The Rudolf Steiner Archive

26. On Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel — The Value of Philosophy for Theosophy

[ 1 ] As announced, I do not intend to give you a theosophical lecture this hour, but rather a more or less purely philosophical one. And if any of our esteemed theosophical listeners find the subject too philosophical and, shall we say, too difficult, I ask you to bear in mind that I did not promise anything easy for this afternoon, but rather something philosophical.

[ 2 ] The reason I am happy to include such an extraordinary lecture as this one is as follows: It is truly not unfair to bring to consciousness the realization that, in fact, within our theosophical consciousness, within our entire theosophical worldview and the current of our times, as it is practiced in the world—not as it is in its very essence—there is far too little thoroughness, far too little conscientiousness regarding what one might call the intellectual, the philosophical principle in the human soul.

[ 3 ] Now, anyone who wishes to look more deeply into what Theosophy truly is can come to realize—and will come to realize this with every step they take into Theosophy, where it reveals itself in its true form— that in the field of Theosophy, nothing—absolutely nothing—is said that would be incompatible with philosophy, scientific rigor, and intellectual thoroughness. Theosophy can be justified philosophically, scientifically, and logically from every angle. But Theosophy is not always cultivated and represented with the necessary seriousness. Therefore, this lecture is intended as an exhortation to a sense of responsibility—which is necessary when speaking of the highest things that Theosophy addresses—and as an exhortation to a sense of responsibility toward the intellectual realm, toward what is called scientific sense and scientific spirit.

[ 4 ] This is not to say, however, that every adherent of Theosophy should be required to possess this scientific mindset; that would be going too far. Theosophy aims to be something that can penetrate the hearts of the broadest masses of humanity, and with an unbiased sense of truth, it will always be received. However, those who advocate theosophy with full responsibility must always be mindful of the sense of scientific and intellectual rigor discussed here, in addition to all other factors that come into play in the field of theosophy.

[ 5 ] I would now like to offer you, from the broad realm of what a theosophist can present as such an admonition, a synthesized overview of the inner driving principle of modern philosophy, from Fichte through Schelling to Hegel. This will best help us to understand what was explained yesterday from a theosophical perspective—namely, that the philosophers Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel have contributed something significant to the development of the human spirit, though this has not yet been grasped in our present age.

[ 6 ] This comes as no surprise whatsoever to anyone who can appreciate what was at stake back then in the magnificent intellectual struggles of this triad of thinkers—Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. For the intellectual weapons that our present age produces—and which are sufficient for the great, admirable achievements of the natural sciences—these intellectual weapons are not sufficient to achieve what was at work in the souls of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel at the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. And why should we be surprised by this? In the final analysis, it can be fully justified and understood within the history of philosophy.

[ 7 ] If one wishes to understand Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in terms of their place within the intellectual development of humanity, one must consider this development from its starting point with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. For those who look deeply into these matters, everything in between is of little significance for the intellectual development of humanity. When one considers the matter historically, it becomes clear how, in the Middle Ages, Catholicism interpreted philosophy in the spirit of the medieval worldview. Aristotle, that great thinker of the pre-Christian era, first had to be forgotten, then rediscovered and applied according to the method of medieval philosophy and the medieval worldview. A compromise had to be reached: the justification of spiritual revelation through Aristotelianism. These two elements were brought together in the Middle Ages by attempting to do justice to both; in Scholasticism, they were combined—most decisively by Thomas Aquinas, who was called the “Doctor Angelicus” because he undertook the task of justifying the revelation of Christianity with the aid of Aristotelianism.

[ 8 ] Just how ill-equipped we are today to meet the challenges of that era is best illustrated by the fact that one of the more recent thinkers has completely misunderstood the matter. An understanding of Aristotelian thought is a prerequisite for comprehending the philosophy of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The theosophist need not be surprised by this. He can tell himself: It was inevitable that the dominant philosophy within Christianity would speak differently than it did in the eighteenth century.

[ 9 ] In particular, it is difficult to grasp that Aristotle’s psychology offers a—albeit faint, because purely philosophical—reflection of what we encounter again in theosophy. Let us first speak of the physical body. Aristotle begins only with the etheric body. He speaks of these things as one had to speak three to four centuries before the Christian era. What he calls the “Treptikon” is nothing other than what we call the etheric body, and what he calls the “Aesthetikon” is nothing other than what we call the sensory body or astral body. Essentially, it is all the same. The difference is that for theosophy it is something grasped from living perception, whereas for Aristotle it is something held within the shadowy realm of the logical philosophical tradition. Then there is also the “Erektikon,” which is what we call the sensory soul. And then the “Kinetikon,” the intellectual or emotional soul.

[ 10 ] There is one thing, however, that is missing from Aristotelianism: there is no adequate term for the soul of consciousness. But why should you be surprised that you cannot find it? At that time, thinking had simply not yet advanced and developed to the point where one could have spoken of the soul of consciousness. But it is only in the conscious soul that the “I” attains a conceptual, an inner perception of itself. At that time, Aristotle could not yet speak of the “I”—as in modern philosophy. Therefore, he had to speak of something else: that which flows in from the outside, from the spiritual exterior, into the sensory soul and into the intellectual or emotional soul. You will find that which reigns within—what we today call the conscious soul—in Aristotle’s gaze upward toward the divine, which acts upon human beings from without and spiritualizes the two soul components: the sensory soul and the intellectual or emotional soul. Aristotle calls this the “Nous.” What Aristotle calls the Nous is that which was perceived externally as the spirit in those days. The Nous is experienced in two ways: in the sensory soul and in the intellectual or emotional soul—as the inspirer of the sensory soul: “Nous poietikos,” and as the inspirer of the intellectual or emotional soul: “Nous pathetikos.” Here you have, from the ancient traditions of the Greek mysteries, what we encounter again today through spiritual research.

[ 11 ] Aristotle’s psychology was then used in the Middle Ages as a means of delving into the truths of Catholic revelation. However, Aristotelian psychology does not contain an actual doctrine of the self, as it arises from the perception of the self in the conscious soul. Yet it would be beneficial for our present age if we were to reclaim a somewhat different concept of Aristotle and incorporate it into our conceptual framework. Our entire conceptual framework lacks a concept that Aristotle possessed, and which, if understood, would suffice to simply sweep aside what modern Darwinism asserts with its philosophy of nature.

[ 12 ] Philosophy has lost this concept. Aristotle is well aware that, when it comes to human beings, we are first and foremost dealing with what we call their animal nature, and Aristotle certainly speaks of this animal nature of humans and its similarity to the animal nature in the animal kingdom. However, Aristotle speaks of the animal nature of human beings differently than he does of the animal nature of animals. Aristotle certainly speaks of the soul in animals, but he is clear that, although this animal soul is still present in the entire human organism, it undergoes a transformation there—one it must undergo—due to the animal soul’s permeation by the nous. And Aristotle describes this permeation of the animal soul by the Nous with a term that has been little understood. This is evident from the way it has been translated in standard histories of philosophy and translations of Aristotle. This is a term that is extremely difficult to convey today because it has not undergone any further development. If we wish to convey it, we might say something like the following would capture the concept: Something within the soul is filled with awe by a Higher Power, so that what occurs with the animal soul through Aristotle’s Nous is what one might call: a sense of awe, an overcoming of the power of the animal soul by the Nous. It is through this, however, that the human soul is brought forth in metamorphosis from the animal soul. And once this concept is grasped again, then one will indeed understand how to conceptualize the relationship between the human and the animal in a corresponding way within the framework of natural philosophy.

[ 13 ] I have presented to you some of the philosophical ideas that run through the entire Middle Ages, have been preserved into modern times, and have been used to justify Catholic ecclesiastical revelation. I have attempted to characterize this with a few concepts. These are just a few selected examples. I wanted to highlight this because I wish to convey to you the idea that it is not so easy to capture the meaning of Aristotelian concepts precisely and concisely, since today’s concepts no longer correspond to Aristotle’s. Even in the Middle Ages, the philosophers who understood him had the greatest difficulty in protecting him from misunderstandings. While *nous* was correctly translated as *intellectus agens*, the pantheistic philosophers of Arabism made the wildest leaps of interpretation precisely with such terms, which can only be correctly interpreted if one grasps their full significance for human nature and which are terribly distorted when one reads a nebulous pantheism into them.

[ 14 ] If we now turn to the second epoch of philosophical intellectual development that has been mentioned, one can, of course, characterize it adequately only by tracing the entire course of philosophical intellectual development from Aristotle’s initial struggle onward through Spinoza, then showing how, in German philosophy, this struggle took on a remarkable form in Leibniz and Wolff, and how, in Kantianism, a form of skepticism emerged in opposition to Wolffianism. It would be necessary to demonstrate this if one wishes to characterize the intellectual struggle of Western humanity; if one wishes to understand the triad of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel within the context of German philosophy; and if one wishes to gain an understanding of what, at the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, was philosophically attempted by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; and from the perspective of Kantianism, Fichte sought to present his philosophy of the “I.” But anyone who studies the emergence of Fichteanism from Kantianism sees that Kantianism was not the actual cause, but rather that the true impetus lay in Fichte’s own nature. Thus, I would like to characterize Fichteanism as a self-contained system. Entirely in keeping with humanity, which has by now attained self-consciousness, Fichte sets out to grasp the self. Whoever now descends into this abyss does not have an easy time of it. Therefore, do not believe that it would ever occur to me to be harsh toward those who do not understand Fichte and distort him. I understand every misunderstanding, every one of the still numerous objections, and I understand Schopenhauer, who called Fichte a windbag and a charlatan. This is perhaps somewhat understandable, because what one must possess to understand Fichte is so infinitely deep and abysmal that one can always find it forgivable when misunderstandings arise.

[ 15 ] Human thought does not always know how to relate logically to the “I,” and in this regard one can sometimes encounter a spectacular illogicality in literature, particularly in scientific literature. Even today, one can still see the wildest leaps being made when it comes to finding the transition from a claim made by the “I” to the application of that claim to the “I” itself. This is the logical foundation that matters. The transition from a claim made by the “I” to its application to the “I” must be grasped. Take the classic school example: A Cretan says, “All Cretans are liars.” — If all Cretans are liars, then that cannot be true. Therefore, what the speaker asserts can only be considered valid if he himself is excluded—if he is taken out of the equation. The moment you apply a statement made by the “I” to the “I” itself, you can no longer even cope with it in terms of formal logic. Yet all these points, which are repeatedly brought up, are not understood. Where the transition occurs from a statement made by the “I” to the “I” itself, people do not realize that this is a leap.

[ 16 ] There is a philosopher and psychologist who attributes everything a person does out of desires and passions, to a greater or lesser extent, to ordinary sensual drives. He has also written about student suicides. He attempts to show that it was not the reasons the student imagines that drove him to suicide, but that the real reasons lie in his sensual and sexual life. This philosopher and psychologist distinguishes, in countless areas, between the motive behind an action and the pretext, and he says that the pretext can be something entirely different from the motive—the motive, he claims, is something rooted in sensual life. If this worldview could only once realize how it appears when applied to itself—if one were to say to this psychologist: “Your reasons, everything you use to prove your case, are mere pretexts; but we see into your sensual, instinctual life, into your sinful instincts—that is where we find the motives for what you write.” There you have, in broad terms, characterized the transition that is not brought to consciousness.

[ 17 ] I wanted to use a rough example to show you how people today actually have so little logic in them that they do not understand the Cretan’s proposition. That was an example of the failure to understand this proposition. I wanted to show that one enters very specific realms when one ascends from the entirety of our worldview to that which constitutes the essence of our “I.”

[ 18 ] But then Fichte said to himself: Within the consciousness that a person initially possesses, nothing can actually exist; there can be nothing of which a person is aware without their “I” being involved. Whatever objects enter this consciousness must first be grasped by this “I” —they must touch the “I” in some way. Unless things, beings, or whatever they may be enter into some relationship with this “I,” the “I” can know absolutely nothing of what appears within the field of view of our consciousness. Fichte thus concluded: The “I” must be present everywhere; therefore, there is nothing we find within our consciousness, within our thinking organism, that can lie outside the “I.” Thus, for Fichte, a concept such as Kant’s “thing-in-itself” is a non-concept. And one can easily conclude that this thing-in-itself is a non-concept. After all, one would have to try to imagine this thing-in-itself. One is thus supposed to imagine that which lies outside of imagination. Can you imagine that which lies outside your imagination? It is impossible to imagine it.

[ 19 ] What I have expressed in a few words was what Fichte felt as a powerful impulse within his soul. Everything must be grasped by the tentacles of the “I”; the “I” is the great agent—and there can be nothing else within our experience—that must grasp everything. But this raises a question, of which Fichte is well aware: How is it, then, that the “I” is constantly surrounded by things that it clearly did not produce itself? Nothing should enter the field of consciousness in which the “I” is not involved. And yet the “I” finds that there are a great many things that it did not create. These are the fundamental points where Fichte drew attention to something that only modern theosophy can fully understand. He draws attention to this by saying: There is an activity of the “I” that we usually overlook. In somnambulism, we have an activity that emanates from the “I” but is not encompassed by conscious thinking. In somnambulism, we see an activity of the “I” that is more comprehensive and far-reaching than what one initially perceives through the ordinary waking consciousness of the “I.” Fichte thus descends to an activity that is an activity of the “I,” but does not fall within the realm of thought; yet it can be conceived, whereas an “I in itself” cannot be conceived as an absurdity. But that which corresponds to the “I” and is of the same nature as the activity of the “I”—that is what can also be grasped internally by the “I,” because it is of an “I”-like nature. Thus, Fichte points to an external world of which the “I” is aware that it did not create, yet—when it experiences itself as a comprehensive “I,” as an absolute “I”—in contrast to the relative “I”—it can still recognize that it is a part of this external world. In this way, Fichte points beyond the “I” through the “I.” This is the great advance in the field of philosophy, and with this advance something has occurred that goes beyond Descartes, beyond the “cogito ergo sum.” The “cogito ergo sum” is something that demonstrates the existence of the “I” through thought, whereas in Fichte’s characterization, the existence of the “I” arises from the will, and that is the essential point. All the cognitive powers Fichte could muster are condensed into the point of the “I.” And that is why it was he who was able to understand that, starting from the “I,” one must comprehend everything in the world.

[ 20 ] What I have outlined here in very rough terms was presented by Fichte in Jena in 1793–94, and if one wishes to understand his philosophical struggle in its nascent stage, the best way to do so is to pick up the first version of his *Wissenschaftslehre*—the 1794 edition, which still reveals the full extent of his philosophical struggle. Thus, so to speak, the philosophical horizon was created, and the spirit was raised to a higher level. The starting point, the vanishing point of the perspective, had been established.

[ 21 ] The next person to take up this task of formulating a worldview was Schelling. Schelling did something that is entirely understandable to anyone who can see into the essence of this matter, but which cannot be understood in our present time using the terms in common use. Schelling said to himself: Well, our great teacher Fichte—Schelling was his most brilliant student—has led us up to this point, but here the soul must be given content. Schelling had to go beyond the one-sided psychological understanding of “I am”; he had to, as it were, expand “I am” into a world. He could do this only by showing that, in the very way one perceives the “I am,” one can perceive even more. He referred to what is called “intellectual intuition.” What is this intellectual intuition? This much-misunderstood intellectual intuition is nothing other than the awareness that one can stand at the vantage point of “I am,” but does not have to remain there; rather, one can perceive something that is perceived in the same way as “I am,” and the content of this perception is present in intellectual intuition. This intellectual intuition has been widely denied.

[ 22 ] Thus, in Schelling, we find a conception of nature and spirit developed in the manner of self-knowledge. However, one must have a certain aptitude for this if one wishes to engage with such ideas as those expounded by Schelling. This applies in particular to his thoughts on light. It is easy to refute everything found in Schelling; it is much easier to refute him than to understand and justify him. The same is true of Hegel. It is easy to refute Hegel, but for those who wish to understand Schelling and Hegel, the goal cannot be to refute them, but rather to understand what they intended. Hegel was a student of Fichte and a contemporary of Schelling. For his part, he sought to carry forward what emerged on the horizon to which Fichte had elevated humanity—only in a different way than Schelling. Hegel did not allow for an “intellectual intuition.” He wanted to present what every person can discover without intellectual intuition, simply by honestly and sincerely adopting this standpoint. It became clear to Hegel that everything underlying a thing, a being, is given to us in the form of “I am.” Let us understand correctly what was on Hegel’s mind. It occurred to him: Why should concepts and ideas have any significance for the nature of things, or correspond to any truth, if what we experience in the mind—what our mind undergoes in the development of concepts—were not originally underlying the things themselves, if that were not the objective course of things? Thus, Hegel’s standpoint must be characterized in such a way that one says: Human beings can initially approach things in such a way that they form all manner of opinions and thoughts about them, only to then proceed from the opinions they form through external sensibility to the pure subject.

[ 23 ] Hegel set forth these ideas in his monumental work *Phenomenology of Spirit*, published in 1807. He completed this work in 1806, just as the thunder of cannon fire from the Battle of Jena could be heard in the vicinity of Jena. Hegel was in Jena at the time and was writing the final sentence. There, Hegel knew how to find his way to a vantage point where nothing subjective is taken into account, where neither subject nor object is taken into account, but where the Spirit manifests itself everywhere in the objective course of things. In ideas and concepts, the Spirit has made itself identical with the inner course of things.

[ 24 ] Anyone who cannot bring themselves to understand that these things must be interpreted in this way will not be able to grasp Hegel’s philosophy or Hegel’s logic. For Hegel, the point is that all “subjective reasoning” must be excluded. One should not intervene in how one concept is linked to another, but rather allow the concepts to link themselves to one another, just as they naturally grow out of one another and are structured in relation to one another. Hegel’s logic seeks to be a surrender to the structure of the world of concepts. How one concept develops from another—that is the essence of Hegel’s dialectic.

[ 25 ] To delve into Hegel’s logic is one of the most difficult undertakings of human thought. And that is why the usual result that occurs when people set out to study Hegel’s logic is that they find it too difficult. And I can assure you: Back when the critical edition of Hegel’s works did not yet exist—when only the old edition of Hegel was available—it was evident from the library records that this edition had been read very little. The consequences of this were then evident in the lectures; the instructors knew nothing. It is difficult to grapple with Hegel’s logic, but I would like to briefly suggest what one gains from engaging with it. I cannot provide an overview of Hegel’s philosophy today, but I can suggest what one gains by delving into it. Once one has delved into it, one has trained oneself to apply concepts with rigor.

[ 26 ] When you trace the steps in Hegel’s Logic from the abstract concept of Being through Nothingness, Becoming, Existence, Unity, Number, and Measure—when you allow all these concepts, which are strictly and organically structured in Hegel’s Logic, to take effect within you—then you come to realize deep in your soul that you say to yourself: Oh, how feeble much of what is said within humanity about spiritual matters is. One learns to use the concept in the sense to which it truly belongs in logic. That is what one becomes accustomed to through familiarity with this logic. Consider how all manner of concepts are used, picked up from our literary and scientific circles. Something of this rigor in thinking should be felt in the realm of theosophy. Here, what prevails most is the arbitrariness of “subjective reasoning”—the arbitrariness of concepts picked up here and there.

[ 27 ] Hegel then moves on from the “Science of Logic” to what he calls the philosophy of nature. This has, however, been the subject of much mockery, yet little has been understood of it. When one surveys things intellectually, one moves from logic to the philosophy of nature. One should let the phenomena speak for themselves; one should no longer speculate, but rather let the phenomena express themselves as they are reflected in the concept. Therefore, one has no choice but to let nature speak for itself. One must develop this inner activity, just as one has developed it for logical dialectics. But this is a complete mystery to me, and I can fully understand why Helmholtz—whom I admire as a natural scientist—said, upon reading Hegel’s philosophy of nature, “This is pure nonsense.”

[ 28 ] This requires that one first accustom oneself to that conscientious, logical-rational responsibility toward intellectual facts, as one can cultivate it through Hegel’s logic. Hegel accomplished many things for which modern philosophy has no understanding. The mechanical concepts applied to ordinary earthly events should, in the spirit of Hegel’s philosophy of nature, be used only for earthly processes; these finite mechanical concepts lose their meaning when we ascend to the realms of the heavens. There, Hegel moves from finite to absolute mechanics and demonstrates in a thorough and incisive manner how this is something entirely different from what must be referred to as Newtonian mechanics.

[ 29 ] One could gain a great deal by seeking to understand Hegel. Of course, from the perspective of that time, his views are sometimes highly questionable, but even so, one can be clear about what each individual point means. However, one must be aware that most of it was published based on notes taken by his students. I would therefore like to expressly emphasize that one should bear in mind from the outset that some of what is written there was expressed differently by Hegel himself. Regarding what is circulating in the world based on these notes, I can say that I have personally experienced what can result from transcribed lectures! Nevertheless, anyone open to engaging with it will recognize a major achievement in Hegel’s philosophy of nature.

[ 30 ] From this, as it were, “pouring out” of the Spirit into the individual things of nature, Hegel then moves on to the Spirit’s “return” to itself. He distinguishes three realms: the “Spirit in itself,” the beginning; the “Spirit for itself,” the Spirit that is spread out in nature and must be perceived in and of itself; and the “Spirit in and for itself.” This is the true philosophy of the Spirit, the “Philosophy of the Spirit.”

[ 31 ] Within the field of political philosophy, Hegel developed the philosophy of law in particular. When one considers what has been achieved since then, it can be said that there is still much to be gained from Hegel’s philosophy of law. Hegel was a figure with a profound Aristotelian sensibility who therefore initially sought to understand everything through the lens of Aristotelian rationality. Consequently, he placed at the forefront of his philosophy of law the principle that there is a rational point of entry for every problem. It is easy to refute Hegel—even through action; all it takes is for someone to do something foolish, and there is the refutation. But here you can see that, for Hegel, it is not a matter of witty refutations. Hegel developed his philosophy through the strictest, most disciplined thinking, and this discipline of thought can be acquired through the study of Hegelianism. One can also understand that the loftiness of this standpoint is not easily grasped. It is therefore understandable that the great poet Grillparzer—who was extraordinary in many respects—was terribly horrified when he was introduced to Hegel’s philosophy. He said:

“It is possible that you teach us, prophetically, the divine way of thinking,
But the human way, my friend, you will surely destroy.”

[ 32 ] You can see that intellectual matters are held in such high regard here that even great minds who do not understand Hegel can be excused. There is no need to consider them idiots. But it must be immediately countered that the greatest discipline can be found in Hegel’s philosophy. A lack of this intellectual discipline can be found in all subsequent philosophers. It is painful for anyone who has a grasp of this difficult intellectual activity to witness the arbitrariness of scientific—and especially philosophical—literature. It is terrible what impossibilities one experiences who has been educated in Hegel. It is terrible what one must endure who has engaged with the highest intellectual structures that Hegel has constructed.

[ 33 ] We can be certain that humanity will one day come to understand what was expounded yesterday in the theosophical lecture. Hegel’s fate will be the same as Aristotle’s. Hegel is forgotten today. What appears today as a revival of Hegelianism is a chapter we would rather not discuss. Even if the intellectual struggle of the triad of thinkers—Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel—is forgotten today, the human spirit will have to work through this intellectual struggle, just as Catholic revelation was worked through in the Middle Ages in light of Aristotle. Hegel’s philosophy is something that must be grasped from the starting point of our present into the future. Those who have made this clear to themselves can defy all that is devastating that may emerge from the present; they can see that this devastation is merely the flip side of what is taking shape today as the future, and how the seed of what must come is revealed in this flip side.

[ 34 ] It is quite disheartening to see how rapidly the level of thought has declined. It behooves the theosophist to turn his gaze toward the realms of pure thought. I would love to give lectures of this kind everywhere to establish a firm, secure foundation for Theosophy, if only I had the time and could justify it in light of the need for Theosophy to progress more rapidly.

[ 35 ] When we approach the great theosophical truths that speak to our most fundamental human sensibilities, as presented in spiritual science, let us be aware that we must not abandon rigorous thinking. Let us be aware that there can be nothing theosophical that cannot withstand the strictest criticism of a philosophical mind. We should make it our ideal to say nothing that cannot withstand the strictest demands of reason.