The Rudolf Steiner Archive

6. Goethe's Approach to Knowledge

[ 1 ] Johann Gottlieb Fichte sent the first pages of his *Wissenschaftslehre* to Goethe in June 1794. Goethe replied to the philosopher on June 24: “As for me, I shall be most grateful to you if you can finally reconcile me with the philosophers, whom I have never been able to do without and with whom I have never been able to unite myself.” [WA 10, 167] What the poet sought here in Fichte, he had previously sought in Spinoza; later, he sought it in Schelling and Hegel: a philosophical worldview that would be in accordance with his own way of thinking. However, none of the philosophical schools he encountered brought the poet complete satisfaction.

[ 2 ] This makes our task considerably more difficult. We wish to approach Goethe from a philosophical perspective. Had he himself designated a particular scientific standpoint as his own, we could have relied on it. But that is not the case. And so it falls to us to discern, from all that the poet has left us, the philosophical core that lay within him, and to construct a picture of it. We consider the correct approach to solving this task to be a line of thought derived from German idealist philosophy. This philosophy, in its own way, sought to satisfy the same highest human needs to which Goethe and Schiller dedicated their lives. It emerged from the same historical current. It is therefore much closer to Goethe than the views that often dominate the sciences today. From that philosophy, a perspective can be formed from which what Goethe shaped poetically and what he expounded scientifically follows as a consequence. This would certainly never be possible from our current scientific schools of thought. Today, we are very far removed from the way of thinking that was inherent in Goethe.

[ 3 ] It is true, of course: We have made progress in all areas of culture. However, it can hardly be claimed that this progress goes in depth . Yet it is precisely this progress in depth that is decisive for the substance of an era. The best way to describe our time, however, is to say that it rejects any progress in depth as unattainable for human beings. We have become disheartened in all areas, but especially in those of thought and will. As far as thought is concerned: people observe endlessly, store up their observations, and lack the courage to shape them into a comprehensive scientific understanding of reality. German idealist philosophy, however, is accused of being unscientific precisely because it possessed this courage. Today, people want only to perceive sensually, not to think. They have lost all confidence in thought. They do not consider it sufficient to penetrate the mysteries of the world and of life; they renounce any attempt whatsoever to solve the great enigmas of existence. The only thing people consider possible is: organizing the findings of experience into a system. In doing so, they simply forget that this view brings them closer to a standpoint they have long considered outdated. The rejection of all thinking and the insistence on sensory experience is, when examined more deeply, nothing more than the blind faith in revelation found in religions. The latter, after all, rests solely on the fact that the Church transmits ready-made truths that one must believe. Thought may strive to penetrate their deeper meaning; yet it is barred from examining the truth itself, from delving into the depths of the world by its own power. And empirical science: what does it demand of thought? That it listen to what the facts say, and interpret these statements, organize them, and so on. It, too, denies thought the ability to penetrate independently into the core of the world. There, theology demands blind submission of thought to the pronouncements of the Church; here, science demands blind submission to the findings of sensory observation. In both cases, independent thought that penetrates to the depths counts for nothing. Empirical science forgets only one thing. Thousands upon thousands observed a fact apparent to the senses and passed it by without noticing anything remarkable about it. Then came someone who looked at it and perceived an important law in it. Where does this come from? It is simply because the discoverer knew how to look at it differently than his predecessors. He viewed the fact through different eyes than his fellow human beings. As he looked, he had a specific thought—how the fact should be related to other things, what was significant for it, and what was not. And so, through thought, he made sense of the matter and saw more than the others. He saw with the eyes of the mind. All scientific discoveries rest on the observer’s ability to observe in a manner guided by correct thought. Thinking must naturally guide observation. It cannot do so if the researcher has lost faith in thinking, if he does not know what to make of its scope. Empirical science wanders aimlessly through the world of phenomena; the sensory world becomes a bewildering diversity to it because it lacks the energy of thought to penetrate to its core.

[ 4 ] People today speak of the limits of knowledge because they do not know where the goal of thought lies. We have no clear idea of what we want to achieve, and we doubt that we will achieve it. If someone were to come along today and point out the solution to the mystery of the world, it would be of no use to us, because we would not know what to make of the solution.

[ 5 ] And it’s exactly the same with will and action. One doesn’t set oneself any specific life tasks that one would be capable of handling. One dreams of vague, unclear ideals and then complains when one fails to achieve what one has barely a dim, much less a clear, conception of. Ask one of the pessimists of our time what he actually wants and what he is desperately striving to achieve. He does not know. They are all troubled souls, unable to cope with any situation, and yet satisfied with none. Do not misunderstand me. I do not wish to eulogize that shallow optimism which, content with life’s trivial pleasures, desires nothing higher and therefore never lacks anything. I do not wish to condemn individuals who keenly feel the profound tragedy inherent in the fact that we are dependent on circumstances that paralyze all our actions, and which we strive in vain to change. But let us not forget that pain is the very essence of happiness. Consider the mother: how is her joy in her children’s flourishing sweetened when she has achieved it through worry, suffering, and toil? Any rational person would surely reject happiness offered by some external power, for they cannot perceive as happiness what is bestowed upon them as an undeserved gift. If any Creator had set out to create humankind with the idea of bestowing happiness as an inheritance upon his image, he would have been better off leaving humankind uncreated. It enhances human dignity that what humankind creates is always cruelly destroyed; for humankind must constantly shape and create anew; and our happiness lies in action, in what we ourselves accomplish. Happiness bestowed as a gift is like revealed truth. It is worthy of man alone that he seek the truth himself, that neither experience nor revelation guide him. Once this is thoroughly recognized, the revealed religions will have run their course. People will then no longer want God to reveal Himself to them or bestow blessings upon them. They will seek to recognize the truth through their own thinking and to establish their own happiness through their own strength. Whether some higher power directs our destinies toward good or evil is none of our concern; we must chart the course for ourselves that we are to follow. The most sublime conception of God, after all, remains the one that assumes that, after creating humankind, God withdrew entirely from the world and left humankind entirely to its own devices.

[ 6 ] Anyone who acknowledges that thought possesses a capacity for perception that extends beyond sensory perception must necessarily also acknowledge that it has objects that lie beyond mere sensuous reality. The objects of thought, however, are ideas. As thought takes hold of the idea, it merges with the very foundation of the world’s existence; that which acts from without enters the human mind: he becomes one with objective reality at its highest potency. The realization of the idea in reality is humanity’s true communion.

[ 7 ] Thinking has the same significance for ideas as the eye has for light and the ear for sound. It is the organ of perception.

[ 8 ] This view is capable of uniting two things that are today considered completely incompatible: the empirical method and idealism as a scientific worldview. It is believed that acceptance of the former necessarily entails the rejection of the latter. This is by no means correct. Of course, if one regards the senses as the sole organs of perception of an objective reality, one must arrive at this view. For the senses provide only those relationships between things that can be traced back to mechanical laws. And with that, the mechanical worldview would be presented as the only true form of such a reality. In doing so, one commits the error of simply overlooking the other, equally objective components of reality that cannot be traced back to mechanical laws. The objectively given does not at all coincide with the sensually given, as the mechanical worldview believes. The latter is only half of what is given. The other half consists of ideas, which are likewise the object of experience—albeit of a higher kind, whose organ is thought. Ideas, too, are accessible to an inductive method.

[ 9 ] Contemporary empirical science follows the entirely correct method: holding fast to what is given; but it adds the impermissible assertion that this method can only yield facts that are immediately apparent to the senses. Instead of focusing on how we arrive at our views, it determines from the outset the content of those views. The only satisfactory conception of reality is the empirical method combined with idealistic research results. This is idealism, but not the kind that pursues a nebulous, dreamlike unity of things ; rather, it is the kind that seeks the concrete conceptual content of reality just as empirically as today’s hyper-precise research seeks factual content.

[ 10 ] By approaching Goethe with these views, we believe we are gaining insight into his essence. We hold fast to idealism, but in developing it, we do not base ourselves on Hegel’s dialectical method, but rather on a purified, higher form of empiricism.

[ 11 ] Such a concept also underlies Eduard von Hartmann’s philosophy. Eduard von Hartmann seeks in nature the unity of ideas, as it positively emerges for a meaningful way of thinking. He rejects a purely mechanical view of nature and hyper-Darwinism, which clings to the superficial. In science, he is the founder of concrete monism. In history and aesthetics, he seeks the concrete idea. All of this is done using an empirical-inductive method.

[ 12 ] Hartmann’s philosophy differs from mine only in the question of pessimism and in the metaphysical radicalization of the system with regard to the “unconscious.” As for the latter point, see below. With regard to pessimism, however, the following should be noted: What Hartmann cites as reasons for pessimism—that is, for the view that nothing in the world can fully satisfy us, that displeasure always outweighs pleasure—I would go so far as to describe as the very happiness of humanity . To me, what he presents is merely evidence that it is futile to strive for bliss. We must simply abandon such a pursuit entirely and seek our purpose purely in selflessly fulfilling those ideal tasks that our reason sets before us. What does this mean other than that we should seek our happiness only in creation, in ceaseless activity?

[ 13 ] Only the person who acts—and specifically the selfless person who acts without seeking reward—fulfills his or her purpose. It is foolish to want to be rewarded for one’s actions; there is no true reward. Here, Hartmann should have elaborated further. He should have shown what, under such conditions, can be the sole driving force behind all our actions. When the prospect of achieving a desired goal disappears, it can only be selfless devotion to the object to which one dedicates one’s actions, it can only be love. Only an act done out of love can be a moral one. The idea must be our guiding star in science, and love in action. And with that, we have returned to Goethe. “What matters to the active person is that he do what is right; whether what is right actually comes to pass should not concern him.” “Our entire feat consists in giving up our existence in order to exist.” (“Sayings in Prose”; Natural Scientific Writings, Vol. 4, Part 2, pp. 464 and 441.)

[ 14 ] I did not arrive at my worldview solely through the study of Goethe or, for that matter, Hegelianism. I started from a mechanistic-naturalistic view of the world, but realized that one cannot remain there if one thinks deeply. Proceeding strictly according to the scientific method, I found in objective idealism the only satisfactory worldview. The way in which self-consistent, non-contradictory thinking arrives at this worldview is shown in my Theory of Knowledge. ^{86 Rudolf Steiner, *Grundlinien einer Erkenntnistheorie der Goetheschen Weltanschauung mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Schiller*. Berlin and Stuttgart 1886, 6th ed. Complete Edition, Dornach 1960.} I then found that this objective idealism, in its fundamental features, permeates Goethe’s worldview. Thus, of course, the development of my views has for years proceeded in parallel with my study of Goethe; and I have never found a fundamental contradiction between my basic views and Goethe’s scientific work. If I have succeeded, at least in part, in first developing my point of view in such a way that it comes alive for others as well, and second, in bringing about the conviction that this point of view is truly Goethe’s, then I consider my task fulfilled.