The Rudolf Steiner Archive

6. The Threefold Social Order and the Current World Situation

[ 1 ] What one might call social programs or the like are swirling through the air today in endless numbers, challenged—truly more than at any other time—by all the forces at work in the present that are leading toward destruction. There is actually no shortage of proposals on how a new structure might emerge from this destruction. If, nevertheless, what might be called the idea of the threefold social order seeks to gain acceptance—driven by the urgency of the times— seek to gain acceptance among these various proposals, it does so primarily out of the conviction that this idea of the threefold social order offers something which, when grasped in its inner essence, cannot in any way be equated with programmatic proposals or social ideals in an abstract sense. What I would like to present to you here should be thoroughly imbued with the realization that today there is a great danger for all such things to lapse into utopianism. One need only consider how, in essence—even if it has not yet been sufficiently recognized here and there in the European world— everything that was believed to be firmly established in the traditional economic, legal, and intellectual order is subject to a certain process of destruction, and how this process of destruction has become all too evident in the course of the last four to five terrifying years of European civilization.

[ 2 ] In times like these, one cannot build upon this or that—things that already exist, things that have retained their reality. After all, even the most firmly established institutions, so to speak, have been reduced to absurdity over the past few years. And so it naturally stands to reason to build, as it were, from a completely new foundation. People can do this only by building from a foundation of thought, and it soon becomes apparent that the foundations necessary for a sound structure are not easy to find. For at first, one seemingly has no basis for knowing whether what one wishes to translate from thought into reality can in any way be grounded in that reality. And anything that cannot, from the outset, demonstrate through its very content that it can fully establish itself within reality is, after all, utopian.

[ 3 ] The idea of the threefold social order seeks precisely to avoid the danger of utopianism, and it seeks to do so by, in essence, not establishing anything that could be called a social philosophy or a social program, but rather by pointing to a specific way in which people can interact in public life so that the forces of destruction can be countered by forces of renewal and new development.

[ 4 ] I would like to say that what others claim is supposed to happen—according to the idea of the threefold social order—will only come into being once the kind of cooperation between individuals and groups of people that the idea of the threefold social order seeks to describe can actually take place. When one stands on this ground, one does not take the position that one is somehow omniscient, that one is a prophet who can declare how this or that institution should take shape in the future for the benefit of humanity; rather, one simply seeks to call upon the judgment of people who have something to say, in such a way that, through the cooperation of people, this judgment can also become an objective reality.

[ 5 ] The origin of this idea of the threefold social order actually lies far in the past for the one who takes the liberty of speaking to you. It can be traced back to decades of life experience relating to social conditions in a wide variety of regions of Europe, but particularly in Central Europe and those parts of Central Europe that, precisely through their fate in the last great war catastrophe, demonstrate how what has hitherto been the social structure of humanity—of civilized humanity in Europe—is, of its own accord, tending toward something new, and how it is no match for the forces that, I might say, are now striving to rise to the surface from the depths of humanity. If one looks at historical life with an open mind—particularly in the last third of the 19th century and in the years of the 20th century preceding 1914—one can clearly see how that which is clung to so dogmatically—and which, even today, though shaken in many parts of Europe, is still regarded as something that must not be challenged—such as the unitary state, which has gradually come to encompass all areas of public life over the past three to four centuries—is in fact no longer up to the task of meeting certain great demands of humanity, just as it is incapable of simultaneously encompassing spiritual life, political and legal life (in both the narrower and broader senses), and economic life. Consequently, those who have most recently engaged with the idea of the threefold social order have been led to begin precisely there and to raise the question: What form must the state—hitherto regarded as a necessary unity—take in relation to the three principal spheres of human life: the spiritual sphere, the legal-political sphere, and the economic sphere? And now, before I proceed to a kind of justification, I would first like to take the liberty of outlining for you, in a brief sketch, how human cooperation should be conceived so that the tasks arising for human beings from these three principal spheres of life can truly be accomplished through the social structure.

[ 6 ] In essence, it is only in the last three to four centuries that the history of these three regions has been summarized. You need only recall—to cite just one example—how, as “medieval conditions evolved into modern ones,” schools—all the way up to universities—were not founded by the state, but rather by church communities or other communities that developed alongside the nascent forms of state life. It was only over the course of the last three to four centuries that the view arose that the unitary state must also extend its power, for example, over schools, universities, and the like. Similarly, one can say that economic life, too, was sustained by corporations formed under economic impulses; it was led by individuals who formed associations solely out of economic motives. And it is only again in the course of the last three to four centuries that the state has extended its power over economic life as well, so that this synthesis of intellectual life, legal life, and economic life is actually something that has only come to the fore in its full significance in recent times, even though its early signs—naturally, since everything in human history foreshadows itself—had already appeared here and there earlier.

[ 7 ] In contrast, the idea of the threefold social order seeks to place each of these three spheres on its own independent foundation. It proceeds from the assumption that a certain impulse, driven by an inner necessity, has risen to the surface of historical development in the course of recent history—I would say once again—from the depths of human feeling and sensibility. And that is—I believe one cannot deny this, no matter how biased one may be—that in public life, despite everything that is coming to the fore today, the most powerful impulse is the one toward democracy. This impulse appears as something fundamental in human development. One might say: Just as sexual maturity emerges in an individual at a certain stage of life, so too does the tendency toward democracy emerge in the development of European humanity, a process that has been building since the 15th century.

[ 8 ] If one attempts to identify the most essential element among the various forms required for the democratic coexistence of people, it ultimately comes down to this—at least, this appears to be the only rational possibility— that the affairs of the state should be managed through the cooperation and collective judgment of all people who have attained maturity, who are regarded as equals in this cooperation and collective judgment, so that each person stands before the other as an equal—equal in judgment, equal in the contribution they must make to social life, and equal in everything they are entitled to demand from that social life. This is, first and foremost, the abstract democratic demand. It becomes concrete through the fact that the most important sentiments and emotional impulses have become associated with it in the recent historical life of humanity. One could also say that this democratic tendency has found its way into the political structures of Europe, struggling in various ways against what has been inherited from feudal and other social orders. The democratic impulse has, to a greater or lesser extent, worked its way into the traditional forms. But the drive toward it has been quite clearly evident in recent history. Since the states could not help but somehow incorporate democratic forces into their existing structures—even if some, I might say, did so merely for the sake of appearances—they also extended this democratic principle to the realms of intellectual and economic life.

[ 9 ] But this has now given rise to a significant contradiction in the development of modern humanity, one that permeates all of public life. It is precisely those who are serious and sincere about realizing the democratic impulse who must actually recognize this inner contradiction in modern public life. It is a contradiction that I would like to characterize as follows: Spiritual life, even in its most essential aspect—school life—cannot develop from anything other than the abilities of human beings, which are entirely distinct from one another. The moment one seeks to extend the leveling force of democracy over that which, in its individual form, seeks to grow and flourish as spiritual life—at that very moment, spiritual life must always suffer in some way; it must always feel stifled in some way. That is why I believe: precisely the person who is sincere about the democratic impulse—so much so that he says, “Wherever democracy can exist in public life, it must exist”—must also say: Then, from all that all mature human beings decide upon as equals, one must exclude that which truly not all mature human beings, as equals, can judge appropriately. By pursuing this idea to its ultimate consequences—and by examining whether one has truly taken into account everything that comes into play—one ultimately comes to the conclusion that, precisely when striving for the democratization of modern state life, one must separate the entire realm of intellectual life from this state life, from political and legal life.

[ 10 ] Intellectual life must be grounded in its own foundation. It must be grounded so firmly in its own foundation that those who, for example, teach—from the lowest grades all the way up to the highest levels of education—are at the same time the administrators of the educational system, so that the administration of the educational system is closely linked to the entire spiritual life, whatever form it may take, of a cohesive social organism. Only if—to speak concretely—one ensures that those who stand in the classroom and teach are given just enough to do in their role so that, at the same time, they have time to also serve as administrators of the educational system from the lowest level to the highest level—only then, by creating such institutions, can those who are to work in spiritual life, in particular teaches and educates, has nothing else to do but interact with other teachers and educators; when the entire spiritual organism is an independent unit, built upon itself—only then can all the forces inherent in humanity be truly unleashed in the realm of spiritual life, and only then can spiritual life develop in its full fruitfulness. This seems, at least at first glance and in a somewhat abstract form, to point to the necessity of separating spiritual life—which must be built upon its own principles and its own impulses—from everything that is subsumed under democracy.

[ 11 ] Just as intellectual life must be separated from mere political life, so too must economic life be separated from it. Here, however, one enters a realm where there are fewer opponents today than in the realm of intellectual life. In the realm of intellectual life—particularly in the school system—it has become customary over the past three to four centuries to regard as an enlightened mind only those who view the state’s control over the school system as the right course of action, and who cannot even conceive of a return to the independence of intellectual life without falling into clericalism or the like.

[ 12 ] In economic life, things are essentially similar. While spiritual life deals with what is inherent in human beings as an ability—something that must be freely developed, something that, in a sense, a person brings with them into physical existence at birth—economic life deals with what must be built upon experience, what must be built from the context into which one grows as one becomes absorbed in one’s professional activity within a specific economic sphere. Therefore, in economic life, what stems from democratic life cannot be decisive; rather, only that which arises from professional and objective foundations can be decisive.

[ 13 ] How can these professional and factual foundations be provided for economic life? Actually, not through some kind of corporation, through some kind of organization that is so highly prized today, but solely through what I would like to call “associations.” So that associations form among people who immerse themselves in their professions and become truly knowledgeable and expert in the field of economic life. Not that people are organized, but that they come together based on objective criteria arising from the individual economic sectors, from the relationship between producers and consumers, and from the relationship between professional fields and economic sectors. This even gives rise—as you can read in greater detail in my writings—to a certain law governing how large such associations may be, how they should be structured, how they become harmful if they grow too large, and how they become harmful if they remain too small. It is entirely possible to establish an economic life by building it upon such associations, by basing everything that is brought about within such associations—out of a purely economic impulse—in the social structure solely on objective and technical considerations. In a sense, everyone knows whom to turn to regarding this or that matter when they know they are linked to the other person in one way or another through the social structure of associations; they must channel their product through a chain of associations in this manner, and so on.

[ 14 ] Of course, since I must keep my remarks brief, I can only outline the principles of the matter here. And so, I would like to say, intellectual life must develop independently through its own forces, with those who contribute to it also serving as its stewards; likewise, economic life must develop according to its own principles, with those active in economic life uniting according to the principles of economic life. If economic life is autonomous, then that which can rest only on the shared judgment of all people who have attained maturity will emerge as the content of the third member of the social organism—the actual state community.

[ 15 ] I know very well that many people are truly horrified when they hear about this threefold social order, which is said to be necessary for the future. But this is only because people usually believe that the state is now to be split into three parts: How are these three parts then to work together? — In truth, it is precisely by bringing these three parts to their full development—in the way that I have, admittedly, only been able to sketch—that unity is maintained, for the human being as a unity is present in all three parts. He participates in some way in the spiritual organism. If he has children, he is involved in the spiritual organism through the school. Through his spiritual interests, he is somehow entwined with the spiritual organism. As a person who has attained legal majority and participates in the democratic state, he carries what he has gained from the spiritual organism—through his actions and his life—into this democratic state as well. But what constitutes public law, public safety, public welfare, and so on—matters that concern every person who has attained legal majority—is developed on the foundation of the unified state. And with the dispositions of the soul that one develops there in the direct interaction from person to person, one re-enters economic life in its specific sphere, where one is linked through various associations in which one is active. One carries what one has gained from spiritual life and from political life into this economic life, enriches it through these elements, sustains it, and brings justice and spiritual enrichment into this economic life. The individual himself forms the unity between what is not a division into estates.

[ 16 ] I have often been told that this would mean reverting to what in ancient Greece comprised the classes of producers, warriors, and teachers. Such an objection only shows how superficially such matters are often viewed today. For the issue is not a division of human beings themselves, nor a classification into estates, but rather that external life, in its institutions, is divided into three parts. It is precisely because human beings are situated within such a threefold social organism that it becomes possible for all estates to cease to exist and for true democracy to emerge. I would say that the development of modern states points to this as an inner necessity for anyone who approaches the matter with an open mind.

[ 17 ] Do we not see that, on the one hand, they must take into account the necessary drive toward democracy, but then, in turn, allow democracy to be undermined by the fact that—as is only natural, given the nature of intellectual life—the capable will always carry more weight in democratic political life than the less capable? In matters where ability is what counts—for example, in the intellectual sphere—this is entirely justified. On the other hand, a truly democratic form of government must be kept free and untainted by such overpowering influences from particularly capable individuals, for—in accordance with the fundamental demand of modern humanity—there must be a sphere in which only that which is equally due to all people who have come of age is given due consideration.

[ 18 ] The economic sphere demonstrates particularly clearly how impossible it is to allow the abilities that human beings acquire through their unique nature to influence economic life. Through this, a person may acquire economic dominance. However, this must not become social dominance. It does not become so only because economic power—that which remains within economic life—cannot possibly become political or legal dominance. Everything that has led today to a caricature of the so-called social question would be overcome if we were willing to accept that economic life be placed on its own foundation, and that democratic political life, precisely through this, could once again stand honestly and sincerely on its own foundation. The development of modern states demonstrates how necessary it is for humanity to turn toward such principles. And so, allow me—in addition to the historical impulses one must take to heart in order to be guided toward this idea of the threefold social order—to first characterize, if I may say so, the two subjective sources from which this impulse toward the threefold social order has arisen within me for many years.

[ 19 ] One reason is that, through insights from Spiritual Science—which I have chosen to adopt as my worldview—one can gain a different understanding of certain conditions of human development than one can through the materialistic, natural-scientific worldview that is commonplace today. This materialistic, natural-scientific worldview, which is so prevalent today, cannot actually lead to a true understanding of humanity’s historical development, for what we call “history” today is, in essence, more or less a fable convenue. We approach history today—and then seek to learn something from this history for the social and political tasks of the present—in such a way that we have a mental image of what comes next in human development as the effect of what came before, and that which came before is in turn the effect of what came before that, and so on. A truly appropriate comparison—one not based merely on analogies—of the entire development of humanity with the development of the individual human being could cure us of this error.

[ 20 ] When I observe the development of the individual human being, I must say: What occurs in a person’s early years, middle years, and at the end of life cannot be explained simply in terms of cause and effect. I truly cannot say that a person who reaches the age of thirty-five experiences, organically speaking, only the effects of what he or she experienced at the ages of twenty or twenty-five; rather, as the person develops, we see how certain developmental impulses arise from within his or her organism—from his or her entire organic being and essence— forces of development arise from his organism—from his entire organic being and essence—which prove to be particularly effective at certain periods of time.

[ 21 ] Thus, we must say that for each individual human being, there are distinct stages of life: When the teeth begin to change around the age of seven, if we have the ability to observe this process, we find that the child’s entire inner life changes; the child transforms from an imitative being into one who feels the need to submit to a certain authority and to conform to the judgments of others, whereas before the child simply imitated. Similarly, at the onset of puberty, a clear transformation of the soul life begins. One can also observe this transformation of the soul life in later stages of life, provided one is attuned to it.

[ 22 ] Just as for the individual human being it is not merely a matter of cause and effect, but rather the forces of development spring forth from the depths of his being, so it is with all of humanity. And if one studies history properly, one finds—to cite just one example—such a turning point in the development of all of modern civilized humanity around the middle of the 14th and 15th centuries. There one finds precisely that transition which, out of the fundamental necessity of development, actually gave rise to modern humanity with all its demands. Oh, there is a great difference between what people have regarded as the right way to live a dignified life since the 15th century and what people in the Middle Ages regarded as such.

[ 23 ] The history of the soul—which we have not really explored—as it can emerge from Spiritual Science, represented by our building in Dornach, leads one to view what I have called the democratic principle as something that manifests itself in modern humanity, just as one views the characteristics that emerge in the individual human being, say, at the age of sexual maturity. By considering the fact that modern humanity is, in fact, quite different, and that—just as with the individual human being—account must be taken of its principles of development throughout all of humanity, this gives rise to the firm conviction that democracy is something that cannot be resisted; but precisely because democracy is something that springs forth from the most elementary human being, the social organism must be threefoldly organized so that what can be ordered democratically may come into its own in the development of humanity. That is one aspect: this spiritual-scientific perspective on the developmental impulses of humanity. The other is the observation of the facts of life among nations.

[ 24 ] I can, however, only give you a few specific examples. But it is nonetheless interesting to see, through these examples, the impossibility of the newer unitary states developing a truly viable social structure out of their unity. To demonstrate this, it is sufficient to point to individual examples. You will understand that, as a non-Swiss, I do not exactly cite Switzerland as the most obvious example. I need only mention that what has already occurred to such a great extent in certain European states will gradually occur in the others as well, and that it is quite short-sighted to keep relying on the notion: “Oh, things are still different here; we don’t need to worry about what’s happening elsewhere.”

[ 25 ] Now, perhaps I will choose Eastern Europe—Russia—as an example, not merely because Russia, due to its current tragic fate, is particularly significant for the study of human nature, but because, according to the practical political assessments of leading English politicians, Russia is also the country where it is most clearly evident, I would say, as if in an experiment unfolding in the life of nations, what needs and what impossibilities prevail in modern international life. Let me highlight just a few aspects of this Russian national character for you.

[ 26 ] Here, set against the backdrop of Russian absolutism in the 1860s—with which you are, of course, thoroughly familiar—we encounter the peculiar institution of the zemstvos. These were regional assemblies where representatives of rural life—people deeply involved in economic life or other spheres of life within individual regions—would gather in certain meetings to deliberate on these matters, I might say, in the manner of a council or something similar, such as a cantonal council. From the 1860s onward, Russia has been filled with such zemstvos. They actually carry out fruitful work; they operate in conjunction with something else that is traditional in Russia: the mir organizations of the individual village communities, a kind of compulsory organization for the economic life of the village. Here we find, on the one hand, old democratic customs within the Russian peasant organization; on the other hand, however, we see in the functioning of the semstvos something newer that leans decidedly toward democracy. But something highly peculiar is becoming apparent. And this peculiarity becomes even more striking when we consider another phenomenon that arose in Russia before the global catastrophe destroyed it all or cast it in a different light.

[ 27 ] In Russia, it has become apparent that people from a wide variety of individual professions have formed associations among themselves, and, in turn, that associations have emerged between different professions—bank tellers and bank cash carriers, for example, have formed associations. These associations, in turn, have merged into broader associations. Anyone who has visited Russia has not actually interacted with individual people, but has encountered such associations everywhere they had any dealings.

[ 28 ] All of this became intertwined with the broader political life of absolutism. Now, if one studies these semstvos, these associations, or even the Mir organization itself, one notices something. Certainly, these organizations also extend to some other areas of life, such as educational institutions and the like, but there they do nothing particularly noteworthy. Anyone who undertakes an unbiased study of these associations—for after all, the semstvos did not develop into corporations, but rather into associations, in which farmers joined forces with those at the outset of industrial life, and so on—even if all of this took on a character that resembled a public institution, in reality, these were associations, and they all did good work. But what they accomplished, they actually achieved solely within the realm of economic life. And we can say: What is remarkable about this Russia is that an organic system based on the principle of association is emerging. It further becomes apparent that the Russian state is incapable of doing anything with what is emerging there. So we can say: Since the necessity of early-capitalist development, as it occurs in Russia, leads to economic organizations, these must, out of an inner necessity, stand alongside the political institutions.

[ 29 ] Well, something else peculiar emerged in Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Yes, certainly, absolutism established its schools; but these schools are nothing more than—I would say—a reflection of the needs of absolutist state life. Well, an intellectual life is developing in Russia—a more intense intellectual life than Western Europe realizes. But how must this intellectual life develop? Entirely in opposition, indeed in revolutionary upheaval, against everything that constitutes the Russian state. One sees that this rigidly and uniformly organized state is splintering into three parts, but in reality it merely wants to splinter apart. Yet it cannot. Precisely through what it is experiencing, it shows us how impossible it is to force these three most essential spheres of human life together within the unitary state.

[ 30 ] I can only give you a rough outline of this. If one studies in detail how these three elements of Russian political life then became entangled in the World War, how the World War gave rise first to Milyukov’s truly insubstantial rule, and how, under Kerensky, something emerged that one might call the transformation of absolutism into a democratic system of government—though still thoroughly rooted in the belief in the omnipotence of the unitary state— then one can see precisely why Kerensky was bound to fail after a short time in office—how this Russian state, striving to become democratic, was rendered incapable of even addressing the most important issues—the economic question and the agrarian question—because in the agrarian question, the structures of Russian life are such that any attempt at democracy emerging from the old absolutism shatters against them.

[ 31 ] Certainly, everything manifests itself in a specific, concrete way. One cannot see everything in it at once. But anyone who takes an unbiased look at this evolution of Russia—its drift toward an impossible social-democratic structure, precisely because the unified state is fragmented by the impossibility of bringing the three spheres of life together—will see that this very example from Eastern Europe is a highly significant one, and that the far-sighted English politicians are indeed correct in viewing Russia as the very arena in which the course of human development is unfolding, as in a global experiment.

[ 32 ] One could survey all of Europe from such a perspective and see everywhere how the unitary state is gradually disintegrating. Even if it still appears firmly established in some regions, it will disintegrate because it cannot manage the proper interplay of the three spheres of human life. Just look at how, in recent times, in places where, for example, political consciousness and political sentiment completely permeate the innermost being of the human being, political sentiment cannot gain the upper hand over economic life.

[ 33 ] France serves as a good example in this regard. From its 18th-century Revolution, France has preserved what is now the true inner spirit of democracy, even if this democratic spirit is coupled with a strong conservatism regarding family life. Even though much of what is democratic bears a resemblance to philistine patriarchy, the tendency toward democracy in the very essence of the French mindset is perhaps—if not the purest—the most strongly expressed among the peoples of Europe. This democratic spirit initially sought to take shape in public life. It is precisely through this embodiment of the democratic spirit in French public life that the nation has, on the one hand, been abstractly divided into its departments; yet these departments have, in turn, been united into a single entity. All of this is the fruit of the French Revolution.

[ 34 ] One need only consider one aspect of this structure of the French state—the position of the departmental prefect—to see how inorganically the political-legal, state element is linked to the economic element. From a certain perspective, the prefect is, in fact, nothing other than the executive organ of the Paris government. The Paris government has, I might say, the various departmental prefects as its many hands. But the departmental prefect, in turn, must maintain ties with the economic interest groups in his department. Thus, when an election is held in France, the prefect will certainly oversee it, but the outcome will not differ from what it would be based on what the prefect grants to the economic interest groups.

[ 35 ] Thus we see that in France there are political parties—parties with party mottos and, indeed, party slogans—but that these slogans have far less real significance than what arises from the economic interests of the department. In this regard, the study of the individual facts of French life is extraordinarily interesting. It is precisely in France that one can see how a proper interaction between the legal-state sphere and the economic sphere cannot develop into a certain public truth, because the state element cannot overcome the economic one.

[ 36 ] I myself have, I would say, studied for decades from firsthand observation what was bound to lead to the downfall—let’s say—of Austria. That Austria could not have ended any other way than by perishing in some form or another. For when the newer democratic way of life emerged, it was bound to introduce something like democracy into its political life, into a political life whose intellectual structure, above all, was characterized by such diversity among its peoples that there were actually thirteen official languages in Austria; a political life that, on the other hand, had a complex economic structure, leaning toward the Orient on one side and toward Germany and Western Europe on the other—toward Italy and so on. When it came time to introduce some element of democracy into this Austrian political life, it was structured by establishing an Imperial Council. Four different sections were elected to this Imperial Council: the Curia of Chambers of Commerce, the Curia of Large Landowners, the Curia of Cities, Markets, and Industrial Centers, and the Curia of Rural Municipalities. If one looks more closely at the matter: all of them were representatives of economic interests who were elected to the Austrian Parliament to shape the state. Naturally, they achieved nothing other than transforming economic interests into state interests, and nothing at all resembling a true state emerged; instead, a conglomerate of economic interests arose, against which the intellectual life of the various nations then rebelled—a development that, for internal reasons, was bound to lead to its own fragmentation.

[ 37 ] We can observe something else as well—something that is, however, much more international and universal—and we will see how everything, when viewed impartially in the recent history of humanity, tends toward this threefold division. For take the most striking issue that has come to the fore—take, I say explicitly, not the social question, but the social-democratic question. In Russia, indeed—because the old political system, when it sought to democratize, fragmented due to the impossibility of unifying the three spheres of life as consistently as a democratic conception of the state would require—it became evident that something entirely foreign had been imposed upon the Russian national character, and that what is now unfolding in Russia is, of course, nothing other than something that must inevitably lead the social life it affects to ruin. What social democracy—the socialist movement sworn to Marxism—can actually achieve, above all for the democracy that is truly demanded by the innermost being of man, is precisely demonstrated by the sad state of today’s Russia, about which it can already be reported that the ideals of the well-meaning workers are being fulfilled in such a way that, under the necessity of the circumstances, one is now compelled to turn the eight-hour day into a twelve-hour day; that, in place of the usual organization in which the worker supposes he finds his freedom, a military labor regiment is being established that promises to become far more tyrannical than the Prussian military regiment ever was. These are the fruits of Leninism, of Trotskyism!

[ 38 ] They cannot be any different. They merely illustrate, in their most radical form, how the Social Democratic movement has developed from within the proletariat—for today’s Russian rule over the many millions of the Russian people encompasses only a few million industrial workers, and, in essence, what exists there today is a tyranny of those few million industrial workers. How did it develop? Yes, we can say: this Social Democracy, which is characterized above all by the fact that it derives all of human life solely from economic production, that it regards all intellectual life merely as an ideology—as something that rises like smoke from economic production—this Social Democracy, how could it have come into being?

[ 39 ] This social democracy, which is under Marxist influence—I do not, of course, mean healthy socialism—is actually the sin of the bourgeois movements that have emerged in recent times; I might even say it is the result of the sin of the bourgeois movements. For if one looks everywhere—as I have shown with two examples, France and Russia—and surveys the entire civilized world in its modern development, one would see everywhere: economic life has become one that has been stamped by technology, one that has torn people away from their former connection to their trade, placing them before the abstract, indifferent machine, within the indifferent factory—and the proletariat, in essence, has known nothing other than economic life.

[ 40 ] In more recent times, it would have been necessary to integrate this ever-growing proletariat into a social structure. It was not possible to draw upon what historical development in humanity had brought about to devise, so to speak, a unified structure encompassing those who are the leaders in economic life, in intellectual life, and so on, and those who must work with their hands. One had, so to speak, failed to develop new forces out of the old ones. The old princely states did not give rise to genuine institutions that would have been supported by democracy. Thus, one must say that what modern social democracy actually is arose because the leading classes, the leading figures in modern history, were unable to cope with what economic life had brought about. The states were simply left organized in such a way that they could not encompass economic life, which was becoming ever more powerful and overwhelming. And so it is precisely in the failure to cope with what arose in the human soul with the emergence of the proletariat that the fact becomes apparent: nothing fruitful for a possible structure of the social organism could emerge from the mental image one had of the state.

[ 41 ] And I could cite many more examples; they would show you that, based on what can be observed, it is indeed necessary to place the three main spheres of human life and of humanity on their own foundation.

[ 42 ] One could indeed have spoken of this necessity even before this terrible catastrophe loomed over the world and so clearly revealed the destructive forces over the past four to five years. But I do not believe that humanity, in the period before 1914—when people lived only in illusions about what they perceived as a great, powerful upswing in modern humanity—could have been persuaded in any way to understand this necessity. Now times have come in which it is no longer enough to prove theoretically that such a necessity exists, but in which states—particularly those that were exposed to the dangers of a unitary state—have been swept away in their old form and now face the necessity of rebuilding themselves from scratch.

[ 43 ] We see the former Russian state in the East fragmented, facing the necessity of rebuilding itself, but also facing the inability to rebuild itself in a prosperous manner, as it must accept having something imposed upon it that never springs from its own national character, but rather is superimposed upon that character like a universal socialist template applicable to everything. And we see, for example, in Germany, where a failed revolution—the November 1918 Revolution—truly reveals how the circumstances can lead only to chaos, to genuine chaos. And the most striking—I would say, in fact, heart-wrenching—aspect of life in Germany today is that wherever one encounters people and has to discuss public affairs with them, they appear at a loss. Why do they seem at a loss? For the simple reason that the dogma of the unitary state is deeply rooted in their souls, and because the terrible lessons of the last four to five years have truly not yet been enough for people to eradicate this dogma from within themselves. I have asked many individuals why it is that people are so apathetic—why it is impossible to inspire anyone to take action for anything positive in the direction of rebuilding. People calmly admitted: Yes, we were in the trenches for such-and-such a long time; we didn’t know if we’d still be alive in eight days; we gradually had to become indifferent to whether we’d still be alive in eight days; shouldn’t we now be indifferent to what kind of social institutions will be established in eight days? One can empathize with such states of mind. That is what many—truly, not just one—have said.

[ 44 ] Certainly, the circumstances of the time explain many things, but something greater, something more significant, is the historical, the purely human necessity. There is only an either/or here. And I believe that even here one could already recognize—since the conditions are truly not far off that are capable of sending their ripples throughout all of Europe—what needs to be recognized: namely, that it is impossible to bring the three spheres of life—spiritual life, political life, and economic life—into a single unity. One should recognize the necessity of placing each of these three spheres on its own foundation.

[ 45 ] I am well aware of how much can be objected to this threefold division of the social organism based on traditional views. But anyone who considers the current state of the world—as I have attempted to describe it using specific examples—will say to themselves: unlike all other, more utopian proposals, this one—based on the threefold social order—differs in that it does not present a program, that it by no means claims to know everything, but rather that it says: If people organize themselves socially in such a way that their best qualities come to the fore—in an independent, free, and emancipated spiritual life, in which all mature human beings are equal; in an independent, democratic political life, in which everything must develop on the basis of economic foundations; and in an independent economic life—then it is precisely because people are called upon to engage in social action that something like a solution to the social question will come about.

[ 46 ] For I do not believe that anyone who truly understands life can go along with the superficial view that the social question is something that arose only yesterday—something for which one need only come up with a few ideas or draw a few conclusions from life in order to cobble together a program, and then the social question will be solved. There are many such concoctions. But the impulse for the threefold social order does not rest on this foundation of omniscience. It is imbued with the conviction that the social question has indeed arisen, that it cannot be solved overnight or by any single individual: it will always be present in the future, it will permeate our lives, and the solution can only consist in continually operating within such institutions that the difficulties arising anew each day are gradually overcome. Life in the future will consist entirely of this: it will be a kind of solution to the social question.

[ 47 ] The impulse for the threefold social order hopes that what individual human beings will bring about—by working and making judgments in a natural way within the threefold social organism—will lead to what could be called a solution to the social question. It does not seek to solve the social question theoretically; rather, it aims to give people the opportunity to solve the social question through cooperation and shared judgment. But even what can be put forward as a proposal—I have been able to give you only a rough outline today—this characterization of the three spheres of the social organism, even that is by no means regarded by the proponents of this idea as something that could be a dogma. That is all I wish for: that it be discussed, that as many people as possible be imbued with what the hardships of our time teach us, and that, drawing on the best qualities of the human being, we do what can lead to a new order.

[ 48 ] When people of good will from a wide variety of backgrounds work together in this way, a fruitful discussion can emerge. And such a fruitful discussion is actually what matters most to those who champion the idea of the threefold social order. If they must believe that they could not have come forward until the distress of the world catastrophe had set in—they now have some optimism; though, I would say, a sad optimism: that the ever-spreading distress must become the great teacher, that it is precisely through this distress that people must come to recognize that something like what is now seeking to be articulated—I do not mean merely in terms of the content we are able to provide regarding the idea of the threefold social order, but in terms of the impetus we wish to give to public discussion through this idea—must somehow be taken seriously. Much will depend on whether such things can be taken seriously. A kind of drowsiness of the soul still pervades European humanity—indeed, modern civilized humanity as a whole—and even though those who are already active today in the movement for the threefold social order have put one or another of their convictions into practice, they know that the right outcome will only come when a sufficiently large number of people engage with the details of the matter.

[ 49 ] We have already had the opportunity to establish a Free School at the Waldorf School in Stuttgart, where children between the ages of six, seven, fourteen, and fifteen are taught in an eight-grade elementary school according to the principles of a free spiritual life, so that they grow into a social order from within a free spiritual life. We have tried a wide variety of approaches in this area, and we are also considering economic initiatives in which we intend to view the various branches of economic life through the lens of the threefold social order, to organize them, and to finance them according to these principles; for it may be particularly necessary, in order to have a convincing impact, that the model—that the example—be set. But in order for this example to have a sufficient impact—to bring it into reality at all—it is necessary, above all else, that a sufficiently large number of people participate in the discussion of what the impulse for the threefold social order actually aims to achieve.

[ 50 ] I would like to have sparked a little discussion on this topic—and nothing else—with the remarks I was able to offer this evening, albeit in a very sketchy manner, given the limited time available.

[ 51 ] This was followed by a discussion in which various questions and objections to the points made in the lecture were raised.

[ 52 ] Concluding Remarks

[ 53 ] Actually, I must admit that no real objections have been raised. I understand very well that, based on what I have said this evening, a wide variety of questions could be asked, and I believe it is impossible to address such a question so exhaustively in a one-hour lecture that hundreds and thousands—and perhaps even more—questions could not be raised in its wake. I would therefore like to make just a few remarks that, rather than providing an answer to the various questions—which would indeed take several days—might at least offer some insights. First, with regard to what the Chair said just now, that there are no clear formulations regarding what the threefold social order actually aims to achieve. You see, in my book *The Key Points of the Social Question*, I have tried, as best I can with a movement that is essentially only at the beginning of its work, to discuss some of these problems—such as the one already outlined regarding the circulation of the means of production, which I must propose as an alternative to the impracticable socialization of the means of production, and so on. You will find more such details in *The Key Points of the Social Question* than might be expected. I must emphasize again and again: just as I try to grasp this impulse toward threefolding, it is actually drawn from the whole, full life, and life in its entirety actually has dimensions not only in two directions but always also dimensions of depth; and there, at times, the abstract formulations cannot be so easily defined as one might find desirable, because, of course, the individual problems must first be elaborated. I would ask you to bear in mind that the movement is just beginning and that, at the end of my presentation today—if I may call it that—I actually called for a discussion. I believe that it is only through discussion that something truly fruitful will emerge.

[ 54 ] Now I would like to address certain questions, at least briefly. A fundamental misunderstanding between Dr. S. and me must have arisen precisely because I am not, as the doctor has interpreted it, speaking of three parliaments. I do not see the essence of this threefold division as lying in, for example, dividing today’s unified parliament into three parliaments, but rather in the fact that a parliament in the modern sense exists only for that which can be democratically administered or guided, whereas the other two spheres are not administered through a parliamentary system but are governed by what arises from within them. I find it very difficult to discuss these concrete matters in abstract terms. I would therefore like to structure my answer, so to speak.

[ 55 ] It was precisely while establishing the Waldorf School that I once again had to deal in depth with everything that, I would say, presents itself as a cross-section: the result of state administration of the school system. After all, I had to establish the Waldorf School from two perspectives. On the one hand, I had to base it on what I believed could be derived from the very demands of spiritual life itself as the impetus for the Waldorf School. On the other hand, I certainly could not build on thin air. That is to say, I had to create a school where it would be possible for students who leave—for example, at the age of fourteen or, for that matter, at any point in between—to rejoin the mainstream school system. Naturally, this meant I had to grapple with the curricula. Well, you see, at first I came across—please forgive me for having to go into very specific details, but I believe this is the best way to make myself understood—I came across the curricula. The curricula are state-mandated descriptions of the subject matter, the educational objectives, and so on. It is quite another matter when, as an educational and didactic artist, one can study—purely from the nature of the human being—how, from the age of seven to fourteen, the process unfolds of what is to be imparted to the child. I am convinced that the educational goals for each year can indeed be derived from the developing human being.

[ 56 ] Now I would like the person who is actively involved in teaching to set the educational goals, and not the person who is pulled out of that context to become a government official—someone who thus transitions from active teaching to democracy. So I would like what constitutes spiritual life to be managed by those who are still immersed in it, who are building this spiritual life. It is therefore essential that the entire structure of administration be built upon the fabric of spiritual life itself. Isn’t that right? For example, today I still had to make the decision that children, once they have completed three grades, can rejoin the program—in order to have freedom in between—and after another three years, in their twelfth year, can rejoin again. So I had to do justice to an external reality.

[ 57 ] That is the essence of the threefold social order. It is grounded in reality everywhere and must also operate from that reality. But when one has a foundation in reality, one does not have something vague and undefined. Spiritual life does exist, after all; it does have an administration, simply because one person is in one position and another is in a different position. In this separation of the spiritual body from the state body, I would simply like the administration to take on a hierarchical form, and I believe—though of course this is something that cannot be implemented so quickly—that the hierarchical administration will have all its imperfections. I know what lecturers in particular object to, but perhaps even such transitions sometimes require greater imperfections in order to arrive at something perfect; but what is at stake is that, little by little, based solely on purely pedagogical and didactic conditions and other conditions of intellectual life, a purely didactic body of intellectual life will form, one that is administered in a manner grounded in objective reality—sounding, if only somewhat abstractly, like Klopstock’s “Republic of Scholars,” and that something like this is indeed possible in the realm of intellectual life, provided one has the good will to establish it.

[ 58 ] I imagine that it will then become very clear—let me mention something specific, pick out an example—that pedagogy, as practiced in higher education, has been one of the worst disciplines to date, at least throughout Central Europe. As a rule, it has been foisted upon some educator who has pursued it as a minor. In such an academic republic, someone who proves themselves capable can be called upon for three years to teach pedagogy and then return to their primary field of instruction.

[ 59 ] As for the external structure, however, I must say that, on a small scale, things have gone exceptionally well so far among our teaching staff at the Waldorf School in Stuttgart. Right from the start, the question arose: Who will be the principal? — Of course, no one; we simply have teachers with equal status across all grades, and one member of this teaching staff—who has slightly fewer teaching hours than the others—takes care of administrative matters. Even now, it is already apparent that the capable teachers also have a certain authority over the others—a natural authority—and a certain hierarchical system is emerging. But this need not be an answer to the question, as Chief Judge L. meant it: “Who gives the orders?”—rather, it happens of its own accord. I will, of course, refrain from naming names; but this is how it develops. So, in the realm of intellectual life....

[ 60 ] How can you ask parents about the state of education? That's a dictatorship!

[ 61 ] Objective and factual! Certainly, call it a dictatorship if you like—the name doesn’t matter to me. Insofar as the individual does not make the decision, it is a dictatorship. Since you are a scientist, you will easily understand when I say: it does no harm for a “dictatorship” to decide on the correctness of the Pythagorean theorem, because there is a certain necessity inherent in the matter.

[ 62 ] And what about religious education?

[ 63 ] The point here is that certain theoretical questions now give way to didactic ones. In religious education, as it is organized in the Waldorf school—though I do not mean to say that it is always organized this way, since developments may be taking place there as well— the point is that, for my part at least, it is appropriate—or something along those lines—that, for example, what I was able to offer as a pedagogical and didactic teaching course is expressed solely in the methodology—not in the worldview, but in the conduct of the lessons. The Waldorf School is not intended to be a school based on any particular worldview. This has only been achievable because all of my institutions are grounded in pedagogy and didactics and operate from that foundation. Children from Catholic families receive Catholic religious instruction, and children from Protestant families receive Protestant religious instruction from their respective Catholic and Protestant pastors. Now, it so happened that there were a large number of children from working-class families as well as children of anthroposophists, and that there was also a demand for non-denominational religious instruction. And the children whose parents request non-denominational religious instruction receive from us their non-denominational religious instruction, which is based on our convictions. So in this matter, an emotional truth, combined with certain social driving forces, is the deciding factor.

[ 64 ] Of course, things look different while they are still developing than they do after some time has passed. But it is precisely in practice that it becomes evident that one can make progress if one does not want a parliament for spiritual matters. That is why I cannot go along with the “three parliaments,” nor can I answer the question, “If Kerensky had had three parliaments. . .”; the point is precisely that he should have resolved the agrarian question in his one parliament and failed to do so. For example, I see no causal connection between the threefold social order and what came before; I merely wanted to point out that what came before failed because of the three spheres of life, which I cannot regard as two or four or even more, because there are only three.

[ 65 ] Dr. S.: I didn't take that objection seriously either.

[ 66 ] Dr. Steiner: That’s exactly how I understood it, too! Now that the state has failed to establish the three parliaments it set out to create, I wonder how we can move forward by making a fresh start—not through a causal link—though, of course, whatever is good must remain. You see, the elements of the answer to your questions lie in what you said. Even in the economic sphere, I do not want a parliament; for heaven’s sake, no democracy in the economic sphere! But an order that arises not from a hierarchy, but from the matter itself.

[ 67 ] Now, these spheres are by no means simply juxtaposed; rather, if you read my “Key Points,” you will find that the circulation of the means of production is essentially shaped precisely by what is determined in the spiritual realm, so that the spiritual realm thus has a direct influence on the economic sphere. And so much in economic life—in terms of the position one holds—is determined by the organization. What I mean to say, then, is that in the spiritual organization, the question will also be whether a person is capable of this or that and is being trained for it; this determines the economic position to which he or she can be assigned. Of course, this must now take place collaboratively between the economic and the spiritual spheres. By virtue of being capable of this or that, a person will already be superior to another who holds a different position. This does not give rise to anything hierarchical, nor, in a certain sense, to anything bureaucratic. Any bureaucratic parliament for economic affairs leads only to the dissolution of the economic system. So for me, the essential point lies in the way the three members are organized, and one cannot say: everyone will be part of three parliaments; there is only one parliament in which everyone can participate, but only based on the judgment of every person who has attained legal age. So let us say, to highlight the most important area: all legal matters. Legal matters are, in fact, such that they are at the very least in the interest of every person who has attained legal capacity, and I would like to say—of course—that not every person who has attained legal capacity is, ideally, equally capable as every other person who has attained legal capacity. However, a certain arithmetic mean does yield the appropriate result with regard to legal matters. This brings us to the theory of the justification of law in general. Law is not actually based on judgment, but on sentiment, on the customs that arise from the interaction of people living together. This can be judged when people who belong together pass judgment on it. I do not believe, Dr. $., that the individual therefore needs to find the correct law, but together they will find it. That is what democracy does. I see much greater significance in this interplay than in the individual. So I would like to see mature citizens in a democratic parliament, allowing them to make decisions there—primarily on legal matters, but rightly also on welfare institutions, because every mature citizen can decide on those as well; of course, in many matters not regarding the

[ 68 ] Factual and Technical.

[ 69 ] Well, the eight-hour workday is something that simply cannot be seriously considered at all in the context of the threefold social order, for what does an eight-hour workday actually mean? I must admit, I’m not one to boast, but for most of the year I work far more than eight hours and don’t find it at all excessive, and I don’t believe it’s possible to establish such an eight-hour workday without undermining our actual social life. In my *Key Points of the Social Question*, you will therefore find it explained that everything relating to working hours is determined within the framework of a democratic state, and on that basis, agreements are then reached regarding the distribution of earnings—not employment contracts, but agreements on the distribution of the proceeds between what I call “work supervisors” and what I must simply call “workers.”

[ 70 ] So, the one in the Legislative Assembly?

[ 71 ] The legislative body determines the hours and nature of work. In this regard, manual laborers are on equal footing with intellectual workers, because intellectual workers cannot assert their interests. People can communicate with one another in good faith, but they cannot make arbitrary demands that pertain to economic life itself; they cannot regulate exports and imports according to parliamentary laws—rather, this must be studied based on economic conditions and on factual, technical expertise. The fact that I have been with a company for twenty years gives me a different moral standing among my fellow human beings than if I had only been there for a year. In democratic life, it is irrelevant whether I am a brash young upstart at twenty-one when it comes to judging anything. In economic life, it simply comes down to taking life experience into account. This is simply necessary for the good of humanity.

[ 72 ] I deliberately raised the issue of the eight-hour workday. If we had a four-hour workday, what could the manager do? I don’t care at all about the eight-hour workday. I work more than that, too. I’m referring to the regulation of working hours.

[ 73 ] All right. The point is this: If the democratic parliament passes a law establishing a four-hour workday, then within the economic system, this four-hour workday will either be sufficient to sustain economic activity, or it will not be sufficient. Isn’t that right? Then it will be a matter of everyone, drawing on their matured reason—for the change must also be carried out through democratic means—recognizing that the change must come about through democratic means, not by any other means, not by the economically powerful exerting pressure, for example. So what exists as legal relationships within economic life belongs in the democratic parliament. But what is the economic question—after all, what is not an economic question? One might ask: Can intellectual life even be separated from economic life at all?—Here, the monetary issue has rightly been raised: it costs something. Well, that is why I see associations emerging in economic life from the individual branches of economic activity—branches that intertwine, whether related or unrelated—such as production, consumption, and so on. To describe this in detail would take us too far afield.

[ 74 ] What matters is this: the various members of spiritual life—in their administration of spiritual life—are exactly what I have described as spiritual life; as participants in economic life, they are economic consumers and are members and associations that belong to the economic body. What I am distinguishing is life itself; it is not an abstract division into three bodies, but rather life itself that is structured. Isn’t it true that spiritual life is indeed administered hierarchically, but the economic life of all those engaged in spiritual work is embedded within the economic life of the associations? So in their economic activities, teachers and so on are also very much economic entities, economic organizations. And so the various groups do indeed interact with one another. And this can really only be traced in detail; just as, after all, when one wants to explain chemistry, not everything can be covered in a single hour, but one must simply refer to what then needs to be carried out in detail.

[ 75 ] But to answer a question posed by Chief Judge L.: it is easier for someone who has just come of age to address and answer certain questions than to deal with factual ones—I mean, that is, after all, obvious. Certain socialists—they really didn’t appear by the dozen anymore, but in waves during that time, didn’t they, when people were suddenly allowed to be active again over in Germany—certain socialists had a mental image of how to organize the various sectors and so on by imposing what they had learned as political agitators onto economic life. That is, after all, the great misfortune in today’s political discussion: that people have actually acquired a certain training only in the realm of purely political struggle—in elections and so on—but are now unable to engage with economic life.

[ 76 ] Basically, socialist agitators usually don’t have the slightest clue about economic life, let alone the conditions of economic life. And so a wide variety of utopian ideas have been put forward about how this or that could be organized. I would like to mention, for example, how industrial sectors—which are based on a delicate, meticulous interplay of very different elements—are supposed to manage their exports if they are to be organized according to a Möllendorff-style planned economy or something similar. It is essential that certain matters—which can only be managed from within an economic organism—be managed not by the government, but from within the system itself.

[ 77 ] It is characteristic, for example, when people say: “Today, you cannot separate schools from the state; people won’t put up with it, and in a socialist state it is not necessary.” — Anyone who is familiar with the conditions that actually exist among humanity—not those that haunt the minds of political agitators—must conclude: in a socialist state, it would be all the more necessary! There, above all else and for the sake of humanity, it would be all the more necessary to at least remove the school from what is intended for humanity in the socialist state, as depicted in a Marxist mental image.

[ 78 ] Well, I believe that if there is a willingness to address each specific point—the objection regarding the three parliaments has already been raised with me repeatedly—I want the threefold structure to be based purely on practical considerations, not simply to have three groups of people or three houses side by side; there really will not be three houses. If I am understood correctly, people will probably find that we can already meet in the concrete solutions I have already provided for individual questions—and for others, if I have some time left to live, I will provide—though I would prefer it if others were to provide them—I believe we will certainly be able to get along just fine.

[ 79 ] I would like to emphasize once again: this is not a matter of claiming to know everything, but rather of attempting—without resorting to utopian ideals—to determine what should happen down to the smallest detail, starting from the premise that the three spheres of life have very different living conditions, and that only when people from these three spheres of life interact—in a qualitatively different way, that is, not merely in a quantitative, parliamentary sense, but qualitatively—will concrete conclusions emerge in the proper manner.

[ 80 ] I must say this as well: for me, this threefold structure of the social organism is so certain that I would like to compare this certainty—roughly speaking, and of course cum grano salis—to the certainty of the Pythagorean theorem. It cannot be proven everywhere or in every case, but it can be proven that it is useful. The threefold social order need not be abstracted from all particular cases, but it is applicable in every detail—in this case, practically applicable—in that within the threefold social order, political life, economic life, and spiritual life are organized in this way; a practical implementation will be achieved.

[ 81 ] Answering the questions posed by Chief Judge L.—which are, of course, very far-reaching—would, I believe, take too long this evening; but it is perhaps nevertheless evident that the point here is to proceed from the concrete structure of reality, and that it is therefore extremely difficult to provide abstract answers, precisely because one wishes to remain within the full reality.

[ 82 ] I’d just like to come back to this: I also find it extremely interesting that syndicalism, of all things, has emerged within French popular culture, and I believe that the best way to resolve this issue is to study the process of socialization. It is very interesting to study the various nuances of English and French socialism. English socialism is, at its core, a watered-down form of capitalism. It is, in fact, essentially the same as what operates under capitalism. Thus, the purely economic element in the English labor question is, by and large, simply focused on the interests of the worker; but it has not been entirely eliminated, so that English socialism has an economically opportunistic character.

[ 83 ] German socialism embraced Marxism with military efficiency and a military spirit of organization, and it developed a strict military-style organization. And anyone who, like me, has worked in a workers’ educational school that grew entirely out of social democracy—but was expelled precisely because of his non-Marxist orthodoxy, that is, because of his non-Marxism—was told: “It is not freedom, but reasonable coercion that can judge this.” German socialism is, at its core, something that is deeply rooted in the very same spirit that gave rise to Prussian militarism.

[ 84 ] French syndicalism is, after all—truly without wishing to speak favorably of any particular people or to attribute anything to the Germans—French syndicalism is, after all, what I must regard, precisely because of its associative character, as the best starting point for what I conceive of as association in economic life. And precisely when I compare it with English and German socialism, I see that it stems from the very same thing I tried to characterize: the democratic spirit. There are two sides to this; one side has manifested itself among the bourgeoisie, the other among the workers. And what took on a more capitalist and rentier form among the bourgeoisie has taken on a syndicalist form among the workers. They are simply two sides of the same coin.

[ 85 ] Well, I believe that these three different nuances—the English, French, and German nuances of socialism—are connected to the characteristics of the national character.

[ 86 ] And this brings us to a question that I consider to be of extraordinary importance. One should not start from the premise of a general socialism, nor should one believe that there is such a thing as abstract socialism; rather, one should ask: How must each national culture be treated based on its own specific characteristics? And anyone who comes from Western European observations, has mulled them over here in Switzerland, goes to Russia, and imposes something completely foreign on the Russian people is actually destroying what has been able to develop from within the Russian people itself. — But, as I said, not all social issues can be resolved today.