The Rudolf Steiner Archive

6. Social Science and Social Practice

[ 1 ] Allow me today to pick up on a few points that I could only touch upon yesterday and that will then lead us to our discussion today. Yesterday, I had to build on a statement that emerged from the worldview of the 19th century—insofar as it prevailed in Central Europe—namely, that just as the tongue draws in air from the surroundings, so too does it draw from the teeth the word, that is, the power to speak. And I drew your attention to how the 19th-century scholar could only add to this statement that he found it laughable. But I have also characterized the gap that lies between the era in which such an instinctive view as the one cited yesterday belongs, and the era in which this philistine, ironic criticism then asserted itself—that era which begins precisely with the first third of the 15th century. That statement still belongs to the preceding era and, for the reasons I gave you yesterday, is in a certain sense extraordinarily characteristic of that era.

[ 2 ] However, it must also be regarded as characteristic in terms of its content. For I explained to you yesterday how, in order to understand the capacity for language and language itself, one must first familiarize oneself with what spiritual science has to say, in the sense of what I set forth in my short treatise The Education of the Child from the Perspective of Spiritual Science. There I showed what a significant process takes place with the change of teeth—how that which later fills the human being as a rhythmic being and a being of limb metabolism, but which had previously filled him entirely, withdraws from the nervous-sensory organization and thereby brings about precisely this process, which is described in my treatise The Education of the Child from the Perspective of Spiritual Science is formulaically described as the birth of the etheric body. I then guided you to understand how, in a similar way, the process that occurs around the age of fourteen or fifteen—sexual maturity—must be grasped, and I explained how what is taking place there can be formulaically summarized with the expression: the birth of the astral body. But I have said that the events which occur in this way in a person’s life at any given stage also take place as metamorphoses at other times—though precisely as metamorphoses—and that what unfolds outwardly between the human being and the external world at the time of sexual maturity, must be sought internally as a process that takes place between the spiritual-soul and the physical-bodily within the human being—as the process that is essentially the physiological correlate of the child’s learning to speak—and that one must therefore also seek the starting points for a truly rational linguistics by proceeding from a penetrating, intuitive understanding of this process.

[ 3 ] I then said that through the establishment and development of abstract logic and abstract logical thinking, the sphere of experience in which what takes place between the spiritual-psychic and the physical-bodily unfolds in a living way is, so to speak, displaced, pushed down into the subconscious, and that Aristotle, precisely by directing consciousness into abstraction, cut off the view into the prenatal realm. For if one had, as was instinctively possible in early antiquity, had before one’s eyes that activity of the astral in the process of reaching sexual maturity and in language—as we must now strive to do once again—then one could also have gradually come to perceive what the connection of the “I” itself with the entire physical-etheric-astral human being is. That is to say, one could have advanced in this field from an understanding of how speech is learned to an understanding of the integration of the human spiritual-soul ego into its physical-bodily being. And this is precisely why Aristotle established his doctrine that with every single human being born here, the soul-spiritual aspect also comes into being. In doing so, he removed from the realm of knowledge the notion of a pre-existing human soul.

[ 4 ] Only the intuitive perception of this pre-existent human soul provides a true understanding of the eternity of the human soul. This understanding is not derived from any philosophical speculation, but solely from an intuitive judgment along the lines I have just indicated. This dogma of the non-existence of preexistence has since become part of Christian doctrine. And it must be strongly emphasized: that the denial of preexistence, having been established by councils, is not Christian in the true sense of the word, but rather Aristotelian, and became a Christian dogma with the infiltration of Aristotelianism into Christian doctrine. The moment Christianity is able to free itself from this element of Aristotelianism, the way will also be clear for a recognition of pre-existence.

[ 5 ] It must be said: this pre-existence, which until Origen had not been questioned by Western Christian doctrine, disappeared from Western Christian doctrine as a result of the imperial decree of Justinian, who played a part in Origen’s condemnation. That is why it is so uncomfortable for the adherents of this non-Christian Western Christian doctrine when anyone draws attention to the historical facts of the first centuries of Christianity. They then bring up every falsehood they can muster regarding the connections between anthroposophy and Gnosticism, and so on.

[ 6 ] Well, I can’t go into these matters any further here. But what I want to say is this: If one bases the spiritual and soul aspects of the human being solely on what has been present in the field of consciousness since birth, then one gradually arrives at a point where the doctrine of immortality becomes a mere article of faith.

[ 7 ] One could say that whatever was prenatal or pre-existent in the human being enters a completely unconscious state as a result of passing through birth. This can only be perceived again when one rises to the levels of imagination and inspiration. But at the other pole of the human being, it appears in the nature of the will and emotions. In the threefold human being, we have, on the one hand, the nervous-sensory human being, which is connected to the imaginative human being, and, on the other hand, the limb-metabolic human being, which is connected to the human being’s volitional and emotional nature. Because the life of imagination is subdued, dampened down to objective observation, pre-existence is initially closed off to this objective imagination in the process of cognition. But what is given with it lives in the sphere of the human being that appears at the other pole. There the nature of the will and the nature of emotion come to the fore. From this, no knowledge can initially be gained; hence it remains mere belief. And while that which is pre-birth can become knowledge through the expansion of knowledge, without this expansion of knowledge, that which lives in will and emotion can become nothing other than an article of faith for human beings. Thus, as supersensible knowledge fades, so too does the knowledge of the eternity of the human soul fade, even into language itself. It should at least be striking that, in the better-known languages of civilization, we do indeed have a word for immortality—that is, for life after death—but we do not have a word that would express, at the other pole of the human being, the eternity of the human soul, the state of not yet being born. But this is something modern humanity will have to reclaim, even in language: that the eternity of the human being, just as it appears on one side—the side of death—in the word “immortality,” can also become visible on the other side through a word such as “unbornness”—which, of course, will become more refined as civilization advances. Then, however, what can be said about the eternity of the human soul will no longer be a mere article of faith, but a matter of knowledge. As long as one remains confined to the afterlife, the question of immortality must be a question of faith. As soon as one moves on to a true understanding of the supersensible, the question of immortality becomes a question of true knowledge.

[ 8 ] This is a connection that must be understood; it is a Rubicon that modern civilization must cross. For what follows from crossing this Rubicon will not merely have a theoretical effect, but will continue to have an impact in an entirely different way. We can say: If we learn to ascend properly from such things as the understanding of tooth replacement and the understanding of language to what we then arrive at, we thereby acquire an understanding of the immortal nature of the human soul.

[ 9 ] Those who, in the Irish century and spoke of the tongue “sucking language from the teeth” did not believe, as Wilhelm Scherer strangely assumes, that only dental sounds exist; rather, they were imbued in their instinctive insight with the realization that, in order to understand language, one must delve down into the human essence, just as one must delve down to understand the process of tooth replacement. Just as the forces rise up there, so one must delve down to the origins of the path that, through the change of teeth, points to what was revealed at an earlier stage of human development: the emergence of language. These insights were instinctive and subconscious. But anyone who brings the corresponding insights to the surface of consciousness today will discover the depth they possess in a certain sense—and the philistinism inherent in objections such as those I discussed in detail yesterday. But by elevating ourselves to such insights as those concerning language, we also gain, at the same time—I would say—access to the path of recognizing immortality. Therefore, the recognition of this supersensible world is simultaneously linked to the attainment of sound judgment regarding what surrounds us in life, such as language. And we cannot, without becoming inwardly dishonest, pretend to penetrate something in our environment such as language unless we simultaneously admit: there are limits here that must not merely be recognized as the limits of familiar knowledge, but which necessitate that they be transcended through a different kind of knowledge.

[ 10 ] Thus, true knowledge of the external sensory world is already connected with the ascent toward supersensory knowledge. In truly sound knowledge, supersensory perception and sensory perception must work together, and one must support the other. Therefore, we may believe that by attaining sound judgments about the supersensible, we can also arrive at sound judgments regarding what surrounds us as human beings in another realm—one with which we, as human beings, are connected and must enter into intimate relationships: social life.

[ 11 ] In the style of my previous lectures, I have tried as much as possible to adhere to what one might call a strictly scientific approach. Since we must now turn to what follows from such an inner state of mind—as it must arise from spiritual science, as understood here—in terms of social science and social practice, we find ourselves in the midst of that practice right now. For what needs to be said in social terms today simply cannot be viewed in the same way as what has gone before.

[ 12 ] It is necessary to take the following into account as well. As one rises to the levels of imagination, inspiration, and so on, that which is otherwise merely conceptual—and cannot directly motivate the will—is drawn into the will. Therefore, supersensible knowledge motivates the will, and there is no moral or religious ideal that is not at least unconsciously rooted in the supersensible. What is gained through the imagination from the sensible realm alone can never be a source of social or moral motivation, because it remains ineffective for the will. That is why one must say that it might perhaps be striking that people who picked up my treatise on social life—specifically, The Threefold Social Order—found, upon reading it, absolutely nothing in it of what they were accustomed to finding, for example, in my anthroposophical writings as the underlying tone. Some might have expected that when someone who professes anthroposophy writes on a topic such as that contained in my Threefold Social Order, all manner of familiar “anthroposophical” judgments would flow into every detail discussed there; one would have to proceed in a rather mystical manner to offer all sorts of exhortations, and so on.

[ 13 ] Even if such a judgment has often been heard from anthroposophical quarters, it is entirely comparable in nature to the judgments of those who, when I wrote my Theosophy, expected to find in it—word for word—what was stated, for example, in my critiques of Haeckelianism. People simply cannot understand how true anthroposophy, when it translates into will, leads to an engagement with the environment—that is, to an objective examination of every field it undertakes—meaning that one need not simply carry over the formulas applicable to one field into another. It is quite understandable that those who have been accustomed to hearing this or that word for word over a long period of time might then find it unfamiliar and uncomfortable to hear the same thing expressed in a different language. However, different spheres of life require different languages. And the point is that, when speaking about them, one should speak from the same spirit—but not that one should find the same concepts and ideas expressed verbatim everywhere. And in anthroposophy, it is indeed essential that one not merely take it in according to its literal wording, but that one take it in according to its spirit. Then, however, one will recognize—when it seeks to be active in an eminently practical sphere such as the social question—what kind of action is called for by the needs of the times, by all the forces of decline that are coming to light in our time. Innerly, this very approach to the social question is thoroughly connected to what flows through the more theoretical aspects of anthroposophy—viewed from other epistemological perspectives, though not from other practical ones. Therefore, I must ask you today to bear in mind that I must depart from the style of my previous lectures, which were conducted along the lines of objective scientific inquiry. For it is necessary that what must live as impulses of the will in immediate life—and which has yet to fight for its place—be grasped in a different form, that it approach our souls in a different way than that of which one can say: “That is how it is!” Look at what is presented regarding the threefold social order in my book The Key Points of the Social Question. And today I want to speak more from the standpoint of broad social practice. I would like to speak not theoretically, but from the standpoint of social practice—from the perspective of what must first be done in the broadest sense. What must be done is intrinsically connected to what has been done in recent years regarding the question of the threefold social order, even though it has provoked such boisterous displeasure among fellow students as was, for example, evident the day before yesterday in Stuttgart in such a despicable form. That is why I also want to describe to you, entirely in the context of the times, how this fits into the present era—what you can read about in terms of content in my book The Key Points of the Social Question, in my book On the Implementation of the Threefold Social Order, and what you will then find characterized from various angles in the lectures that will still be given here today. I would simply like to offer a kind of introduction to the general tone that will then be set. But I would like to say that humanity, precisely because in the course of modern times—for the reasons that have already been elaborated—it has, more and more—despite believing itself to be so practical, believed it had mastered practical matters inside and out—has elevated itself to a level of abstraction that can bear fruitful results nowhere else but in the scientific study of the inorganic; and that, as a result, humanity has become entirely impractical. Humanity had become accustomed to this abstractness and had gradually begun to speak from this abstractness even about what immediately surrounds us as concrete social life. If you read through all the theoretical debates that modern, scholarly economists typically preface their systems with, you will find that the question appears everywhere: To what extent can the scientific observer of the economy even gain insight into what is taking place immediately and practically around us? And how should the economist—in order to live up to scientific standards (which is nothing other than the scientific standards one has, out of habit, adopted from the natural sciences)—how should this economist conduct himself so that he can meet these scientific standards?

[ 14 ] That there is a lack of clarity regarding this question, and that this lack of clarity reflects an alienation from real social life—that was what I set out to demonstrate in my book The Key Points of the Social Question; and that this alienation itself is embedded in today’s social life, which has gone astray. I had to show how, in this recent era rushing headlong toward abstraction, leading figures have indeed found a way to adapt to the technical and social operations of capitalist technology; yet precisely because attention to the human being has been lost, nothing has emerged from these leading figures regarding the social question—a matter so closely connected to the human being and human understanding. After all, even philosophically, the connection between theoretical knowledge and so-called practical knowledge had been lost; despite Schopenhauer’s words—or perhaps precisely because of the meaning of those words, since that meaning was so deeply ingrained in modern humanity—despite the saying: “Preaching morality is easy; justifying morality is hard”—despite these words, people could not see how necessary it is to seek out those foundations of life that do not merely preach morality, as Schopenhauer says, and thereby seek to provide a theoretical proof for it, but that seek to justify morality through facts by pointing to what truly lives in the world of facts.

[ 15 ] In Kantian philosophy, the confusion surrounding this area is expressed by the fact that a sharp distinction has been drawn between what constitutes theoretical consideration—which is the subject of criticism in the Critique of Pure Reason—and what is supposed to be the content of a mere imperative and therefore a matter of mere faith—which is the subject of criticism in the Critique of Practical Reason. No bridge is to be allowed to be built between them, whereas—as you have heard from this very place in recent days—Goethe turned against this with his concept of “intuitive judgment,” the “intellectus archetypus,” in order to then attempt to approach what is truly practical in the foundation of human action in a different way. Schopenhauer could not find it because he regarded what exists in the world of the imagination from the outset as something merely pictorial, incapable of being imbued with the substance of being, and because he relied solely on the will—which, in turn, cannot be brought into consciousness for objective knowledge without higher, supersensible knowledge. Thus, he sensed the inadequacy of a theoretical justification for practical action. Through mere theoretical reason, he was unable to point to the justification of practical action itself, because he saw in the will only something blind, never something that could be penetrated by the light of knowledge. For this light can only be the supersensible. And Schopenhauer did not wish to elevate himself to that level either.

[ 16 ] Then came other attempts, such as Herbart’s. In Herbart, we find an attempt to establish a kind of justification in practical life for what constitutes practical action. But what is characteristic of Herbart is that, in his practical philosophy, he seeks what is essentially an aesthetic judgment; that is, he attempts to ground practical philosophy as a part of aesthetics. Through this—by implicitly going beyond what he theoretically holds in his consciousness—the five well-known practical ideas of perfection, benevolence, inner freedom, justice, and equity come to light. But humanity’s relationship to them is one of assent, which in turn requires a motivating force. Here, too, I can only point out how attempts have been made—I would say, to break through—what was given by the merely abstracting intellect; yet how this attempt, because it did not seek to advance to the realm of true spiritual science, failed in every possible respect.

[ 17 ] Therefore, I must point out that this development in the recent historical life of humanity is the reason why leading figures were unable to find what truly resonates with people. And so they found their way to the machine, they found their way to technology, they found their way to capitalism. They did not find their way to human beings, whom they left standing beside the machine—just as the natural scientist leaves the real human being standing beside what he theoretically investigates through his natural science.

[ 18 ] What is playing out in the natural sciences is rooted in a deep-seated way of life and manifests itself in all areas. That is why the first chapter of my Key Points could only be structured in such a way as to shed light on the impact of a spiritual life alien to real life in modern times. It was necessary to sharply point out the fact—which was provided to me not by some theoretical consideration but by the life experience described in my book—that the leading figures in all traditions in the artistic, religious, and scientific spheres in addition to what mere conceptualization in the imagination has produced in modern times, created an emotional and religious content that could not arise in that class which was torn away from life within tradition and placed before the machine—a class that, in response to what emerged in this modern era, only the theoretical abstraction, so that the life of toil and labor among this class was further compounded by what arises from the barrenness of the soul—a soul that, while it may theoretically satisfy itself with what a theoretical, scientific way of thinking can offer, cannot live by it.

[ 19 ] Thus, what was to come to life through my “Key Points of the Social Question”—and already in the “Call” that preceded them—was conceived in the most practical sense, as something that must pass directly into life, something that was not meant to engage merely the intellect, but rather the will. And it had emerged from that which was meant to seize the will.

[ 20 ] When it became clear even to a large number of figures in the outside world how the terrible, catastrophic events of the second decade of the 20th century would unfold, something intervened in the course of events—as I said, I want only to hint at general directions today; you will find more precise details in my writings—that which was the most lifeless abstraction, something born entirely and solely out of abstract spirituality. It was with this abstract form of spirituality that the man who had risen from being a scholar to become President of the United States of America—Woodrow Wilson—had emerged. In his Fourteen Points, he also presented to the world, as an impetus for practical action, something that sprang solely from an abstraction divorced from life. The situation provided practical proof of this—you can read about it in Maynard Keynes—as Woodrow Wilson found himself in the negotiations at Versailles, where what lived in his theory melted away more and more in the face of what had been established at Versailles at that time out of the most outdated traditional views. Historical development itself has provided proof of the detachment from reality of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. When they were formulated, however, they demonstrated that such abstraction can indeed bring something into reality: one brings something into it, but one brings only error! It is not that abstractions, when passed through human hands, cannot conjure up realities; but the fact is that they must always give rise to confusion or inadequacies within these realities, precisely because they are not drawn from life itself. Thus, the Fourteen Points were able to bring ships and armies across the sea, but these Fourteen Points could not send a vital impulse into modern civilization.

[ 21 ] I fear that what this entails within modern civilization is still not understood in any meaningful way by a sufficiently large number of people. For in the postwar period in America, Woodrow Wilson was succeeded by Harding—and we were recently able to read Harding’s inaugural address: the same abstract phrases, the same talk of “human brotherhood,” which cannot be motivating because it exists in abstractions—a continuation of Wilson’s policies under a different name. I cannot find that a sufficiently large number of people have a sufficient understanding of the inadequacy that persists here. It is as if modern man had virtually lost all connection with any enthusiasm for the truth, for living truth, and were to pass by, as if asleep, such a detachment from life as was once again evident in the American president’s inaugural address.

[ 22 ] Back when the Fourteen Points first entered modern life, the alienation from reality contained within those Fourteen Points was to be countered by a genuine practice of life, something that sprang from life itself, and at the same time from the most important elements of modern public life—from real social practice and from an understanding of the social issues that pulse through contemporary humanity.

[ 23 ] In a down-to-earth manner, I recently pointed out such things in a lecture in Stuttgart, after Lloyd George had sought to prevent the strike that was then looming and had patched up the situation. After this “patching up” of social conditions, I said in Stuttgart: One can certainly use such ideas—which, despite coming from Lloyd George, are purely theoretical—to patch things up, but one cannot control reality, and people will come to realize that what has been patched up is merely theoretical, that nothing has been achieved in practical terms, and that this will become apparent shortly. — Now you see! Now, based on what has actually come to pass, you can judge for yourselves whether that Stuttgart lecture was grounded in an understanding of social forces or whether it was merely theoretical—whereas today people not only speak theoretically but also act theoretically in public life and, in particular, in social life, where such an approach is truly out of place.

[ 24 ] And so, back then, when—I might say—the political fruit of modern abstract thinking emerged in a classic way in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, an attempt was made to awaken, among those who listened to it at the time with despondency and a reluctance to act, yet were in a certain sense curious about it, to understand that from Europe—initially only Central Europe was accessible—manifestations of the threefold social order were offering something concrete and practical in contrast to the impractical Fourteen Points. And one could have been convinced, had one had a sense for realities rather than merely for cherished theories that had then become “practical,” one could have been convinced that, just as the impractical abstractions had in reality set armies and ships in motion, that which would have spoken from a reality—if only it had been conveyed from the right place—would also have conjured up realities.

[ 25 ] But those who had a say in the matter back then refused to listen. Social practice was foreign to them. They were accustomed to what had developed over the course of modern times: to follow the path leading to the machine, to the machinery of social order, but not to follow the path leading to the person standing at the machine—the person who lives there as a human being within the machinery of social order, and who, as a human being, is an active agent.

[ 26 ] Since people at that time did not understand what the necessities of life demanded, it was an inevitable consequence that, immediately after the bloody catastrophe of war had ended, at the instigation of friends in Stuttgart, what is set forth in my “Appeal to the German People and the Civilized World” and in my “Key Points of the Social Question” came to pass. And at a time when, in certain areas of modern civilized life, the old powers had disappeared, an attempt was made to speak to the broad masses of the people—to those who had suffered the most from all the circumstances I have now alluded to and have otherwise described time and again. The beginning was, in essence, a good one. It was possible to reach the broad masses of the people. They gradually came to understand the essence of the impulse behind the threefold social order. For it is nonsense to say that this is difficult to understand in and of itself. The difficulty in understanding stems solely from the fact that people cannot break free from old habits of thought; they cannot refrain from imposing what they are accustomed to as a rigid form of thought onto something that presents itself as fundamentally different. That is where the difficulty lies, not in the subject matter itself. That is why there was also the possibility of finding understanding precisely among those who, out of their own needs, were striving for a relative solution to the social question, and who had already realized by then that they could not arrive at a satisfactory organization of social life in modern times by remaining within the confines of old, dogmatic Marxism.

[ 27 ] Those plans were thwarted by the fact that, on the one hand, it was not the workers but their leaders who were opposed to them, and on the other hand, leading figures of the old bourgeoisie. From all sides, one was, so to speak, left in the lurch with regard to the impulse toward the threefold social order.

[ 28 ] At first, in the spring of 1919, those in the ruling circles were gripped by a desperate fear, and they clung to anything that had anything to do with the social question. As a result, some of them found themselves caught up in the initial surge toward the threefold social order as it came their way, but they lacked the strength and the courage to persevere. One of the celebrated leaders of the bourgeoisie in a Central European region told me, when we were right in the thick of what was about to happen: “Yes, given the way you yourself are understood and speak to the broad masses of the people, one might indeed have high hopes; but such a matter—and you’ll grant this to a party leader of the old parties—must not rest on two eyes alone; there are as yet no others—and I am merely quoting—who would be effective in this direction; therefore, we do not rely on this entire broad movement, but rather we intend to uphold the old order—even though it may only last another fifteen or twenty years at most—with cannons and rifles.

[ 29 ] That was the response from one side. But let me also speak about the response from the other side, because I need to describe in practical terms what this is all about. The working class, insofar as I was able to speak to them, tried to engage with the Threefold Social Order movement with relative ease and inner understanding. Then the labor leaders came along, and they became—I would say—pale with envy that the working class could now be addressed from a perspective other than their indoctrinated Marxism. And they, just like the others, invented all sorts of slanders and smear campaigns to block the path to understanding for the workers, who, after all, are prone to blindly following authority in this regard when it comes to their leaders. The workers, however, are not yet ready to properly come to terms with the belief in authority that has been carried over from the past decades. The moment the working class comes to realize what the lower- and higher-ranking labor leaders are really after, much of what still exists today in this sphere as well-meaning faith will shatter—when people realize that those of the ilk of Lenin and Trotsky, or Lunacharsky, are at the helm, do not in their true intentions have the happiness and well-being of the masses in mind, but rather say to themselves and among themselves: “The broad masses of the people are stupid and will always be driven by passions; there is nothing to be done with them except to tyrannize them; therefore, it should come as no surprise that we, too, tyrannize them, whether we are called Tsar Nicholas or Lenin; for us, the only issue is that those who once sat on the Kurul chairs have fallen from them and we now sit upon them; for us, it is a matter of seizing the seats of government!

[ 30 ] The moment this realization dawns on the broadest circles, many things will change. But then the time will also have come when truly social practices can take root in social life. Then people will view with practical understanding what I expressed in the second and third chapters of my Key Points of the Social Question—I would say as an illustration of what must come about from such a spirit. Then people will see that none of this has been invented out of a theory, but that it has all been derived from hard-won practical experience, just as it was back then when, after Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points became known, this idea of the threefold social order first emerged.

[ 31 ] I speak as someone who has spent half his life—thirty years—in Austria, this laboratory for social impossibilities. I speak as someone who knows full well how people used to talk in this Austrian laboratory, in a ministry—a liberal ministry. During the heyday of Austrian liberalism, when the social question was already beginning to emerge behind the scenes of liberalism, the liberal Giskra said: “In Austria, we have nothing to do with the social question, for the social question ends at Bodenbach!” — This was proclaimed in the Austrian Parliament—the seat of liberalism—by the minister of the interior responsible for these matters, in the last third of the 19th century.

[ 32 ] Anyone who now wishes to study how, in this Austrian parliament, I would say, the impossible intermingling of the three members of the social organism has operated in its purest form—as I have already expressed in my “Key Points” by citing the composition of the Parliament consisting of four economic curiae—can see how things gradually developed. And anyone who wishes to understand the ultimatum to Serbia must thoroughly study everything that has happened in Austria since 1867 up to the period preceding the ultimatum to Serbia. Then they will see what the situation was like with regard to the bread shortage, inflation, and the inflation-related conflicts in the months leading up to the outbreak of war, particularly in the Austrian provinces, and they will have the opportunity to examine the social factors there to determine where the underlying causes lie. And this would lead one into a new way of looking at things.

[ 33 ] But what must emerge from any such consideration is that the goal is to find impulses for practical social life that speak from within that life itself. Then perhaps we will reach a time when there is a sufficiently large number of people who—unbothered by the old labels of “right” and “left”—turn their attention to what is factual and practical; and because this flows directly from reality, it can rightfully claim a voice in the most important matters of life. And those are the social matters.

[ 34 ] Today, many people take the view that the world will fall into place if only we can succeed in carrying on the old impulses, and for quite some time now, people have been trying once again to see how things might work by letting the old ways continue. People turn a blind eye to how, under this irrational, unrealistic way of operating, something is increasingly coming to the surface that must at the same time have a corrosive effect on modern civilization as a whole.

[ 35 ] But a way forward will not emerge until we realize that we must set out to view immediate life objectively, without looking to the left or right. For it is only through this that we gain an understanding of those practical-social ideas that can not only preach an ethical-social life but also ground it. For the foundation of this life should be pointed out through the threefold structure of the social organism. Theorists have long enough repeated, based on their theoretical views, that today one must view as “social” whatever also lives in ethics. Since the division of labor, human beings have been placed entirely within the social sphere, and one must understand “from within the social realm” what motivates a person when they are to act.

[ 36 ] As long as this judgment remains devoid of substance, as long as it remains an abstraction, it will have no effect. For as an abstraction, it is just as true as it is false. I have shown in my Philosophy of Freedom that it is false. It has the other, the troubling true side, namely that human beings are surrendering their freedom more and more to the objective economic process and the like, as is even theoretically expounded in Marxism. And as human beings thus surrender themselves to the economic process, or to the state apparatus, or to the other social institutions we now have, the motivation for their actions naturally becomes more and more social. This can and must be recognized. For modern civilization aims to teach people to live together in a division of labor. But if the social order is to motivate appropriate social action in human beings, then it must be a social organism that, by virtue of the inner laws of such an organism, is capable of motivating the will; then, through a viable social organism, one must not merely preach morality but establish social morality. In this realm, morality must not be founded on words and ideas; it must be founded on the thing itself, on realities. Realities should be stimulated by the impulse of the threefold structure of the social organism.

[ 37 ] People understood the matter so little that the abstract thinkers even made fun of me because I used the word “impulse” instead of “idea” over and over again to suggest that there should be power in this tendency toward a threefold social organism, not just empty talk. That is precisely what the work on the threefold social order is all about: that there is reality in it, not just empty talk. Otherwise, one might as well go around as a moralizing itinerant speaker—as there are so many of them nowadays—and try to persuade people: “Just become ethical again, just become good again, and social harmony will surely arise!” — I have always said to those who were willing to listen: if you speak to the stove in the room, saying, “O stove, by your very nature it is your categorical imperative to warm the room”—it will not warm the room. But there is no need to preach when you put wood in it and light it. There is no need for theoretical moralizing or mystical aestheticizing. One needs not merely a “practical” jumble of ideas, but real impulses to stimulate idea-filled social forces if social practice is to be achieved. And the moment one develops an understanding of this fact, one will finally learn to think correctly about what the threefold social order actually aims to achieve.

[ 38 ] But because this reaches down into the mind and the will, an understanding of this threefold division requires not only a theoretical interest in the truth and in theoretical discussion, but also enthusiasm for and a commitment to the truth. As long as we are unable to take the truth into our will, to bring it out of the realm of theory, and to let it permeate our whole being, we cannot even begin to address the social question and social practice in a fruitful way.

[ 39 ] This is what it is all about: that those who seek to understand what the threefold social order aims for may seek this understanding with their whole being. Then enthusiasm does not arise from blind instincts, but is inspired by enlightened insight. Then it does not remain blind itself, but will shine with its own light. When impulses of the will do not arise from instincts and drives, but from an overview of social life, then they do not remain blind and dark; rather, they themselves become seeing and radiant. And the path regarding the impulse toward the threefold organization of the social organism depends on enthusiasm and the will toward truth becoming ever more radiant in this sense. And I would like to express here, at the conclusion of this very reflection, the hope that what can be said in this direction may contribute in some measure not to stirring up a blind and dark enthusiasm and will, but rather to luminous, volitional formations of life.

[ 40 ] Closing Remarks on the Fourth Debate Evening

[ 41 ] In the course of the very lively discussion on the topic “Social Science and Social Practice,” a Dutch member of the society once again brought up the “World School Association” (see p. 92 ff.). He called for “taking immediate action,” namely to proceed with the founding right away (following a Dutch initiative that bore the name “iso”). In doing so, the member pointed out that in April 1912, members of the “German Section” of the “Theosophical Society,” at the suggestion of a member who had traveled from England, had founded an “association” through such “action,” from which “what is known today as the Anthroposophical Society” had “sprung.”

[ 42 ] I do not wish to keep you much longer, but only to make a few remarks, first in connection with what our friend v.L. has proposed here, which is certainly quite commendable—or rather, will be, if it leads to the promised goal. I would just like to note that it would be a questionable foundation if the matter were built on the same basis as the “Bund,” to which reference has been made. At that time, work was indeed carried out with a certain zeal, much as Mr. v.L. has outlined today: People gathered in small committees, discussed all sorts of possibilities regarding what should be done, and so on. But then Mr. v.L. made a statement—which, of course, is initially a minor error, but which, if it were to continue to have an effect, could lead to a major error. It was said, in fact, that the Anthroposophical Society emerged from this work, which was carried out so tirelessly that night. — No, that is out of the question: nothing at all emerged from that night or from the founding of that association! I would like to see the intended “restless work of that night” spared from such a fate. Although there was much talk at the time about what needed to be done, nothing at all came of it. And the error that could arise stems from the fact that one might think something must now be done along the lines of what was implied by that “federation.” What actually happened was that those who were already involved in our anthroposophical work—that is, those who were already fully part of our movement—went on, quite apart from the founding of this “League,” to establish the Anthroposophical Society, which then continued to develop, while the “League” gradually slipped, so to speak, from a gentle slumber into social oblivion.

[ 43 ] Well, it would be a minor error! And this must certainly be emphasized so that the mistakes of that “night committee” are not repeated in its second edition, for example. That is one thing.

[ 44 ] The other point I would like to make is that whatever the World School Association might aim to achieve must truly be placed on a broad foundation and undertaken from the outset with a certain degree of courage and a comprehensive vision.

[ 45 ] Our friend v.L. has quite rightly emphasized that the position regarding free spiritual life in connection with the threefold social order must be addressed in a variety of ways for a wide range of fields. However, this must then also truly

[ 46 ] so that the approach taken for the territories in question is truly suited to those territories. I myself will always point out that, for England, for example, it will be necessary to present matters in a way that is specifically suited to the conditions of English civilization.

[ 47 ] One must thoroughly discern what is mere illusion and what is reality when it comes to the great questions facing humanity today. One must not, therefore, present the matter in such a way as to give rise to the belief that English intellectual life is freer than others. And you will see, if you truly go through the “key points,” that less emphasis is placed on the negative aspect—the liberation of intellectual life from the state—and that far less emphasis is placed on it than on the establishment of a free intellectual life in general. And this will always remain a valid point: that it depends on the individual; that what truly matters is the spiritual foundations from which a person emerges and the spiritual foundations laid for their education. It is not so much a matter of emphasizing the negative aspect, but rather of emphasizing the positive. And I need only say this: If, let us say, intellectual life were formally liberated from state coercion, and everything else remained the same, then liberation from the state would not be of much use.

[ 48 ] The point is that this positive spirit—as it sought to be represented here this week, as attempts were made to represent it—this free spirit should be brought into the international spiritual life. And then things will unfold as they are meant to.

[ 49 ] In the case of the Waldorf School, for example, it is not merely that it is a truly free school—that it does not even have a principal—but that the teaching staff is a truly representative community. It is not merely that all decisions are made in such a way that “nothing else” speaks but what emerges from the teaching staff itself—that is, that here we truly have “an independent spiritual community”—but it is also that in all countries there is a lack of the spiritual life that has been discussed here all week. And when one hears it emphasized somewhere that “spiritual life in this country is free”—I am not referring to Switzerland here, but to England—that is precisely a different matter. And it is this positive aspect, above all else, that matters. It must then be emphasized: This will, of course, only exist if one actually attempts to address the specific conditions in the individual countries and territories.

[ 50 ] But one must have a heart and a mind open to what the unfree spiritual life has ultimately brought about in our time. Not to address what was presented here yesterday, but to show what fruits of the human way of thinking—in intellectual, moral, and emotional terms alike—our present spiritual life brings to light, I would like to read a passage to you. I do not wish to keep you long, nor do I wish to speak again from the standpoint from which a vicious attack on anthroposophy and the threefold social order was launched here yesterday; but I would nevertheless like to read a sentence from that pamphlet which had to be discussed here yesterday. General von Gleich writes about me: “As a man approaching forty, around the turn of the century—which also marks a turning point in the supersensible world of anthroposophy—Mr. Steiner was gradually led toward theosophy through Winter’s lectures on mysticism.”

[ 51 ] Now you may ask who this Mr. Winter is, whom Mr. v. Gleich mentions here as the person whose lectures in Berlin converted me to anthroposophy. One can only put forward the following hypothesis: In the preface to those lectures that I gave in Berlin during the winter of 1901–1902, there is a sentence in which I say: “The movement of which I am about to speak began with my lectures during the winter of 1901–1902.” — That winter, during which I gave my lectures, gave rise to the gentleman named “Winter,” who converted me to theosophy in 1901–1902.

[ 52 ] You see, I do not wish to use the term that applies to the intellectualist disposition of a person who is now called upon to lead the opponents of the anthroposophical movement; I do not wish to use that term; but you will surely be able to use it sufficiently. Such are the fruits of human intellectual activity to which the spiritual life leads—a spiritual life through which one could, in the present day, advance to the point of becoming a major general.

[ 53 ] So one really has to look at the matter from a somewhat deeper perspective. Only then will one develop a heart and a sense for what is necessary. And precisely because spiritual life must be addressed first and foremost through the school system, it would be so desirable that this World School Association could be established—which would not be all that difficult to do if the will to do so exists. However, it need not be a small or large committee; rather, it must be established in such a way that its membership is vast. Only then will it have value. It must not—I do not wish to offer advice on this, for I have already said enough on the matter—it must, of course, impose no special sacrifices whatsoever on any individual. It must be there to create a mood for that which so urgently needs a favorable atmosphere today! — That is part of what I still needed to add to what has come to light today.

[ 54 ] Finally, I must say something that I would rather not say, but which I simply must say, since it has not been mentioned at all this evening and it might be too late in the coming days, when the pain of parting will likely set in. I must bring this matter up myself. The point is that it goes without saying that action must be taken regarding everything that has been discussed today. However, this action only makes sense if we can preserve the Goetheanum as it stands here—and, above all, bring it to completion.

[ 55 ] Well, no matter how well things go with “Futurum A.-G.” and no matter how well things go with “The Coming Day,” they will by no means serve as any kind of economic support for this Goetheanum. Certainly not. And the greatest concern—despite all the other worries weighing on me today—allow me to speak personally for once—is this: that in the not-too-distant future, we might find ourselves without any financial resources for this Goetheanum. That is why, above all else, it is necessary to emphasize that everyone should do their part—that everyone who can contribute in any way to ensuring this building is completed should do so! That is what is necessary above all else: that, through the friends of our cause, we be enabled to preserve this Goetheanum, and above all, to complete its construction. And that, as I said, is my great concern. I must speak it aloud here. For after all, what good would it do if we could carry out as much publicity as we wanted—and yet might have to close this Goetheanum in three months’ time? This, too, is part of the social concerns that, in my opinion, are connected to the general social life of the present. And I had to emphasize this concern because the underlying facts really should not be forgotten: what makes it possible to strengthen the movement that emanates from this Goetheanum.

[ 56 ] We can see, after all, what intellectual foundations underlie the struggle of those who are currently taking their positions against us. This will be a beginning. We must be vigilant, very vigilant, for these people are shrewd. They know how to organize themselves. What happened in Stuttgart is a beginning—it was intended as a beginning. And we will only be able to stand up to them if we kindle a spirit of idealism—I’d like to say this again—that does not say: “Oh, the ideals are so terribly lofty, they are so sublime, and my pocket is such a trivial thing—I won’t reach into it when it comes to these sublime ideals.”—It must be said: True idealism is the kind that is willing to reach into one’s pocket for the sake of those ideals!

[ 57 ] Closing Remarks at a Student Assembly

[ 58 ] A meeting was held on the afternoon of April 9, 1921, at the suggestion of German students, to discuss how anthroposophical work could be established at universities. Dr. Steiner spoke at the end of the meeting.

[ 59 ] Dr. S., however, has pointed out the three most important considerations here: whether to have an organization or not, as desired. But above all, I would like to emphasize this one point: When one is part of a movement such as ours, it is indeed necessary to learn a little from the past and to guide the movement’s next stages in such a way that certain earlier mistakes are avoided.

[ 60 ] What will matter most of all, after all, is this: that anthroposophy—to the extent that it can already be understood by the student body today, and to the extent that it is at all possible given the available resources or opportunities—be disseminated among the student body in its various branches as a positive spiritual content. Essentially, we have found that something real can only be achieved by truly building upon a foundation of the positive.

[ 61 ] Yesterday I had the opportunity to point out that years ago an attempt was made to establish a kind of World Federation for Spiritual Science, and that this World Federation—which actually intended to operate solely according to the rules of formal, external organization—never came to fruition. It ended, so to speak, as the Germans say, like “the Hornberg shooting.” But because there was a need for cohesion and cooperation at that time, the existing adherents of anthroposophy had to be brought together in the “Anthroposophical Society.” These were, more or less, all people who had simply been engaged with anthroposophy. Only with an organization like this—one that already has substance—can one actually accomplish anything.

[ 62 ] Of course, it will be particularly important for the student body not only to work toward disseminating the existing anthroposophical issues in the narrower sense, but also to develop general issues and the like, in the sense that Dr. S. has just indicated. Of course, at first it will not be all that necessary to work toward dissertations on such topics. It has often—really quite often—happened recently that I have been asked by younger students along the following lines: “Yes, we would actually like to integrate anthroposophy with our specific field of study. How should we proceed so that we work toward our goal of earning a doctorate or passing the state examination in the right way? What should we do? How should we structure our work?” — I have always given the following advice: Try to work your way through the official course of study as quickly as possible—though I am always more than happy to offer any advice along the way—and choose any scientific topic that seems to emerge from the course of your studies as the subject of your dissertation, state examination thesis, or the like. Whichever topic you choose, each one is, of course, diametrically opposed to other perspectives from an anthroposophical standpoint; there can be no doubt about that. Each is diametrically opposed. But now my advice to you is this: Write your dissertation in such a way that you first include what the professor can evaluate—what he will understand—and take a second notebook; in that, write down everything that comes to you in the course of your studies and that you believe should actually be incorporated from the perspective of anthroposophy. Keep that separate. Then compile your two sheets—that is how long a dissertation must be. Submit those. And try to finish. Then, with what you have gradually acquired beyond what is in this first notebook—in the second one—you can truly and actively contribute to anthroposophy. For it is only when one is compelled to work scientifically on a specific topic and the like that one actually realizes what significant problems—specialized problems and those faced by specialists—arise. But a danger arises from, I would say, an unclear collaboration with the professoriate. And submitting dissertations to professors that are written “in the anthroposophical sense”—which usually do not suit professors—I do not consider this beneficial, because it actually slows us down in the pace that the anthroposophical movement is supposed to maintain.

[ 63 ] We need as many academically trained staff members as possible. If there is one thing—and it is sorely lacking—in the anthroposophical movement today, it is a sufficiently large number of academically trained staff members. I do not mean by this the superficial notion that we need, shall we say, people with a certain label. That is not what I mean. But first, we need people who have learned to work scientifically from within. After all, the best way to learn this kind of inner scientific approach is through one’s own work. Second, however, we need—as soon as possible—collaborators who are emerging from the student body and who are no longer held back by concerns about their future specialized studies. (You see, it’s not at all surprising that this is as difficult as it is, for example, in Switzerland. ) As a student, of course, it’s easy to join such a group in the first few semesters if you’re open-minded enough to do so. Then the final semesters arrive. By then you’re occupied with other things, and that’s when things get more difficult. And so, time and again, the threads you’ve woven there snap. This was just emphasized a moment ago.

[ 64 ] So here’s what I’d like to say, especially regarding academic collaboration: Even during a transitional period like this, topics need to be approached in two ways: one that the professor understands, and another that you save for later.

[ 65 ] Of course, I am by no means suggesting that very specific opportunities that arise should not be seized, or that these opportunities should not be closely monitored by the student body in the most eminent sense and truly utilized in the spirit and service of the movement: On the one hand, I hope—and on the other, I fear almost silently—that our dear friend, Professor Römer in Leipzig, will now be inundated with a vast number of anthroposophical dissertations! But I think that would also lead to the very things he would probably most welcome. And such a document of student trust would show that he does not belong to the group of professors who have just been mentioned. That would, after all, be evident from the very foundation.

[ 66 ] Now, however, we need to build upon what has already been discussed here in Dornach—namely, some form of collaboration. You will work out among yourselves later how best to accomplish this from a technical standpoint. It would be beneficial if, with the help of the Waldorf teachers—supplemented by other figures from our ranks, such as Professor Römer, Dr. Unger, and others—a certain exchange could take place, particularly regarding the selection of topics for dissertations or scientific papers, without in any way impeding the individual’s free initiative. All of this can only take the form of advice. Precisely for this reason, you should seek a closer collaboration—which need not necessarily be an organization, but rather an exchange of ideas—for this scholarly work.

[ 67 ] The economic situation is, of course, a very, very significant matter. It is certainly true that the university system in particular—but really, more or less the entire higher education system—will suffer extraordinarily from our economic hardships. The point here is that we must finally recognize clearly that help can really only be provided if it is possible to advance institutions such as, for example, “Kommende Tag” in Germany or “Futurum” here. In this way, these organizations can serve as a catalyst for a reorganization of the economic situation of the student body. I can assure you that all the initiatives we are undertaking in this direction are, in fact, designed for rapid growth. We don’t have time to take our time; rather, we must indeed make rapid progress with such economic organizations. And here I must say: the student body, perhaps with very few exceptions, will be able to help us above all by fostering an understanding of these matters. After all, it has indeed happened before—in connection with other matters—that a student was able to persuade his father to support this or that, and was also able to persuade his relatives. Not everyone has only friends without financial means. And that’s when something truly takes hold that acts like an avalanche. Just let that sink in—how powerful, as experience shows, something like an avalanche can be: once it starts somewhere, it keeps going. This is exactly the kind of thing that gains momentum when you act from a positive perspective: Try to study these brochures published by “Kommender Tag” and “Futurum,” and try to foster understanding for such things.

[ 68 ] It is this understanding that the oldest people, in particular, find extraordinarily difficult to grasp. I have seen how older people—I might say—have struggled to grasp the meaning of “the coming day” or “the future,” how they have fallen back again and again, like a cat landing on its feet, into their old economic prejudices—the very ones that swept them into economic decline—and how they cannot find their way out. That is why I believe that a clear understanding truly lives on among our dear fellow students, one that could also have some impact on the older generations. There is no other way for us to move forward. For I can tell you this: Once we have reached a point with regard to these economic institutions where we can take effective action—where, first, we have sufficient resources to act on a grand scale—for only then will it help— and, on the other hand, can overcome the resistance of the proletariat—which is so sharply evident in this very area and which is simply hostile to any economic improvement in the students’ situation—then it will indeed have to be the primary concern of our economic organizations to work economically specifically on behalf of the student body.

[ 69 ] The “problems of the struggle”! Yes, you see, that is the point: the Anthroposophical Society—even though it wasn’t called that in the past—has existed since the beginning of the century, and it has really always worked in a positive way, at least as far as I am concerned. It let its opponents rant and do whatever they wanted. But of course, the opponents then come forward with certain objections. They say, “This was said here, that was said there”—and indeed, “that hasn’t even been refuted.” It is certainly true that it is difficult to get people to understand that the burden of proof actually lies with the one who makes a claim, not with the one against whom it is leveled. And we have truly witnessed, time and again, that peculiar views have emerged precisely among academics—I mean lecturers, professors, pastors, and those who have come from academic circles. Just consider that from, I would say, figures who are venerable to the outside world—though I say this, of course, only in quotation marks: “venerable”—arguments are put forward against anthroposophy, anthroposophists, and so on, which are supported by evidence such that, if one traces these pieces of evidence back to their sources, it is a mockery—a bloody mockery—of every conceivable method by which one might make any kind of claim in science. That is why, in the case of someone like Professor Fuchs, I simply had to say: It is impossible for this man to be anything other than a thoroughly incompetent anatomist! For am I to believe that he examines his subjects conscientiously when, after all that has been presented, he examines my baptismal certificate in the manner in which he did? For one must infer from the way a person handles one field how he handles another. Such things simply reveal—through the fact that people step out of line and display their particular habits—the symptoms of how scientific work is conducted today. Even the ideas put forward today at universities and technical colleges are, when it comes down to it, hardly on a better footing than the claims made in this manner; it is simply that the generally extremely lax habits in academic life are revealed in this way. And that is what is needed: to raise the struggle, so to speak, to a higher level.

[ 70 ] And it is not necessary—as my fellow student, for example, would like, which I understand very well—to present ourselves as a “militant organization.” That is not necessary. Rather, there is only one thing: to avoid what has occurred so frequently in the Anthroposophical Society. In the Anthroposophical Society, this has always come to the fore—as unbelievable as it is—not in everyone, of course, but very frequently: One was compelled to defend oneself against a vicious accusation, even to the point of using harsh words—for example, let’s say in the case where a Mr. von Gleich invents a speaker named “Winter” by reading that I myself have given winter lectures, then invents a “Winter” character, and brings this into the fray in a very nasty way. Yes, you see, I don’t think one would be using overly harsh words in this case if one were to speak of “idiocy”! For here, even if it occurs with a general, we are dealing with genuine idiocy in its purest form. — And in the Anthroposophical Society, it was usually the case that people didn’t blame the one who acted like Mr. v. Gleich, but rather the one who defended himself. Right up to the present day! We’ve heard it said a few times that one mustn’t become aggressive in this way. — To many people, “becoming aggressive” means defending oneself in this way. It is therefore necessary—without emphasizing that we are a militant organization or the like—to keep a watchful eye on things and reject them. You must take a concrete, positive stand in such situations; and then the others must stand behind the one who is compelled to defend themselves. It is not a matter of us becoming fighting cocks ourselves; but it is a matter of ensuring that, should it become necessary to defend ourselves, the others will stand behind us. And it is a matter of truly keeping track of and taking an interest in the manifestations of ideological, scientific, religious, and other such tendencies in this regard in our time.

[ 71 ] Take this particular instance: I was compelled to characterize Count Keyserling’s philosophical—or whatever one might call it—writings—in my opinion, it makes no difference what one calls them—in the appropriate manner, because, in his incredible superficiality, he has gone so far as to claim that I had based my views on Haeckel’s ideas. This is, of course, not merely an objective but, in this case, a subjective untruth—that is, a lie—because one must demand that anyone who makes such a claim consult the sources; and he could have seen the chapter I wrote in the earliest years of my writing career, in my debates with Haeckel, in the introduction to Goethe’s Scientific Writings. You can all read that for yourselves, of course. — Now Count Keyserling has had a short treatise published through his publisher: The Path to Perfection. I do not wish to characterize this work further, but I recommend that one or two of you purchase it and pass it around; for if everyone were to buy it, it would be a waste of money; but I nevertheless recommend that you read it so that you can get an idea of what, so to speak, defies all wisdom in this work, “The Path to Perfection,” by Keyserling. It contains the following sentence, which he cobbled together, more or less as I recall it: Yes, if I said something incorrect in suggesting that Dr. Steiner drew on Haeckel, Dr. Steiner could simply have corrected that; he could have set the record straight with me, because I—and now I ask you to pay very close attention to this sentence—because I have no time for specialized research into Steiner’s sources.

[ 72 ] Well then, you see, we have already reached the point in scientific ethics where someone who founds a “school of wisdom” considers it justified to put things out into the world that he admittedly has no time to research—and which he therefore does not research! Here one catches someone who apparently considers himself distinguished—for Count Keyserling has always invoked omnipotence in his writings—and that is precisely what is so impressive about Count Keyserling: that he always invokes omnipotence. All of today’s writing has reached a point where it is at its most mired and debased. And despite this omnipotence, there is a complete moral debasement of views here. And so people need to be told once and for all: Certainly, no one is demanding that you engage in research into Steiner’s sources; but if you’re not doing that research—if you don’t have the time—then—with regard to all these matters about which you ought to know something: Keep your mouth shut!

[ 73 ] You see, it is essential that we not harbor any illusions, that we simply cast aside any principle of authority—and the like—that has arisen from convention, and that we confront what exists in our time with an open mind, truly, truly examining it. Then we will already be able to notice quite a lot of this today.

[ 74 ] I would certainly advise you to take a look at some of the phrases that the great Germanist Roethe in Berlin keeps repeating from time to time—purely in terms of their form; I will completely set aside the viewpoint behind them, which one can certainly respect. Then you will find them instructive. We do not need to be a militant organization. But we must be ready and vigilant so that, when the things that are truly leading us so horrifically into decline actually arise, we can genuinely take a stand against them. Do we really need to be an organization of anthroposophical students to do that? We simply need to want to be vigilant, decent, and scientifically conscientious people; then we can always—from the most purely personal standpoint—take a stand against such harm. And if, in addition, we are organized for positive work, then the number of those organized for that purpose can stand behind us and support us. We need the latter. But it would by no means be very wise for us to present ourselves as a militant organization. Rather, the point is that we work earnestly to improve our current circumstances. And part of that involves taking note of the terrible injustices that come to light in one area or another—and which really are hard to ignore, since they exist in vast numbers—and having the courage to stand up against them in whatever way we can.

[ 75 ] You have already accomplished something if you can do just this: simply correct the misconceptions of a small number of your fellow students regarding such matters, even if this takes place within the smallest of circles. Yesterday I said to one of our group here regarding the World School Association: I consider it particularly valuable, especially with regard to such matters, to begin by speaking to two or three others—that is, in very small groups—even if there are only two; and, to put it quite radically, if one cannot find anyone else, then let them at least say it to themselves! So these things are certainly such that one can grasp what the individual is capable of. Individuals will be capable of much more, as has in fact already happened with a doctor who was a member, and whose fellow students proved to be very enthusiastic. The point is that we must not make enemies by acting like fighting cocks in a wild manner, but also that we must not shy away from the struggle when the others start it. That is it: we must always let the others start; and then we must have the necessary support behind us that does not allow a certain tactic to take hold—for a very specific tactic has indeed emerged: that we were the ones who started it. If the other side strikes first, then one is compelled to defend oneself; and then you will always read that, from the anthroposophical side, this or that was carried out in the struggle as an attack, and so on. The tables are always turned. That is practically a standard tactic among our opponents. We must not allow that to take hold.

[ 76 ] As far as the World School Association is concerned, I would like to say just one more thing: in my opinion, it would be best if the World School Association could be established simultaneously, independently of one another, in Entente countries and in neutral countries—and, of course, in the German-speaking region of Central Europe as well. If this could happen simultaneously—so that, as it were, things would spring up at the same time yet independently of one another—that would be the very best. Of course, this requires a certain vigilance regarding what is happening. I believe that Switzerland, in particular, would then have to act as a mediator here. It would be good if we could set this in motion right now, at this very moment. I can assure you: things are on a knife’s edge—and if the same conditions for war existed today as they did in 1914, then, then we would have been at war again long ago. In terms of public sentiment and so on, the situation is hanging by a thread. And we couldn’t pull off something like this World School Association if, for example, it were established in Germany now, and then the others had to follow suit—even if only a week later. It simply wouldn’t happen; it would be impractical to do so.

[ 77 ] On the other hand, however, we must by no means allow the impression to arise that we in any way deny our stance on these matters. This School of Spiritual Science is called the Goetheanum. We gave it the name “Goetheanum” here during the World War. The other nations, insofar as they have participated in anthroposophy, have adopted the name and accepted it. We have never denied that we have reasons to call the School of Spiritual Science the “Goetheanum,” and it would therefore not be appropriate if things in Germany were to be presented as some kind of imitation from the other side.

[ 78 ] So it would really be a matter of—forgive the harsh word—not being too clumsy in this regard, of handling it with a bit more skill in the broader sense of world culture! Switzerland would have to work on this with full understanding. So, in fact, it is absolutely essential that Central Europe, the Entente, and the neutral powers all work together to propel this matter forward.

[ 79 ] For now, I don’t yet know whether it will even take off in one or two places. I received word this morning that the committee convened yesterday—which had intended to work so diligently—went to sleep just a few minutes after yesterday’s assembly had left the hall; it has been postponed until tonight. Let’s wait and see for now whether they will meet tonight. We have already had some very strange experiences; and based on this knowledge—that we have already had the most varied experiences—I have now taken the liberty of speaking to you here about the need to take these experiences into account as the movement progresses.

[ 80 ] On the other hand, however, I am convinced that if the necessary strong impetus and the appropriate enthusiasm can be found—particularly among my fellow students—namely for what I myself and some of my friends have mentioned in the course of this class: enthusiasm for the truth—then the endeavor will succeed.

[ 81 ] I’d like to add: I recently read aloud a passage from a feature article, and I can assure you that what happened recently in Stuttgart is by no means the end, but only the beginning, and I can assure you that things will get much, much worse. I have said this to our friends here on several occasions—even a very, very long time ago—and I recently read aloud a passage from a feature article that states: “Intellectual sparks, hissing like lightning after the wooden mousetrap, are certainly abundant, and it will take quite a bit of Steiner’s wisdom to act as a conciliating force, lest one day a real spark bring an inglorious end to the splendor of Dornach.”

[ 82 ] I truly believe that the response required to such an action—which will only grow stronger and stronger—must be better organized and, above all, carried out more vigorously. And I believe that you, my dear fellow students, need to channel all your youthful enthusiasm in this direction—into what we have often referred to here during this course: enthusiasm for the truth. Youthful enthusiasm for the truth has always been a very positive driving force in the further development of humanity. May it, in a cause that you recognize as good, continue to be realized through you in the near future.