The Rudolf Steiner Archive

8. “Faust” as a Problem in Science Education

Article in “Pädagogische Reform, auch Organ der Hamburger Lehrmittel-Ausstellung” dated August 10, 1904

[ 1 ] It is not difficult to see how much Goethe’s Faust is, in fact, a tragedy of the quest for education. And through the student, who receives instruction from Mephistopheles and then, in the second part, displays his own wisdom, the tragedy at times also becomes a comedy. But there is more! It is not merely education in general that we see here being pursued—and, in part, even mocked. The text also portrays very specific historical institutions of the educational system. The medieval university comes to life once again.

[ 2 ] As our understanding of the educational system itself advances, it will also be valuable for us to gain a deeper understanding of images such as those Goethe has presented to us here. His work is a late manifestation of a long literary tradition—the Faust legend and Faust poetry, which have unfolded in manifold ways since the 16th century. A modern movement aimed precisely at promoting and exploring the highest levels of all systems of education and upbringing cannot, least of all, overlook such deeply characteristic literary representations. The movement that has set itself this task—and which therefore seeks to cultivate the pedagogy of the sciences and the arts as such—has indeed sought to grasp the significance of the Faust theme for itself.

[ 3 ] The somewhat cumbersome and ambiguous term “science and arts education” has been replaced by that movement with the simpler term “higher education.” This highlights the crucial role that institutions of higher education actually play in the education of the sciences and arts. Higher education, with its various institutions, also plays a role in the Faust poems. Yet this role of the educational system remains, for both this literature and that movement, primarily an external matter. The main point, in both cases, is the manner in which devotion to a science or an art unfolds in relation to the subject matter and the individual. And it is precisely this that Goethe’s Faust depicts in such a unique way. The author of these lines has made a few allusions to them in two other places, in the two essays: “Faust’s Disciples and Companions” (“Ethische Kultur,” April 11, 1903) and “A New Faust” (“Neue Freie Presse,” July 5, 1903). However, it seemed urgently necessary to explore the topic in greater depth beyond these brief allusions. The “Association for Higher Education,” which aims to provide an external framework for this modern movement, therefore turned to a researcher who had long been committed to its ideals and who possessed specialized knowledge of Goethe’s work. Thus, Dr. Rudolf Steiner undertook the task of delivering a lecture on this subject, entitled: “Faust as a Problem in the Pedagogy of Science.” The lecture took place at the aforementioned association in Berlin and also gave rise to a lively discussion within that circle. We can hardly continue our own treatment of the topic any better than by simply yielding the floor to the aforementioned speaker and to the voices of the debate that joined his lecture. Dr. Steiner stated, roughly:

[ 4 ] The idea of treating the theme of Faust as a problem in the pedagogy of the sciences originated with the founder of the Association for Higher Education Pedagogy. “A certain shudder,” the speaker continued, “seized me at first, as if this were merely a continuation of the old habit of linking everything possible to Goethe. Upon careful reflection, however, I found a deep connection to what we advocate under the name of higher education pedagogy.” Pedagogy finds its specific application at all levels of educational institutions: in elementary schools, in secondary schools, and also in institutions of higher education in the broader sense of the term. The very premise of our endeavors is that these, too, must be subject to a form of pedagogy. If a comprehensive literary account of these institutions were ever to be undertaken, it would require, as its final chapter, one devoted precisely to the present topic. After all his other discussions, the author will have to answer the important question: How should a subject taught at a university relate to the ideal aspects of life? What can our higher education provide and offer us in terms of a higher outlook on life? Everywhere we must navigate one-sided educational paths. How, then, do we arrive at a broad and free perspective? At a satisfying outlook on life?

[ 5 ] The question raised here also lies at the heart of the Faust problem in its historical form, which it has taken on since the 16th century and was still evident in the 19th century in the work of Nikolaus Lenau. In a word, the question is: What does higher education have to offer humanity?

[ 6 ] The historical Faust is said to have earned his bachelor’s degree in Heidelberg in 1509, later obtaining a master’s degree and a doctorate, and to have also studied in Ingolstadt, etc. The historical figure of Dr. Faust and the significant impression he made on his contemporaries are beyond question. Faust appears to us as a highly dangerous individual. As early as 1505, Abbot Tritheim wrote about him. According to him, Faust was already a famous figure at that time, appearing in many places in a dizzying manner. Later, he went to Kraków to study magic. This raises the question for us: how could a doctor of theology and medicine go to Kraków for the sake of such trifles and then go on to become a sorcerer? In addition, there are reports of his dissolute lifestyle and so on. He was, therefore, a person who had excelled in his studies yet gained so little stability in life from them. Did science offer him so little strength? Is it possible to reach the pinnacle of scholarship and still be unable to cope with life?

[ 7 ] A key question in higher education is that of the value of an academic education. We see this reflected in Goethe as well. Faust, however, was not a pathological figure, but rather a product of his time. And Goethe incorporated his most personal experiences into Faust. Recall the way he speaks of himself on the occasion of his departure from the University of Strasbourg. The questions of higher education education practically swarm around us here.

[ 8 ] Goethe’s personality certainly has much to tell us here as well, despite the fact that his studies were disjointed. He was in a similar position to Faust. He studied in Leipzig and Strasbourg in a scientific manner familiar to us today, and in doing so sought enlightenment regarding the mysteries of life. He confronts us with a profound doubt, which was, however, also a fundamental trait of Goethe’s personality. With the necessary distinctions, we find Goethe similar to Faust, yet without the latter’s instability. Thus, it seems to us that even in Goethe’s case, higher education proves powerless when it comes to the ideal goods of life. How does the student come to such a state of bewilderment? Goethe pondered this throughout his life. However, he sought salvation for his Faust from outside himself. Had he still been living during the Enlightenment as an older man, he would (according to his own statement) have concluded Faust with the words:

A good person, even in their darkest moments
Is well aware of the right path.

[ 9 ] But now, in his old age, he had to put an end to mysticism. Goethe was unable to say how a scholar, as such, could relate to life.

[ 10 ] We are thus faced with a depressing thought; and this raises two further questions for us. First: How do such personalities in particular come to ask such questions? The naive person, of course, will be easily satisfied; but how do these questions arise specifically in the mind of the scholar? Consider Lenau’s Faust standing before the corpse, from which no answer ever comes! But then, secondly, the question: Does such doubt stem from the inherent limitations of science itself, or rather from our inadequate university education? In the former case, we approach it from an epistemological perspective; in the latter, from the perspective of university pedagogy. I would like—said the lecturer—to demonstrate here that the latter is correct.

[ 11 ] We see a well-educated individual who stands powerless before the mysteries of life. The point is that something takes the place of science. The sciences raise questions in the student’s mind that would not otherwise occur to him. That is not the purpose, but it is a necessary side effect of scientific inquiry. Jurisprudence may teach us this and that; beyond that, however, it raises questions—such as those concerning human responsibility—that the naive person does not ask. Economics awakens in us questions about social connections. The natural sciences have a similar effect: consider biology, particularly the question of the gradual development of organic life. And the study of classical art leads us to ask about the psychology of the Greek people and the development of humanity as a whole. Thus, our studies instill in us a sense of caution precisely regarding the most profound mysteries of human life. Without those side effects, we cannot become competent lawyers, etc.

[ 12 ] It is only natural that academic study—whatever else it may offer—initially makes us feel uncertain; and this is all the more true because any field of study must necessarily be one-sided. Dilthey’s Introduction to the Humanities shows that we can only ever view the whole from individual perspectives. How do we manage to transcend these inevitable limitations? How do we move from one-sidedness to comprehensiveness? It is only natural that those who have passed through one-sidedness lose their footing. Goethe, however, could not resolve this question in a scholarly, university-level manner. And I, too—said the lecturer—must proceed one-sidedly here and not, for example, take an aesthetic approach.

[ 13 ] Goethe was unable to find what he was seeking based on the knowledge available at the universities of that time. During his studies in Leipzig, he searched for a worldview. Later came his relationship with Fräulein von Klettenberg and his study of Paracelsus.

[ 14 ] What, then, follows from that necessary relationship? The sciences burden us with questions, yet cannot, at first, free us from them. The demand is to give human beings what they have the right to demand here. Goethe sought to demonstrate this in his own way. Our question is this: How can we organize higher education while taking into account the side effects described above? That final chapter of a comprehensive work on higher education pedagogy will move from one branch to the next, examining the existential doubts that arise there. Furthermore, how should these doubts be addressed within the university itself so that students emerge equipped to face life? In a certain sense—if we may speak in extremes—the university is at fault in that it burdens us. The task of its pedagogy will be to answer precisely the question of what demands should be placed on higher education pedagogy in this regard. The situation is similar even in elementary school pedagogy. The goal of true higher education pedagogy must be not to eradicate those doubts, but to equip us so that we can combat them. Yet it is precisely this that is usually overlooked.

[ 15 ] Now we know why the historical Faust could lose his footing. It was precisely in his time that it became possible for the scholar to find no definitive confirmation of his studies. Earlier, in the Middle Ages, it was theology that provided this crowning achievement. From the fifteenth to the sixteenth century, a major upheaval took place in the world of scholarship; the Faust legend is precisely the expression of this. How does one cope with life without the Bible and theology? These, however, had resolved doubts in their own way. Yet even in the eighteenth century, higher education had not yet advanced that far.

[ 16 ] The Kantian question—“How is science possible?”—also has an aspect related to higher education. We recognize this in Kant’s two writings: the one from 1796, “On a Recently Assumed Grand Tone in Philosophy,” and the one from 1798, “The Conflict of the Faculties.” And well into the nineteenth century, this lack of stability can be seen as a psychological foundation of scientific personalities. Our poet also made this fundamental question of the era—up to Goethe—his own. Thus, he became the poet of the problem of higher education.

[ 17 ] We put forward the following thesis: Our task with regard to higher education pedagogy will only be fulfilled if we overcome those reservations. If we fail to do so—if we allow students to leave without having grasped what we intended—this constitutes a clear breach of our ethical and pedagogical duty in higher education. Every individual field of study must be accompanied by a careful exploration of the questions about life that arise from that field. If the higher education educator does not carelessly overlook the human soul, he must come to terms with this question. In doing so, we will not promote career advancement, but we will foster reflection on life’s questions in the spirit of what has been studied. In this way, we can cause the “Faustian” natures—even the minor ones—to disappear.

[ 18 ] It is impossible here to go into the details of Goethe’s work. We must not mistake Mephistopheles’ mockery—which is the very expression of vulgar life—for Goethe’s own words. From these contexts arises that oppressive atmosphere, that peculiar milieu, which characterizes the first part of the tragedy. Opposite the narrow-minded minion Wagner stands the helpless Faust; and then, in turn, the student thirsting for problems, who cannot find the solution in the unpedagogical treatment of science! Goethe has Mephistopheles speak out against this false pursuit of science. In the second part of the tragedy, we then see how Goethe reflects on this in his poetic way. By then, he had also undergone practical training in higher education—specifically at the institutions of the University of Jena, which he headed as minister. The scenes of the first part had been written out of longing and demand. Those of the second part are different. As supervisor of the university, Goethe had gained intimate experience. Anyone who has even briefly examined the records of the Weimar Ministry recognizes Goethe as the most ideal university administrator, one who takes into account, on the one hand, the most immediate practical demands of life and, on the other, the demands of scholarship, yet strives to harmoniously unite the two. Goethe knew full well how to navigate the university system. Drawing on these experiences and his own efforts, he wrote the second part of his tragedy, particularly its second act. The character of the Homunculus has been the subject of a wide variety of interpretations, none of which are incorrect, since such figures possess infinite depth. In any case, however, one thing is symbolically expressed here: the connection between scientific knowledge and the highest goals of life. Goethe also wove his knowledge of science education into the second part. There he symbolically shows how science is guided step by step; the focus is on the observation of living nature, the progression from dry conceptualization to the human being. Yet the Homunculus has a second task: it leads to antiquity. From Goethe’s Italian Journey, we see how the poet seeks knowledge of nature step by step, but also immediately transforms this knowledge into skill and leads it to the pinnacle of human existence. What is the goal of art? “There is necessity, there is God,” and so on. He now shows us this psychological development of his own spirit in the second part. Thus, scholarship—whether dry or solitary—must never stand alone; it must always lead to life. The homunculus longed for reality, a longing to step beyond one-sidedness. May people always be led to dry scholarship: this, too, must have the power to lead them beyond themselves.

[ 19 ] In this final chapter on higher education pedagogy, we must therefore demonstrate what major life puzzles the various academic disciplines raise, and how these puzzles can be solved. This is not an insurmountable task. The various branches of science place high demands on us today; nevertheless, it must still be possible to meet those demands of science.

[ 20 ] My intention—the speaker concluded—was to derive a conclusion from Goethe, namely, simply a demand. How this demand is to be fulfilled will be the subject of many further reflections on higher education. I have endeavored to demonstrate the necessity of that thesis. So much for Dr. Steiner’s lecture. It may now be of interest to report on the impression the lecture made among his audience—that is, to recount the discussion that followed. It began with the following presentation from a philosophical perspective.

[ 21 ] The speaker—as this voice explained—has shown how the positive sciences stimulate us to ask questions, but do not resolve the ultimate “metaphysical” questions. What is certainly true here is that science neither wants nor is able to offer more than that. The reason, however, that the sciences are nevertheless capable of more than merely addressing specific details lies in the fact that naive understanding overlooks the deeper questions, since it lacks experience and the work of preceding generations. To frame a problem correctly is tantamount to solving it halfway. The sciences rise above superficial observation, delve deeper, reveal things more clearly than superficial observation does, and pose new questions. With knowledge comes doubt. The deeper we delve, the more questions we ask. But how can this misfortune be remedied? Uncertainty can become oppressive for us. Ms. Beneke has used the motif of this insurmountable burden to reinforce the assumption of immortality. In any case, it is one of the soundest arguments for her. However, those questions cannot be answered by Goethe. “I do not know,” said the questioner, “what can be done in this regard for higher education.” Only the individual teacher can impart to the individual student something that goes beyond philistinism. Antiquity also has something to offer here, but far too little.

[ 22 ] Another voice from the medical community expressed the following view. It would be too much to go over the entire matter. Where there is so much agreement, it should not be considered ungrateful to also fulfill the duty of raising necessary reservations. We have been led here, so to speak, to a pseudo-academic level. To support the idea that all knowledge leads to doubt, one could even cite the Preacher of Solomon and Friedrich Schiller. It seems, however, that the individual sciences are demonstrating that the riddles they raise are unsolvable, and every single teacher could ensure this. But this goes beyond the scope of our discussion so far. The lecturer was shrewd in not saying how this should be done. Perhaps the message is: We should once again listen to our philosophy lectures as we did in the past. But does philosophy really have an answer for everything?! Rather, it seems necessary to us to point out that the search for truth takes precedence. Today, due to the natural sciences, circumstances are different than they were in the past.

[ 23 ] The author of these lines emphasized, in response to the previous comment, that the topic is of great relevance to higher education pedagogy and will in fact be addressed in a chapter of a comprehensive work. The “how” in question primarily concerns the teacher’s pedagogically trained personality.

[ 24 ] Furthermore, a speaker who took the floor immediately afterward stated that we cannot do justice to the wealth of material presented in the lecture, and that he intended to highlight just a single point. Goethe was so universal that it is impossible to pin down any single detail as the poet’s personal opinion. With him, everything is in a state of becoming. According to Hegel, this corresponds to the dialectical development inherent in things. Which branch of knowledge, then, provides a comprehensive picture and thus a concentrated influence on the personality? Philosophy is the first to claim this role, especially metaphysics—which Goethe himself despised. The fact that people no longer wish to engage with it is a product of modern anxiety. Redner has long been the first to practice it again at his university. It concerns the well-known problems, chiefly that of the relationship between our world of ideas and the real world. Yet one can arrive at this problem from any branch of science. Just as with the natural sciences, one can point, for example, to jurisprudence. It is up to us to establish the i8&i0oxpayia tüs vvxig; in doing so, we will master the problem of life. The most despised discipline, dogmatics, gives these problems serious consideration. In this way, all the individual disciplines could be cited. The division of labor makes this understandable. Metaphysics cannot solve the problem of life without the other disciplines. The great shift that has taken place over the past few decades has led us to view as the only truly knowable that which lies within consciousness. In his treatise on the function of judgment, W. Jerusalem (Vienna) retreats into a form of realism to which the “You-problem” allegedly compels us. Thus, we are directed toward practical purposes and policing! I cannot go along with this sacrilege against the unconditional nature of the drive for knowledge. We say: “Whoever wants to teach must have something to offer” (Goethe). There is a need to instill knowledge in others. Thus, we move from science to the “I-You problem.” For the connection between science and life, however, we still need another science. And this is, in fact, pedagogy. In it, all sciences come into their own. Furthermore, one of the purposes of higher education is also to train university educators. We also need a seminar on university pedagogy. The question raised several times—who, then, should train its teachers—is simply answered by the fact that the older ones train the younger ones.

[ 25 ] In his closing remarks, the speaker went on to say the following: My task was strictly one of science education. For that reason, I could not delve into the specifics of the individual sciences. Students must become capable of coping with life—even in the face of resignation. It was necessary for me to remain strictly focused on education here. I merely sought to discuss the psychological reality of those longings. Something must be done to address them. Goethe, however, grasped our problem in higher education pedagogy only intuitively and exemplified it for us, just as he exemplifies nature for us. He may not have given higher education pedagogy a second thought. As for the “how,” a philosophical seminar is not enough. Rather, we must explore, from an educational perspective, how the individual teacher is to come to terms with life’s challenges. We cannot offer detailed solutions, but we can certainly point the way. That “how” is, in fact, a major philosophical endeavor. For this reason, we cannot delve further here into the question of epistemological standpoints, despite the valuable insights offered by a seminar. The main point is: We want to become capable of living. So it is not a matter of dogmatic solutions, but rather of finding paths.