The Rudolf Steiner Archive

3. Legal Issues—The Role and Limits of Democracy: Public Legal Relationships and the Administration of Criminal Justice

[ 1 ] Whether one gains a proper understanding of social life depends in many respects on whether one is clear about the relationship between people—who, after all, bring about social life through their coexistence—and the institutions within which people live. Anyone who looks at social life with an open mind will discover that, ultimately, all the institutions we have around us arise from the actions and the will of human beings. Anyone who brings themselves to adopt this view will ultimately conclude: In social life, what matters above all is whether people, through their strengths, their abilities, their attitude toward others, and so on, prove themselves to be social or antisocial individuals. People with a social mindset and a social outlook on life will create institutions that have a social impact. And to a very large extent, one can say: Whether the individual is able to earn a livelihood commensurate with his or her income will depend on how his or her fellow human beings provide the means for this livelihood—whether they work in such a way that he or she can support himself or herself with his or her own resources. Whether the individual can buy enough bread—to put it in the most concrete terms—will depend precisely on whether people have established such institutions through which anyone who works, who contributes, can exchange their work and contributions for the corresponding amount of bread. And whether the individual is in a position to actually put his work to use—to actually occupy the position where he can acquire the necessary means for his livelihood—depends, in turn, on whether the people among whom he lives have established social institutions through which he can attain his rightful place.

[ 2 ] Well, it really takes very little more than an unbiased look at social life to recognize what has just been stated as an axiom, as a fundamental insight into the social question. And for those who do not acknowledge it, it will be difficult to prove this principle to them, because they lack the inclination to look at life with an open mind—yet they can be convinced from every aspect of life that this is indeed the case.

[ 3 ] For modern people, however, this view has something extraordinarily unpleasant about it. For modern people place great importance on ensuring that no one dares to meddle with them. He readily accepts talk of improving institutions or transforming them, but he perceives it as an infringement on his human dignity when one is compelled to suggest that he himself should undergo a transformation in his state of mind or in his way of life. They readily accept it when people say that institutions should be made more socially oriented; they find it hard to accept when the demand is made that they themselves should become more socially oriented.

[ 4 ] And so something extraordinarily peculiar has occurred in the recent historical development of humanity. Over the course of the last few centuries, economic life—as I have already discussed in the first lecture—has developed beyond what people have formulated in terms of their views, particularly their legal and intellectual views, regarding this economic life. In the first lecture, I pointed out how Woodrow Wilson’s social critique ultimately boils down to his statement: Economic life has made its demands, has advanced, and has taken on certain forms; legal and intellectual life—through which we seek to govern this economic life—still stands on old ground and has not kept pace. This, however, highlights a profoundly significant fact of recent human development.

[ 5 ] With the emergence of complex technical conditions and the resulting complex capitalist and business conditions, economic life has imposed its own demands. The realities of economic life have, I might say, gradually slipped beyond human control; they are, to a greater or lesser extent, taking their own course. Human beings have not found the strength to master this economic life of their own accord through their mental images or ideas. Through reflection on economic demands—on the economic reality as it is directly observed—modern humanity has come to shape its concepts of law and its spiritual concepts more and more. And so one can say: What is characteristic of the development of humanity in recent centuries is that both the legal concepts through which people seek to live together in peace, and the concepts of spiritual life through which they seek to develop and shape their abilities, have become highly dependent on economic life.

[ 6 ] One hardly notices how much, in recent times, people’s mental images and their behavior toward one another have come to depend on economic life. Of course, people have created the institutions of the past few centuries themselves, but for the most part they did not create them out of newly formed mental images and ideas, but rather out of unconscious impulses and drives. And this has resulted in something that can actually be called a certain anarchic element in the structure of the social organism. I have already analyzed this anarchic element from various perspectives in the first two lectures.

[ 7 ] But it is precisely within this anarchic social structure of recent times that the conditions have developed which have led to the modern form of the proletarian question. The proletarian, who has been torn away from his craft, placed at the machine, crammed into the factory—what did he see above all else as he observed the life unfolding around him? He saw, above all, in his own life how dependent everything is—everything he can think, every right he has vis-à-vis other people—on economic power relations, on the economic power relations that are determined for him, above all, by the fact that he is economically weak in relation to the economically strong.

[ 8 ] And so one can say: Among the ruling circles, a certain denial has set in regarding the fundamental truth that human institutions should arise from human beings themselves, out of their conscious lives. People have forgotten to truly apply this fundamental truth in social life. The ruling circles have gradually and instinctively devoted themselves to a way of life—if not a belief—that has made the spirit and the law dependent on the means of economic power. From this, however, a dogma has arisen: a worldview held by socialist-minded individuals and their followers. This view of life has emerged from the belief that human development must be such that there is no possibility for human beings to organize legal relationships of their own accord, or to organize spiritual life for themselves; rather, spiritual life and legal life must arise as an appendage from economic realities, from the branches of economic production, and so on.

[ 9 ] And so the social question emerged among broad circles as a specific demand. This was based on the belief that economic life shapes legal life, and economic life shapes intellectual life—and therefore economic life must be restructured in such a way that it gives rise to a legal life and an intellectual life that meet the demands of these circles. What had become a way of life for the ruling classes, the proletariat learned to bring into conscious awareness; what the others had instinctively lived out, it turned into a dogma, and today we face the social question in such a way that the view is widespread in the broadest circles: We need only reorganize economic life and economic institutions; then everything else—legal life and intellectual life—will follow naturally, just as such intellectual and legal life will arise from economically sound, good, and socially structured institutions.

[ 10 ] Under the influence of this perspective, the true nature of the modern social question has been misunderstood. It has, so to speak, been obscured and veiled by a great deception, by a powerful illusion stemming from this dogma. For the issue is actually this: it is precisely a result of the recent history of humanity that the dependence of legal and intellectual life on economic life must be overcome. And while broad socialist circles today believe that economic life must first be restructured, after which everything else will follow naturally, we must ask ourselves: What conditions must be created in the realms of law and intellectual life so that, out of a renewed intellectual life and a renewed legal life, economic conditions may arise that meet the demands of a dignified existence? Not: How do we make legal life and intellectual life increasingly dependent on economic life? — but rather: How do we break free from this dependence? — that is, above all, the question that must be asked.

[ 11 ] This observation is a very important one, for it shows us what obstacles stand in the way of an unbiased understanding of the social issues of our time, and how one of the most significant obstacles is a dogma that has developed over the centuries. And this dogma has become so firmly entrenched that many educated and uneducated people today—proletarians and non-proletarians alike—will practically laugh at anyone who believes that a revitalization of the legal and intellectual spheres could come about through any means other than a transformation of economic life.

[ 12 ] Today, my task is to speak about legal life; the day after tomorrow, about spiritual life. Legal life, in its very nature and significance, has often confronted people with the question: What is the actual origin of law? What is the origin of that which people, in their interactions with one another, describe as “just”? — This question has always been a very, very important one for people. Yet it is very strange that, among a wide circle of socially minded individuals, the actual question of law has, one might say, fallen through the cracks—it is no longer even there. Certainly, there are still many academic and theoretical discussions today about the nature and significance of law and so on, but what is characteristic of the social perspective of broad circles is precisely that the question of law has more or less fallen by the wayside.

[ 13 ] If I am to discuss this with you, I must draw your attention to something that is becoming increasingly evident in the present, even though it was completely overlooked until recently. People have witnessed the emergence of untenable social conditions. Even those whose own way of life has remained more or less unaffected by these antisocial conditions have tried to reflect on them. And while it was indeed the case—as I just stated—that not so long ago people would simply laugh at the very idea that legal and philosophical questions could have any bearing on economic conditions, today—as if from the dark depths of the human spirit, one might say—we are increasingly confronted with the assertion: Yes, in people’s mutual social behavior, factors such as spiritual and legal issues do indeed come into play; and much of the confusion in social conditions today stems from the fact that too little consideration has been given to the spiritual, psychological, and legal circumstances of human beings in their own right. - So, to some extent—because it is tangible—it is pointed out that salvation must come from a perspective other than the purely factual, economic one. But in practical discussions of the issue, this aspect is still given little weight.

[ 14 ] It is like a common thread running through everything that modern socialist thinkers have to say: that a social structure must be brought about in which people can live according to their abilities and their needs. Whether this is presented in a more or less grotesquely radical manner or in a more conservative vein is irrelevant; we hear it everywhere: The ills of the current social order stem largely from the fact that people are unable to fully utilize their abilities within the current social order; on the other hand, that this social order is such that they cannot satisfy their needs—namely, that there is no certain uniformity in the satisfaction of those needs.

[ 15 ] By saying this, one goes back to two fundamental elements of human life. Abilities are something that relate more to human mental images. For all abilities ultimately arise in human beings—since they must act consciously—from their mental image, from their will to think. Certainly, feeling must continually spur on and inspire the faculties of imagination; but feeling as such can do nothing unless the fundamental mental image is present. So when one speaks of faculties—even when speaking of practical skills—one ultimately arrives at the life of imagination. It thus dawned on a number of people that care must be taken to ensure that human beings can bring their imaginative life to bear within the social structure. The other point that is then raised pertains more to the life element of volition in human beings. The will—which is connected to desire and to the need for certain products—is a fundamental force of the human being. And when one says that people should be able to live within a social structure according to their needs, one is referring to the will.

[ 16 ] Without realizing it, even the Marxists are talking about human beings when they raise their social question and actually want to give the impression that they are speaking only of institutions. They may well be speaking of institutions, but they want to shape these institutions in such a way that the life of the imagination and human abilities can come to the fore, and that human needs can be satisfied equally, just as they exist.

[ 17 ] Now there is something very peculiar about this view. In this view, in fact, one element of human life is completely overlooked, and that is the emotional life. You see, if one were to say: The aim is to achieve a social structure in which people can live according to their abilities, their feelings, and their needs—then one would be addressing the whole person. But curiously, in attempting to comprehensively characterize what the social goal for human beings is, one leaves out their emotional life. And whoever omits emotional life from their view of humanity actually omits any consideration of the real legal relationships within the social organism. For legal relationships can only develop in human coexistence in such a way that, in this coexistence, emotion is gradually shed and worn away. Just as people feel toward one another, so does public law emerge. And therefore, because the vital element of feeling was omitted from the fundamental question of social movement, the question of law actually had to, as I said, fall into a void and disappear. And the point is to place precisely this question of law in the proper light. Certainly, one knows that a right exists, but one would like to present the right merely as an appendage to economic conditions.

[ 18 ] And how does law develop in human society? You see, attempts have often been made to define law, but no truly satisfactory definition of law has ever emerged. Nor has much come of examining the origin of law—where law comes from. People have sought to answer this question. Nothing worthwhile has ever come of it. Why not? It is just as if one were to try to develop language somehow from human nature alone—and from human nature alone. It has often been said, and it is true: a person who grows up on a deserted island would never learn to speak, for language is sparked by other people, by the whole of human society.

[ 19 ] Thus, within public life, law arises from one’s own feelings in interaction with the feelings of others. One cannot say that law arises from this or that aspect of the individual or of humanity; rather, one can only say: Through the feelings they develop toward one another, people enter into such relationships that they define and establish these relationships as rights. Law is therefore something that should be examined by focusing, above all, on its development within human society. Consequently, for modern people, the consideration of law comes into direct proximity to what has emerged in the history of modern humanity as the democratic demand.

[ 20 ] One cannot come close to understanding the nature of such demands—such as the demand for democracy—unless one views human development itself as a kind of organism. But current ways of thinking are very, very far removed from this. Surely everyone would find it utterly ridiculous and paradoxical if one were to try to explain how a person develops from birth to death under the influence of food; if one were to claim that because cabbage is this way, wheat is that way, and beef is another way, a person develops in such-and-such a way from birth to death. No, no one will admit that this is a reasonable way of looking at things; rather, everyone will concede that one must ask: How is it rooted in human nature itself that, for example, around the age of seven, the forces that bring about the change of teeth arise from this human nature? One cannot draw the conclusion from cabbage or beef that the change of teeth takes place. Similarly, one must ask: How does that which constitutes, for example, sexual maturity develop from within the human organism? — and so on. One must address what is developing in terms of its inner nature.

[ 21 ] But look among today’s theories of evolution for one that can apply this to the history of human development—one that would, for example, clearly recognize that as humanity evolves on Earth, it develops certain powers and abilities, certain characteristics, from within itself, from its very nature, throughout the various ages!

[ 22 ] Anyone who learns to adopt an objective approach to observing nature can also apply this objective perspective to the study of history. And there one finds that, emerging from the depths of human nature since the mid-15th century, this very demand for democracy has developed and has been more or less fulfilled in various parts of the world—this demand: that in one’s conduct toward other people, one can accept only that which one oneself perceives as right and appropriate. The democratic principle, arising from the depths of human nature, has become the hallmark of human striving in social relations in modern times. This democratic principle is a fundamental demand of modern humanity.

[ 23 ] Anyone who sees through these things must, however, take them completely seriously; they must then ask themselves: What is the meaning of the democratic principle, and what are its limits? — The democratic principle—which I have just characterized—consists in the fact that people living together in a cohesive social organism should make decisions that emerge from each individual. Naturally, these decisions can only become binding on society through the formation of majorities.

[ 24 ] Whatever is incorporated into such majority decisions will be democratic only if each individual, as an individual, stands before every other individual as an equal. But then, decisions can only be made on those matters in which the individual, as an equal, is in reality equal to every other individual. That is to say: Decisions can only be made on a democratic basis regarding matters on which every person who has attained legal capacity is capable of judgment by virtue of having attained that capacity. But in doing so—and I mean this as clearly as possible—they have drawn the boundaries of democracy. After all, the only things that can be decided on the basis of democracy are those that can be judged simply by virtue of being a person who has attained legal capacity.

[ 25 ] Consequently, anything related to the development of human abilities in public life is excluded from democratic measures. Everything that constitutes education and the educational system—indeed, intellectual life in general—requires the involvement of the individual human being—we will discuss this in more detail the day after tomorrow—and requires, above all, a genuine understanding of human nature; it requires the teacher and the educator to possess special individual abilities that cannot possibly be acquired simply by becoming a mature adult. Either one does not take democracy seriously—in which case one allows it to decide even on matters pertaining to individual abilities—or one takes democracy seriously—in which case one must exclude the administration of intellectual life from the realm of democracy. But one must also exclude from this democracy what constitutes economic life. Everything I elaborated on yesterday is based on expert knowledge and professional competence, which the individual acquires within the sphere of economic life in which he or she is immersed. The maturity and judgment of every person who has come of age can never simply determine whether one is a good farmer, a good industrialist, or the like. Therefore, majority decisions cannot be made by every person who has come of age regarding what is to happen in the realm of economic life.

[ 26 ] This means that democracy must be separated from the realm of intellectual life and from the realm of economic life. Then, between the two, true democratic political life emerges, in which each person faces the other as a rational, responsible, and equal human being, but in which decisions can be made by majority vote only on matters that depend on the equal capacity for judgment of all people who have attained maturity.

[ 27 ] Anyone who does not merely speak of the things I have just mentioned in abstract terms, but rather measures them against real life, will see that people are deceived about these things precisely because they are actually difficult to create as mental images—because they do not wish to muster the courage to delve into the ultimate consequences of this human conception.

[ 28 ] But the fact that people did not want this—that they did not counter the general demand for democracy with entirely different ideas—had a very, very practical significance in the recent development of humanity. I would like to present these ideas to you not so much on the basis of abstract principles as on the basis of the historical development of humanity itself.

[ 29 ] In recent years, we have witnessed a state collapse—one might say, collapse as a result of its own internal conditions—and this state can be viewed as a case study, even for legal issues. It is the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, which no longer exists. Anyone who has followed the war years knows, of course, that Austria ultimately fell as a result of purely military events; yet the dissolution of this Austrian state occurred as a secondary phenomenon—as something that arose from its internal conditions. This state fell apart, and it would likely have fallen apart even if the military events had turned out more favorably for Austria. One can say this if one has properly observed these conditions in Austria—as I, who am speaking before you here, have been able to do; I have spent thirty years of my life in Austria—over the course of decades.

[ 30 ] It was in the 1860s that the demand for democracy—that is, for a representative government—emerged from Austria. How, then, was this popular representation structured? It was structured such that the representatives were drawn from four curiae within the Austrian Imperial Council—four curiae of a purely economic nature: first, the curia of large landowners; second, the cities, market towns, and industrial centers; third, the chambers of commerce; the fourth curia consisted of the rural communities, but even within the rural communities, only purely economic interests were considered. Thus, depending on whether one belonged to a rural community, a chamber of commerce, and so on, one elected one’s representatives to the Austrian Imperial Council. And there, the representatives of purely economic interests sat together. The resolutions they passed—by majority vote, of course—stemmed from individual people, but those individuals represented interests that arose from their economic affiliation with landowners, cities, markets, and industrial centers, chambers of commerce, or rural communities. And what public rights, adopted through majority decisions, came to light as a result? This gave rise to public rights that were nothing more than transformed economic interests. For, of course, if, for example, the chambers of commerce agreed with the large landowners on something that brought them economic advantages, a majority decision could be passed against the interests of the minority, which might have been directly affected by the matter. Whenever economic interest groups are represented in parliaments, it is always possible to assemble majorities that pass resolutions based on economic interests, thereby creating rights that have absolutely nothing to do with what prevails as a sense of justice based on human-to-human empathy.

[ 31 ] Or consider the fact that, for example, in the old German Reichstag there was a large party called the Zentrum, which represented purely spiritual interests—namely, Catholic spiritual interests. This party could join forces with any other to form a majority, and in this way, purely spiritual needs were transformed into various public rights. This has happened countless times.

[ 32 ] People have often noted what is happening in modern parliaments that aspire to become democratic. But they have not come to realize what must happen: a clear separation of what constitutes the legal sphere from what constitutes the representation and administration of economic interests. The impulse for the threefold social order must therefore most decisively demand the separation of the legal sphere—the legal foundation—from the administration of economic conditions and from the management of the economic cycle.

[ 33 ] As I explained yesterday, associations are to form within the economic cycle. Professional groups will stand opposite one another; producers and consumers will stand opposite one another. Whatever happens there in terms of purely economic facts and measures will be based on contracts that the associations conclude with one another. In economic life, everything will be based on contracts, everything on mutual performance. Corporations will stand opposite corporations. Expertise and professional competence will be the deciding factors. It will not be a matter of what opinion I hold—say, if I am an industrialist—regarding the standing my particular industry should have in public life; no, I will have no say in that once economic life is autonomous, but rather I will have to perform in my industry, will have to enter into contracts with associations from other industries, and they will have to offer me reciprocal benefits. Whether I am in a position to demand compensation from them will depend on whether I can deliver on my end of the bargain. A competency association will be formed through contractual agreements. That is what the facts are.

[ 34 ] Life must unfold differently within the legal framework. Within the legal framework, one person can stand face to face with another. In the realm of law, the focus can only be on the enactment of laws that regulate public rights through majority decisions. Certainly, many people say: But what, after all, is public law? It is nothing other than that which, put into words, translates into laws what exists in economic conditions! — In many respects, this is true. But this by no means disregards the idea of the threefold social order, which does not ignore reality at all: What emerges as lawful through decisions made on a democratic basis is, of course, carried into economic life by the people who engage in economic activity. They are simply not supposed to take it out of economic life and turn it into law. They carry it into economic life.

[ 35 ] Abstract thinkers who say: Yes, but isn’t what one person does with another in external life—when he issues a bill of exchange or the like—and what arises from the law of bills of exchange, entirely contained within the activity of economic life? Isn’t that a complete unity? And you, proponent of the threefold social order, come along and want to take apart what is a complete unity in life!

[ 36 ] As if there weren’t many areas in life—especially in that part of life where human beings have no access with their opinions and thus cannot corrupt it—where currents of energy from various sides come together to form a unity! Take, for example, a person growing up: he has various characteristics that he has inherited. These are inherent in him. Then he has certain characteristics that are instilled in him through upbringing. The growing person acquires characteristics from two sources: through heredity and through upbringing. But when you do something at the age of fifteen, you cannot say that what you do is not a unity! The result of your heredity and the result of your upbringing flow together as a single unity. Thus, a unity lives within you, but it is truly a unity only because it flows together from both sides. It is precisely because it flows together from both sides that it becomes a healthy unity.

[ 37 ] Thus, it follows from the reality of life for the idea of the threefold social organism that a healthy unity for action in the economic sphere can only arise to the extent that legal concepts are incorporated into it—by ensuring that economic measures are administered independently from an economic perspective, and that rights are established on a democratic legal foundation. People then bring these elements together to form a unity. It all works together, whereas if you allow rights to arise solely from economic interests, you turn those rights into caricatures. The law then becomes merely a photograph, merely an imprint of economic interest. The law is not really there at all. Only by allowing the law to arise originally and from the very beginning on its own independent democratic foundation can you bring it into economic life.

[ 38 ] One would think this were so self-evident that there would be no need to discuss it at length. But what is peculiar about our times is precisely that the clearest truths have been obscured by modern life and that, in fact, the clearest truths are being distorted. Today, based on the groundwork from which many socialist views develop, people think that the dependence of legal life on economic life must simply be continued. Yesterday I hinted to you how a kind of hierarchy is to be established according to a political model, and how economic life is to be regulated and administered accordingly. There, people think, those who administer economic life will also develop the legal system as a matter of course. By making this claim, one lacks any sense of concrete, real life. It is not economic life—in which one must above all be competent in shaping the relations of production—that can give rise to legal relations; rather, these must arise alongside economic life from their own source. They are never produced merely through reflection, but rather through the concrete development, alongside the economic cycle, of a state element in which one individual human being stands face to face with another individual human being.

[ 39 ] The point is not that, as an economic actor, one creates legal laws out of some kind of primordial consciousness, but rather that one first creates the concrete foundation on which people, through their feelings, enter into such relationships that they can transform these relationships into legal ones. The point is to create a reality alongside economic life. Then the law will not be a mere superstructure above economic life, but will stand as an entity that takes shape independently. Then one will not overcome the fundamental error—the superstition—of the social question through a theoretical answer, as if one need only reorganize economic life to arrive at different legal concepts; then one will create reality within the threefold social organism simply by establishing an independent legal foundation—the reality from which, through human interaction and relationships, arises the powerful driving force of legal life capable of mastering economic life.

[ 40 ] And finally, a historical examination of more recent times from a different perspective also demonstrates how what I have just discussed is further substantiated. Look back at the motivations that people still had for their craft and other work up until the 13th and 14th centuries. Modern socialist thinkers often emphasize that human beings are separated from their means of production. It is only through modern economic conditions that this separation has reached the extent it does today. Specifically, they are separated from their products. The worker who labors in the factory—what share does he actually have in what the entrepreneur then sells? What does he know about it? What does he know about the path that product takes out into the world? A tiny fragment of a vast whole! He may never even catch a glimpse of that vast whole. Just imagine what a colossal difference this is compared to the old craft traditions, where the individual worker took pleasure in what he produced—anyone familiar with history knows this to be true; think of a person’s personal connection to the creation of a door key, a lock, and the like. When you visit primitive regions, you can still have quite pleasant experiences in this regard, but in less primitive areas, you no longer have such experiences. I once—forgive me for sharing something so personal, but perhaps it serves to illustrate my point—visited such a region and was truly delighted when I walked into a barber shop and saw how the barber’s assistant took such obvious pleasure in cutting a person’s hair beautifully! He took genuine joy in what he was doing. There are fewer and fewer of these personal connections between people and the products they create. The fact that this connection is missing is simply a requirement of modern economic life. It cannot be otherwise under the complex conditions in which we must work according to the division of labor. And if we did not have the division of labor, we would not have modern life with all the necessities we require; we would have no progress. It is not possible for the old relationship between people and their products to exist.

[ 41 ] But people need a connection to their work. People need there to be joy between themselves and their work—a certain devotion to their work. That old sense of devotion—that direct connection with the object one has created—no longer exists, but it must be replaced by something else. For it is intolerable to human nature that there should be no motivation for work similar to that which existed through the joy of directly creating the object. This must be replaced by something else. By what can it be replaced? It can be replaced only by broadening people’s horizons, by calling people forth onto a stage where they will meet with their fellow human beings in a large circle—ultimately with all fellow human beings who inhabit the same social organism with them—in order to develop an interest in one another as human beings. This must come to pass: even the person who, in the most hidden corner, works on a single screw for a larger whole need not lose himself in the sight of that screw through his personal circumstances, but may carry into his workshop what he has absorbed as feelings for other people, and may find it again when he steps out of his workshop; that he has a vivid sense of his connection to human society; and that he can work—even if he does not take joy in the immediate product—simply because he feels himself to be a worthy member within the circle of his fellow human beings.

[ 42 ] And it is from this impulse that the modern demand for democracy and the modern way of democratically establishing public law have emerged. These matters are intrinsically linked to the nature of human development. And only those who have a genuine inclination to look deeply into the nature of human development—as it unfolds in the social sphere—can truly understand these matters. One must sense how the horizon of human beings ought to be broadened, how they ought to feel: Certainly, I do not know what I am doing for my fellow human beings by manufacturing this screw here, but I know that through the living relationships I enter into with them via public law, I am a worthy member within the social order—a member who is equally valued alongside all others.

[ 43 ] This is what must underlie modern democracy, and what must underlie modern public legal statutes, operating from one human emotion to another. And it is only by looking into the inner structure of the human being in this way that one arrives at truly modern concepts of what must develop as public law in all areas. We will discuss this in more detail in the fifth lecture. But now, in conclusion, I would like to show you how the realm of legal reasoning extends from the actual legal realm to the realm of the spirit.

[ 44 ] By simply understanding the circumstances I have just described to you, one can see how laws arise through the gradual refinement of feelings among equals on democratic ground, whereas in the economic sphere, contracts arise between coalitions or even between individuals. From the moment it becomes a matter of the individual having to seek or find his rights—whether under civil law, private law, or in any other way, including criminal law—at that very moment, the law shifts from the realm of law itself to the realm of spiritual life. Here, too, there is a point—just as with tax legislation—where the modern human mental image is still far from coming to terms with what, when one examines the fundamental relationships, actually turns out to be self-evident.

[ 45 ] You see, when it comes to assessing how a given law is to be applied to an individual, the individual assessment of that person comes into play; what matters is that one can truly engage with that individual through one’s spiritual faculties. Criminal justice and civil justice cannot be based on general legal principles; they must be grounded in a foundation whose deeper nature I will clarify the day after tomorrow when discussing spiritual life. It can only become a legal act if everyone who becomes a judge is truly enabled to judge based on the individual capacities—indeed, the individual relationships—with the person over whom they are to pass judgment. Perhaps one might imagine that such a thing could be achieved in a variety of ways. In my Key Points of the Social Question, I drew attention to how it can be achieved in one particular way.

[ 46 ] Within the threefold social organism, there is the independent economic administration that I described to you yesterday; there is the democratic legal foundation that I have outlined today and which I will elaborate on further in the fifth lecture in terms of its interaction with the other spheres. But there is also the independent spiritual life, where, above all, the system of teaching and education is administered in the manner I indicated yesterday and will elaborate on the day after tomorrow. Now, those who are the administrators of spiritual life will at the same time have to appoint the judges, and every person will have the right and the opportunity—let us say, even if only for a limited time—to choose which judge they wish to be judged by, should they find themselves in a situation where they are to be judged for any civil or criminal matter. Based on their actual individual circumstances, people will choose their own judge. The judge—who is not a legal bureaucrat but is appointed from within the spiritual organism, based on the social relationships in which the individual is situated—will also be able to determine, from the context of that person’s social environment, how the person to be judged should be assessed. The point will be that judges are not appointed based on the needs of the state, but rather that the reasons for appointing a judge are similar to those invoked in free spiritual life for placing the best educator in a particular position. Becoming a judge will be similar to becoming a teacher or educator.

[ 47 ] Of course, this shifts the focus of the adjudication of law away from the determination of law, which arises through democratic processes. It is precisely in this example of the administration of criminal justice that we see how democracy gives rise to that which is a matter of the individual and which must also be judged on an individual basis. The determination of the law is, after all, a social matter in the most eminent sense. The moment one is compelled to turn to a judge, one is generally dealing with a supra-social or anti-social matter—something that falls outside the realm of social life. Such matters are, at their core, all individual matters of human beings. Such matters constitute the administrative branches of intellectual life, including the administration of the adjudication of law. The adjudication of law extends beyond the boundaries of democracy.

[ 48 ] The point, then, is to establish in reality what, as a reality, brings about legal life among people. Then this legal life will not be a superstructure of economic life, but will instead have a direct impact on economic life. One will never arrive at what needs to be done in this area through a merely theoretical approach, but only by looking into practical life and saying to oneself: A genuine legal life with the necessary driving force can only arise if an independent legal foundation is created. This legal foundation has disappeared beneath the all-encompassing economic life. Legal life has become an appendage of economic life. It must once again become independent, just as spiritual life must be emancipated from economic life. The great error must be overcome in order to see clearly the social question—the great error that one need only restructure the economic institutions, and then everything else would follow of its own accord. This error has arisen because economic life alone has become powerful in recent times. People allow themselves to be influenced by the sole power of economic life. This will never lead to a solution to the social question. People will succumb to illusions—especially those of the proletariat. They will seek to extract from economic life what they call the “just distribution of goods.” However, the just distribution of goods will only be achieved if the social organism includes people who have the ability to create the appropriate institutions through which economic demands can be met. This can only happen when people come to realize that satisfying social demands is not merely a matter of restructuring economic life, but of answering the question: What must be established alongside economic life so that this economic life may be continuously shaped in a social way by social human beings—those who become social human beings through their participation in legal and spiritual life?

[ 49 ] This truth must stand in opposition to superstition and dogma. And those who seek in economic life the sole remedy for the restoration of social life must be directed toward the spirit and the law. They should not delude themselves into thinking that the law is merely a wisp of smoke rising from economic life, but must think realistically: Precisely because the law and legal consciousness have receded in recent times due to the overwhelming influence of economic life, we need—for the social structuring of our social organism—the real creation of a legal organism with the corresponding social driving force.

Q&A following the third presentation

[ 50 ] I have now been asked a number of questions. The first:

[ 51 ] How can the economy be regulated by a law enacted on an independent basis?

[ 52 ] Now it is simply necessary to take into account how different the threefold organism envisaged here is from what is found in the Platonic state as the division of the people of a social organism into three classes: the class of producers, the class of warriors, and the class of teachers. Among the various misunderstandings, I have also encountered people who have said: “Yes, this threefold division into a spiritual organism, a legal or state organism, and an economic organism is merely a rehash of the Platonic principle that the teaching class equals the spiritual organism—and so it is believed that the military class equals the state-legal organism, and the productive class equals the economic organism.” That is by no means the case. It is quite the opposite. For the threefold division of the social organism is, in fact, about separating the administrations of the respective branches of human life from one another—that is, it is not a matter of dividing people into estates, but rather of ensuring that what is separate from the human being—the administration of institutions—is divided into three parts, which must work together precisely through the living human being. The living human being is, after all, present in all three spheres. Gradually, the awareness has arisen within humanity that it is actually undignified to develop class distinctions, social distinctions, and so on. In reality, these will only be overcome if the social organism is structured according to the objective, according to that which is separate from the human being.

[ 53 ] For example, one must create a mental image of the following. I will have more to say about something similar in the fifth lecture. Anyone who gains an insight into the truly free spiritual life will be able to see that this truly free spiritual life does not at all possess the abstractness that is so often characteristic of today’s spiritual life. Today you are familiar with—or at least could be familiar with—all sorts of philosophical and religious worldviews and the like. Just think how abstract, how detached from life these worldviews have become. One need only recall how, today, a person can hold ethical, aesthetic, scientific, and religious views as a merchant, a statesman, an industrialist, or a farmer—and at the same time manage the affairs of their office, their business, and so on. Yes, in a sense, both run parallel to one another. One does not encroach upon the other. This stems from the fact that, fundamentally speaking, we still have today, in the realm of spiritual life, a continuation of the ancient Greek spiritual life, which emerged from entirely different social conditions. Most people are unaware of this, but in our social outlook we do in fact have a continuation of Greek spiritual life, which was based on the idea that a truly dignified existence is led only by those who do not actually work, who concern themselves solely with politics and, at most, supervise agriculture and the like. Those who worked did not, in reality, belong to the category of people who are considered worthy in the higher sense. For the Greeks, this attitude toward humanity was, so to speak, in their blood, and their entire intellectual life was organized accordingly. Greek intellectual life is inconceivable as anything other than a higher culture superimposed upon a broad lower culture of people who could not participate in this intellectual life, who did not possess Greek intellectual life as such.

[ 54 ] But this view of spiritual life has remained in our consciousness. One truly need not judge such matters with passion, but one can take them into account: the leading circles have often dealt in a very abstract way with what human brotherhood is, what charity is, and so on. Let’s take a striking example. In the mid-19th century, when people were also reflecting on charity and brotherhood from the perspective of their religious and ethical worldviews, a statistical survey was conducted on the hazards of mining in England. It turned out that, in fact, nine-, eleven-, and thirteen-year-old children were lowered into the mine shafts before sunrise and not brought back up until after sunset, so that the poor children did not see sunlight all day, nor all week—only on Sunday. Indeed, while the coal extracted in this manner was being burned in well-heated rooms, the educated classes entertained themselves in their unrealistic worldview with discussions of brotherhood and charity, developed their ethical views, and even came to believe that an ethical person is only one who loves all his fellow human beings without distinction of social status or the like.

[ 55 ] But such an intellectual life—and, when you get right down to it, this trait runs through our entire intellectual life—is an intellectual life detached from reality. It is the intellectual life one leads inwardly, one that lacks the momentum to extend into actual life. Consider the gulf that exists between what the merchant experiences in his aesthetic and religious education and what he records in his ledger. Although the first page also reads, “With God,” he knows very little about the God he worships in his heart.

[ 56 ] Well, you see, there you have the deep chasm between abstract intellectual life and external, concrete reality. Today, people have grown accustomed to this chasm as something that goes without saying. There are philosophers and ethicists who discuss benevolence, goodness, charity, and all sorts of things. But if you take such a philosophical book and ask, for example, how one should design a bank, you won’t find any guidance in it on how to design the bank. An intellectual life that is truly emancipated—one that stands on its own two feet—will, in turn, connect the practice of life with intellectual activity, with that which constitutes intellectual life.

[ 57 ] Anyone who, in particular, will hear my lecture the day after tomorrow will not believe that I intend, in any way whatsoever, to give spiritual life a materialistic character. You will see that the exact opposite will be the case. But precisely when one does not want that—when one wants to ground spiritual life on its spiritual foundations—this cannot lead one to treat material life as something alien to spiritual life, but rather to treat the spirit in such a way that it can immerse itself in immediate reality. People are already astonished by this today when one speaks to them in such concrete terms.

[ 58 ] For example, an industrialist asked me: “Well, you want, for instance, the practitioner who works in a practical profession knows his way around the field—if he has the aptitude—if the spiritual administration determines that he has the aptitude—whether he is thirty-five or forty years old—the call goes out, regardless of the field of knowledge, for him to teach at some higher or lower school for a certain number of years.” Then he steps back out of practical work! Spiritual life is separate from economic life. “But the economic actor makes use of precisely what he acquires in the separate spiritual life: a constant back-and-forth.”

[ 59 ] “But the fact is that people must be assigned to positions commensurate with their abilities. You see, I have someone in my business, in my factory, who is just the type of person who is always demanding that I set up a chemistry lab for him where he can do nothing but conduct experiments. People are simply different!” They are different because they have been raised in this way by the circumstances of modern times. In truth, no one can truly be at home in spiritual life unless they can also hold their own in practical life. Only when one can bring the spirit into every aspect of practical life can one also hold one’s own in spiritual life.

[ 60 ] Thus, precisely because that which is separate from the human being becomes threefold, the separated elements are brought together by the human being. So when law arises in a democratic state, the people who are then active in economic life will carry that law into economic life and establish institutions that correspond to that law. It is carried into economic life by living human beings, not by abstract measures or the like. That is what this is all about: once again placing social institutions on the foundation of the living human being. That is my answer to this question.

[ 61 ] You see, even in individual fields it will become apparent that knowledge can truly be put to fruitful use in life. Take a look at a large number of universities today. Education is taught there as well. Well, philosophers teach pedagogy as a minor subject, about which they generally understand very little. In a healthy social organism, any suitable schoolteacher who knows how to handle instruction in practice will be required to teach pedagogy for two or three years; then he will return to his practical subject. This is how it will be throughout life. Because that which is separate from the human being is divided into three parts, this is precisely what enables the human being to bring into each of these areas that which is fully realized in his or her independence within the other area.

[ 62 ] The second question:

[ 63 ] Who adjudicates commercial court matters—surely not just council members from the cultural sphere who lack specialized knowledge, nor just technical experts?

[ 64 ] Essentially, much of this question has already been answered by what I have just said. Through the shaping of our spiritual life, a person is formed in the way he must be in order to be a proper law clerk, a proper businessman, and so on. The point is that, within the threefold social organism—with its independent spiritual life—education will not be provided in the conventional sense; rather, through the way in which spiritual life sets its own conditions, a person will actually develop a certain way of living and will also be able to shape this way of life. After all, one certainly does not need to have a competent judgment in every field. That is precisely what cannot be the case and what must not be expected. It will, of course, be the responsibility of the spiritual administration to ensure that the right person sits on a commercial court, because within the spiritual administration there will also be people who understand something about commercial law. Knowledge will not be centralized into disciplines in the way it is today; rather, it will be possible—based on how people relate to one another within the corporations of the spiritual organization—to compose such a court in the appropriate manner, to compose it competently, not out of any economic necessity or the like.

[ 65 ] How can one accurately determine a person’s needs or assess the true value of an object they have produced, given that people’s material needs are so diverse?

[ 66 ] Precisely because they are different, real institutions must be created—ones that consist of people who study these needs and come to understand them. Such things do not hang in the air; they can certainly be grounded in reality. I could give you a small example. There is an organization—its name is even printed on the posters: the Anthroposophical Society. In addition to what some people attribute to it, it has already dealt with quite practical matters that are very much in line—albeit on a small scale—with what I have discussed here regarding the social question. For example, within the Anthroposophical Society there was a man who could produce bread. Since there was already a group of people available—who are, of course, also bread consumers—a group of anthroposophists, it was possible, so to speak, to establish a connection between the man as a bread producer and these consumers; that is, he could tailor his production to consumer needs, so that the needs are known and production can be organized entirely according to those existing needs. This is not something the market will do—which shapes the whole process in an anarchic and haphazard manner—but it can only happen if there are institutions through which people who truly study these needs can direct production according to them and regulate it through these associations.

[ 67 ] Socialist thinkers today would like to determine these needs based on statistics. This cannot be done based on statistics. Real life can never be shaped by statistics alone, but only through people’s immediate powers of observation. Therefore, within the economic organism, people must be placed—through social conditions—in certain positions or the like, which serve to convey the understanding of needs to the realm of production. Precisely because needs vary, the goal is not to bring about a tyranny of needs—which would certainly arise on the basis of today’s social democratic program—but rather to discern from these living needs how they should be satisfied. The fact that certain needs cannot be satisfied will, of course, become apparent in practice. Decisions must not be made based on dogma, simply because someone believes that this or that is not a genuine human need. But if a number of people have needs that call for goods whose production would require the exploitation of human labor—a situation that will arise precisely in a vibrant economic life that stands on its own two feet—then it will not be possible to produce those goods for which individuals have needs. The task will be precisely to determine whether these needs can truly be met without neglect and without harm to human capabilities.

[ 68 ] How does Dr. Steiner envision the practical implementation of the threefold social order? Is it possible to influence the Federal Council? Or should a referendum be held once these ideas have been sufficiently disseminated? Or will we have to wait until a revolution and civil war have overthrown the current order?

[ 69 ] First and foremost, we must take seriously the fact that a new method—or at least a relatively new method compared to those otherwise followed—must be adopted here. The point is not to pursue goals, as is the case with the old parliaments, but rather to grasp—from the matter itself, I would say, from the trends of modern life—what people actually demand in their subconscious, even if they are not aware of it. And then, when one is able to make it clear what this is all about, there will be a number of people who will understand what needs to happen. And when there is a sufficiently large number of people who understand what needs to happen, then, I believe, the paths will become clear. In my Key Points of the Social Question, I have just explained how this threefold structure can actually be applied to every aspect of life—if only one is willing, if only one truly understands its meaning.

[ 70 ] The fact that there is no intention to bring about through any kind of revolution what is alive in the threefold social order is also based on a historical perspective. What I have to say here is that transformations in spiritual realms—take Christianity, for example—have indeed taken place in the West, and that transformations have also taken place in the political realm. But even in the political realm, these transformations leave certain remnants behind. Today people think of economic revolutions—we will have to discuss the entire issue in the fifth lecture, and indeed in the upcoming lectures—but such revolutions will all share the fate that the revolution in Eastern Europe will most certainly face: they will only bring about destruction, not to build up—which is what the Hungarian Revolution did, and which the German Revolution of November 9, 1918, in particular, has done; a revolution that is, after all, completely fizzling out, fizzling out for the reason that it is clearly evident that what truly matters today is not bringing about any massive upheavals, but having ideas through which normal, sustainable conditions can be established.

[ 71 ] If a sufficiently large number of people commit themselves to understanding such a matter, then the paths will emerge. For the idea of the threefold social order is not merely a goal; it is, in fact, a path in and of itself. But the point is that one must not take the stance that so many people adopt. For example, in certain areas where I have explained the threefold social order, I have found that people have also read my book The Core Points of the Social Question. They found what is written in it to be plausible. But people from the radical wing of the Left have said: Yes, this threefold social order is very good, but it must first be preceded by revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat; then we will fall back on the threefold social order—and this was said quite sympathetically—but for now we will fight it tooth and nail! — That was the conclusion: Because one actually agrees with it, one fights it tooth and nail! I have encountered this many times. These things are actually based entirely on a false way of thinking: that one can do something before an understanding of it has been established.

[ 72 ] One small episode is particularly telling: I was speaking about these matters in a town in southern Germany. A communist then took the floor. The man was actually quite a nice person. But during the course of his talk, he said something like this to his audience—he was a very modest man on a conscious level, but on a subconscious level, he was far, far less modest: “You see, I’m a cobbler. Since I’m a cobbler, I know full well that I won’t be able to become a registrar in the future social order.” To be a registrar, you need someone who has been trained for that. — But this man had previously laid out his plans for the social order in great detail, from which it became clear: he felt well-suited to be a minister in the future state—but not a registrar, certainly not a minister!

[ 73 ] I could prove to you that this way of thinking prevails with many other good examples. But it simply shows that what is at stake is that, first and foremost, a genuine understanding of the content of the threefold social order must take root. Then the way forward will become clear. And one should hope that this understanding can take root before it is too late. If only a few people today could rouse themselves to understand what is necessary, then we would already be on our way. Then people wouldn’t really be asking whether they should appeal to the Federal Council through a referendum or the like, but they would know: As soon as there are enough people, the cause is there—if enough people understand it. That is, in essence, the secret of a society that strives for democracy: that the cause is there when it truly finds inner understanding and when it is truly clear within. That is what matters.

[ 74 ] Now the question arises:

[ 75 ] Isn't the principle of criminal law a relic?

[ 76 ] Continue:

[ 77 ] Is the idea of punishment justified in comparison to the idea of educational reform?

[ 78 ] The concept of punishment is indeed one of the most difficult, and throughout history, all manner of answers have been offered specifically to this question. On such ground, from which ideas such as the threefold social order emerge, certain consequences arise that do not arise on any other ground. Every single event that occurs within a social order is, at its core, a consequence of the entire social order. Just as every loaf of bread I can purchase, with its price, is a consequence of the entire social order, so too are the impulses behind punishment rooted in the entire structure of the social organism. And it is precisely in the fact that punishment becomes necessary—precisely in this—that it becomes evident there is something within the entire social organism that should not actually be there. If one—and I am not now advocating the threefold social organism as such—but rather develops a practical worldview from such impulses, from which one derives the idea of the threefold social organism, then the view actually emerges that one will indeed arrive at different conclusions regarding punishment and the penal system, and the need for punishment will arise far less frequently if such things are truly realized socially, as has been called for, for example, in today’s lecture. Criminal law, which, like a shadow, actually accompanies antisocial conditions, will be able to be reduced to a minimum in truly social conditions. Therefore, the questions arising today regarding criminal law—whether it is a relic and the like—will be placed on an entirely new footing if such a transformation truly takes place. I would like to say: When a person is sick, they do certain things; when they are healthy, they do other things. The same is true here. The need to punish points to certain symptoms of illness within the entire social organism. If one strives to restore the social organism to health, then the concepts of punishment, criminal law, and the penal system will indeed be placed on an entirely different foundation. So I would like to say: In the entire debate on social transformation, we must try to find the answer to what will then become of the individual aspects, such as criminal law or the penal system.

[ 79 ] Is it within every person's capacity to determine how much labor time a particular branch of production requires?

[ 80 ] Yes, being able to exercise sound judgment together with other people and decide on such matters is different from being at the mercy of a single individual. If you read my “Key Points on the Social Question”—and I will, of course, return to labor law in my lectures—you will see that in the threefold social organism, the regulation of the nature of work and working hours is to become a matter of public law; that is, what is being asked here is to be regulated precisely on the basis of democratic law. The point, then, is that such a question should be regulated by each individual in collaboration with all other members of the social organism. Human beings possess the capacity for judgment to establish regulations regarding such a question together with others. So it is not justified to ask: Is it within the capacity for judgment of every individual to determine how much working time a particular branch of production requires? — That certainly does not lie with the individual, at his or her arbitrary discretion; but it lies in the possibility of reaching a public judgment on the matter through democratic regulation and democratic majority on the legal basis I have described today.

[ 81 ] Shouldn't we first clarify the spiritual aspect of human nature before we proceed to discuss the broader issues in this state?

[ 82 ] Well, much of what is meant here will in fact be the subject of the next lecture. But, you see, the idea of the threefold social order is a practical idea. That is why it also views all things from a realistic perspective. There are many people today who simply say: Well, we have the social question, so it must be solved; therefore, we must devise a program through which the social question will be resolved; today we have social conditions that are undesirable, so we will find a solution to the social question; then, tomorrow, social conditions will emerge that are socially desirable. — But that is not how things are. In the development of humanity that I have described today, the social question has arisen precisely from certain states of mind, physical conditions, and their consequences with regard to social life. The social question is there, and it cannot be solved theoretically; one cannot enact laws that will solve the social question. It is there and will remain there. It will always be there. It will be raised anew every day. For this reason, there must always be institutions in place through which it will be resolved anew every day. So it is not a matter of neatly dividing things up like this: First we’ll make human souls suitable, then we’ll bring about socially desirable conditions. — No, the point is to acknowledge the social question and to attempt to realize in reality something akin to, for example, an independent legal foundation or an independent spiritual foundation, through which the social question can be continuously resolved.

[ 83 ] In my book The Key Points of the Social Question, I objected to the view that what I said about the similarity between the individual human organism and the social organism—with reference to the threefold order—should be regarded as a futile exercise in analogy. I certainly did not intend to engage in some kind of analogical exercise—similar to that of Meray or the elder Schäffle—between the human organism and the social organism. But what I explained in my book On the Mysteries of the Soul—namely, that a genuine observation of nature leads us to view the human organism as an interplay of three independent members—requires a way of thinking and a perspective that can then be fruitfully applied to the social organism as well, not through transposition, but precisely through an unbiased observation of both the social and the natural organism. There is much that can be learned from both.

[ 84 ] Isn’t it true that people want to view the social organism as containing institutions that maintain everything in an ideal state, ensuring that everything is done in the best possible way? No one ever asks whether that is even possible. People want to establish an economic system with institutions that can never cause harm. They fail to consider that life is, after all, about life itself and not about abstractions! In human beings, in the natural organism, for example, there is a mechanism by which we inhale oxygen; this is converted into carbon dioxide. Oxygen plays a role in the human organism through certain organs that combine it with other substances in such a way that certain functions of the human organism can take place. Yes, there must be specific organs that perform this function. If only those organs were present, damage would occur in the organism. This damage must be allowed to occur, but it must be prevented as it arises. That is the essence of life. Those who say: “We have an economic organism; let’s structure it so that it functions on its own”; then we need, alongside this, a legal or spiritual organism”—they speak just like those who say: “Wouldn’t it be much better if, by the will of the Creator or the forces of nature, one only needed to eat once in a lifetime, and if the human organism were arranged in such a way that it is not constantly destroyed and does not have to be replenished again and again.” — When it comes to living things, it is a matter of processes rising and falling. An economic life that is properly organized economically gives rise to damage precisely because of its efficiency; and as it arises, in its nascent state, one must simultaneously counteract this damage. This cannot be done by the economic organism itself, but rather by the accompanying spiritual and legal organisms. They must be present so that they can counteract the damage caused by the economic organism as it emerges. This is the nature of the living: that things are in a dynamic interrelationship.

[ 85 ] Such a perspective is, of course, far more uncomfortable, but it is one that takes reality into account—one that does not seek to reform the economic organism in such a way that it negates itself, that it destroys itself. It is easy to say: This or that harm has arisen from modern production, so let’s do away with it and replace it with something else. — The point is not simply to demand something, but to study the possibilities of a living entity. And one such possibility is that, within this one part, certain things are brought about on the one hand which—if you were to follow only the one-sided process from the perspective of this organ system—would lead to the death of the organism in question. Other members of the organism counteract this, and even in the status nascendi—the state of becoming—correction is exercised by the other. Thus, the three members must exercise correction upon one another. This is how it is conceived in accordance with reality. And anyone who truly wishes to engage with the social question today must accustom themselves to thinking in accordance with reality. We are sailing toward the most terrible conditions if distorted, caricatured thinking—which has nothing to do with reality and which devises programs based on human passions and emotions—takes hold everywhere. Realistic thinking, however, will create reality. Therefore, the first task is to develop realistic thinking.