motion. As can be seen in the “Wheel of Life” and the “Kinetoscope,” where mere changes in form are interpreted as changes in location, motion, too, can only be established as a subjective quality, not as an objective phenomenon. In reducing all phenomena to mere mechanical processes, the inductions themselves are correct, but their interpretation is not. Once we have conceived of color—which, according to induction, is supposed to underlie motion—as subjective, we can no longer escape subjectivity at all. Thus, alongside empirical science, the development of the philosophical mind as a regulative principle—as a form of self-knowledge—is necessary. Promising beginnings have been made; however, the theory of knowledge must be developed by those who have themselves conducted scientific research, and only those who stand on the ground of contemporary empirical sciences can address its problems. The fact that natural scientists do not work philosophically undermines the teaching of the natural sciences, and the fact that philosophers do not work scientifically undermines the teaching of philosophy. Conclusion: Such a two-sided principle points to the duty of higher education pedagogy to organize the individual sciences into a proper system of instruction.