The Rudolf Steiner Archive

18. Goethe's World View in his “Proverbs in Prose”

[ 1 ] Human beings are not satisfied with what nature willingly presents to their observing minds. They sense that, in order to produce the diversity of its creations, nature requires driving forces that it initially conceals from the observer. Nature does not speak its final word itself. Our experience shows us what nature can create, but it does not tell us how this creation takes place. The means to unveil nature’s driving forces lies within the human mind itself. From the human mind arise the ideas that shed light on how nature brings about its creations. What the phenomena of the external world conceal becomes apparent within the human mind. What the human mind conceives of as laws of nature is not something invented in addition to nature; it is the very essence of nature itself, and the mind is merely the stage upon which nature makes the secrets of its workings visible. What we observe in things , is only one part of things. What wells up in our mind when it confronts things is the other part. It is the same things that speak to us from without and that speak within us. Only when we bring the language of the external world into harmony with that of our inner world do we have the full reality. What did the true philosophers of all ages seek? Nothing other than to proclaim the essence of things, which they themselves express when the mind offers itself to them as an organ of speech.

[ 2 ] When a person allows his inner self to speak about nature, he realizes that nature falls short of what it could achieve by virtue of its driving forces. The mind perceives what experience contains in a more perfect form. It finds that nature does not achieve its intentions through its creations. He feels called upon to represent these intentions in a perfected form. He creates forms in which he shows: this is what nature intended; but it could only accomplish it to a certain degree. These forms are the works of art. In them, man creates in a perfect way what nature displays imperfectly.

[ 3 ] Philosophers and artists share the same goal. They seek to create the perfection that their minds perceive when they allow nature to influence them. But they have different means at their disposal to achieve this goal. In the philosopher, a thought, an idea , dawns when he confronts a natural process. He articulates this. In the artist, an image of this process arises, one that reveals it more perfectly than it can be observed in the external world. Philosophers and artists further develop their observations in different ways. The artist need not know the driving forces of nature in the form in which they reveal themselves to the philosopher. When he perceives an object or a process, an image arises immediately in his mind in which the laws of nature are expressed in a more perfect form than in the corresponding object or process of the external world. These laws, in the form of thought, need not enter his mind. Knowledge and art are, however, intrinsically related. They reveal the dispositions of nature that do not reach their full development in mere external nature.

[ 4 ] When, in the mind of a true artist, not only perfect images of things but also the driving forces of nature express themselves in the form of thoughts, the common source of philosophy and art becomes particularly clear to us. Goethe is such an artist. He reveals the same mysteries to us through his works of art and through his thoughts. What he creates in his poetry, he expresses in the form of thought in his essays on natural science and the arts, as well as in his “Prose Sayings.” The deep satisfaction that emanates from these essays and aphorisms stems from the fact that one sees the harmony of art and knowledge realized in a single personality. There is something uplifting about every thought of Goethe’s: here speaks someone who can simultaneously perceive, in an image, the perfection he expresses in ideas. The power of such a thought is amplified by this feeling. What stems from the highest needs of a personality must be intrinsically interconnected. Goethe’s teachings of wisdom answer the question: What kind of philosophy is in keeping with true art? I shall attempt to trace the context of this philosophy, born of the spirit of a true artist.

[ 5 ] The content of thought that arises from the human mind when it confronts the external world is truth. Human beings cannot demand any knowledge other than that which they themselves produce. Anyone who seeks something beyond things that is supposed to signify their true essence has not yet realized that all questions about the essence of things arise solely from a human need: the need to penetrate what one perceives with thought. Things speak to us, and our inner self speaks when we observe things. These two languages originate from the same primordial being, and human beings are called upon to bring about their mutual understanding. This is what is called knowledge. And this—and nothing else—is sought by those who understand the needs of human nature. For those who do not attain this understanding, the things of the external world remain alien. They do not hear the essence of things speaking to them from within. Therefore, they suspect that this essence lies hidden behind things. They believe in an external world that lies even beyond the world of perception. But things are external only as long as one merely observes them. When one reflects on them, they cease to be outside of us. One merges with their inner essence. For human beings, the contrast between objective external perception and the subjective inner world of thought exists only as long as they fail to recognize the interconnectedness of these worlds. The human inner world is the innermost core of nature.

[ 6 ] These ideas are not refuted by the fact that different people form different conceptions of things. Nor are they refuted by the fact that people’s constitutions differ, so that one does not know whether one and the same color is perceived in exactly the same way by different people. For what matters is not whether people form exactly the same judgment about one and the same thing, but whether the language spoken by a person’s inner self is precisely the language that expresses the essence of things. Individual judgments differ according to a person’s mental constitution and the perspective from which they view things; but all judgments spring from the same element and lead to the essence of things. This may be expressed in various nuances of thought; but it nevertheless remains the essence of things.

[ 7 ] Human beings are the organ through which nature reveals its secrets. The deepest essence of the world is manifested in the subjective personality. “When the healthy nature of man functions as a whole, when he feels himself to be part of a great, beautiful, dignified, and valuable whole in the world, when harmonious contentment grants him pure, free delight, then the universe—if it could perceive itself—would exult as having reached its goal and admire the pinnacle of its own becoming and being ” (Goethe, “Winckelmann,” Kürschner’s National Literature, Vol. 27, p. 42). The goal of the universe and the essence of existence do not lie in what the external world provides, but in what lives within the human spirit and springs from it. Goethe therefore considers it a mistake for the natural scientist to attempt to penetrate the inner workings of nature through instruments and objective experiments, for “human beings themselves, insofar as they make use of their sound senses, are the greatest and most precise physical apparatus that can exist, and that is precisely the greatest misfortune of modern physics: that experiments have been, as it were, separated from human beings, and that nature is to be understood—indeed, its very capabilities are to be limited and demonstrated—solely through what artificial instruments reveal.” “But this is precisely why human beings stand so high: that which is otherwise unimaginable is made manifest within them. What, then, is a string—and all its mechanical divisions—compared to the musician’s ear? Indeed, one might ask: what are the elementary phenomena of nature itself compared to human beings, who must first tame and modify them all in order to assimilate them to some extent?” (See Natw. Schr., Vol. 4, Part 2, p. 351)

[ 8 ] Human beings must let things speak through their minds if they wish to recognize their essence. Everything they have to say about this essence is drawn from their inner spiritual experiences. Human beings can judge the world only from their own perspective. They must think anthropomorphically. Even the simplest phenomenon—for example, the collision of two bodies—is imbued with anthropomorphism when one speaks of it. The judgment, “One body collides with the other,” is already anthropomorphic. For if one wishes to go beyond the mere observation of the event, one must project onto it the experience that our own body has when it sets a body in the external world in motion. All physical explanations are hidden anthropomorphisms. One humanizes nature when one explains it; one projects the inner experiences of human beings onto it. But these subjective experiences are the inner essence of things. And one cannot therefore say that human beings do not recognize the objective truth—the “in-itself” of things—because they can form only subjective conceptions of them. ^{106Goethe’s views stand in the sharpest possible contrast to Kantian philosophy. The latter is based on the notion that the world of ideas is governed by the laws of the human mind and that, therefore, everything presented to it from the outside can exist within it only as a subjective reflection. Human beings do not perceive the “in-itself” of things, but rather the phenomenon that arises when things affect them and they combine these affections according to the laws of their understanding and reason. Kant and the Kantians have no conception that the essence of things speaks through this reason. For this reason, Kantian philosophy could never mean anything to Goethe. When he adopted individual propositions from it, he gave them a meaning entirely different from the one they have within the doctrine of their originator. It is clear from a note that only became known after the opening of the Weimar Goethe Archive that Goethe was well aware of the contrast between his worldview and Kant’s. For him, Kant’s fundamental error lies in the fact that Kant “now regards the subjective faculty of cognition itself as an object and distinguishes the point where the subjective and the objective converge—sharply, but not quite correctly.” The subjective and the objective come together when a person unites what the external world expresses and what one’s inner self makes known into a single essence of things. But then the opposition between the subjective and the objective ceases entirely; it vanishes into unified reality. I have already alluded to this in this work, pp. 218 ff. K. Vorländer now takes issue with my remarks from that time in the first issue of “Kantstudien.” He finds that my view on the contrast between Goethe’s and Kant’s worldviews is “at the very least highly one-sided and in contradiction to Goethe’s own clear statements” and that it stems from my “complete misunderstanding of Kant’s transcendental method.” Vorländer has no idea about the worldview in which Goethe lived. Engaging in a polemic with him would be of no use to me at all, for we speak different languages. Just how clear his thinking is can be seen in the fact that he never understands what I mean when I write something. For example, I make a comment on the following statement by Goethe: “As soon as a person becomes aware of the objects around him, he regards them in relation to himself—and rightly so. For his entire fate depends on whether they please or displease him, whether they attract or repel him, whether they benefit or harm him.” This entirely natural way of viewing and judging things seems as easy as it is necessary . . . A far more arduous daily task is undertaken by those whose lively drive for knowledge strives to observe the objects of nature in themselves and in their relationships to one another; they seek and investigate what is, and not what pleases.” My comment is: “Here we see how Goethe’s worldview is precisely the opposite pole of Kant’s. For Kant, there is no view whatsoever of things as they are in themselves, but only as they appear in relation to us. Goethe regards this view as merely a very subordinate way of relating to things.” Vorländer> comments on this as follows: These (words of Goethe) are intended solely as an introduction to clarify the trivial distinction between the pleasant and the true. The researcher should seek what is and not what pleases˃. Anyone who, like Steiner, dares to describe the latter as a very subordinate way of relating to things than Kant’s, would be well advised to first clarify for himself the basic concepts of Kant’s doctrine—for example, the distinction between subjective and objective sensation, as found in § 3 of the Critique of Judgment.” Now, as is clear from my statement, I have by no means said that this way of relating to things is Kant’s, but rather that Goethe does not find Kant’s conception of the relationship between subject and object to correspond to the relationship in which a person stands to things when he wishes to recognize them as they are in themselves. Goethe is of the opinion that Kant’s definition does not correspond to human cognition, but only to the relationship in which a person places himself in relation to things when he considers them in terms of his pleasure and displeasure. Anyone who can misunderstand a sentence in such a way as Vorländer does, should refrain from giving others advice on their philosophical education and instead first acquire the ability to learn how to read a sentence correctly. Anyone can look up Goethean quotations and compile them historically; Vorländer certainly cannot interpret them in the spirit of Goethe’s worldview.} There can be no question of any truth other than a subjective human truth. For truth is the projection of subjective experiences into the objective context of phenomena. These subjective experiences can even take on a wholly individual character. Nevertheless, they are the expression of the inner essence of things. One can project into things only what one has oneself experienced within oneself. Accordingly, each person, in accordance with their individual experiences, will project something that is, in a certain sense, different into things. How I interpret certain natural phenomena cannot be fully understood by another person who has not experienced the same thing inwardly. However, the point is not at all that all people should think the same way about things, but only that, when they think about things, they should live within the element of truth. One cannot, therefore, regard another’s thoughts as such and simply accept or reject them; rather, one should view them as expressions of that person’s individuality. “Those who contradict and argue should sometimes bear in mind that not every language is understandable to everyone” (Natw. Schr., Vol. 4, Part 2, p. 355). A philosophy can never convey a universally valid truth; rather, it describes the philosopher’s inner experiences through which he interprets external phenomena.

[ 9 ] When a thing expresses its essence through the faculty of the human mind, full reality comes into being only through the convergence of the external objective and the internal subjective. Human beings do not perceive reality through one-sided observation or one-sided thinking. Reality does not exist as something ready-made in the objective world, but is brought into being only through the human mind in connection with things. Objective things are only a part of reality. To those who extol sensory experience alone, one must reply, with Goethe, “that experience is only half of experience” (Natw. Schr., Vol. 4, Part 2, p. 503). “Everything factual is already theory”—that is, something ideal reveals itself in the human mind when it contemplates something factual. This worldview, which recognizes the essence of things in ideas and conceives of knowledge as an immersion into the essence of things, is not mysticism. It does, however, share with mysticism the view that objective truth is not regarded as something existing in the external world, but as something that can truly be grasped within the human being. The opposing worldview places the causes of things behind appearances, in a realm beyond human experience. It can either surrender to a blind faith in these causes—a faith that derives its content from a positive revealed religion—or formulate rational hypotheses and theories about the nature of this transcendent realm of reality. Both the mystic and the adherent of Goethe’s worldview reject both belief in an afterlife and hypotheses about such a realm, and hold fast to the true spiritual realm that expresses itself within human beings themselves. Goethe writes to [F. H.] Jacobi: “God has punished you with metaphysics and driven a stake into your flesh, while blessing me with physics ... I hold fast—and ever more firmly—to the atheist’s (Spinoza’s) worship of God … and leave to you all that you call and must call religion … When you say that one can only believe in God …, then I tell you, I place great value on contemplation.” [WA 7, 214] What Goethe wishes to see is the essence of things as expressed in his world of ideas. The mystic, too, seeks to recognize the essence of things through contemplation of his own inner self; but he rejects precisely this clear and transparent world of ideas as unsuitable for attaining a higher knowledge. He believes he must develop not his capacity for ideas, but other inner powers, in order to behold the fundamental nature of things. Geusually, it is through vague sensations and feelings that the mystic believes he grasps the essence of things. But feelings and sensations belong only to the subjective nature of human beings. They reveal nothing about things themselves. It is only in ideas that things speak for themselves. Mysticism is a superficial worldview, even though mystics often boast to rational thinkers about their “depth.” They know nothing about the nature of feelings; otherwise, they would not regard them as expressions of the essence of the world. And they know nothing about the nature of ideas; otherwise, they would not regard them as shallow and rationalistic. They have no inkling of what people who truly possess ideas experience in them. But for many, ideas are merely words. They cannot grasp the infinite richness of their content. No wonder they perceive their own idea-less empty phrases as empty .*

[ 10 ] Anyone who seeks the essential content of the objective world within their own inner self can also locate the essence of the moral order only in human nature itself. Anyone who believes in a reality beyond the human world must also seek the source of morality within it. For morality in the higher sense can only arise from the essence of things. The believer in the afterlife therefore accepts moral commandments to which human beings must submit. These commandments reach him either through revelation, or they enter his consciousness as such, as is the case with Kant’s categorical imperative. Nothing is said about how this enters our consciousness from the otherworldly “in itself” of things. It is simply there, and one must submit to it. The empirical philosopher, who expects all salvation from pure sensory observation, sees in morality only the workings of human drives and instincts. The norms that govern moral action are to follow from the study of these.

[ 11 ] Goethe posits that morality arises from the human realm of ideas. Moral action is guided neither by objective norms nor by mere instincts, but by ideas that are clear in themselves, through which human beings set their own course. He does not follow them out of duty, as he would have to follow objective moral norms. Nor does he follow them out of compulsion, as one follows one’s drives and instincts. Rather, he serves them out of love. He loves them as one loves a child. He desires their realization and advocates for them because they are part of his own being. The idea is the guiding principle, and love is the driving force in Goethe’s ethics. For him, duty is “where one loves what one commands of oneself” (Natw. Schr., Vol. 4, Part 2, p. 460).

[ 12 ] Action in accordance with Goethe’s ethics is free action. For human beings are dependent on nothing but their own ideas. And they are accountable to no one but themselves. I have already refuted, in my *Philosophy of Freedom* ^{107Berlin 1894 [Complete Edition, Dornach 1973]} refuted the facile objection that the consequence of a moral world order in which everyone obeys only themselves must be general disorder and disharmony in human action. Anyone who raises this objection overlooks the fact that human beings are similar in nature and that they will therefore never produce moral ideas that, due to their essential differences, would result in a disharmonious blend. ^{108The following circumstance demonstrates just how little understanding there is among contemporary professional philosophers of both ethical views and an ethics of freedom and individualism in general. In 1892, in an essay published in *Zukunft* (No. 5), I advocated a strictly individualistic conception of morality [now in *Collected Essays on Cultural and Contemporary History 1887–1901*; Complete Edition, Dornach 1966, pp. 169ff.]. Ferdinand Tönnies of Kiel responded to this essay in a pamphlet titled “Ethical Culture and Its Entourage: Nietzsche Fools in the ‘Future’ and in the ‘Present’.” (Berlin, 1893). He presented nothing but the tenets of philistine morality cast in philosophical formulas. Of me, however, he says that “on the way to Hades I could not have found a worse Hermes” than Friedrich Nietzsche. It strikes me as truly comical that Tönnies, in order to condemn me, cites some of Goethe’s “Sayings in Prose.” He does not realize that, if there was a Hermes for me, it was not Nietzsche but Goethe. I have already outlined the relationship between the Ethics of Freedom and Goethe’s ethics on p. 195 ff. of this work. I would not have mentioned this worthless pamphlet if it were not symptomatic of the misunderstanding of Goethe’s worldview that prevails in academic philosophical circles.}

[ 13 ] If human beings did not have the ability to produce creations that are shaped entirely in the same spirit as the works of nature, and that merely bring this spirit to life in a more perfect way than nature itself is capable of, there would be no art in Goethe’s sense. What the artist creates are natural objects at a higher level of perfection. Art is a continuation of nature, “for since man is placed at the summit of nature, he sees himself once again as a whole nature, which in turn must bring forth another summit within itself. To this end, he elevates himself by imbuing himself with all perfections and virtues, invoking choice, order, harmony, and meaning, and finally rising to the creation of the work of art” (Goethe, “Winckelmann”; Nat.-Lit. Vol. 27, p. 47). After viewing Greek works of art in Italy, Goethe writes: “These sublime works of art have been produced by human hands as the highest works of nature, in accordance with true and natural laws.” ^{109Italian Journey, Sept. 6, 1787.} Compared to the mere reality of sensory experience, works of art are a beautiful illusion; for those who are able to look more deeply, they are “a manifestation of secret laws of nature that would never become apparent without them” ([free rendering] cf. Natw. Schr., Vol. 4, Part 2, p. 494).

[ 14 ] It is not the material that the artist draws from nature that makes the work of art; rather, it is solely what the artist infuses into the work from within himself. The greatest work of art is one that makes us forget that it is based on natural material, and that arouses our interest solely through what the artist has made of that material. The artist creates, of course; but he does not create as nature itself does. These sentences seem to me to express the main ideas that Goethe set forth in his aphorisms on art .