The Rudolf Steiner Archive

The Conceptual World and Its Relationship to Reality I

[ 1 ] Tomorrow I would like to briefly return to the spiritual aspects of early Christianity and their lasting impact. This will provide some insights that will allow us to delve deeper into what has been discussed in the public lectures of the past few days. Today I would like to offer a kind of philosophical introduction to this topic in order to familiarize you with some historical context, for it is good for us within the Spiritual Science movement to also know something about how people in the wider world strive to approach the mysteries of the world, and how they think and feel about these mysteries.

[ 2 ] If one examines the history of philosophy textbooks up to the present day, one essentially finds that they always deal only with certain philosophical movements—movements that are familiar to most contemporary philosophers. However, one would be quite mistaken to assume that what is commonly found represents the full range of such philosophical avenues of inquiry in the present day. For example, most of you will not know that throughout the 19th century—especially in the second half of the 19th century and particularly toward the end of the 19th century— right up to the present day, there has been a vibrant philosophical life within the Catholic Church; that within the Catholic Church, the scholarly clergy have cultivated—and many continue to cultivate—a quite distinctive philosophical tradition that diverges from the rest of the world’s philosophy, so that there is a rich body of literature in this field—at any rate, a body of literature as rich as that on other areas of philosophical activity. And this body of literature is referred to as the literature of Neoscholasticism.

[ 3 ] A curious circumstance led to the resurgence in the 19th century of the school of thought that flourished in the Middle Ages—a tradition that essentially began with Scotus Erigena, continued through Thomas Aquinas, and persisted until the time of Duns Scotus—arising from a very specific, albeit faith-infused, need for knowledge. Particularly from the second third of the 19th century onward, we see this trend of Neoscholasticism emerge in Catholic circles. In all Central and Western European languages, countless books are being written in an effort to regain an understanding of what Scholasticism was all about. And if one attempts to explore the underlying reason for Scholasticism’s resurgence, one must actually take a broad view. And that is what we would like to touch on a little today.

[ 4 ] In the lectures I have given over the past few days, I have repeatedly emphasized that the path to knowledge of Spiritual Science lies in a very special approach to thinking, concepts, and logic; that under the influence of the exercises leading to this development of thinking, a person comes to think no longer in their physical body, but in their etheric body. As a result, they do not merely think in terms of dead conceptual logic, but they live within the act of thinking—that is to say, they live and weave within their etheric body, as we might technically put it. It is a living into the etheric body when logic itself comes alive, when—as I have put it in layman’s terms—the statue, through which one can illustrate the logic at work in ordinary life, comes alive, when the human being himself comes alive in his etheric body, that is to say, when concepts are no longer dead concepts, but rather those living concepts begin to emerge of which I have been saying for years that the concept gains life, as if one were present within it with one’s soul in a living being. Of this living reality—as the truth of concepts and ideas—humanity has, in essence, known nothing in external philosophy for many centuries. I have attempted to point to this fact in the first chapter I added to the new edition of my *Riddles of Philosophy*.

[ 5 ] Even in the final philosophical era of Greek civilization, humanity had, philosophically speaking, lost all awareness of the potential vitality of concepts and ideas. Let us bear this in mind. To begin with, the Greeks—as you can read in my *Riddles of Philosophy*—experienced concepts and ideas in the same way that people today experience sensory perceptions: a color, a sound, or a smell. The great Plato, right up to Aristotle, and even more so the earlier philosophers, did not believe that they had created the concept or the thought internally, but rather that they received it from things, just as one receives red or blue—that is, mental images.

[ 6 ] Then came the time—and I have described how this unfolds in cycles—when one no longer felt inwardly that things had given one the concept, but one felt only that the concept arose within the soul. And now one did not know what to do with the concept, with the inner mental image, which the Greeks had still believed they received from things. Hence arose those scholastic problems, those scholastic riddles: What does the concept even mean in relation to things? — The Greeks could not ask this question, for they were conscious that things gave them the concepts; thus, the concepts belonged to things, just as colors belong to things. — This came to an end with the advent of the Middle Ages. Then one had to ask: What kind of relationship does something that arises in our mind have to things? And furthermore: the things out there are many, manifold, and individual, but concepts are general, a unity. We walk through the world and encounter many horses; from these many horses, we form the unified concept of “horse.” Every horse corresponds to the concept of “horse.”

[ 7 ] Today, many people say they understand the concept even less than the medieval philosophers, who viewed it as a thorny problem: Well, the concept simply isn’t to be found in the things themselves.

[ 8 ] I have repeatedly mentioned a comparison that my friend, the late Vincenz Knauer—a great scholar of medieval philosophy—often used in response to those who say: “Out there is only the material aspect of the animal; the concept is formed by the soul.” — Old Knauer would always say: “People claim: ‘The lamb is out there,’ but what really exists is only the matter. The wolf is out there, but what really exists is only the matter. The soul forms the concept of a lamb, and the soul forms the concept of a wolf.” — And old Knauer would say: If only the matter were truly present, and one were to lock up a wolf that ate nothing but lambs, then eventually, once it had shed its old matter, it would be nothing but a lamb, for it would contain only the matter of a lamb. But one would notice with astonishment that it had remained a wolf after all—that, therefore, there must be something else besides the matter.

[ 9 ] For medieval scholasticism, this raised a significant problem, a major puzzle. The scholastics reasoned: Concepts are universals because they encompass many individual things. And they could not say—as people today are so fond of saying—that these universals are merely something created in the human mind, having nothing to do with things themselves. These medieval philosophers distinguished three kinds of universals. First, they said, there are universals ante rem—prior to the thing itself, prior to what one sees out there—that is, the universal “horse” is conceived prior to all possible sensible horses, as a thought within the Divine. So said medieval scholasticism.

[ 10 ] Then there are universals in re, in things, namely as the essence within things—precisely what matters. The universal “wolf” is what matters, and the universal “lamb” is what matters. They are what prevent the wolf from becoming a lamb, even if it eats nothing but lambs.

[ 11 ] And then there is a third form in which universals exist, namely: post rem, after the things, just as they are in our minds when we contemplate the world and have abstracted them from the things themselves. The medieval scholastics attached great importance to this distinction, and this distinction protected them from that skepticism, from that nitpicking, which cannot arrive at the essence of things, for the reason that it regards the concepts and ideas that humans gain from things in their souls as merely a product of the soul and conceives of no mental image beneath them that could have any significance for the things themselves.

[ 12 ] This particular form of skepticism is found in one form in Hume and in another form in Descartes. There, concepts and ideas are, in general, nothing more than what the human mind constructs as ideas. There, human beings can no longer approach things through concepts and ideas.

[ 13 ] For theologians who also wish to be philosophers—that is, who wish to penetrate theology philosophically—a very particular difficulty has arisen and will always arise. For the theologian is compelled not merely to see the things in the world, but to conceive of them in a certain relationship to the divine Primordial Being, and he runs into difficulties when he cannot himself place the concepts and ideas he derives from things—which constitute the content of purely ideal knowledge, unless one ascends to the Spiritual Science—in some relationship to the deity; that is, when he cannot conceive of them as universalia ante rem, as universal concepts prior to things.

[ 14 ] Now, there is something very significant connected with what I have said. There will always be people who cannot see in a concept anything that has to do with things—who, in other words, see in the things out there only the material aspect, and, on the other hand, those who can see in concepts something real that has to do with the things themselves—something that is within the things and that the human mind extracts from them, transforming universals in re into universals post rem.

[ 15 ] Those who acknowledge that concepts have a reality outside the human mind were called realists in the Middle Ages and thereafter, particularly in Catholic philosophy. And the view that concepts and ideas have a real significance in the world is called realism. The other view, which assumes that concepts and ideas are merely fabricated in the human mind, as it were, as words, is called nominalism, and its proponents are called nominalists.

[ 16 ] You will readily see that the nominalists can, in fact, perceive the real only in its diversity, in its multiplicity. Only the realists can see something real in the unifying, in the universal. And this brings us precisely to the point where a particular difficulty arose for the philosophizing theologians. These Catholic theologians had to defend the dogma of the Trinity—of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the three Persons of the Godhead. Given the development of ecclesiastical theology, they had no choice but to say: the three Persons are individual, self-contained entities, yet at the same time they are supposed to be a unity! If they had been nominalists, the Godhead would always have fallen apart into three Persons. Only the realists could still conceive of the three Persons as united under a universal. For this, however, the concept of the universal had to have a reality; for this, one had to be a realist. Consequently, the realists fared better with the Trinity than the nominalists, who faced great difficulties and who, in the end—when Scholasticism was already drawing to a close and had degenerated into skepticism—could only entrench themselves behind the claim that: “One cannot understand how the three Persons are to be one God; but precisely for that reason one must believe it, must renounce understanding; such a thing can only be revealed.” Human reason can lead only to nominalism; it cannot lead to any form of realism. And, fundamentally speaking, it is the Hume-Kantian doctrine that, via the detour through phenomenalism, has become pure nominalism.

[ 17 ] The central dogma of the Trinity—the three divine persons—thus depended on realism or nominalism, on one or the other conception of the nature of universals. You will therefore understand that, as Kantian philosophy increasingly became the philosophy of Protestant circles in Europe, a reaction began to take hold in Catholic circles. And this reaction consisted in the view, held within these circles, that one must now once again thoroughly examine the old Scholasticism and fathom what Scholasticism had actually meant. In short, since it was not possible to arrive at a new way of viewing the spiritual world, an attempt was made to reconstruct Scholasticism. And a rich body of literature emerged whose sole purpose was to make Scholasticism accessible to people once again.

[ 18 ] Of course, this literature was read only among educated Catholic theologians, though it was widely read among them. And for those interested in everything that is taking place in humanity’s intellectual culture, it is by no means useless to take a brief look at the extensive body of literature that has come to light. For this reason alone, it is worthwhile to explore this neo-scholastic literature, because in doing so one can gain a mental image of how black and white can coexist in the world—please, the word has no negative connotation here! The entire way of thinking, the entire way of viewing the world, is different in the progressive current of philosophy that follows, for example, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, or, earlier still, Descartes, Malebranche, Hume, all the way to Mill and Spencer. This is a completely different kind of intellectual inquiry, a completely different way of thinking about the world, than what emerged, for example, in the work of Gratry and the numerous neo-Scholastics who wrote everywhere—in France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, England, and Germany; for there is indeed a rich neo-Scholastic literature in all these countries. And all orders of the Catholic priesthood participated in the discussions. The study of Scholasticism became particularly active from 1879 onward, for that was when Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical “Aeterni patris” was published. In this encyclical, the study of Thomas Aquinas was made virtually mandatory for Catholic theologians. Since that time, a rich body of literature based on Thomism has emerged, and the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas has been studied and interpreted in depth. However, the entire movement had already begun earlier, so that today one could fill libraries with the many insightful works that have emerged from this renewal of Thomism.

[ 19 ] There, for example, you can learn from a book such as *The Origin of Human Reason*, or from various French works, or—if you prefer—from numerous works by Italian Jesuits and Dominicans, just how astutely this philosophy has been pursued. A great deal of acumen has been devoted to the study of scholasticism in all countries—an acumen of which people, even those who study philosophy today, usually have no conception whatsoever, because they lack the necessary interest to pay attention to all aspects of human endeavors. It was this need that gave rise to the shift toward Kantianism, which—by becoming pure nominalism, particularly in the second half of the 19th century—pulled the rug out from under Catholic theology.

[ 20 ] I am speaking now purely from a historical perspective—not to evaluate anything, not even to refute anything or to agree with anything, but purely from a historical perspective. And there one can see that, fundamentally, people to this day are still striving to get to the bottom of what the concept of “thinking” actually entails. People today can no longer do anything at all with the concept in its old sense. It must be revitalized if we are to make progress; we must continue to make efforts for a long time to come to understand, theoretically and through the mere concept of the image, what significance thinking actually has for the divine.

[ 21 ] Others have made efforts in different ways. For example, a very significant movement has emerged that is even very close to the Catholic Church and has been driven by priests within Catholicism, but which has not found the same degree of favor with Catholic authorities as scholasticism did. In the encyclical “Aeterni patris,” Catholic theologians were even dutifully urged to renew the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, to revive it. Another movement has met with less favor from Catholic authorities: that of Rosmini-Serbati and Gioberti. Rosmini in particular—who was born in Rovereto near Trento and died in 1855 in nearby Stresa—expressed his aspirations especially in works that were actually published only after his death. And it is interesting to note the way in which Rosmini sought to work his way up through an investigation of the real value of the concept. Rosmini realized that human beings have the concept present within their inner experience. The mere nominalist stops at the fact that he experiences the concept internally and overlooks the question of where the concept actually exists. Rosmini, however, was brilliant enough to know: even if something reveals itself within the soul, that does not mean it has reality only within the soul. And so, by starting specifically with the concept of being, he knew that the soul, in experiencing concepts, simultaneously experiences the inner essence of things that lives within those concepts. Thus, Rosmini’s philosophy consisted in seeking inner experiences—which for him were experiences of concepts—yet he did not go as far as the vitality of the concepts, but only as far as their diversity. He then sought to specify how the concept lives simultaneously in the soul and in things. This is expressed very clearly, in particular, in Rosmini’s posthumous work titled *Teosofia*. Others within Catholicism held similar views, but Rosmini is simply one of the most brilliant.

[ 22 ] However, a school of thought such as Rosminism is somewhat inconvenient for Catholic theology and causes it some unease, because it is very difficult for this school to reconcile the concept of revelation with this theory of concepts. For the concept of revelation boils down to the idea that the highest truths must be revealed. They cannot be experienced internally within the soul, but must be revealed externally in the course of human history. Human beings can only approach reality with their concepts to a certain degree, and above this sphere of concepts rises the sphere of revelation. The scholastics had to adopt this perspective. This is also more compatible with what Catholicism still regards as its very essence today than Rosminian “experienced concepts.” For if one has “experienced concepts,” it is actually God who lives within one. And Catholic theology, at its core, has a sort of dread of this when people claim that God lives within human beings. This is also why Leo XIII, in the 1880s, declared Rosmini’s philosophy heretical by a decree of his own and forbade Catholic theologians from studying and teaching Rosminian philosophy unless they had permission from their superiors. For this is how strict measures are taken within the ranks of Catholic theologians. I do not know whether this rule is followed without exception. In any case, in the publications of Catholic theologians of all persuasions, one will find everywhere the seal of the superior episcopal authority. This signifies that Catholic theologians are permitted to study such a work. There are certain exceptions for those who are university professors, but the rules are, at least in theory, enforced very strictly.

[ 23 ] This also reflects an attempt to work toward an understanding of the relationship between thought and the world.

[ 24 ] I would like to make a digression here that is of an entirely different nature. Such digressions are sometimes necessary. Many of our friends believe they are doing our movement a great service when, for example, they explain to Catholic theologians that we are by no means anti-Christian, that we are in fact seeking an honest understanding of Christ. And in their good faith, our friends then go so far as to share this or that with Catholic theologians based on the way we characterize Christianity. For our friends believe—forgive me—in their naivety that they can convince these theologians to see that we are good Christians. But as Catholic theologians, they can never admit that! My dear friends, we will be much more to their liking if we do not seek Christ, if we do not concern ourselves with Christ! For their concern—and this must always be kept in mind—is not that anyone is seeking this or that concept of Christ, but rather the dominion of the Church. And precisely if one were to have an equally good or better concept of Christ outside the Church, one would then be opposed most fiercely. Thus, those of our friends who, in their good faith, go to Catholic theologians and try to convince them that we are not anti-Christian are the ones who harm us the most. For the theologians will say: It is all the worse if a concept of Christ were to take root outside the Church. One must judge the things of life according to the circumstances of life and not according to one’s naive opinion. We will be fought particularly fiercely if the theologians were to discover that we understand something of the inner essence of Christianity that could make a convincing impression on a wider circle of humanity.

[ 25 ] But one can see that it had become necessary to work one’s way toward an understanding of the concept and its relationship to reality. And it must be said: Among the most brilliant developments in this direction in recent times are those contained in Rosmini’s writings. He worked this through for all fields, and it could be of particular value to study Rosmini’s concepts of beauty and aesthetics. Rosmini’s theory of beauty and his aesthetics are something of exceptional value that one should engage with in order to see how a modern mind works its way up, standing at the threshold of Spiritual Science yet unable to enter it. This is precisely what can be studied to such an outstanding degree in Rosmini.

[ 26 ] We will thus find that there are indeed currents of thought that seek to work toward an understanding of the concept, but fail to realize that we are now living in a time when the concept must come to life if one is to enter into reality.

[ 27 ] So the concept has undergone a certain historical development. I have dealt with this history in part in my book *The Riddles of Philosophy*, in that first chapter I mentioned. But here I would like to point out something else. We can say, then, that the concept continues to develop. There was a time when the concept was perceived as a sensed concept, grasped in the same way as color or sound. This was the case with the Greeks. Plato is just about the last to speak of concepts in such a concrete way that one can see in him a lingering echo of an understanding of this kind of grasping of concepts. With Aristotle, things are already different. Then comes the Middle Ages, when the concept is viewed as purely rational, and when scholars sought to understand how it relates to things as a universal, resorting to bridges and arriving at the classification: ante rem, in re, post rem — before, in, and after things.

[ 28 ] Then comes the period when the concept is understood in a thoroughly nominalistic way. This continues into our own time. But a reaction makes itself felt—the secondary currents that seek the concept as an inner experience, as in Rosmini. From this point (see diagram: Rosmini), one would arrive at the life or experience of the concept. Thus, the concept would, so to speak, be chained to the physical body during this period (see diagram: from pre-Plato to the Middle Ages), and would now pass over to the etheric body. The concept would lead to a clairvoyant experience of the concept. Here, however, one must say that the entire earlier perceived concept, as well as the nominalist and rational concept, developed out of an atavistic clairvoyance of the concept, and that the way in which the concept is now to be experienced is a conscious one, whereas in earlier times it was more subconscious. And indeed, if you move from Plato and the Greek philosophers, who regarded the concept as something perceived, to the echoes of Zarathustrianism, you will find this concept grasped in an atavistic manner—or perhaps one need not say “atavistic,” since this term is only valid today—that is, experienced in a dreamlike, clairvoyant way.

	Physical Body			Etheric Body
concepts experienced in a dreamlike clairvoyant manner	concept perceived	concept rational	concept nominal	Experience of the concept
Persians	before Plato	Middle Ages	Rosmini...

[ 29 ] Thus, the philosophies of the Near East conceived of the concept as a mental image they experienced figuratively. Persian philosophy views the “horse in general” as a being in general—one that, when specified and differentiated from the individual horse, is still something living. The Persians called this “Feruer.” This concept is abstracted and becomes the Platonic Idea. The Persians’ Feruer becomes the Platonic Idea.

[ 30 ] Abstraction is becoming increasingly widespread because thinking is experienced only within the physical body. We must return to the consciously experienced concept. In this realm, you see a beautiful cycle unfolding—from the ancient clairvoyance of the concept through what the concept had to become in the age of physical experience: the purely rational concept, the merely conceptualized concept, the purely logical concept.

[ 31 ] I have often emphasized that logic only came into being with Aristotle, when the concept was nothing more than a concept. Before that, for the concept as experienced, logic was not needed. And now logic comes to life; the statue of logic comes to life.

[ 32 ] This single example of the concept once again illustrates what we generally observe on a larger scale. In the same way, we must also delve into the entire course of human development in detail, for only then will we gain an ever-deeper understanding of the underlying meaning of the spiritual current to which we belong. And through these things, we truly become more and more objective, but that is also necessary. Where would we end up if the objective were not understood at all and our dear friends were to drag everything more and more into the personal realm! Working objectively—that must be our task, and the purely personal must take a back seat more and more.