Introductions to Goethe's Scientific Writings
GA 1
Translated by Steiner Online Library
5. Conclusion on Goethe’s Morphological Views
[ 1 ] When, at the conclusion of my reflection on Goethe’s ideas regarding metamorphosis, I look back on the views I felt compelled to express, I cannot help but note how many distinguished representatives of various scholarly disciplines hold a different opinion. Their stance toward Goethe is clear to me; and the judgment they will pass on my attempt to represent the viewpoint of our great thinker and poet can likely be anticipated.
[ 2 ] Opinions regarding Goethe’s endeavors in the field of natural science are divided into two camps.
[ 3 ] The proponents of modern monism, led by Professor Haeckel, see in Goethe the prophet of Darwinism, who conceives of the organic world—entirely in line with their own views—as governed by the same laws that are at work in inorganic nature. The only thing Goethe lacked, they argue, was the theory of natural selection, through which Darwin first established the monistic worldview and elevated the theory of evolution to a scientific conviction.
[ 4 ] This viewpoint is countered by another, which holds that Goethe’s concept of the “type” is nothing more than a general concept, an idea in the sense of Platonic philosophy. Although Goethe did make individual assertions reminiscent of evolutionary theory—to which he arrived through the pantheism inherent in his nature—he felt no need to proceed all the way down to the ultimate mechanical cause . Therefore, there can be no question of an evolutionary theory in the modern sense of the word in his work.
[ 5 ] As I attempted to explain Goethe’s views without presupposing any particular standpoint, purely from Goethe’s essence, from the entirety of his spirit—it became clear that neither of the two schools of thought mentioned—however extraordinarily significant their respective contributions to the assessment of Goethe may be—has interpreted his view of nature perfectly correctly.
[ 6 ] The first of the views described is quite correct in asserting that, by seeking to explain organic nature, Goethe opposed the dualism that posits insurmountable barriers between it and the inorganic world. But Goethe did not assert the possibility of this explanation because he conceived of the forms and phenomena of organic nature within a mechanical context, but because he recognized that the higher context in which they exist is by no means closed off to our understanding. He did indeed conceive of the universe in a monistic way as an undivided unity—from which he by no means excluded human beings [see Goethe’s letter to F. H. Jacobi dated Nov. 23, 1801; WA 15, 280f.]—he nevertheless acknowledged that within this unity, distinct levels can be distinguished, each with its own laws. Ever since his youth, he had been opposed to efforts that conceived of unity as uniformity and that viewed the organic world—and, indeed, everything within nature that appears as a higher form of nature—as governed by the laws operative in the inorganic world (see “History of My Botanical Studies” in Natw. Schr., Vol. 1, p. 61ff.). It was this rejection that later compelled him to accept the existence of an intuitive faculty of judgment, through which we grasp organic nature, in contrast to the discursive intellect, through which we recognize inorganic nature. Goethe conceives of the world as a circle of circles, each of which has its own explanatory principle. Modern monists recognize only a single circle: that of the laws of inorganic nature.
[ 7 ] The second of the opinions cited regarding Goethe acknowledges that his view differs from modern monism. However, since its proponents regard it as a scientific postulate that organic nature must be explained in exactly the same way as inorganic nature, and since they reject a view such as Goethe’s from the outset, they consider it entirely pointless to examine his endeavors in greater detail.
[ 8 ] Thus, Goethe’s lofty principles could not be fully realized in either place. And it is precisely these principles that constitute the outstanding aspect of his endeavors; they are what, for those who have grasped their full depth, do not lose their significance even when they realize that some of the details of Goethe’s research require correction.
[ 9 ] This now requires anyone attempting to expound Goethe’s views to look beyond a critical assessment of the specific points Goethe made in this or that chapter on the natural sciences and to focus instead on the core of Goethe’s view of nature.
[ 10 ] In seeking to meet this demand, there is a real possibility that I might be misunderstood precisely by those whom I would most regret being misunderstood by: the pure empiricists. I am referring to those who thoroughly investigate the empirically verifiable relationships among organisms—the empirical material as it presents itself from all angles—and who regard the question of the fundamental principles of organic science as one that remains open to this day. My remarks cannot be directed against them, for they do not concern them. On the contrary: I base part of my hopes precisely on them, because their hands are still free in every respect. It is also they who will yet have to correct some of Goethe’s assertions, for in fact he was sometimes mistaken; here, of course, even genius cannot overcome the limitations of its time.
[ 11 ] In principle, however, he arrived at fundamental concepts that are as significant for the science of organic life as Galileo’s fundamental laws are for mechanics.
[ 12 ] I made it my mission to explain this.
[ 13 ] May those whom my words fail to convince at least recognize the sincere intention with which I endeavored—without regard for individuals, but focused solely on the matter at hand—to resolve the problem I have outlined, namely, to explain Goethe’s scientific writings in light of his entire nature, and to express a conviction that I find uplifting.
[ 14 ] If one has begun to explain Goethe’s poetry in this way—happily and successfully—then this already implies the need to include all his intellectual works in this manner of analysis. This cannot be put off indefinitely, and I will not be the last of those who will rejoice wholeheartedly if my successor succeeds better than I have. May youthful, aspiring thinkers and researchers—especially those whose views not only reach far and wide but also look directly into the core of our cognition—pay some attention to my remarks and follow in droves to more fully carry out what I have endeavored to set forth.